Abstract for the Kant in Asia
International Conference
at Hong Kong Baptist
University
20-23 May 2009
Douglas R. McGaughey,
“The Unity of Personhood and Freedom”
Already
in the “pre-critical” Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie (1774), Kant locates the dignity of
every individual in the capacity to initiate a sequence of events that nature
cannot accomplish on its own. He
calls this capacity “freedom,” which is not to be confused with “liberty.” According to Kant, both freedom and the
soul (personhood) are dependent upon an understanding of the self as a unified
totality. Morality, then, is not
based in one’s prior knowledge of moral principles. Rather, it is grounded in the fact that
we cannot not act because any
knowledge we might acquire is concerned with the conditions of possibility for
our action. The authority of the
moral law is not established in advance by relative cultural contexts or
revelation from God. The authority
of the moral law is ultimately established categorically at the moment of
self-legislation. Without the unity
of personhood and freedom, we cannot be(come) human.