This
Glossary briefly defines the most important technical terms used in The Tree of Philosophy. Where relevant, opposite terms are given in
parentheses at the end of the definition. Words defined herein (including
slight variations) appear in italics the first time they are used in
the definition of some other word in either section of this Glossary. An
asterisk (*) is appended to any italicized word that is defined in the other
section. The first section defines terms used mainly by Kant. The second
section defines other technical terms as they are used in this text, usually
naming the philosopher(s) who used them in the specified way(s).
a posteriori: a way of gaining knowledge
by appealing to some particular experience(s). Kant used this
method to establish empirical and hypothetical
truths*.
(Cf. a priori.)
a priori: a way of gaining knowledge
without appealing to any particular experience(s). Kant used this
method to establish transcendental and logical truths*.
(Cf. a posteriori.)
aesthetic: having to do with sense-perception.
In Kant's first Critique this word refers to space and time
as the necessary conditions for sense-perception. The first half of his third Critique
examines the subjective purposiveness
in our perception of beautiful or sublime objects
in
order to construct a system of aesthetic judgment. For example, he
defined beauty* in terms of four basic principles: subjective
universality, disinterested delight, purposiveness without
a purpose, and necessary delight.(Cf. teleological.)
analysis: division of a representation
into two opposing representations, with a view toward clarifying
the original representation. Philosophy* as metaphysics
employs analysis more than synthesis. (Cf. synthesis.)
analytic: a statement or an
item of knowledge that is true solely because of
its conformity to some logical laws. "All bachelors are
unmarried" is a typical analytic proposition*. (Cf. synthetic.)
anarchy: a politicalsystem having "no ruling power"
("an" and "arche" in Greek) and
serving as the basis for many versions of utopian visions.
appearance: an object
of experience, when viewed from the transcendental
perspective. Though often used as a synonym
for phenomenon, it technically refers to an
object considered to be conditioned by space
and time,
but not by the categories. See also appearance*.
(Cf. thing in itself.)
architectonic: the logical
structure given by reason (especially through the use of twofold and threefold
divisions), which the philosopher should use as a plan to organize the contents
of any system.
autonomy: the principle of
self-legislation, whereby the subject freely chooses his or
her own ends by imposing the moral law onto the will.
An action must be autonomous in order to be moral. (Cf. heteronomy.)
belief: holding something to
be true on the basis of subjective certainty, even
though objective certainty is lacking. See also faith.
(Cf. knowledge.)
categorical imperative: a command expressing
a general, unavoidable requirement of the moral
law.
Its three formulations convey the requirements of universalizability,
respect and autonomy. Together they establish that an
action is properly called "morally good*" only if (1) we
can will all persons to do it, (2) it enables us to treat
other persons as ends and not merely as the means to our own selfish ends, and
(3) it allows us to see other persons as mutual law-makers in an ideal
"kingdom of ends".
categories: the most general concepts,
in terms of which every object must be viewed in order for it to become an object
of empirical knowledge. The four main categories
(quantity, quality, relation, and modality) each have three sub-categories,
forming a typical example of a twelvefold, architectonic pattern. (Cf. space and time.)
concept: the active species
of representation, by means of which our understanding
enables us to think. By requiring perceptions to conform to the categories,
concepts serve as "rules" allowing us to perceive general relations
between representations. (Cf. intuition.)
conscience: the faculty
of the human subject that enforces the moral law
in a particular way for each individual by providing an awareness of what is
right and wrong in each situation.
Copernican revolution: in astronomy, the
theory that the earth revolves around the sun; in philosophy*, the (analogous)
theory that the subject of knowledge does not remain at
rest, but revolves around (i.e., actively determines certain aspects of) the object.
Thus, the formal characteristics of the empirical world (i.e., space and time
and the categories) are there only because the subject's
mind puts them there, transcendentally.
Critical: Kant's philosophical*
method, distinguishing between different perspectives and then using such
distinctions to settle otherwise irresolvable disputes. The Critical approach
is not primarily negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate quarrels by showing
how both sides have a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly
understood. Kant's system of Critical philosophy examines the structure and
limitations of reason itself, in order to prepare a secure foundation for
metaphysics. .
