Abstract for the Kant in Asia
International Conference
at Hong Kong Baptist
University
20-23 May 2009
Soraj Hongladarom,
“Kant and Vasubandhu
on the 'Transcendent Self'”
Kant
and Vasubandhu apparently make the same distinction
between the empirical self and what might be called the ‘transcendent' self.
The key question is how similar or how different these two conceptions are. The
well known passage where Kant mentions that the ‘I think' must be able to
accompany all my representations, points to the fact that there must be an
overarching conception of a self that binds up the various representations into
a single whole so that judgment is possible. Among these various representations
are conceptions of the empirical selves, the uses of ‘I' in various
circumstances. I will compare and contrast Kant's argument here with that found
in Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikakārikā,
where the same kind of distinction between the ‘ordinary' self and the
ineffable ‘substantial' self is being made.