Summary of the December 15th meeting of the Hong Kong Philosophy Cafe
Topic: "Does everything happen for a reason?"
Tony began by saying that he prefers not to define "reason"; asking why and
giving reasons are inescapably human activities. He therefore requested that the
discussion focus on whether or not there is an "ultimate reason" for what
happens. He referred to some of the observations and views expressed in Richard
Dawkin's book, *River out of Eden*. Most notably: genes seem just to know what
to do; since everything happens as a result of the blind force of evolution,
nothing is intrinsically good or bad; there are no reasons for anything when we
look at the universe this way. Fundamentalists, by contrast, say God is the
ultimate reason, and often claim to know God's reasons for arranging things as
they are. But if so, Dworkin's work raises the question of whether or not what
happens here is some kind of sadistic game God is playing. While Tony expressed
some attraction to Dworkin's views, he did not want to go so far as to say there
is no moral meaning in the universe.
Much of the initial discussion focused on why "reason" should or should not be
defined. Dworkin's own view seems to identify genes as the "ultimate reason" for
everything. Roy suggested that a more important question is: "Is there a *good*
reason?" Tom pointed out that the Japanese have a custom of asking "why?" five
times before laying an issue to rest. He also noted that in many situations
people seem impelled to *invent* reasons for events that may actually not have
any single or ultimate reason--such as fluctuations in the stock market.
Clifford argued that human intelligence makes us ask "why?".
Jervina then observed that "everything" also needs to be defined. After
mentioning Camus' belief that life is absurd, she asked whether the question at
issue implies that human beings are not in control. After some discussion of
issues such as relativity, Roy claimed that "growing up" often requires us to
realize that there isn't always a reason for what happens. Along these lines,
Clifford noted that many new discoveries are actually quite accidental. Jervina
reiterated that the postmodern world often requires us to face the anxiety of *
not* knowing reasons for what happens.
At several points Steve attempted to clarify and/or sum up the discussion, for
example by distinguishing between "experience" (which is not always, and does
not need to be, based on reasons) and "knowledge" (which always is, and must be,
based on a reason of some sort). He called attention to the fact that the topic
refers to what "happens" (i.e., to *events*) more than to what "is" (i.e., to *
things*). Roy challenged the former distinction on the grounds that Eastern
philosophies often emphasize experience more than knowledge. But Steve said that
only confirms the legitimacy of the distinction. Tom pointed out that babies
inevitably have to learn a knowledge-base in order to be aware of what they are
experiencing. And Steve added that it may be more than a coincidence that a
baby's sense of "I" typically arises and develops at about the same time as his/
her tendency to ask "why?".
Roy then pointed out a serious flaw in Dworkin's argument: he anthropomorphizes
the genes, giving them "intentions" when in fact they have none. Alex responded
that reason or intention *is* in the genes, on Dworkin's view, so that Dworkin's
answer to our question would have to be "yes, there is a reason for everything
(i.e., our genes)." Steve argued that it would be possible to give a "no"
answer, as for example Camus did; but if we take this option, then the
discussion would have to stop. Discussing the issue presupposes that we are
looking for (but have not yet found) a suitable "yes" answer. Ironically, as
Alex then pointed out, Camus' actions did not seem to match his theory, because
he accepted a Nobel Prize for his achievements in literature, thus implying that
in his day-to-day life, he really did see a reason for doing things, such as
writing books. Roy responded that a "no" answer could just indicate that *some*
things are not caused. Always needing a reason for everything often functions as
a psychological prop, he claimed; it is not a logical necessity.
After the break, Steve reminded the group that Tony wanted us to focus on the
issue of an *ultimate* reason--i.e., one reason, or final explanation, that can
function as the basis for everything. Clifford asked why we need to spend time
and effort searching for such a reason, if it's already "there" in the world.
Tony responded by sharing Marcel's theory of the two realms: the "higher" realm
of mysteries and the "lower" realm of known facts. Roy claimed that the realm of
mysteries (as governed by religion) has been gradually decreasing as science and
psychology learn more and more facts about how nature and the human mind work.
But Tom cautioned that many scientific theories are not actually "facts" at all.
The Big Bang, for example, may have never happened. Science presents it as a
fact, but it is actually a mystery. Roy agreed, but opined that "we don't know"
is a better answer than "God did it". Steve added that our ignorance of such
ultimate "reasons" is built in to the reasoning process by its very nature, but
so is our unquenchable desire to *search* for (an) ultimate reason(s): reason
always seeks unification of diversity; but when we raise this to the point of an
absolute union of all diversity, we find (if we're honest) that we cannot
observe or demonstrate the unity (reason) we think we have found. This, he
claimed, is the human situation.
Several alternative views were expressed at this point. Tom told us about the
methods used by Aborigines to find water, suggesting that this can serve as a
model of how human reasoning works. Roy questioned whether they are actually
conscious of their reasons for following such methods. Tom explained that the
point is not with the reasons, but with the fact that their method works in the
real world: they really do find the water, reasons or no reasons. Cecilia then
remarked that humans have a fundamental need to be comforted, and that reasons
give us that comfort. Clifford asked whether it would be better just to "be", to
live without reasoning. But Cecilia said that might make us more like robots
than humans.
We then strayed into a brief but intense debate over whether religion is
concerned more with controlling others or with teaching self-control. After
himself prolonging the discussion, Steve stopped it before any conclusion was
reached, on the grounds that it was too far removed from the topic at hand.
Tony concluded the meeting by suggesting that it would be a good thing for us to
admit that some things may happen without a reason; always searching for a
reason could drive a person crazy.
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