Critique: to use the Critical
approach to doing philosophy*. This term appears in the
titles of the three main books in Kant's Critical philosophy, which adopt the theoretical,
practical and judicial standpoints,
respectively.
disposition: the tendency a
person has in any given situation to act either good* or bad (i.e., to
obey the moral law or to disobey it). (Cf. predisposition.)
duty: an action that we
are obligated to perform out of respect for the moral
law.
empirical: one of Kant's four
main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge
that is both synthetic and a
posteriori.
Most of the knowledge we gain through ordinary experience, or through science*,
is empirical. "This table is brown" is a typical empirical statement.
(Cf. transcendental).
experience: the combination of
an intuition with a concept
in the form of a judgment.
"Experience" in this (mediate) sense is a synonym for "empirical knowledge".
The phrase "possible experience" refers to a representation
that is presented to our sensibility through intuition, but is not yet
known, because it has not been presented to our understanding through concepts.
"Experience" in this (immediate) sense contrasts with
"knowledge".
faculty: a fundamental power
of human subjects to do something or perform some rational
function.
faith: in the first Critique,
a synonym of belief. Kant encouraged a more humble approach to philosophy*
by claiming to deny knowledge in order to make room for
faith-i.e., by distinguishing between what we can know empirically
and what is transcendent, which we can approach only by
means of faith. "Practical faith" refers to the
conviction that God will reward those who adopt a good* disposition.
"Rational faith" is Kant's term for pure
(moral) religion, in contrast to "historical
faith", which refers to the extra-rational tradition that attempts to
explain what we cannot understand by reason alone.
formal: the active or subjective
aspect of something-that is, the aspect that is based on the rational
activity of the subject. (Cf. material.)
heteronomy: the principle of
letting something other than the moral law determine what ought
to be done. This replaces freedom with something outside of practical reason,
such as a person's inclinations. Such actions on their own are nonmoral-i.e., neither moral nor immoral-but can be immoral
if they prevent a person from doing their duty. (Cf. autonomy.)
hypothetical: one of Kant's four
main perspectives, aiming to establish knowledge
that is both analytic and a
posteriori-though
Kant himself wrongly identified it as synthetic and a priori.
Most metaphysical ideas are properly viewed
from this perspective, instead of from the speculative perspective of
traditional metaphysics. (Cf. logical).
ideas: the species of representation
that gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special concepts
that arise out of our knowledge of the empirical
world, yet seem to point beyond nature to some transcendent realm. The three most
important metaphysical ideas are God, freedom and immortality.
ideology: an idea
or system* of ideas that is treated as a myth
to live by and often forced onto others who may not otherwise accept it as true.
imagination: the faculty
which, when controlled by the understanding, makes concepts
out of intuitions and synthesizes intuitions with
concepts to produce objects that are ready to be judged. In aesthetic judgment,
by contrast, imagination takes control over the power of thinking. See also imagination*.
inclination: the faculty
or object that motivates a person to act in a heteronomous way. Following inclinations is
neither morally good* nor morally bad, except when doing so directly
prevents a person from acting according to duty-i.e., only when
choosing to obey an inclination results in disobedience to the moral law.
intuition: the passive species
of representation, by means of which our sensibility
enables to have sensations. By requiring appearances to be given in space and time,
intuitions allow us to perceive particular relations between representations,
thereby limiting empirical knowledge to the sensible
realm. (Cf. concept.)
judgment: in the first Critique,
the use of the understanding by which an object
is determined to be empirically real, through a synthesis
of intuitions and concepts. The third Critique
(adopting the judicial standpoint) examines the form
of our feelings of pleasure and displeasure in order to construct a system
based on the faculty of judgment in its aesthetic
and teleological manifestations.
judicial: one of Kant's three
main standpoints, relating primarily to experience-i.e., to what we feel, as
opposed to what we know or desire to do. Judicial reason is virtually
synonymous with "Critique" itself, and is concerned
with questions about our deepest ways of experiencing the world. Finding
the source of two examples of such experiences is the task of the third Critique.
(Cf. theoretical and practical.)
knowledge: the final goal of
the understanding in combining intuitions
and concepts. If they are pure,
the knowledge will be transcendental; if they are impure, the
knowledge will be empirical. The certainty produced must be objective
as well as subjective. In a looser sense,
"knowledge" also refers to what arises out of adopting any legitimate
perspective. (Cf. belief.)
logical: one of Kant's four
main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge
that is both analytic and a
priori.
It is concerned with nothing but the relationships between concepts.
