(Second Half)
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TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
SECOND DIVISION
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
INTRODUCTION
I
TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION
WE have already entitled dialectic in general a logic of illu-
sion. This does not mean a doctrine of probability; for prob-
ability is truth, known however on insufficient grounds, and
the knowledge of which, though thus imperfect, is not on that
account deceptive; and such doctrine, accordingly, is not to be
separated from the analytic part of logic. Still less justification
have we for regarding appearance and illusion as being identi-
cal. For truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is
intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought.
It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err -- not
because they always judge rightly but because they do not
judge at all. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also
illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judg-
ment, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understand-
ing. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws
of understanding there is no error. In a representation of the
senses -- as containing no judgment whatsoever -- there is also
no error. No natural force can of itself deviate from its own
laws. Thus neither the understanding by itself (uninfluenced
by another cause), nor the senses by themselves, would fall
into error. The former would not, since, if it acts only accord-
ing to its own laws, the effect (the judgment) must necessarily
be in conformity with these laws; conformity with the laws
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of the understanding is the formal element in all truth. In
the senses there is no judgment whatsoever, neither a true
nor a false judgment. Now since we have no source of know-
ledge besides these two, it follows that error is brought about
solely by the unobserved influence of sensibility on the under-
standing, through which it happens that the subjective grounds
of the judgment enter into union with the objective grounds
and make these latter deviate from their true function, -- just
as a body in motion would always of itself continue in a
straight line in the same direction, but if influenced by another
force acting in another direction starts off into curvilinear
motion. In order to distinguish the specific action of under-
standing from the force which is intermixed with it, it is neces-
sary to regard the erroneous judgment as the diagonal between
two forces -- forces which determine the judgment in different
directions that enclose, as it were, an angle -- and to resolve
this composite action into the simple actions of the under-
standing and of the sensibility. In the case of pure a priori
judgments this is a task which falls to be discharged by tran-
scendental reflection, through which, as we have already shown,
every representation is assigned its place in the corresponding
faculty of knowledge, and by which the influence of the one
upon the other is therefore likewise distinguished.
We are not here concerned with empirical (e.g. optical)
illusion, which occurs in the empirical employment of rules of
understanding that are otherwise correct, and through which
the faculty of judgment is misled by the influence of imagina-
tion; we are concerned only with transcendental illusion, which
exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for
use in experience, in which case we should at least have had a
criterion of their correctness. In defiance of all the warnings of
criticism, it carries us altogether beyond the empirical employ-
ment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive exten-
sion of pure understanding.
++ Sensibility, when subordinated to understanding, as the object
upon which the latter exercises its function, is the source of real
modes of knowledge. But the same sensibility, in so far as it in-
fluences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make
judgments, is the ground of error.
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We shall entitle the principles whose
application is confined entirely within the limits of possible
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experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, which
profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent. In the case of
these latter, I am not referring to the transcendental employ-
ment or misemployment of the categories, which is merely an
error of the faculty of judgment when it is not duly curbed by
criticism, and therefore does not pay sufficient attention to the
bounds of the territory within which alone free play is allowed
to pure understanding. I mean actual principles which incite
us to tear down all those boundary-fences and to seize posses-
sion of an entirely new domain which recognises no limits of
demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not
interchangeable terms. The principles of pure understanding,
which we have set out above, allow only of empirical and not
of transcendental employment, that is, employment extend-
ing beyond the limits of experience. A principle, on the other
hand, which takes away these limits, or even commands us
actually to transgress them, is called transcendent. If our
criticism can succeed in disclosing the illusion in these alleged
principles, then those principles which are of merely empirical
employment may be called, in opposition to the others, im-
manent principles of pure understanding.
Logical illusion, which consists in the mere imitation
of the form of reason (the illusion of formal fallacies), arises
entirely from lack of attention to the logical rule. As soon
as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us,
the illusion completely disappears. Transcendental illusion,
on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been de-
tected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental
criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: the world must
have a beginning in time). The cause of this is that there are
fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our
reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human know-
ledge), and that these have all the appearance of being ob-
jective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity
of a connection of our concepts, which is to the advantage of
the understanding, for an objective necessity in the deter-
mination of things in themselves. This is an illusion which
can no more be prevented than we can prevent the sea
appearing higher at the horizon than at the shore, since we see
it through higher light rays; or to cite a still better example,
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than the astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing
larger at its rising, although he is not deceived by this illusion.
The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself
with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, and at
the same time taking precautions that we be not deceived by
it. That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually dis-
appear and cease to be an illusion, is something which tran-
scendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve. For
here we have to do with a natural and inevitable illusion,
which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us
as objective; whereas logical dialectic in its exposure of de-
ceptive inferences has to do merely with an error in the fol-
lowing out of principles, or with an illusion artificially created
in imitation of such inferences. There exists, then, a natural
and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason -- not one in which a
bungler might entangle himself through lack of knowledge,
or one which some sophist has artificially invented to confuse
thinking people, but one inseparable from human reason, and
which, even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not
cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into
momentary aberrations ever and again calling for correction.
II
PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF TRANSCENDENTAL
ILLUSION
A
Reason in general
All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from
thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which
there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the
matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of
thought. Now that I have to give an explanation of this highest
faculty of knowledge, I find myself in some difficulty. Reason,
like understanding, can be employed in a merely formal, that
is, logical manner, wherein it abstracts from all content of
knowledge. But it is also capable of a real use, since it contains
within itself the source of certain concepts and principles,
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which it does not borrow either from the senses or from the
understanding. The former faculty has long since been defined
by logicians as the faculty of making mediate inferences (in dis-
tinction from immediate inferences, consequentiis immediatis);
but the nature of the other faculty, which itself gives birth to con-
cepts, is not to be understood from this definition. Now since
we are here presented with a division of reason into a logical
and a transcendental faculty, we are constrained to seek for a
higher concept of this source of knowledge which includes
both concepts as subordinate to itself. Following the analogy
of concepts of understanding, we may expect that the logical
concept will provide the key to the transcendental, and that
the table of the functions of the former will at once give us the
genealogical tree of the concepts of reason.
In the first part of our transcendental logic we treated the
understanding as being the faculty of rules; reason we shall
here distinguish from understanding by entitling it the faculty
of principles.
The term 'principle' is ambiguous, and commonly sig-
nifies any knowledge which can be used as a principle,
although in itself, and as regards its proper origin, it is no
principle. Every universal proposition, even one derived from
experience, through induction, can serve as major premiss in
a syllogism; but it is not therefore itself a principle. The
mathematical axioms (e.g. that there can only be one straight
line between two points) are instances of universal a priori
knowledge, and are therefore rightly called principles, rela-
tively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I
cannot therefore say that I apprehend this property of straight
lines in general and in itself, from principles; I apprehend it
only in pure intuition.
Knowledge from principles is, therefore, that knowledge
alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal
through concepts. Thus every syllogism is a mode of deducing
knowledge from a principle. For the major premiss always
gives a concept through which everything that is subsumed
under the concept as under a condition is known from the con-
cept according to a principle. Now since any universal know-
ledge can serve as major premiss in a syllogism, and since the
understanding presents us with universal a priori propositions
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of this kind, they can also be called principles in respect of
their possible employment.
But if we consider them in themselves in relation to their
origin, these fundamental propositions of pure understanding
are anything rather than knowledge based on concepts. For
they would not even be possible a priori, if we were not sup-
ported by pure intuition (in mathematics), or by conditions of
a possible experience in general. That everything that happens
has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the concept of
happening in general; on the contrary, it is this fundamental
proposition which shows how in regard to that which happens
we are in a position to obtain in experience any concept what-
soever that is really determinate.
The understanding can, then, never supply any synthetic
modes of knowledge derived from concepts; and it is such
modes of knowledge that are properly, without qualification,
to be entitled 'principles'. All universal propositions, however,
may be spoken of as 'principles' in a comparative sense.
It has long been wished -- and sometime perhaps (who
knows when! ) may be fulfilled -- that instead of the endless
multiplicity of civil laws we should be able to fall back on their
general principles. For it is in these alone that we can hope to
find the secret of what we are wont to call the simplifying of
legislation. In this domain, however, the laws are only limita-
tions imposed upon our freedom in order that such freedom
may completely harmonise with itself; hence they are directed
to something which is entirely our own work, and of which we
ourselves, through these concepts, can be the cause. But that
objects in themselves, the very nature of things, should stand
under principles, and should be determined according to mere
concepts, is a demand which, if not impossible, is at least quite
contrary to common sense. But however that may be (it is
a question which we still have to discuss), it is now at least
evident that knowledge derived from principles which are
genuinely such is something quite different from knowledge
obtained merely through the understanding. The latter may,
indeed, also take the form of a principle and thus be prior to
some other knowledge, but in itself, in so far as it is syn-
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thetic, it does not depend on thought alone, nor contain in
itself a universal obtained from concepts.
Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures
the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as
being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of under-
standing under principles. Accordingly, reason never applies
itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understand-
ing, in order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter
an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be
called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind
from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding.
This is the universal concept of the faculty of reason in so
far as it has been possible to make it clear in the total absence
of examples. These will be given in the course of our argu-
ment.
B
The Logical Employment of Reason
A distinction is commonly made between what is immediately
known and what is merely inferred. That in a figure which is
bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is known
immediately; but that the sum of these angles is equal to two right
angles, is merely inferred. Since we have constantly to make
use of inference, and so end by becoming completely accus-
tomed to it, we no longer take notice of this distinction, and
frequently, as in the so-called deceptions of the senses, treat as
being immediately perceived what has really only been inferred.
