Abstract for the Kant in Asia
International Conference
at Hong Kong Baptist
University
20-23 May 2009
Cynthia Schossberger,
“Human Persons in Kant's Realm of Ends”
Much
traditional dissatisfaction with Kantian moral theory rests on the idea that
only a pure will, i.e., one that is solely or perfectly rational, is sufficient
to the ideal of morality; but Kant is clear that human persons, which are
rational beings embodied, “belong to the intelligible world,” wherein lies the
Realm of Ends (G452). I take the conclusion of one of the examples in the
Groundwork—-the often neglected example of cultivating one’s talents—and argue
that the “human capacities for greater perfection” discussed there can give us
greater insight into the fact that Kant grants human agents the status of
personhood, despite our obvious rational shortcomings. Understanding human reason in this way,
I argue, can provide a clearer understanding of what exactly Kant is
envisioning when he talks of a harmonious coexistence of rational wills as “a
systematic union of beings under common laws” (G433)—Kant’s definition of the
moral ideal of the Realm of Ends.