The law of noncontradiction (A≠-A) is the fundamental
law of traditional, Aristotelian or analytic logic*.
Synthetic logic* is based on the opposite, the
law of contradiction (A=-A). (Cf. hypothetical.)
material: the passive or objective
aspect of something-that is, the aspect that is based on the experience
a subject has, or on the objects
given in such an experience. (Cf. formal.)
maxim: the material
rule or principle used to guide a person in a particular situation about what
to do (e.g., "I should never tell a lie"). It thus provides a kind of
bridge between a person's inner disposition and outer actions.
metaphysics: the highest aspect
of philosophy*, attempting to gain knowledge
of the ideas. Because the traditional, speculative perspective fails to succeed in this task, Kant suggests a new,
hypothetical perspective for metaphysics.
Metaphysics can succeed only when it is preceded by Critique. See also metaphysics*.
moral law: the one
"fact" of practical reason that is present in
every rational person, though some people are
more aware of it than others. The moral law, in essence, is our knowledge
of the difference between good* and evil, and our inner conviction that we ought
to do what is good. See also categorical imperative.
noumena/noumenal: objects
viewed as having transcendent reality. Also the realm consisting of
such objects. (Cf. phenomena/phenomenal.)
object: a general term for
any "thing" that is conditioned by the subject's
representation,
and so is capable of being known. The thing
in itself
is a thing that cannot become an object of human knowledge. (Cf. subject.)
objective: related more to the object
or representation out of which knowledge
is constructed than to the subject possessing the knowledge.
Considered transcendentally, objective knowledge is less
certain than subjective knowledge; considered empirically,
objective knowledge is more certain. (Cf. subjective.)
opinion: holding something to
be true even though both objective and subjective
certainty are lacking. (Cf. ignorance*.)
perspective: Kant himself did not
use this word, but he used a number of other, equivalent expressions, such as standpoint,
way of thinking, employment of understanding, etc. The main Critical
perspectives are the transcendental, empirical, logical,
and hypothetical. See also perspective*.
phenomena/phenomenal: objects
of knowledge, viewed empirically,
in their fully knowable state-i.e., conditioned by space
and time
and the categories. Also the realm consisting of
such objects. See also appearance. (Cf. noumena/noumenal.)
practical: one of Kant's three
main standpoints, relating primarily to
action-i.e., to what we desire to do as opposed to what we know or feel.
Finding the sources of such action is the task of the second Critique.
Practical reason is a synonym for will; both terms relate to
issues concerning morality. (Cf. theoretical and judicial.)
predisposition: the natural tendency
a person has, apart from (or before having) any experience, to be morally good*
or evil. (Cf. disposition.)
pure: not mixed with
anything sensible. Although its proper opposite is
"impure", Kant normally opposes "pure" to "empirical".
rational: grounded in the faculty
of reason rather than in sensibility.
reality/real: if regarded from the
empirical perspective, this refers to the
ordinary world of nature, or to an object in it; if regarded
from the transcendental perspective, it refers to the transcendent
realm consisting of noumena.
reason: in the first Critique,
the highest faculty of the human subject,
to which all other faculties are subordinated. It abstracts completely from the
conditions of sensibility and has a predetermined architectonic form.
The second Critique (adopting the practical standpoint)
examines the form of our desires in order to construct a system
based on the faculty of reason. Reason's primary function is practical;
though interpreters have often regarded its theoretical function as primary,
Kant viewed the latter as being subordinate.
religion: the way of acting,
or perspective, whereby we interpret all our duties
as divine commands.
representation: the most general
word for an object at any stage in its determination by the subject,
or for the subjective act of determining the object at
that level. The main types of representations are intuitions, concepts,
and ideas.
sensibility: the faculty
concerned with passively receiving objects. This is accomplished
through physical and mental sensations, via "outer sense" and
"inner sense", respectively. However, such sensations are possible
only if the objects are intuited, and intuition presupposes space and time
to exist as pure formal conditions. (Cf. understanding.)
sensible: presented to the subject
by means of sensibility. Contrasts with "intelligible",
a term roughly equivalent to supersensible and transcendent.
space and time: considered from the empirical
perspective, they constitute the context in
which objects interact outside of us;
considered from the transcendental perspective, they are pure,
so they exist inside of us as conditions of knowledge. (Cf. categories.)
speculative: the illusory perspective
adopted in traditional metaphysics by wrongly using reason
in a hopeless attempt to gain knowledge about something transcendent.
Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of theoretical.
standpoint: the special type of perspective
that determines the point from which a whole system of perspectives is
viewed. The main Critical standpoints are the theoretical,
practical, and judicial.
subject: a general term for
any rational person who is capable of having knowledge.
See also representation. (Cf. object.)
subjective: related more to the subject
than to the object or representation out of which knowledge
is constructed. Considered transcendentally, subjective knowledge is more
certain than objective knowledge; considered empirically,
subjective knowledge is less certain. (Cf. objective.)
summum bonum: Latin for highest good*.
This is the ultimate goal of the moral system presented in the
second Critique; it involves the ideal distribution
of happiness in exact proportion to each person's virtue. To conceive of its
possibility, we must postulate the existence* of God and human
immortality, thus giving practical reality to these ideas.
supersensible: see transcendent.
synthesis: integration of two
opposing representations into one new representation,
with a view toward constructing a new level of the object's reality.
Philosophy* as Critique employs synthesis
more than analysis. On the operation of synthesis
in the first Critique, see imagination. (Cf. analysis.)
synthetic: a statement or item
of knowledge that is known to be true because
of its connection with some intuition. "The cat is on
the mat" is a typical synthetic proposition*. (Cf. analytic.)
system: a set of basic facts
or arguments, called "elements", arranged according to the order of
their logical relationships, as determined by
the architectonic patterns of reason.
Kant's Critical philosophy* is a System made up
of three subordinate systems, each defined by a distinct standpoint,
and each made up of the same four perspectives. The System's overall
Perspective is determined by Kant's Copernican
revolution.
teleological: having to do with
purposes or ends. The second half of the third Critique examines the objective
purposiveness in our perception of natural organisms
in order to construct a system of teleological
judgment.
(Cf. aesthetic.)
theoretical: one of Kant's three
main standpoints, relating primarily to
cognition-i.e., to what we know as opposed to what we feel or desire to do.
Theoretical reason is concerned with questions about our knowledge
of the ordinary world (the world science* seeks to
understand). Finding the source of such knowledge is the task of the first Critique,
which would best be entitled the Critique of Pure
Theoretical Reason.
See also speculative. (Cf. practical
and judicial.)
thing in itself: an object
considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions
under which a subject can gain knowledge
of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used
loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)
time: see space and time.
transcendent: the realm of thought
that lies beyond the boundary of possible knowledge, because it consists
of objects that cannot be presented to us
in intuition-i.e., objects we can never experience
with our senses (sometimes called noumena).
The closest we can come to gaining knowledge of the transcendent realm is to
think about it by means of ideas. The opposite of "transcendent" is
"immanent".
transcendental: one of Kant's four
main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge
that is both synthetic and a
priori.
It is a special type of philosophical knowledge, concerned with the necessary
conditions for the possibility of experience. However, Kant
believed all knowing subjects assume certain transcendental truths*,
whether or not they are aware of it. Transcendental knowledge defines the
boundary between empirical knowledge and speculation
about the transcendent realm. "Every event has a
cause" is a typical transcendental proposition*. (Cf. empirical.)
transcendental argument: Kant's special
method of proof by reference to the possibility of experience; it claims that
something (e.g., the categories) must be true because if it were
not true, experience itself would be impossible.
understanding: in the first Critique,
the faculty concerned with actively
producing knowledge by means of concepts.
This is quite similar to what is normally called the mind. It gives rise to the
logical perspective, enabling us to compare concepts
with each other, and to the empirical perspective (where it is also
called judgment), enabling us to combine
concepts with intuitions in order to produce empirical
knowledge. The first Critique (adopting the theoretical
standpoint) examines the form
of our cognitions in order to construct a system based on the faculty
of understanding. (Cf. sensibility.)
will: the manifestation of
reason as viewed from the practical standpoint,
including but not limited to the faculty of choice.
2LAR: see second level analytic relation.
analytic logic: the type of logic
based on the laws of identity (A=A) and noncontradiction
(A≠-A). (Cf. synthetic logic.)
analytic method: see deduction.
angst: the Danish word for
anxiety or dread. Kierkegaard used this term to refer to a special kind of existential
fear, involving a person's fear of non-being. It therefore includes not only a
fear of death, but a fear of the meaninglessness of life.
appearance: Plato's term for an object*
or event in the material world, indicating it is an illusory reflection of an
ultimate reality* in the world of forms. See also
appearance*.
