Abstract for the Kant in Asia International Conference

at Hong Kong Baptist University

20-23 May 2009

Pong Wen-berng, Mou Zongsan's critique of theory of self-consciousness in Kant's first Critique

In Critique of Pure Reason Kant claimed that the principle of transcendental apperception is the highest principle of human knowledge (B136). Kant argued in both editions of First Critique (1781/1787) the same claim in two different presentations, both of which were disputed in many different ways in the history of philosophy. One of the famous critique of this theory in the Chinese speaking world was offered by Mou Zongsan(1919-1995). His critiques are based mostly on the Chinese traditional Confucianism that was articulated in Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (1971) and Appearance and Thing-in-itself (1975). In this paper I will try to summarize Mou’s main arguments in both writings and answer the following three different problems:

 

(1) Did Mou Zongsan understand Kant right?

(2) What is his main critique of Kant?

(3) Can his critique philosophically be justified?

 

My intention in this study is to find out a connecting point between eastern and western philosophy.

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