Abstract for the Kant in Asia
International Conference
at Hong Kong Baptist
University
20-23 May 2009
Adriano Naves de Brito,
“Freedom and Value in Kant”
The defence of compatibilism is frequently linked to the argument that without the presupposition of freedom the consequent imputation of responsibility would be compromised. Kant's moral philosophy, for which freedom is a fundamental concept, is referred to by many of those who follow this line of argument, in the hope of finding resources which vindicate it. I first propose to defend the position that, despite the role which freedom plays in Kantian philosophy, his moral theory does not bear out this expedient of giving support to compatibilism. Secondly, for Kant the centrality of freedom to the system of morality is the result of the conception of moral value which underlies his practical philosophy. Finally, I will defend that the imputation of responsibility in Kant does not necessitate the presupposition of freedom, whilst his theory of value does. The topic is central to the debate whether personhood depends or not on freedom.