Apollonian: Nietzsche's term for
the type of person who is willing to sacrifice personal greatness in order to
follow traditional (life-denying) moral and political norms. Following a
"slave" morality and a "herd" mentality, they tend to be
conscious, rational, and calm in their actions, and democratic in their politics.
(Cf. Dionysian.)
aristocracy: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein a few of the "best" ("aristos" in Greek) people have the power and authority
to rule. (Cf. oligarchy.)
beauty: one of the three
aims of the philosophical quest, as conceived by Plato and
many subsequent philosophers. It corresponds to the heart and is powered by the
spirit. See also aesthetic*.
being-itself: the term used by
Tillich and other existentialists to refer to the ultimate reality*
from which existing things stand out; also referred to as "the Ground of
Being" or "God".
compound relations: the term used in Palmquist's geometry of logic to refer to any logical
relation that combines an analytic* (twofold) and a synthetic*
(threefold) relation. The most significant type is twelvefold (12CR), combining
a second-level analytic relation with a simple
synthetic relation. Kant's table of categories* is a typical example
of a 12CR.
deconstructionism: a literary and
philosophical movement in the late twentieth century inspired largely by
Derrida and based on the conviction that supposedly absolute foundations for knowledge*
or truth are actually tools of oppression that need to be
replaced by a more playful approach to interpreting the meaning
of spoken and written language.
deduction: Euclid's analytic method
of arguing that defends a predetermined conclusion by showing how it
necessarily follows from two or more "premises" (i.e., propositions
that are assumed to be true). Aristotle demonstrated that if the premises are
accepted and if the deduction is constructed properly, without any fallacies,
then the conclusion is certain. (Cf. induction).
democracy: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein the "common" ("demos"
in Greek) people have the power and authority to rule. He calls it the
"least bad" of the three bad types of political systems. (Cf. polity.)
demythologizing: the process of
questioning a myth in order to distinguish between aspects that are
worth believing and aspects that should be given
up as meaningless.
dialogue: Plato's method of philosophizing,
whereby two or more persons discuss various philosophical questions, in the
hope that reason will lead them to the truth.
Dionysian: Nietzsche's term for
the type of person who is more concerned about personal greatness and other
life-affirming values than about following traditional moral and political
norms. Following a "master" morality and a "hero"
mentality, they tend to be unconscious, irrational, and passionate in their
actions, and aristocratic in their politics. (Cf. Apollonian.)
ecclesiocracy: Palmquist's term for the
worst kind of political system*, wherein leaders believe God directs the people
solely through their mediation and/or church structures are imposed onto the
secular political realm. Following this system requires people to give up their
God-given freedom in exchange for the presumed right to claim salvation. (Cf. theocracy.)
empiricism: the approach to philosophy
that regards sense* experience* and observation as
the fundamental means of finding philosophical truth. Empiricists usually
tend to mistrust evidence based solely on logical argumentation. Hume
is a typical example of an empiricist. (Cf. rationalism.)
epistemology: the branch of philosophy
dealing with questions about the origin and nature of knowledge*.
One of its most fundamental questions is: "How do we come to know
something that we do not already know?" Since Descartes, most philosophers
have thought one's epistemology determines one's metaphysics, rather than vice
versa.
existence: Tillich's term for
the quality of "standing out" ("ex-sistere"
in Latin) from being-itself. Also Palmquist's
term for the common factor uniting metaphysics and science
through the application of ignorance and knowledge*, respectively. (Cf. meaning.)
existentialism: the major school of
twentieth century western philosophy inspired largely by Heidegger
and based on the conviction that discovering the meaning of human existence
is philosophy's main role. This is typically accomplished by means of analogical
reasoning, based on the fundamental distinction between existing things and being-itself
and/or nothing. (Cf. hermeneutics and linguistic
analysis.)
fallacy: a mistake in the formal*
structure of an argument used to draw a conclusion based on some evidence. A
fallacious argument may appear to prove something that is not actually true.
