Abstract for the Kant in Asia
International Conference
at Hong Kong Baptist
University
20-23 May 2009
Robert Greenberg, “A Neglected Proposition of Identity”
The
second sentence in the body of the Critique
of Pure Reason expresses a fundamental proposition of identity that lies at
the heart of Kant’s theory of knowledge. Unfortunately, the proposition has been ignored
by every prominent Anglophone commentator on the Critique.
The proposition is
that the object that is given to us is the same object that affects the mind in
a certain way. Clearly, this object cannot be the thing in itself, since the latter cannot be given to us. My claim is that the object that is here said to affect us cannot be the appearance, either. What, then, is this
identical object?
At bottom, this is the
question of how to interpret Kant’s transcendental idealism, and so my answer
to the question will also suggest a new interpretation of Kant’s idealism.