Abstract for the Kant in Asia International Conference

at Hong Kong Baptist University

20-23 May 2009

Natascha Gruber, “When is a Person a Person – When does the ‘Person’ begin?”

Among the most polarized ethical disputes within current human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) is whether embryos should be treated as potential persons, or as mere biological cell material, appropriately used for research. Opponents of hESCR stress Kant’s definition of human dignity, which prohibits treating a person as means to an end. That embryos bear the potential of personhood is enough for them to call for an end of hESCR. However, proponents also draw on Kant’s philosophy to find arguments in favor of hESCR. They emphasize that Kant’s notion of personhood does not refer to humans as a biological species, but is rather linked to the faculty of reason, of free will and autonomy. Highlighting the difference between biological facts and events and the metaphysical definition of personhood constituted by the faculty of reason, this paper examines where the line is to be drawn: when and where does the “person” begin?

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