Aristotle was the first to give a systematic* account of the
various types of logical* fallacies.
geometry of logic, the: Palmquist's
method of mapping logical relations onto simple
geometrical figures. The simplest analytic* relations are
twofold while the simplest synthetic* relations as threefold; these
are best mapped onto the endpoints of a line and a triangle, respectively. See
also compound relations and second-level
analytic relations.
goodness: according to Plato
and many subsequent philosophers, one of the three aims of the philosophical
quest. It corresponds to the belly and is powered by appetite.
hermeneutics: the major school of
twentieth century western philosophy inspired largely by Gadamer and based on the conviction that grasping the art
of meaningful interpretation is philosophy's
main role. This is typically accomplished by reflecting on the nature of
texts-e.g., by focusing on the fundamental interplay between the author's
intentions and the reader's prejudices. (Cf. existentialism and linguistic analysis.)
idealism: the metaphysical
position inspired largely by Plato and based on the conviction that the objects*
we perceive in the external world are not ultimately real, but are
"shadows" or appearances of a higher or deeper reality*.
ignorance: the goal of metaphysics,
serving as the door to all good philosophical thinking. Kant distinguished
between necessary (i.e., unavoidable) ignorance and empirical* ignorance that can
be transformed into knowledge* once we recognize that it
exists. (Cf. opinion*.)
imagination: the power of the
mind that is typically most active in a person's childhood and reaches its
highest expression in myth. See also imagination*.
induction: Euclid's synthetic method
of arguing that draws a conclusion based on evidence collected from experience*.
Hume argued that induction always involves some guesswork, so it can never
suffice to provide absolute certainty that its conclusion is true. (Cf. deduction.)
insight: the
"fruit" of the tree of philosophy; a creative new
thought that comes to a person suddenly and often unexpectedly, providing a
deeper understanding* of some issue or a way of
answering a previously unanswered question. Insights often provide a new perspective
that enables us to break through old, traditional ways of thinking. To be sure
they are more than mere opinions*. we should subject our insights
to thorough analysis*.
kingship: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein one good person holds all the
power and authority. (Cf. tyranny.)
language-game: Wittgenstein's term
for the different socially-constructed contexts that give meaning
to the way people use words in specific situations. For example, a word such as
"spirit" will have one meaning and follow one set of
rules if it appears in a religious context, but may take on a completely new
meaning, with different rules, if it appears in a conversation between two fans
at a sports event.
lateral thinking: de Bono's term for a way of thinking that runs counter to the
ordinary or accepted ("horizontal") way of thinking about a given
problem or situation . By looking at a familiar situation from a new perspective,
we can gain interesting new insights about how best to proceed.
linguistic analysis: the major school of
twentieth century western philosophy inspired largely by Wittgenstein
and based on the conviction that clarifying concepts* is philosophy's main
role. This is typically accomplished by means of logical* analysis*
of key propositions, or by showing how most
philosophical problems arise out of a misuse of the way words are used in
ordinary language. (Cf. existentialism and hermeneutics.)
logic: the systematic*
study of the structures that enable words to be understood. The main question
of logic is: "What gives words and propositions their meaning?"
See also logical*.
meaning: Palmquist's
term for the common factor uniting logic and ontology
through the processes of understanding* words and silent wonder,
respectively. Frege argued that a proposition
has meaning only if it has both a "sense" and a
"reference". (Cf. existence.)
metaphysics: Aristotle's term for
the area of philosophy that is "after" or
"beyond" physics. Its main question is "What is ultimate reality*?"
Socrates and Kant both thought the proper outcome of studying metaphysics is
negative: to enable us to recognize our ignorance. See also metaphysics*.
myth: Eliade's
term for a belief* that is held to be absolutely true.
Palmquist's term for any unquestioned belief that a
person holds with deep conviction. (Cf. science.)
numen/numinous: Otto's terms for the
mysterious object* that causes a religious* experience*
to happen. He argued that a numinous experience typically involves the same set
of five elements, regardless of one's religious tradition: awe, majesty,
urgency, mystery (or "otherness"), and fascination.
oligarchy: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein only "a few" ("oligos" in Greek) wealthy people hold all the power
and authority. (Cf. aristocracy.)
ontology: the study of being,
aiming to promote silent wonder of the mystery of human existence.
