From borst@chass.utoronto.ca
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997
From: Christopher Borst
To: Multiple recipients of list PHIL-COUNSEL
Subject: on the practice of philosophy
I was signed on to this list on June 13 of this year, and have since
received some 530 messages. The quantity has often been so great that I
have had to save them unread. Thus, I recently had the opportunity to go
through a very large number of messages dating back to August, and see all
the many, many issues which were raised. It is gratifying to see the sheer
range of concerns expressed. The following is my attempt to formulate a
comprehensive response to all these concerns.
Two intimately linked issues have been the focus of interest,
(1) what is philosophy, and(or) what counts as practice of it?
(2) should we certify (and perhaps even license) those who claim to engage
in such practice, and, if so, what training and other standards would be
appropriate to such certification?
On the one hand, these are the most traditional of questions: what is
philosophy? what is education? who is the philosopher?
On the other hand, these questions are raised in the particular context of
trying to *professionalize* philosophy, i.e., justify being paid to
practice it.
This context is very interesting, since there already exists an obvious
"professional" path in philosophy, i.e., to become a professor. This
debate is extremely useful in so far as it reopens the question, which is
all too often treated as settled, of whether the professor is the only
(or, for that matter, is at all a) "professional" practitioner of
philosophy.
However, this context should not be forgotten, in that it must remain an
open question whether the professionalization of philosophy is desirable -
whether it might even be a blatant contradiction of the very idea and
purpose of philosophy. We cannot forget that the foundational gesture of
the Socratic tradition in philosophy is the rejection of "sophistry", by
which is meant primarily the charging of fees to hear lectures on how to
succeed in life from, and otherwise discourse with, people claiming
expertise in living the good life.
Now, a great many distinctions have been drawn with respect to what is
philosophy and who counts as a practitioner of it. We have been asked to
distinguish between philosophy and:
* psychology (including psychotherapy),
* religion (including pastoral counselling),
* New Age/occult (to which questions of meditation and touch are often
equated, though these issues are also raised by Eastern philosophy),
* sophistry - by which was meant not so much sophistry as defined above,
but what the ancients called "sagehood": the actual possession of wisdom,
rather than the love and pursuit of it,
* philosophizing - sometimes put as 'thinking clearly' v. 'philosophy
proper' - which can also be equated to 'lay' v. 'professional' engagement
with philosophy,
* philosophology - commentary on philosophy rather than philosophy itself,
* punditry, and
* science.
In so far as we practice philosophy, distinctions have been drawn between:
* "counselling" (with a medical/therapeutic model, though we also have
seen distinctions drawn between medicine and healing, and between 'sick'
and 'in need of wisdom'),
* "consulting" (with a legal - or, one might add, a business - model),
* tutoring, coaching, assisting, advising,
* being an "instructor" or "professor",
* free thinking/inquiry, and
* friendship (particularly important, in so far as the context demands
that we justify being paid for our practice).
In so far as we are, undoubtedly, engaged in a process of questioning,
distinctions have been drawn between:
* 'pure' and 'applied' questions,
* 'general/abstract' and 'personal' questions (which could possibly be
equated to the above), and
* public/organizational/policy v. private/personal questions.
Questions have been raised about individual v. group v. (with specific
reference to the classroom) large group, large enough to perhaps even be
called 'mass', philosophical practice.
The question has been raised about the relation between the practitioner
and the other(s) in the relationship - whether that other should be
thought of as a client or a student or as a co-inquirer.
And, in terms of overall goals, we have had references to:
* consistency and thoroughness,
* thinking clearly,
* challenging the 'natural',
* providing 'freedom to think',
* overcoming 'obstacles to the smooth flow of life',
* building the ability to laugh at oneself,
* curing/solving problems,
* personal growth (both for the practitioner and the other), and
* the grandaddy of them all, happiness.
That all of these issues are of direct and immediate concern is perhaps
most easily shown by Schlomit's response to questions about litigation and
insurance - "do a good job, be nice and no one will sue you". Obviously,
we can only "do a good job" if at least WE (though preferably our
clients/students/co-inquirers) have some idea what "doing a good job"
entails! Particularly since it is at least conceivable that (see Timon,
Diogenes, Nietzsche, and the general reaction to Socrates!) "being nice"
is not a part of it.