In every process of reasoning there is a fundamental proposi-
tion, and another, namely the conclusion, which is drawn
from it, and finally, the inference (logical sequence) by which
the truth of the latter is inseparably connected with the truth
of the former. If the inferred judgment is already so contained
in the earlier judgment that it may be derived from it without
the mediation of a third representation, the inference is called
immediate (consequentia immediata) -- I should prefer to entitle
it inference of the understanding. But if besides the know-
ledge contained in the primary proposition still another judg-
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ment is needed to yield the conclusion, it is to be entitled an
inference of the reason. In the proposition : "All men are
mortal", there are already contained the propositions : "some
men are mortal", "some mortal beings are men", "nothing
that is not mortal is a man"; and these are therefore immediate
conclusions from it. On the other hand, the proposition: "All
learned beings are mortal", is not contained in the funda-
mental judgment (for the concept of learned beings does not
occur in it at all), and it can only be inferred from it by means
of a mediating judgment.
In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major premiss)
through the understanding. Secondly, I subsume something
known under the condition of the rule by means of judgment
(the minor premiss). Finally, what is thereby known I deter-
mine through the predicate of the rule, and so a priori through
reason (the conclusion). The relation, therefore, which the
major premiss, as the rule, represents between what is known
and its condition is the ground of the different kinds of syllo-
gism. Consequently, syllogisms, like judgments, are of three
kinds, according to the different ways in which, in the under-
standing, they express the relation of what is known; they
are either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive.
If, as generally happens, the judgment that forms the con-
clusion is set as a problem -- to see whether it does not follow
from judgments already given, and through which a quite
different object is thought -- I look in the understanding for the
assertion of this conclusion, to discover whether it is not there
found to stand under certain conditions according to a uni-
versal rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object of the
conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then
the conclusion is deduced from the rule, which is also valid for
other objects of knowledge. From this we see that in inference
reason endeavours to reduce the varied and manifold know-
ledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest
number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to
achieve in it the highest possible unity.
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C
The Pure Employment of Reason
Can we isolate reason, and is it, so regarded, an independ-
ent source of concepts and judgments which spring from it
alone, and by means of which it relates to objects; or is it a
merely subordinate faculty, for imposing on given modes of
knowledge a certain form, called logical -- a faculty through
which what is known by means of the understanding is deter-
mined in its interrelations, lower rules being brought under
higher (namely, those the condition of which includes in its
own sphere the condition of the lower), as far as this can be
done through [processes of] comparison? This is the question
with which we are now provisionally occupying ourselves. As
a matter of fact, multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a
demand of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understand-
ing into thoroughgoing accordance with itself, just as the
understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts
and thereby connects the manifold. But such a principle does
not prescribe any law for objects, and does not contain any
general ground of the possibility of knowing or of determining
objects as such; it is merely a subjective law for the orderly
management of the possessions of our understanding, that by
comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest
possible number; it does not justify us in demanding from the
objects such uniformity as will minister to the convenience
and extension of our understanding; and we may not, there-
fore, ascribe to the maxim any objective validity. In a word,
the question is, does reason in itself, that is, does pure reason,
contain a priori synthetic principles and rules, and in what
may these principles consist?
The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms
gives us sufficient guidance as to the ground on which the
transcendental principle of pure reason in its synthetic know-
ledge will rest.
In the first place, reason in the syllogism does not concern
itself with intuitions, with a view to bringing them under rules
(as the understanding does with its categories), but with con-
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cepts and judgments. Accordingly, even if pure reason does
concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to
these and the intuition of them, but only to the understand-
ing and its judgments -- which deal at first hand with the senses
and their intuition for the purpose of determining their object.
The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible
experience, but is essentially different from such unity, which
is that of understanding. That everything which happens has
a cause, is not a principle known and prescribed by reason.
That principle makes the unity of experience possible, and
borrows nothing from reason, which, apart from this relation
to possible experience, could never, from mere concepts, have
imposed any such synthetic unity.
Secondly, reason, in its logical employment, seeks to dis-
cover the universal condition of its judgment (the conclusion),
and the syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by
means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal
rule (the major premiss). Now since this rule is itself subject
to the same requirement of reason, and the condition of the con-
dition must therefore be sought (by means of a prosyllogism)
whenever practicable, obviously the principle peculiar to reason
in general, in its logical employment, is: -- to find for the con-
ditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the
unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.
But this logical maxim can only become a principle of
pure reason through our assuming that if the conditioned is
given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one
another -- a series which is therefore itself unconditioned --
is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its
connection.
Such a principle of pure reason is obviously synthetic;
the conditioned is analytically related to some condition but
not to the unconditioned. From the principle there must also
follow various synthetic propositions, of which pure under-
standing -- inasmuch as it has to deal only with objects of a
possible experience, the knowledge and synthesis of which is
always conditioned -- knows nothing. The unconditioned, if its
actuality be granted, is especially to be considered in respect
of all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever
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is conditioned, and thereby must yield material for many
synthetic a priori propositions.
The principles arising from this supreme principle of
pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to all
appearances, i.e. there can never be any adequate empirical
employment of the principle. It will therefore be entirely
different from all principles of understanding, the employment
of which is wholly immanent, inasmuch as they have as their
theme only the possibility of experience. Take the principle,
that the series of conditions (whether in the synthesis of
appearances, or even in the thinking of things in general)
extends to the unconditioned. Does it, or does it not, have
objective applicability? What are its implications as regards
the empirical employment of understanding? Or is there
no such objectively valid principle of reason, but only
a logical precept, to advance towards completeness by an
ascent to ever higher conditions and so to give to our know-
ledge the greatest possible unity of reason? Can it be that
this requirement of reason has been wrongly treated in being
viewed as a transcendental principle of pure reason, and that
we have been overhasty in postulating such an unbounded
completeness of the series of conditions in the objects them-
selves? In that case, what other misunderstandings and de-
lusions may have crept into the syllogisms, whose major pre-
miss (perhaps rather an assumption than a postulate) is
derived from pure reason, and which proceed from experience
upwards to its conditions? To answer these questions will be
our task in the Transcendental Dialectic, which we shall now
endeavour to develop from its deeply concealed sources in
human reason. We shall divide the Dialectic into two chapters,
the first on the transcendent concepts of pure reason, the
second on its transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK I
THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON
WHATEVER we may have to decide as to the possibility of
the concepts derived from pure reason, it is at least true that
they are not to be obtained by mere reflection but only by
inference. Concepts of understanding are also thought a -
priori antecedently to experience and for the sake of experi-
ence, but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflec-
tion upon appearances, in so far as these appearances must
necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness.
Through them alone is knowledge and the determination of
an object possible. They first provide the material required
for making inferences, and they are not preceded by any
a priori concepts of objects from which they could be inferred.
On the other hand, their objective reality is founded solely
on the fact that, since they constitute the intellectual form of
all experience, it must always be possible to show their appli-
cation in experience.
The title 'concept of reason' already gives a preliminary
indication that we are dealing with something which does
not allow of being confined within experience, since it con-
cerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge (perhaps
even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical syn-
thesis) is only a part. No actual experience has ever been com-
pletely adequate to it, yet to it every actual experience belongs.
Concepts of reason enable us to conceive, concepts of under-
standing to understand -- ([as employed in reference to] percep-
tions). If the concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, they
are concerned with something to which all experience is subor-
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dinate, but which is never itself an object of experience --
something to which reason leads in its inferences from experi-
ence, and in accordance with which it estimates and gauges
the degree of its empirical employment, but which is never
itself a member of the empirical synthesis. If, none the less,
these concepts possess objective validity, they may be called
conceptus ratiocinati (rightly inferred concepts); if, however,
they have no such validity, they have surreptitiously obtained
recognition through having at least an illusory appearance
of being inferences, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes
(pseudo-rational concepts). But since this can be established
only in the chapter on the dialectical inferences of pure reason,
we are not yet in a position to deal with it. Meantime, just as
we have entitled the pure concepts of understanding cate-
gories, so we shall give a new name to the concepts of pure
reason, calling them transcendental ideas. This title we shall
now explain and justify.
FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALECTIC
Section I
THE IDEAS IN GENERAL
Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often
finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his
concept, and for want of which he is unable to be really intel-
ligible to others or even to himself. To coin new words is to ad-
vance a claim to legislation in language that seldom succeeds;
and before we have recourse to this desperate expedient it is
advisable to look about in a dead and learned language, to see
whether the concept and its appropriate expression are not
already there provided. Even if the old-time usage of a term
should have become somewhat uncertain through the careless-
ness of those who introduced it, it is always better to hold fast
to the meaning which distinctively belongs to it (even though
it remain doubtful whether it was originally used in precisely
this sense) than to defeat our purpose by making ourselves
unintelligible.
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For this reason, if there be only a single word the estab-
lished meaning of which exactly agrees with a certain concept,
then, since it is of great importance that this concept be dis-
tinguished from related concepts, it is advisable to economise
in the use of the word and not to employ it, merely for the sake of
variety, as a synonym for some other expression, but carefully
to keep to its own proper meaning. Otherwise it may easily
happen that the expression ceasing to engage the attention in
one specific sense, and being lost in the multitude of other
words of very different meaning, the thought also is lost which
it alone could have preserved.
