Abstract for the Kant in Asia International Conference

at Hong Kong Baptist University

20-23 May 2009

Makoto Suzuki, “Respect for Persons as the Unifying Moral Ideal”

As David Ross points out, there seem to be various duties, such as duties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and nonmaleficence.[1] What makes all of commonsensical duties moral and, if they are true duties, explains why they are true? Robert Audi and Mark Timmons suggest that the intrinsic end formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative—respect for persons as ends—is such a unifying ideal that renders commonsensical duties “intelligible and even expectable.”[2] I argue that respect for persons can neither ground nor even unify commonsensical moral duties. If respect for persons is given a specific Kantian meaning, some commonsensical duties are not shown to be moral and true. If respect for persons is given a more broad and intuitive understanding, the ideal becomes too thin to explain why any commonsensical duty is moral and true.

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[1] Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2] Audi, Robert. 1997. “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics.” In his Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. New York: Oxford University Press, 48; Audi, Robert. 2001. ‘A Kantian Intuitionism.’ Mind 110 (439), especially 618 (Reprinted as Chapter 3 of his The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press. 2004); and Timmons, Mark. 2002. Moral Theory: An Introduction. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 203-204.