One of the four main aspects of philosophy, investigating the
essential nature of various kinds of human experience*.
paradox: a meaningful
contradiction, used intentionally by philosophers such as Chuang Tzu and Hegel
in order to stimulate insight into various aspects of transcendent*
reality*. Synthetic
logic
can also be called the "logic of paradox".
perspective: Palmquist's
term for a way of thinking about or dealing with an issue or problem, or a set
of assumptions adopted when viewing an object*. Knowing which
perspective is assumed is important because the same question can have
different answers if different perspectives are assumed. See also perspective*.
philosophy: the Greek term for
love of wisdom. It is a product of human understanding*
whose four main aspects are metaphysics, logic, science,
and ontology. One distinctive feature of
philosophy is that it is self-defining: it is the only discipline wherein
asking the question "What is this discipline?" is part of the
discipline itself.
poetry: a product of
passionate human creativity (or "making") that provides a cultural
link between mythical and philosophical ways of thinking.
polity: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein the middle class holds the power and
authority to govern. In the version called "timocracy",
only landowners are eligible to vote. (Cf. democracy.)
proposition: a sentence or set of
words that expresses a meaningful content.
rationalism: the approach to philosophy
that regards logic and rational* argument as the
fundamental means of finding philosophical truth. Rationalists usually
tend to mistrust evidence based solely on the senses*. Descartes is a
typical example of a rationalist. (Cf. empiricism.)
realism: the metaphysical
position inspired largely by Aristotle and based on the conviction that the objects*
we perceive in the external world are ultimately real.
republic: Plato's term for a
political system* wherein a philosopher serves as king, who wisely
distributes the power and authority to a trusted body of advisers and
representatives.
science: a product of human judgment;
derived from "sciens", Latin for
"knowing". Viewed in this broad sense, it is one of the four main
aspects of philosophy, aiming to determine the transcendental*
boundary between knowledge* and ignorance in various fields.
Viewed more narrowly, as empirical* or natural science, it is the
discipline that attempts to transcend philosophy by ignoring all myth,
yet paradoxically ends up creating one of the
greatest modern myths.
second-level analytic
relation (2LAR):
the most widely used term in Palmquist's geometry of logic,
referring to any set of four concepts* that can be derived
by relating two sets of opposites to each other. A 2LAR is most often mapped
onto the four poles (or the four quadrants) of a cross, though the corners of a
square can also be used.
self-reference, the
problem of:
a paradox that arises by applying a
certain type of proposition to itself. For example,
"This sentence is false" makes sense if it refers to some other
proposition; but if it refers to itself, it produces a logically impossible
situation.
skepticism: a metaphysical
position that calls into question the human capacity to obtain knowledge*,
expressed in its most influential form by Hume.
spirit: together with mind
and body, one of the three traditional aspects of human nature. Kierkegaard
regarded the human spirit as the paradoxical key to both human
sinfulness and genuine religious faith*.
symbol: Tillich's term for
an empirical* object* that points beyond
itself to a transcendent* object and somehow participates
in the reality* of that more real object.
synthetic logic: the type of logic
based on the laws of nonidentity (A≠A) and contradiction (A=-A). (Cf. analytic logic.)
synthetic method: see induction.
theocracy: Palmquist's
term for a non-political political system*, wherein the person
regards God as the absolute ruler of the heart, regardless of which human
political system may be operating concurrently. Following this system requires
a person to give up all rights, but promises to provide absolute freedom in
return. It can be used as a model for the best kind of human leadership. (Cf. ecclesiocracy.)
timocracy:
see polity.
transvaluation: Nietzsche's term for the radical reinterpretation
of traditional morals, whereby our usual conceptions of good
and evil are negatively assessed as tools for making human beings mediocre;
genuine values must transcend* good and evil.
truth: according to Plato
and many subsequent philosophers, one of the three aims of the philosophical
quest. It corresponds to the head and is powered by reason*.
truth table: any of numerous ways
of displaying the truth value of a specific type of logical*
proposition. One of the functions of truth
tables is to help avoid committing fallacies.
tyranny: Aristotle's term for
a political system* wherein one bad person holds all the power and
authority. (Cf. kingship.)
verification: the principle used
by Ayer and other logical* positivists in the hope of
constructing a philosophy that would be genuinely scientific.
It states that a proposition should be admitted as true
only if it can be shown to be true by reference to some empirical*
state or situation.
wisdom: the ideal object*
of a philosopher's love ("sophos" means
wisdom in Greek), telling us how to use or apply our knowledge*
most appropriately. According to Socrates, only God is truly wise; for human
beings, wisdom consists in recognizing our ignorance of genuine wisdom.
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comments to the author: StevePq@hkbu.edu.hk