Plato made use of the expression 'idea' in such a way as
quite evidently to have meant by it something which not only can
never be borrowed from the senses but far surpasses even the
concepts of understanding (with which Aristotle occupied him-
self), inasmuch as in experience nothing is ever to be met with
that is coincident with it. For Plato ideas are archetypes
of the things themselves, and not, in the manner of the cate-
gories, merely keys to possible experiences. In his view they
have issued from highest reason, and from that source have
come to be shared in by human reason, which, however, is now
no longer in its original state, but is constrained laboriously to
recall, by a process of reminiscence (which is named philo-
sophy), the old ideas, now very much obscured. I shall not
engage here in any literary enquiry into the meaning which
this illustrious philosopher attached to the expression. I need
only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing
the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his
subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find
that we understand him better than he has understood himself.
As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has some-
times spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own in-
tention.
Plato very well realised that our faculty of knowledge feels
a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances ac-
cording to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them
as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself
to forms of knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of
experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide
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with them, but which must none the less be recognised as
having their own reality, and which are by no means mere
fictions of the brain.
Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of
the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its
turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product
of reason. Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from
experience and make (as many have actually done) what at best
can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposi-
tion, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge, would
make of virtue something which changes according to time
and circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of
the formation of any rule. On the contrary, as we are well
aware, if anyone is held up as a pattern of virtue, the true
original with which we compare the alleged pattern and by
which alone we judge of its value is to be found only in our
minds. This original is the idea of virtue, in respect of which
the possible objects of experience may serve as examples
(proofs that what the concept of reason commands is in a cer-
tain degree practicable), but not as archetype. That no one
of us will ever act in a way which is adequate to what is con-
tained in the pure idea of virtue is far from proving this thought
to be in any respect chimerical. For it is only by means of this
idea that any judgment as to moral worth or its opposite is
possible; and it therefore serves as an indispensable founda-
tion for every approach to moral perfection -- however the
obstacles in human nature, to the degree of which there are no
assignable limits, may keep us far removed from its complete
achievement.
++ He also, indeed, extended his concept so as to cover specu-
lative knowledge, provided only the latter was pure and given com-
pletely a priori. He even extended it to mathematics, although the
object of that science is to be found nowhere except in possible ex-
perience. In this I cannot follow him, any more than in his mystical
deduction of these ideas, or in the extravagances whereby he, so to
speak, hypostatised them -- although, as must be allowed, the exalted
language, which he employed in this sphere, is quite capable of a
milder interpretation that accords with the nature of things.
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The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as a striking
example of a supposedly visionary perfection, such as can exist
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only in the brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker has ridiculed
the philosopher for asserting that a prince can rule well only
in so far as he participates in the ideas. We should, however,
be better advised to follow up this thought, and, where the
great philosopher leaves us without help, to place it, through
fresh efforts, in a proper light, rather than to set it aside as use-
less on the very sorry and harmful pretext of impracticability.
A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in
accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to
be consistent with that of all others -- I do not speak of the
greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself -- is at any rate
a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only
in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. For at the
start we are required to abstract from the actually existing
hindrances, which, it may be, do not arise unavoidably out
of human nature, but rather are due to a quite remediable
cause, the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws.
Nothing, indeed, can be more injurious, or more unworthy of
a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse ex-
perience. Such experience would never have existed at all, if
at the proper time those institutions had been established in
accordance with ideas, and if ideas had not been displaced by
crude conceptions which, just because they have been derived
from experience, have nullified all good intentions. The more
legislation and government are brought into harmony with the
above idea, the rarer would punishments become, and it is there-
fore quite rational to maintain, as Plato does, that in a perfect
state no punishments whatsoever would be required. This per-
fect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less
this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order
to bring the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its
greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an
archetype. For what the highest degree may be at which
mankind may have to come to a stand, and how great a gulf
may still have to be left between the idea and its realisation,
are questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the
issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom
to pass beyond any and every specified limit.
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But it is not only where human reason exhibits genuine
causality, and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and
their objects), namely, in the moral sphere, but also in regard
to nature itself, that Plato rightly discerns clear proofs of an
origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement
of the cosmos -- presumably therefore the entire natural world
-- clearly show that they are possible only according to ideas,
and that though no single creature in the conditions of its
individual existence coincides with the idea of what is most
perfect in its kind -- just as little as does any human being
with the idea of humanity, which he yet carries in his soul
as the archetype of his actions -- these ideas are none the
less completely determined in the Supreme Understanding,
each as an individual and each as unchangeable, and are
the original causes of things. But only the totality of things,
in their interconnection as constituting the universe, is com-
pletely adequate to the idea. If we set aside the exaggera-
tions in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's
spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the
physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it ac-
cording to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise
which calls for respect and imitation. It is, however, in regard
to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where
the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible
only by the ideas -- incomplete as their empirical expression
must always remain -- that Plato's teaching exhibits its quite
peculiar merits. When it fails to obtain recognition, this is due
to its having been judged in accordance with precisely those
empirical rules, the invalidity of which, regarded as principles,
it has itself demonstrated. For whereas, so far as nature is con-
cerned, experience supplies the rules and is the source of
truth, in respect of the moral laws it is, alas, the mother of
illusion! Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws
prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to
impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circum-
scribed.
But though the following out of these considerations is
what gives to philosophy its peculiar dignity, we must mean-
time occupy ourselves with a less resplendent, but still meri-
P 314
torious task, namely, to level the ground, and to render it
sufficiently secure for moral edifices of these majestic dimen-
sions. For this ground has been honeycombed by subterranean
workings which reason, in its confident but fruitless search
for hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions, and
which threaten the security of the superstructures. Our present
duty is to obtain insight into the transcendental employment
of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be in a
position to determine and estimate its influence and true value.
Yet, before closing these introductory remarks, I beseech
those who have the interests of philosophy at heart (which is
more than is the case with most people) that, if they find
themselves convinced by these and the following considera-
tions, they be careful to preserve the expression 'idea' in
its original meaning, that it may not become one of those
expressions which are commonly used to indicate any and
every species of representation, in a happy-go-lucky confu-
sion, to the consequent detriment of science. There is no lack
of terms suitable for each kind of representation, that we
should thus needlessly encroach upon the province of any one
of them. Their serial arrangement is as follows. The genus
is representation in general (repraesentatio). Subordinate to
it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A
perception which relates solely to the subject as the modifica-
tion of its state is sensation (sensatio), an objective perception
is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept
(intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the
object and is single, the latter refers to it immediately by means
of a feature which several things may have in common. The
concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure con-
cept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone
(not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A
concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility
of experience is an idea or concept of reason. Anyone who
has familiarised himself with these distinctions must find it
intolerable to hear the representation of the colour, red, called
an idea. It ought not even to be called a concept of under-
standing, a notion.
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FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALECTIC
Section 2
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
The Transcendental Analytic has shown us how the mere
logical form of our knowledge may in itself contain original
pure a priori concepts, which represent objects prior to all
experience, or, speaking more correctly, indicate the synthetic
unity which alone makes possible an empirical knowledge of
objects. The form of judgments (converted into a concept of
the synthesis of intuitions) yielded categories which direct all
employment of understanding in experience. Similarly, we
may presume that the form of syllogisms, when applied to
the synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of the
categories, will contain the origin of special a priori concepts,
which we may call pure concepts of reason, or transcendental
ideas, and which will determine according to principles how
understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience
in its totality.
The function of reason in its inferences consists in the
universality of knowledge [which it yields] according to con-
cepts, the syllogism being itself a judgment which is deter-
mined a priori in the whole extent of its conditions. The pro-
position, 'Caius is mortal', I could indeed derive from experi-
ence by means of the understanding alone. But I am in pursuit
of a concept (in this case, the concept 'man') that contains the
condition under which the predicate (general term for what
is asserted) of this judgment is given; and after I have sub-
sumed the predicate under this condition taken in its whole
extension ('All men are mortal'), I proceed, in accordance
therewith, to determine the knowledge of my object ('Caius
is mortal').
Accordingly, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a
P 316
predicate to a certain object, after having first thought it in
the major premiss in its whole extension under a given con-
dition. This complete quantity of the extension in relation to
such a condition is called universality (universalitas). In the
synthesis of intuitions we have corresponding to this the allness
(universitas) or totality of the conditions. The transcendental
concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of
the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now
since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the
totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions
is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can
in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned,
conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the
conditioned.
The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the
number of kinds of relation which the understanding repre-
sents to itself by means of the categories. We have therefore
to seek for an unconditioned, first, of the categorical synthesis
in a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the
members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the
parts in a system.
There is thus precisely the same number of kinds of syl-
logism, each of which advances through prosyllogisms to the
unconditioned: first, to the subject which is never itself a pre-
dicate; secondly, to the presupposition which itself presup-
poses nothing further; thirdly, to such an aggregate of the
members of the division of a concept as requires nothing
further to complete the division. The pure concepts of reason
-- of totality in the synthesis of conditions -- are thus at least
necessary as setting us the task of extending the unity of
understanding, where possible, up to the unconditioned, and
are grounded in the nature of human reason. These tran-
scendental concepts may, however, be without any suitable
corresponding employment in concreto, and may therefore
have no other utility than that of so directing the understand-
ing that, while it is extended to the uttermost, it is also at the
same time brought into complete consistency with itself.