The writings of Achenbach have been put forward as a complete solution to
all these problems, though that seems unnecessarily limiting in light of
the generality of the issues raised. I certainly get the impression that
few, if any, of us see ourselves as engaged in the business of being The
Disciples of Achenbach. (I, for one, have never read Achenbach, and have
an interest in the non-academic practice of philosophy that arose out of
reading Nietzsche and Greek philosophy.)
Similarly, though more understandably, academics, i.e., University
departments of philosophy, have been put forward as a complete solution to
these problems (e.g., "Since New Age philosophy is not something taught
in University, it does not belong in the list."). This is a solution that
is clearly attractive, and many seem to endorse the 'MA in philosophy'
requirement. Of course, much of that attraction (indeed, I would suggest,
probably very nearly the whole attraction for many/most of us here) may
well be the attraction of a 'new career path for graduating philosophy
majors'.
However, an academic standard raises clear problems:
* what is the quality of thinking that is implied/guaranteed by a degree?,
* does academic training provide the "right" kind of training?,
specifically:
* is some psychology or specific counselling training needed
(and to what extent does practice as a TA meet this need)?,
* is academic training training in philosophy or philosophology?
* what of people without such training who are clearly practicing
philosophy, in some sense, already? (particularly since people obviously
practiced philosophy before there ever were Universities to either hire
professors or qualify "philosophical practitioners").
A further problem is raised by the very context of the debate itself. The
proposal that "philosophical practice" is an open question, and one where
we are quite explicitly saying "professor" is *not* an adequate answer,
seems to undermine the ability of University departments of philosophy,
and University qualifications in philosophy, to serve as an answer.
Lastly, we need to consider what might be called the dialectical
extremities (or contradiction) posed by philosophical practice:
(1) that *no one* is qualified to practice philosophy (which could at
least be taken to imply that anyone and everyone does), and
(2) that, in the same way that not everyone claims to be a carpenter
simply because they've hammered some nails, there clearly is something
that it is to "be a philosopher".
Now, as I've said, it is very gratifying to see all these issues raised.
I'd be inclined to think that, collectively, these define, or come very
close to defining, the whole range of problems with which we must contend
in posing the question of philosophy. And I hope that everyone will see
their own contributions in the above summation.
In summarizing my own view, I will attempt to be brief and programmatic.
Philosophy is the business of building (to make reference to the carpenter
analogy) better human beings. Indeed, it is not inappropriate to say that
it is the business of making us into *human* beings, period.
For that reason, all distinctions of philosophy from "other disciplines"
(notably, from psychology, religion, science, New Age) are bunk. As, very
importantly, is the distinction between philosophy and "philosophizing".
The only distinction which I recognize as valid is the distinction between
philosophy and philosophology (what I call "academicism") - the
distinction between merely talking the talk, and getting out there and
walking the walk.
Philosophy is a *way of life*. The philosopher is the one who *lives
deliberately*. This has traditionally been expressed in such terms as
living "according to reason", "according to virtue", "according to
nature" or, more recently, "as a work of art". This entails that the
philosopher is (or at least seeks to be), in his or her own life,
rigorously and thoroughly consistent in word and in deed. Which is also to
say that being a philosopher is about being rigorously *moral/ethical*.
The true philosopher is the true human being is the truly good person is
the truly happy/satisfied/fulfilled person - which actually amounts to
equating the "true philosopher" with the "sage". That is why it is an act
of arrogance to claim to be a philosopher - but also why we pursue
philosophy and, "true" or only striving to be so, call ourselves
"philosophers".
This rigorous consistency in one's own life, which entails control over
one's words, deeds, emotions, thoughts (such that they are in accordance
with one's style), can only be brought about (in so far as it can!) by
effort - by various sorts of what Pierre Hadot, echoing Ignatius of
Loyola, calls 'spiritual exercises', what Michel Foucault calls
'technologies of the self', and what the Greeks called (this being the
word translated by both the previous phrases) 'askesis'.
