Abstract for the Kant in Asia International Conference

at Hong Kong Baptist University

20-23 May 2009

Li Hon-lam, “Kant’s ‘Mere Means’ Principle & General Deterrence”

Certain practices (such as punishment for the sake of general deterrence) seem to be wrong because they violate Kant’s principle that we should not use people merely as a means (“mere means” principle). However, such practices would seem to be justified, if (1) parties behind a “veil of ignorance” would hypothetically consent to them, (2) the parties have actually consented to them, and (3) each party can rely on the other parties to honor their contractual obligation once the veil of ignorance is lifted. I argue that Kant himself would have no good reason to object to practices that fulfill these conditions. So, if my argument is correct, we have the interesting result that Kant should not object to such practices, as well as the conflicting result that Kant should object to them (because they seem to violate his “mere means” principle).

Back to the Final Programme Schedule