But while we are here speaking of the totality of con-
ditions and of the unconditioned, as being equivalent titles
for all concepts of reason, we again come upon an expression
P 317
with which we cannot dispense, and which yet, owing to an
ambiguity that attaches to it through long-standing misuse,
we also cannot with safety employ. The word 'absolute' is
one of the few words which in their original meaning were
adapted to a concept that no other word in the same language
exactly suits. Consequently its loss, or what amounts to the
same thing, looseness in its employment, must carry with it
the loss of the concept itself. And since, in this case, the con-
cept is one to which reason devotes much of its attention,
it cannot be relinquished without greatly harming all tran-
scendental philosophy. The word 'absolute' is now often used
merely to indicate that something is true of a thing considered
in itself, and therefore of its inward nature. In this sense the
absolutely possible would mean that which in itself (interne)
is possible -- which is, in fact, the least that can be said of an
object. On the other hand, the word is also sometimes used to
indicate that something is valid in all respects, without limita-
tion, e.g. absolute despotism, and in this sense the absolutely
possible would mean what is in every relation (in all respects)
possible -- which is the most that can be said of the possibility
of a thing. Now frequently we find these two meanings com-
bined. For example, what is internally impossible is impossible
in any relation, and therefore absolutely impossible. But in
most cases the two meanings are infinitely far apart, and I can
in no wise conclude that because something is in itself possible,
it is therefore also possible in every relation, and so absolutely
possible. Indeed, as I shall subsequently show, absolute neces-
sity is by no means always dependent on inner necessity, and
must not, therefore, be treated as synonymous with it. If the
opposite of something is internally impossible, this opposite
is, of course, impossible in all respects, and the thing itself
is therefore absolutely necessary. But I cannot reverse the
reasoning so as to conclude that if something is absolutely
necessary its opposite is internally impossible, i.e. that the
absolute necessity of things is an inner necessity. For this
inner necessity is in certain cases a quite empty expression
to which we cannot attach any concept whatsoever, whereas
the concept of the necessity of a thing in all relations (to every-
thing possible) involves certain quite special determinations.
P 318
Since the loss of a concept that is of great importance for
speculative science can never be a matter of indifference to the
philosopher, I trust that the fixing and careful preservation
of the expression, on which the concept depends, will like-
wise be not indifferent to him.
It is, then, in this wider sense that I shall use the word
'absolute', opposing it to what is valid only comparatively,
that is, in some particular respect. For while the latter is re-
stricted by conditions, the former is valid without restriction.
Now the transcendental concept of reason is directed
always solely towards absolute totality in the synthesis of con-
ditions, and never terminates save in what is absolutely, that is,
in all relations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves every-
thing to the understanding -- the understanding [alone] apply-
ing immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their
synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively
with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the
understanding, and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity.
which is thought in the category, up to the completely uncon-
ditioned. We may call this unity of appearances the unity of
reason, and that expressed by the category the unity of under-
standing. Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the
employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter
contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of
the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any
experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely
in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction to-
wards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and
in such manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding,
in respect of every object, into an absolute whole. The object-
ive employment of the pure concepts of reason is, therefore,
always transcendent, while that of the pure concepts of under-
standing must, in accordance with their nature, and inasmuch
as their application is solely to possible experience, be always
immanent.
I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to
which no corresponding object can be given in sense-ex-
perience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under con-
sideration, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure
P 319
reason, in that they view all knowledge gained in experience as
being determined through an absolute totality of conditions.
They are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the
very nature of reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary
relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally,
they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experi-
ence; no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever be
found within experience. If I speak of an idea, then as regards
its object, viewed as an object of pure understanding, I am
saying a great deal, but as regards its relation to the subject,
that is, in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions,
I am for the same reason saying very little, in that, as being
the concept of a maximum, it can never be correspondingly
given in concreto. Since in the merely speculative employment
of reason the latter [namely, to determine the actuality of the
idea under empirical conditions] is indeed our whole purpose,
and since the approximation to a concept, which yet is never
actually reached, puts us in no better position than if the con-
cept were entirely abortive, we say of such a concept -- it is only
an idea. The absolute whole of all appearances -- we might thus
say -- is only an idea; since we can never represent it in image,
it remains a problem to which there is no solution. But since,
on the other hand, in the practical employment of understand-
ing, our sole concern is with the carrying out of rules, the idea
of practical reason can always be given actually in concreto,
although only in part; it is, indeed, the indispensable condition
of all practical employment of reason. The practice of it is al-
ways limited and defective, but is not confined within determin-
able boundaries, and is therefore always under the influence
of the concept of an absolute completeness. The practical idea
is, therefore, always in the highest degree fruitful, and in its
relation to our actual activities is indispensably necessary.
Reason is here, indeed, exercising causality, as actually
bringing about that which its concept contains; and of such
wisdom we cannot, therefore, say disparagingly it is only an
idea. On the contrary, just because it is the idea of the neces-
sary unity of all possible ends, it must as an original, and at
least restrictive condition, serve as standard in all that bears
on the practical.
Although we must say of the transcendental concepts of
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reason that they are only ideas, this is not by any means to be
taken as signifying that they are superfluous and void. For
even if they cannot determine any object, they may yet, in a
fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the
understanding as a canon for its extended and consistent em-
ployment. The understanding does not thereby obtain more
knowledge of any object than it would have by means of its
own concepts, but for the acquiring of such knowledge it
receives better and more extensive guidance. Further -- what
we need here no more than mention -- concepts of reason may
perhaps make possible a transition from the concepts of
nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give
support to the moral ideas themselves, bringing them into
connection with the speculative knowledge of reason. As to
all this, we must await explanation in the sequel.
In accordance with our plan we leave aside the practical
ideas, and consider reason only in its speculative, or rather,
restricting ourselves still further, only in its transcendental
employment. Here we must follow the path that we have
taken in the deduction of the categories; we must consider
the logical form of knowledge through reason, to see whether
perhaps reason may not thereby be likewise a source of con-
cepts which enable us to regard objects in themselves as deter-
mined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of the
functions of reason.
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form
of knowledge, is the faculty of inferring, i.e. judging medi-
ately (by the subsumption of the condition of a possible judg-
ment under the condition of a given judgment). The given
judgment is the universal rule (major premiss). The subsump-
tion of the condition of another possible judgment under the
condition of the rule is the minor premiss. The actual judg-
ment which applies the assertion of the rule to the subsumed
case is the conclusion. The rule states something universally,
subject to a certain condition. The condition of the rule is
found to be fulfilled in an actual case. What has been asserted
to be universally valid under that condition is therefore to be
regarded as valid also in the actual case, which involves that
condition. It is very evident, therefore, that reason arrives at
P 321
knowledge by means of acts of the understanding which con-
stitute a series of conditions. Thus if I arrive at the proposi-
tion that all bodies are alterable, only by beginning with
the more remote knowledge (in which the concept of body
does not occur, but which nevertheless contains the condi-
tion of that concept), namely, that everything composite is
alterable; if I then proceed from this to a proposition which
is less remote and stands under the condition of the last-
named proposition, namely, that bodies are composite; and if
from this I finally pass to a third proposition, which connects
the more remote knowledge (alterable) with the knowledge
actually before me, and so conclude that bodies are alter-
able -- by this procedure I have arrived at knowledge (a con-
clusion) by means of a series of conditions (the premisses).
Now every series the exponent of which is given (in categori-
cal or hypothetical judgment) can be continued; consequently
this same activity of reason leads to ratiocinatio polysyllo-
gistica, which is a series of inferences that can be prolonged
indefinitely on the side either of the conditions (per prosyllo-
gismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos).
But we soon become aware that the chain or series of pro-
syllogisms, that is, of inferred knowledge on the side of the
grounds or conditions of a given knowledge, in other words, of
the ascending series of syllogisms, must stand in a different
relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending
series, that is, of the advance of reason in the direction of the
conditioned, by means of episyllogisms. For since in the former
case the knowledge (conclusio) is given only as conditioned, we
cannot arrive at it by means of reason otherwise than on the
assumption that all the members of the series on the side of the
conditions are given (totality in the series of the premisses);
only on this assumption is the judgment before us possible
a priori: whereas on the side of the conditioned, in respect of
consequences, we only think a series in process of becoming,
not one already presupposed or given in its completeness, and
therefore an advance that is merely potential. If, therefore,
knowledge be viewed as conditioned, reason is constrained to
regard the series of conditions in the ascending line as com-
pleted and as given in their totality. But if the same knowledge
P 322
is viewed as a condition of yet other knowledge, and this know-
ledge as constituting a series of consequences in a descend-
ing line, reason can be quite indifferent as to how far this
advance extends a parte posteriori, and whether a totality of
the series is possible at all. For it does not need such a series
in order to be able to draw its conclusion, this being already
sufficiently determined and secured by its grounds a parte -
priori. The series of premisses on the side of the conditions
may have a first member, as its highest condition, or it may
have no such member, in which case it is without limits a parte -
priori. But however this may be, and even admitting that we
can never succeed in comprehending a totality of conditions,
the series must none the less contain such a totality; and the
entire series must be unconditionally true if the conditioned,
which is regarded as a consequence resulting from it, is to be
counted as true. This is a requirement of reason, which an-
nounces its knowledge as being determined a priori and as
necessary, either in itself, in which case it needs no grounds,
or, if it be derivative, as a member of a series of grounds,
which itself, as a series, is unconditionally true.
FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALECTIC
Section 3
SYSTEM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
We are not at present concerned with logical dialectic,
which abstracts from all the content of knowledge and con-
fines itself to exposing the fallacies concealed in the form of
syllogisms, but with a transcendental dialectic which has to
contain, completely a priori, the origin of certain modes of
knowledge derived from pure reason as well as of certain
inferred concepts, the object of which can never be given em-
pirically and which therefore lie entirely outside [the sphere
of ] the faculty of pure understanding. From the natural rela-
tion which the transcendental employment of our knowledge,
alike in inferences and in judgments, must bear to its logical
P 323
employment, we have gathered that there can be only three
kinds of dialectical inference, corresponding to the three
kinds of inference through which reason can arrive at know-
ledge by means of principles, and that in all of these its busi-
ness is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which
understanding always remains restricted, to the unconditioned,
which understanding can never reach.
The relations which are to be universally found in all our
representations are (1) relation to the subject; (2) relation to
objects, either as appearances or as objects of thought in
general. If we combine the subdivision with the main division,
all relation of representations, of which we can form either a
concept or an idea, is then threefold: (1) the relation to the
subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the
[field of] appearance; (3) the relation to all things in general.
Now all pure concepts in general are concerned with the
synthetic unity of representations, but [those of them which
are] concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) are con-
cerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions
in general. All transcendental ideas can therefore be arranged in
three classes, the first containing the absolute (unconditioned)
unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of
the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute
unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.
The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum-
total of all appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology,
and the thing which contains the highest condition of the
possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings)
the object of theology. Pure reason thus furnishes the idea
for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia ratio-
nalis), for a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia
rationalis), and, finally, for a transcendental knowledge of
God (theologia transzendentalis). The understanding is not in
a position to yield even the mere project of any one of these
sciences, not even though it be supported by the highest
logical employment of reason, that is, by all the conceiv-
able inferences through which we seek to advance from one
of its objects (appearance) to all others, up to the most remote
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members of the empirical synthesis; each of these sciences is
an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure
reason.
In what precise modes the pure concepts of reason come
under these three headings of all transcendental ideas will be
fully explained in the next chapter. They follow the guiding-
thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates directly
to objects, but to the concepts which understanding frames
in regard to objects. Similarly it is only by the process of
completing our argument that it can be shown how reason,
simply by the synthetic employment of that very function of
which it makes use in categorical syllogisms, is necessarily
brought to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking
subject, how the logical procedure used in hypothetical syllo-
gisms leads to the ideal of the completely unconditioned in a
series of given conditions, and finally how the mere form of
the disjunctive syllogism must necessarily involve the highest
concept of reason, that of a being of all beings -- a thought
which, at first sight, seems utterly paradoxical.
No objective deduction, such as we have been able to give
of the categories, is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of
these transcendental ideas. Just because they are only ideas
they have, in fact, no relation to any object that could be given
as coinciding with them. We can, indeed, undertake a sub-
jective derivation of them from the nature of our reason; and
this has been provided in the present chapter.
As is easily seen, what pure reason alone has in view is
the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the con-
ditions (whether of inherence, of dependence, or of concur-
rence); it is not concerned with absolute completeness on the
side of the conditioned. For the former alone is required in
order to presuppose the whole series of the conditions, and
to present it a priori to the understanding. Once we are given
a complete (and unconditioned) condition, no concept of
reason is required for the continuation of the series; for every
step in the forward direction from the condition to the con-
ditioned is carried through by the understanding itself. The
P 325
transcendental ideas thus serve only for ascending, in the
series of conditions, to the unconditioned, that is, to principles.
As regards the descending to the conditioned, reason does,
indeed, make a very extensive logical employment of the
laws of understanding, but no kind of transcendental employ-
ment; and if we form an idea of the absolute totality of such
a synthesis (of the progressus), as, for instance, of the whole
series of all future alterations in the world, this is a creation of
the mind (ens rationis) which is only arbitrarily thought, and
not a necessary presupposition of reason. For the possibility
of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions,
but not of its consequences. Such a concept is not, therefore,
one of the transcendental ideas; and it is with these alone that
we have here to deal.
Finally, we also discern that a certain connection and
unity is evident among the transcendental ideas themselves,
and that by means of them pure reason combines all its
modes of knowledge into a system. The advance from the
knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world,
and by means of this to the original being, is so natural that it
seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premisses
to conclusion.
++ Metaphysics has as the proper ob-
ject of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality
-- so related that the second concept, when combined with the first,
should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion. Any other matters
with which this science may deal serve merely as a means of arriving
at these ideas and of establishing their reality. It does not need the
ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond
nature. Insight into them would render theology and morals, and,
through the union of these two, likewise religion, and therewith the
highest ends of our existence, entirely and exclusively dependent on
the faculty of speculative reason. In a systematic representation of
the ideas, the order cited, the synthetic, would be the most suitable;
but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it the
analytic, or reverse order, is better adapted to the purpose of com-
pleting our great project, as enabling us to start from what is im-
mediately given us in experience -- advancing from the doctrine of
the soul, to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge
of God.
P 325
Whether this is due to a concealed relationship
of the same kind as subsists between the logical and the trans-
cendental procedure, is one of the questions that await answer
P 326
in the course of these enquiries. Indeed, we have already,
in a preliminary manner, obtained an answer to the question,
since in treating of the transcendental concepts of reason
which, in philosophical theory, are commonly confused with
others, and not properly distinguished even from concepts of
understanding, we have been able to rescue them from their
ambiguous position, to determine their origin, and at the
same time, in so doing, to fix their precise number (to which
we can never add), presenting them in a systematic connec-
tion, and so marking out and enclosing a special field for pure
reason.
P 327
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON
ALTHOUGH a purely transcendental idea is, in accordance
with the original laws of reason, a quite necessary product of
reason, its object, it may yet be said, is something of which
we have no concept. For in respect of an object which is
adequate to the demands of reason, it is not, in fact, possible
that we should ever be able to form a concept of the under-
standing, that is, a concept that allows of being exhibited and
intuited in a possible experience. But we should be better
advised and less likely to be misunderstood if we said that
although we cannot have any knowledge of the object which
corresponds to an idea, we yet have a problematic concept
of it.
The transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure concepts
of reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a
necessary syllogism. There will therefore be syllogisms which
contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we
conclude from something which we know to something else of
which we have no concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable
illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality. These conclusions
are, then, rather to be called pseudo-rational than rational,
although in view of their origin they may well lay claim to
the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen
fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of reason.
They are sophistications not of men but of pure reason itself.
Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After
long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against
P 328
actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the
illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
There are, then, only three kinds of dialectical syllogisms
-- just so many as there are ideas in which their conclusions
result. In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the
transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing
manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which,
however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever.
This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental
paralogism. The second kind of pseudo-rational inference is
directed to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality
of the series of conditions for any given appearance. From the
fact that my concept of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the
series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory,
I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind,
although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in
these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the antinomy of pure
reason. Finally, in the third kind of pseudo-rational inference,
from the totality of the conditions under which objects in
general, in so far as they can be given me, have to be thought,
I conclude to the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of
the possibility of things in general, i.e. from things which I do
not know through the merely transcendental concept of them
I infer an ens entium, which I know even less through any
transcendental concept, and of the unconditioned necessity
of which I can form no concept whatsoever. This dialectical
syllogism I shall entitle the ideal of pure reason.
SECOND BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
DIALECTIC
CHAPTER I
THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON
A logical paralogism is a syllogism which is fallacious in
form, be its content what it may. A transcendental paralogism
is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining
us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. Such a fallacy is
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therefore grounded in the nature of human reason, and gives
rise to an illusion which cannot be avoided, although it may,
indeed, be rendered harmless.
We now come to a concept which was not included in the
general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be
counted as belonging to that list, without, however, in the least
altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the
term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think'. As is easily seen,
this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of tran-
scendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiv-
ing of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have
no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our
thought, as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however
free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses),
it yet enables us to distinguish, through the nature of our
faculty of representation, two kinds of objects. 'I', as think-
ing, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'. That
which is an object of the outer senses is called 'body'. Accord-
ingly the expression 'I', as a thinking being, signifies the
object of that psychology which may be entitled the 'rational
doctrine of the soul', inasmuch as I am not here seeking to
learn in regard to the soul anything more than can be in-
ferred, independently of all experience (which determines me
more specifically and in concreto), from this concept 'I', so
far as it is present in all thought.
The rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking
of this kind; for if in this science the least empirical element
of my thought, or any special perception of my inner state,
were intermingled with the grounds of knowledge, it would
no longer be a rational but an empirical doctrine of the soul.
Thus we have here what professes to be a science built upon
the single proposition 'I think'. Whether this claim be well or
ill grounded, we may, very fittingly, in accordance with the
nature of a transcendental philosophy, proceed to investi-
gate. The reader must not object that this proposition, which
expresses the perception of the self, contains an inner experi-
ence, and that the rational doctrine of the soul founded upon
it is never pure and is therefore to that extent based upon an
empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more
than the mere apperception 'I think', by which even tran-
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scendental concepts are made possible; what we assert in them
is 'I think substance, cause', etc. For inner experience in
general and its possibility, or perception in general and its
relation to other perception, in which no special distinction
or empirical determination is given, is not to be regarded as
empirical knowledge but as knowledge of the empirical in
general, and has to be reckoned with the investigation of the
possibility of any and every experience, which is certainly a
transcendental enquiry. The least object of perception (for ex-
ample, even pleasure or displeasure), if added to the universal
representation of self-consciousness, would at once transform
rational psychology into empirical psychology.
