The present paper, draws on a recent interpretation of Kant's epistemology of testimony (see Gelfert, BJHP, 2006) and develops it as a test case for the robustness of a particular version of Kant's conception of 'public reason'. The guiding idea is that the misuse of communication – in cases such as lying, deception, and gossip – may give rise to 'pathologies of testimony' that, in certain respects, are similar to the irresolvable antinomies and paradoxes that arise from the misuse of reason. In developing this thesis, the talk will also hint at how the analysis of testimonial pathologies can be applied, in a reflexive way, to Kant's own remarks on non-European cultures (including Chinese thought). These remarks – which are themselves often based on questionable testimony – are thought to help clarify the systematic structure of Kant's views on the anthropological dimension of pathologies of testimony.