Working out 'clear and distinct ideas' (in Descartes' and Spinoza's
formulation, also implied by the work of Wittgenstein) and other sorts of
what Martha Nussbaum (with reference to Hellenistic philosophy) calls
'therapeutic arguments' are central amongst these askeses, but are by no
means sufficient. Physical practices are necessary and, if one includes
the sitting, standing and moving variants, these may perhaps by summarized
as "meditation". Though note that any kind of physical exercise *can*
count, as well as the whole range of ascetic training in difficult
practices (doing without sleep, food, drink, clothing, shelter, sex,
friends, things and comforts generally; seeking pain, humiliation,
poverty, rejection, exposure to heat and to cold; working; accepting (even
soliciting) exploitation, oppression and violence; following a schedule;
seeing death; as well as overeating, overdrinking, oversleeping, following
out every sexual and aggressive proclivity, not working, completely
ignoring time; confronting every instance of exploitation, oppression and
violence; and, in general, doing anything (or even everything) that makes
one fearful and insecure, trying to break one's habits).
As the above will make clear, becoming a philosopher is something that can
*only* be done by you yourself. No one else can do it for/to you. No one
can "make" you a philosopher. Which, of course, also means that you can't
make anyone else a philosopher. However, you *can* try to aid others in
their own efforts. It is precisely this aid which constitutes the essence
of what the Greek philosophers called "friendship" - and what it involved
can be called (with equal validity) "counselling", "consulting",
"tutoring", "teaching", "coaching", "assisting", "advising", and many
other things. It should be noted that, in doing this, you are at once
displaying your own philosophy, and developing yourself in it.
In line with this, it is quite true that no one can ever be properly
"qualified" to "practice philosophy", in so far as by that is meant
actively pursuing to aid others in their self-developmental efforts. Your
expertise is simply your experience of having done already some of the
things which the other still has to do - and what insight, calm and
control that having done them has brought you, within which you can
create a space to enable the other to do what he or she needs to do. Of
course, you will of necessity still have things to do, and it cannot be
excluded that the other may have already done some of those!
It is one's example that is of the greatest benefit to others, rather than
one's beliefs/doctrines/arguments. Arguments are only one means of
self-development amongst others, and (in so far as they are conducted with
others rather than with yourself) are typically the weakest. Beliefs and
doctrines only confuse matters. For this reason, one can serve as example
to an individual or a group, including large groups, even to the general
public (whether through TV, radio, film, newspapers, magazines, the
Internet, etc.). Though one can be of greatest assistance in long-term,
one-on-one interaction.
It also means that, in general, engaging with personal issues is to be
preferred to engaging with organizational/policy issues (development only
happens in individuals), though such issues cannot be ignored (since they
determine the habits which need to be broken!).
In this assistance, it is of only semantic concern whether one speaks of
"curing/healing" another or "providing wisdom". Whether "sick" or "in
need" (of wisdom), the other lacks - faces difficulty. Your task is to
ease this difficulty, that the other may obtain.
In light of all the above, it should be clear that academic training is of
only tangential importance. Particularly academic training in any one
department. Academic training aims to make one a good scholar. That does
not preclude being a philosopher, not at all. However, it by no means
entails it! And, importantly, the lack of even *all* academic training
does not preclude being a philosopher either - though it certainly makes
it no more likely.
To qualify as a philosopher certainly entails training and practice (both
possible translations of askesis), but it is the clarity, control,
flexibility and freedom obtained that are the relevant measure (if one
wished ever to somehow "certify" philosophers, which seems a mug's game
at best), not grades, degrees or publications!
Lastly, I would like to return to the issue which sets the context for
this whole discussion, the issue of professionalization, i.e., *pay*. As
should be clear from the above, particularly the recognition that aiding
others' efforts constitutes what the Greeks called "friendship", actually
charging others, on any kind of set scale, involves one in difficulties.
Why are you so concerned with money? What are you afraid of? These
difficulties may, perhaps, not preclude receiving money from others,
but they need to be faced, and not simply be assumed solved. "That's the
way things work" or "it's awfully difficult without it" are not adequate
answers - why should things work that way? why not do difficult things?
The philosopher does what he or she *wants* to do, not what others
require him or her to do (i.e., is free), and that means the philosopher
does things *for their own sake*. And it is hard to say "I'm doing this
for its own sake," and, at the same time, demand payment. There may be
resolutions to this difficulty, but they are all-too-likely to be
otherwise than the professional's fee schedule, or the insurance company's
or public institution's forms ....
Chris
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Internet: borst@chass.utoronto.ca (Christopher Borst)