'I think' is, therefore, the sole text of rational psychology,
and from it the whole of its teaching has to be developed.
Obviously, if this thought is to be related to an object (myself),
it can contain none but transcendental predicates of that ob-
ject, since the least empirical predicate would destroy the
rational purity of the science and its independence of all
experience.
All that is here required is that we follow the guidance of
the categories, with this difference only, that since our starting-
point is a given thing, 'I' as thinking being, we begin with the
category of substance, whereby a thing in itself is represented,
and so proceed backwards through the series, without, how-
ever, otherwise changing the order adopted in the table of the
categories. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from
which everything else that it contains must be derived, is
accordingly as follows:
I
The soul is substance.
2
As regards its quality it is
simple.
3
As regards the different
times in which it exists, it is
numerically identical, that
is, unity (not plurality).
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4
It is in relation to possible objects in space.
All the concepts of pure psychology arise from these ele-
ments, simply by way of combination, without admission of
any other principle. This substance, merely as object of inner
sense, gives the concept of immateriality; as simple substance,
that of incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance,
personality; all these three together, spirituality; while the
relation to objects in space gives commercium with bodies,
and so leads us to represent the thinking substance as the
principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima), and as the
ground of animality. This last, in turn, as limited by spiritu-
ality, gives the concept of immortality.
In connection with these concepts we have four paralogisms
of a transcendental psychology -- which is wrongly regarded as
a science of pure reason -- concerning the nature of our thinking
being. We can assign no other basis for this teaching than the
simple, and in itself completely empty, representation 'I'; and we
cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare
consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this
I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is repre-
sented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It
is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates,
and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept what-
soever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any
judgment upon it has always already made use of its repre-
sentation.
++ The reader who has difficulty in guessing the psychological
meaning of these expressions taken in their transcendental abstract-
ness, and in discovering why the last-mentioned attribute of the soul
belongs to the category of existence, will find the terms sufficiently
explained and justified in the sequel. Further, I have to apologise
for the Latin expressions which, contrary to good taste, have usurped
the place of their German equivalents, both in this section and in the
work as a whole. My excuse is that I have preferred to lose somewhat
in elegance of language rather than to increase, in however minor
a degree, the reader's difficulties.
P 331
And the reason why this inconvenience is insepar-
ably bound up with it, is that consciousness in itself is not a
representation distinguishing a particular object, but a form
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of representation in general, that is, of representation in so far
as it is to be entitled knowledge; for it is only of knowledge
that I can say that I am thereby thinking something.
It must, on first thoughts, seem strange that the condition
under which alone I think, and which is therefore merely a pro-
perty of myself as subject, should likewise be valid for every-
thing that thinks, and that on a seemingly empirical proposition
we can presume to base an apodeictic and universal judgment,
namely, that that which thinks must, in all cases, be constituted
as the voice of self-consciousness declares it to be constituted
in my own self. The reason is this: we must assign to things,
necessarily and a priori, all the properties that constitute the
conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot
have any representation whatsoever of a thinking being,
through any outer experience, but only through self-conscious-
ness. Objects of this kind are, therefore, nothing more than
the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things,
which in this way alone can be represented as thinking beings.
The proposition, 'I think', is, however, here taken only prob-
lematically, not in so far as it may contain perception of an
existent (the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum), but in respect of its
mere possibility, in order to see what properties applicable to
its subject (be that subject actually existent or not) may follow
from so simple a proposition.
If our knowledge of thinking beings in general, by means
of pure reason, were based on more than the cogito, if we
likewise made use of observations concerning the play of our
thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be de-
rived from these thoughts, there would arise an empirical psy-
chology, which would be a kind of physiology of inner sense,
capable perhaps of explaining the appearances of inner sense,
but never of revealing such properties as do not in any way
belong to possible experience (e.g. the properties of the simple),
nor of yielding any apodeictic knowledge regarding the nature
of thinking beings in general. It would not, therefore, be a
rational psychology.
Since the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) con-
tains the form of each and every judgment of the understand-
ing and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evi-
dent that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental
P 333
employment of the understanding. And since this employment
excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what
has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations
in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to
follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of
pure psychology.
THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON
FIRST PARALOGISM: OF SUBSTANTIALITY
That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of
our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as deter-
mination of another thing, is substance.
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my
possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot
be employed as predicate of any other thing.
Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance.
Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology
In the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic we have
shown that pure categories, and among them that of sub-
stance, have in themselves no objective meaning, save in so far
as they rest upon an intuition, and are applied to the manifold
of this intuition, as functions of synthetic unity. In the ab-
sence of this manifold, they are merely functions of a judg-
ment, without content. I can say of any and every thing that
it is substance, in the sense that I distinguish it from mere
predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our
thought the 'I' is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only
as determinations; and this 'I' cannot be employed as the
determination of another thing. Everyone must, therefore,
necessarily regard himself as substance, and thought as [con-
sisting] only [in] accidents of his being, determinations of his
state.
But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance?
That I, as a thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in
any natural manner either arise or perish, can by no means be
P 334
deduced from it. Yet there is no other use to which I can put
the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, and
apart from such use I could very well dispense with it.
So far from being able to deduce these properties merely
from the pure category of substance, we must, on the contrary,
take our start from the permanence of an object given in ex-
perience as permanent. For only to such an object can the
concept of substance be applied in a manner that is empiric-
ally serviceable. In the above proposition, however, we have
not taken as our basis any experience; the inference is merely
from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the
'I' as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor should we, in
resting it upon experience, be able, by any sure observation, to
demonstrate such permanence. The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts,
but there is not in this representation the least trace of intui-
tion, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition.
Thus we can indeed perceive that this representation is invari-
ably present in all thought, but not that it is an abiding and
continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as being transitory,
give place to one another.
It follows, therefore, that the first syllogism of tran-
scendental psychology, when it puts forward the constant logi-
cal subject of thought as being knowledge of the real subject
in which the thought inheres, is palming off upon us what is
a mere pretence of new insight. We do not have, and cannot
have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. Con-
sciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representa-
tions to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental
subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this
logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the sub-
ject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does
all thoughts. The proposition, 'The soul is substance', may,
however, quite well be allowed to stand, if only it be recog-
nised that this concept [of the soul as substance] does not
carry us a single step further, and so cannot yield us any of the
usual deductions of the pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul,
as, for instance, the everlasting duration of the human soul in
all changes and even in death -- if, that is to say, we recognise
that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality.
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SECOND PARALOGISM: OF SIMPLICITY
That, the action of which can never be regarded as the
concurrence of several things acting, is simple.
Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. There-
fore, etc.
Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
This is the Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure
doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical play, contrived
by a dogmatist in order to impart to his assertions a super-
ficial plausibility, but an inference which appears to with-
stand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously
exact investigation. It is as follows.
Every composite substance is an aggregate of several sub-
stances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in
it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or acci-
dents, distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now
an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting
substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is
external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the
combined motion of all its parts). But with thoughts, as in-
ternal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different.
For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of
it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken
together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot con-
sistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the
single words of a verse), distributed among different beings,
never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore
impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially
composite. It is therefore possible only in a single substance,
which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.
++ This proof can very easily be given the customary syllogistic
correctness of form. But for my purpose it is sufficient to have made
clear, though in popular fashion, the bare ground of proof.
P 335
The so-called nervus probandi of this argument lies in the
proposition, that if a multiplicity of representations are to
form a single representation, they must be contained in the
P 336
absolute unity of the thinking subject. No one, however, can prove this
proposition from concepts. For how should he set about the task of achiev-
ing this? The proposition, 'A thought can only be the effect
of the absolute unity of the thinking being', cannot be treated
as analytic. For the unity of the thought, which consists of
many representations, is collective, and as far as mere con-
cepts can show, may relate just as well to the collective unity
of different substances acting together (as the motion of a
body is the composite motion of all its parts) as to the absolute
unity of the subject. Consequently, the necessity of presuppos-
ing, in the case of a composite thought, a simple substance,
cannot be demonstrated in accordance with the principle of
identity. Nor will anyone venture to assert that the proposi-
tion allows of being known synthetically and completely
a priori from mere concepts -- not, at least, if he understands
the ground of the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions,
as above explained.
It is likewise impossible to derive this necessary unity of
the subject, as a condition of the possibility of every thought,
from experience. For experience yields us no knowledge of
necessity, apart even from the fact that the concept of absolute
unity is quite outside its province. Whence then are we to
derive this proposition upon which the whole psychological
syllogism depends?
It is obvious that, if I wish to represent to myself a think-
ing being, I must put myself in his place, and thus substitute,
as it were, my own subject for the object I am seeking to
consider (which does not occur in any other kind of investiga-
tion), and that we demand the absolute unity of the subject of
a thought, only because otherwise we could not say, 'I think'
(the manifold in a representation). For although the whole of
the thought could be divided and distributed among many
subjects, the subjective 'I' can never be thus divided and
distributed, and it is this 'I' that we presuppose in all
thinking.
Here again, as in the former paralogism, the formal pro-
position of apperception, 'I think', remains the sole ground to
which rational psychology can appeal when it thus ventures
upon an extension of its knowledge. This proposition, how-
ever, is not itself an experience, but the form of apperception,
P 337
which belongs to and precedes every experience; and as such
it must always be taken only in relation to some possible
knowledge, as a merely subjective condition of that know-
ledge. We have no right to transform it into a condition of the
possibility of a knowledge of objects, that is, into a concept of
thinking being in general. For we are not in a position to re-
present such being to ourselves save by putting ourselves,
with the formula of our consciousness, in the place of every
other intelligent being.
Nor is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really inferred
from the proposition, 'I think'; it is already involved in every
thought. The proposition, 'I am simple', must be regarded as
an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is
referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is
really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my
existence immediately. 'I am simple' means nothing more
than that this representation, 'I', does not contain in itself the
least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely
logical) unity.
Thus the renowned psychological proof is founded merely
on the indivisible unity of a representation, which governs
only the verb in its relation to a person. It is obvious that in
attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of in-
herence only transcendentally, without noting in it any quality
whatsoever -- in fact, without knowing anything of it either by
direct acquaintance or otherwise. It means a something in
general (transcendental subject), the representation of which
must, no doubt, be simple, if only for the reason that there is
nothing determinate in it. Nothing, indeed, can be represented
that is simpler than that which is represented through the
concept of a mere something. But the simplicity of the repre-
sentation of a subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity
of the subject itself, for we abstract altogether from its pro-
perties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty
expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every
thinking subject.
This much, then, is certain, that through the 'I', I always
P 338
entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the
subject (simplicity). It does not, however, follow that I thereby
know the actual simplicity of my subject. The proposition, 'I
am substance', signifies, as we have found, nothing but the
pure category, of which I can make no use (empirically) in
concreto; and I may therefore legitimately say: 'I am a simple
substance', that is, a substance the representation of which never
contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this concept, as also
the proposition, tells us nothing whatsoever in regard to my-
self as an object of experience, since the concept of substance
is itself used only as a function of synthesis, without any under-
lying intuition, and therefore without an object. It concerns
only the condition of our knowledge; it does not apply to any
assignable object. We will test the supposed usefulness of the
proposition by an experiment.
Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature
of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby dis-
tinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it
from the dissolution to which matter is always liable. This is
indeed, strictly speaking, the only use for which the above
proposition is intended, and is therefore generally expressed
as 'The soul is not corporeal'. If, then, I can show that,
although we allow full objective validity -- the validity ap-
propriate to a judgment of pure reason derived solely from
pure categories -- to this cardinal proposition of the rational
doctrine of the soul (that is, that everything which thinks is a
simple substance), we still cannot make the least use of this
proposition in regard to the question of its dissimilarity from
or relation to matter, this will be the same as if I had relegated
this supposed psychological insight to the field of mere ideas,
without any real objective use.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved, beyond
all question, that bodies are mere appearances of our outer
sense and not things in themselves. We are therefore justified
in saying that our thinking subject is not corporeal; in other
words, that, inasmuch as it is represented by us as object of
inner sense, it cannot, in so far as it thinks, be an object of
outer sense, that is, an appearance in space. This is equivalent
to saying that thinking beings, as such, can never be found by
us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, con-
P 339
sciousness, desires, etc. , cannot be outwardly intuited. All these
belong to inner sense. This argument does, in fact, seem to
be so natural and so popular that even the commonest under-
standing appears to have always relied upon it, and thus al-
ready, from the earliest times, to have regarded souls as quite
different entities from their bodies.
But although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and
motion -- in short, everything which outer senses can give us
-- neither are nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolu-
tion, these never being objects of outer intuition, nevertheless
the something which underlies the outer appearances and
which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations
of space, matter, shape, etc. , may yet, when viewed as nou-
menon (or better, as transcendental object), be at the same
time the subject of our thoughts. That the mode in which
our outer sense is thereby affected gives us no intuition of re-
presentations, will, etc. , but only of space and its determina-
tions, proves nothing to the contrary. For this something is
not extended, nor is it impenetrable or composite, since all
these predicates concern only sensibility and its intuition, in
so far as we are affected by certain (to us otherwise unknown)
objects. By such statements we are not, however, enabled
to know what kind of an object it is, but only to recognise
that if it be considered in itself, and therefore apart from any
relation to the outer senses, these predicates of outer appear-
ances cannot be assigned to it. On the other hand, the predi-
cates of inner sense, representations and thought, are not
inconsistent with its nature. Accordingly, even granting the
human soul to be simple in nature, such simplicity by no
means suffices to distinguish it from matter, in respect of
the substratum of the latter -- if, that is to say, we consider
matter, as indeed we ought to, as mere appearance.
If matter were a thing in itself, it would, as a composite
being, be entirely different from the soul, as a simple being. But
matter is mere outer appearance, the substratum of which can-
not be known through any predicate that we can assign to it.
I can therefore very well admit the possibility that it is in itself
simple, although owing to the manner in which it affects our
senses it produces in us the intuition of the extended and so of
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the composite. I may further assume that the substance which
in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the
possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by means of
its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way,
what in one relation is entitled corporeal would in another
relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts
we cannot intuit, though we can indeed intuit their signs in
the [field of] appearance. Accordingly, the thesis that only
souls (as particular kinds of substances) think, would have
to be given up; and we should have to fall back on the
common expression that men think, that is, that the very
same being which, as outer appearance, is extended, is (in
itself) internally a subject, and is not composite, but is simple
and thinks.
But, without committing ourselves in regard to such hypo-
theses, we can make this general remark. If I understand by
soul a thinking being in itself, the question whether or not it is
the same in kind as matter -- matter not being a thing in itself,
but merely a species of representations in us -- is by its very
terms illegitimate. For it is obvious that a thing in itself is of a
different nature from the determinations which constitute only
its state.
If, on the other hand, we compare the thinking 'I' not with
matter but with the intelligible that lies at the basis of the
outer appearance which we call matter, we have no knowledge
whatsoever of the intelligible, and therefore are in no position
to say that the soul is in any inward respect different from it.
The simple consciousness is not, therefore, knowledge of
the simple nature of the self as subject, such as might enable us
to distinguish it from matter, as from a composite being.
If, therefore, in the only case in which this concept can be
of service, namely, in the comparison of myself with objects of
outer experience, it does not suffice for determining what is
specific and distinctive in the nature of the self, then though
we may still profess to know that the thinking 'I', the soul (a
name for the transcendental object of inner sense), is simple,
such a way of speaking has no sort of application to real ob-
jects, and therefore cannot in the least extend our knowledge.
P 341
Thus the whole of rational psychology is involved in the
collapse of its main support. Here as little as elsewhere can we
hope to extend our knowledge through mere concepts -- still
less by means of the merely subjective form of all our concepts,
consciousness -- in the absence of any relation to possible ex-
perience. For [as we have thus found], even the fundamental
concept of a simple nature is such that it can never be met
with in any experience, and such, therefore, that there is no
way of attaining to it, as an objectively valid concept.
THIRD PARALOGISM: OF PERSONALITY
That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself
at different times is in so far a person.
Now the soul is conscious, etc.
Therefore it is a person.
Critique of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
If I want to know through experience, the numerical iden-
tity of an external object, I shall pay heed to that permanent
element in the appearance to which as subject everything else
is related as determination, and note its identity throughout the
time in which the determinations change. Now I am an object
of inner sense, and all time is merely the form of inner sense.
Consequently, I refer each and all of my successive determina-
tions to the numerically identical self, and do so throughout
time, that is, in the form of the inner intuition of myself. This
being so, the personality of the soul has to be regarded not as
inferred but as a completely identical proposition of self-con-
sciousness in time; and this, indeed, is why it is valid a priori.
For it really says nothing more than that in the whole time in
which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as
belonging to the unity of myself; and it comes to the same
whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity,
or that I am to be found as numerically identical in all this time.
In my own consciousness, therefore, identity of person is
unfailingly met with. But if I view myself from the standpoint
of another person (as object of his outer intuition), it is this
P 342
outer observer who first represents me in time, for in the apper-
ception time is represented, strictly speaking, only in me. Al-
though he admits, therefore, the 'I', which accompanies, and
indeed with complete identity, all representations at all times
in my consciousness, he will draw no inference from this to the
objective permanence of myself. For just as the time in which
the observer sets me is not the time of my own but of his sensi-
bility, so the identity which is necessarily bound up with my
consciousness is not therefore bound up with his, that is, with
the consciousness which contains the outer intuition of my
subject.
The identity of the consciousness of myself at different
times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and
their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of
my subject. Despite the logical identity of the 'I', such a change
may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of
its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding
'I', which in every different state, even in one involving change
of the [thinking] subject, might still retain the thought of the
preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent
subject.
Although the dictum of certain ancient schools, that every-
thing in the world is in a flux and nothing is permanent and
abiding, cannot be reconciled with the admission of sub-
stances, it is not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness.
++ An elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a
straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion, and there-
fore its whole state (that is, if we take account only of the positions
in space). If, then, in analogy with such bodies, we postulate sub-
stances such that the one communicates to the other representations
together with the consciousness of them, we can conceive a whole
series of substances of which the first transmits its state together
with its consciousness to the second, the second its own state with
that of the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the
states of all the preceding substances together with its own conscious-
ness and with their consciousness to another. The last substance
would then be conscious of all the states of the previously changed
substances, as being its own states, because they would have been
transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. And yet it
would not have been one and the same person in all these states.
P 343
For we are unable from our own consciousness to determine
whether, as souls, we are permanent or not. Since we reckon
as belonging to our identical self only that of which we are
conscious, we must necessarily judge that we are one and the
same throughout the whole time of which we are conscious.
We cannot, however, claim that this judgment would be valid
from the standpoint of an outside observer. For since the only
permanent appearance which we encounter in the soul is the
representation 'I' that accompanies and connects them all, we
are unable to prove that this 'I', a mere thought, may not be
in the same state of flux as the other thoughts which, by
means of it, are linked up with one another.
It is indeed strange that personality, and its presupposi-
tion, permanence, and therefore the substantiality of the soul,
should have to be proved at this stage and not earlier. For
could we have presupposed these latter [permanence and sub-
stantiality], there would follow, not indeed the continuance of
consciousness, yet at least the possibility of a continuing con-
sciousness in an abiding subject, and that is already sufficient
for personality. For personality does not itself at once cease
because its activity is for a time interrupted. This permanence,
however, is in no way given prior to that numerical identity
of our self which we infer from identical apperception, but
on the contrary is inferred first from the numerical identity.
(If the argument proceeded aright, the concept of substance,
which is applicable only empirically, would first be brought
in after such proof of numerical identity. ) Now, since this
identity of person [presupposing, as it does, numerical iden-
tity] in nowise follows from the identity of the 'I' in the con-
sciousness of all the time in which I know myself, we could
not, earlier in the argument, have founded upon it the sub-
stantiality of the soul.
Meanwhile we may still retain the concept of personality
just as we have retained the concept of substance and of the
simple -- in so far as it is merely transcendental, that is, con-
cerns the unity of the subject, otherwise unknown to us,
in the determinations of which there is a thoroughgoing
connection through apperception. Taken in this way, the con-
cept is necessary for practical employment and is sufficient for
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such use; but we can never parade it as an extension of our
self-knowledge through pure reason, and as exhibiting to us
from the mere concept of the identical self an unbroken con-
tinuance of the subject. For this concept revolves perpetually
in a circle, and does not help us in respect to any question
which aims at synthetic knowledge. What matter may be as a
thing in itself (transcendental object) is completely unknown
to us, though, owing to its being represented as something ex-
ternal, its permanence as appearance can indeed be observed.
But if I want to observe the mere 'I' in the change of all repre-
sentations, I have no other correlatum to use in my comparisons
except again myself, with the universal conditions of my con-
sciousness. Consequently, I can give none but tautological
answers to all questions, in that I substitute my concept and
its unity for the properties which belong to myself as object,
and so take for granted that which the questioner has desired
to know.
THE FOURTH PARALOGISM: OF IDEALITY
(IN REGARD TO OUTER RELATION)
That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause
of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.
Now all outer appearances are of such a nature that their
existence is not immediately perceived, and that we can only
infer them as the cause of given perceptions.
Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is
doubtful. This uncertainty I entitle the ideality of outer appear-
ances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called idealism, as
distinguished from the counter-assertion of a possible certainty
in regard to objects of outer sense, which is called dualism.
Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
Let us first examine the premisses. We are justified, [it is
argued], in maintaining that only what is in ourselves can be
perceived immediately, and that my own existence is the sole
object of a mere perception. The existence, therefore, of an
actual object outside me (if this word 'me' be taken in the
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intellectual [not in the empirical] sense) is never given directly
in perception. Perception is a modification of inner sense, and
the existence of the outer object can be added to it only in
thought, as being its outer cause, and accordingly as being
inferred. For the same reason, Descartes was justified in
limiting all perception, in the narrowest sense of that term, to
the proposition, 'I, as a thinking being, exist. ' Obviously, since
what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my
apperception, nor therefore in any perception, which, properly
regarded, is merely the determination of apperception.
I am not, therefore, in a position to perceive external things,
but can only infer their existence from my inner perception,
taking the inner perception as the effect of which something
external is the proximate cause. Now the inference from a
given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since
the effect may be due to more than one cause. Accordingly, as
regards the relation of the perception to its cause, it always
remains doubtful whether the cause be internal or external;
whether, that is to say, all the so-called outer perceptions are
not a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they stand in
relation to actual external objects as their cause. At all events,
the existence of the latter is only inferred, and is open to all
the dangers of inference, whereas the object of inner sense (I
myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived,
and its existence does not allow of being doubted.
The term 'idealist' is not, therefore, to be understood as
applying to those who deny the existence of external objects
of the senses, but only to those who do not admit that their
existence is known through immediate perception, and who
therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any possible
experience, be completely certain as to their reality.
Before exhibiting our paralogism in all its deceptive
illusoriness, I have first to remark that we must necessarily
distinguish two types of idealism, the transcendental and the
empirical. By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine
that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all,
representations only, not things in themselves, and that time
and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition,
not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor con-
ditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. To this ideal-
P 346
ism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards
time and space as something given in themselves, independ-
ently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus inter-
prets outer appearances (their reality being taken as granted)
as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of
our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us -- the phrase
'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with pure con-
cepts of understanding. It is, in fact, this transcendental realist
who afterwards plays the part of empirical idealist. After
wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be
external, must have an existence by themselves, and inde-
pendently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point
of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to
establish their reality.
The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an
empirical realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may
admit the existence of matter without going outside his mere
self-consciousness, or assuming anything more than the cer-
tainty of his representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. For
he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be
appearance merely; and appearance, if separated from our
sensibility, is nothing. Matter is with him, therefore, only a
species of representations (intuition), which are called external,
not as standing in relation to objects in themselves external,
but because they relate perceptions to the space in which all
things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is
in us.
From the start, we have declared ourselves in favour of
this transcendental idealism; and our doctrine thus removes
all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter
on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of
declaring it to be thereby proved in the same manner as the
existence of myself as a thinking being is proved. There can
be no question that I am conscious of my representations;
these representations and I myself, who have the representa-
tions, therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are
mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of
my representations, the objects of which are something only
through these representations. Apart from them they are
nothing. Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and
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both indeed, upon the immediate witness of my self-conscious-
ness. The only difference is that the representation of myself,
as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while
the representations which mark extended beings belong also
to outer sense. In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects
I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in re-
gard to the reality of the object of my inner sense, that is, in
regard to the reality of my thoughts. For in both cases alike the
objects are nothing but representations, the immediate per-
ception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a suffi-
cient proof of their reality.
The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical real-
ist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does
not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived.
Transcendental realism, on the other hand, inevitably falls
into difficulties, and finds itself obliged to give way to em-
pirical idealism, in that it regards the objects of outer sense as
something distinct from the senses themselves, treating mere
appearances as self-subsistent beings, existing outside us. On
such a view as this, however clearly we may be conscious of
our representation of these things, it is still far from certain
that, if the representation exists, there exists also the object
corresponding to it. In our system, on the other hand, these
external things, namely matter, are in all their configurations
and alterations nothing but mere appearances, that is, repre-
sentations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately
conscious.
Since, so far as I know, all psychologists who adopt em-
pirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have cer-
tainly proceeded quite consistently in ascribing great import-
ance to empirical idealism, as one of the problems in regard to
which the human mind is quite at a loss how to proceed. For
if we regard outer appearances as representations produced in
us by their objects, and if these objects be things existing in
themselves outside us, it is indeed impossible to see how we can
come to know the existence of the objects otherwise than by in-
ference from the effect to the cause; and this being so, it must
always remain doubtful whether the cause in question be in
us or outside us. We can indeed admit that something, which
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may be (in the transcendental sense) outside us, is the cause of
our outer intuitions, but this is not the object of which we are
thinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal
things; for these are merely appearances, that is, mere kinds of
representation, which are never to be met with save in us, and
the reality of which depends on immediate consciousness, just
as does the consciousness of my own thoughts. The transcend-
ental object is equally unknown in respect to inner and to
outer intuition. But it is not of this that we are here speaking,
but of the empirical object, which is called an external object
if it is represented in space, and an inner object if it is repre-
sented only in its time-relations. Neither space nor time, how-
ever, is to be found save in us.
The expression 'outside us' is thus unavoidably ambiguous
in meaning, sometimes signifying what as thing in itself exists
apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer
appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept, in the
latter sense -- the sense in which the psychological question as
to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood --
quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external
objects from those which may be said to be external in the
transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former 'things
which are to be found in space'.
Space and time are indeed a priori representations, which
dwell in us as forms of our sensible intuition, before any real
object, determining our sense through sensation, has enabled
us to represent the object under those sensible relations. But
the material or real element, the something which is to be
intuited in space, necessarily presupposes perception. Per-
ception exhibits the reality of something in space; and in the
absence of perception no power of imagination can invent and
produce that something. It is sensation, therefore, that indicates
a reality in space or in time, according as it is related to the one
or to the other mode of sensible intuition. (Once sensation is
given -- if referred to an object in general, though not as deter-
mining that object, it is entitled perception -- thanks to its mani-
foldness we can picture in imagination many objects which have
no empirical place in space or time outside the imagination. )
P 349
This admits of no doubt; whether we take pleasure and pain,
or the sensations of the outer senses, colours, heat, etc. , per-
ception is that whereby the material required to enable us to
think objects of sensible intuition must first be given. This
perception, therefore (to consider, for the moment, only outer
intuitions), represents something real in space. For, in the first
place, while space is the representation of a mere possibility
of coexistence, perception is the representation of a reality.
Secondly, this reality is represented in outer sense, that is, in
space. Thirdly, space is itself nothing but mere representation,
and therefore nothing in it can count as real save only what
is represented in it; and conversely, what is given in it, that
is, represented through perception, is also real in it. For if it
were not real, that is, immediately given through empirical
intuition, it could not be pictured in imagination, since what
is real in intuitions cannot be invented a priori.
All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of
something real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this
sense empirical realism is beyond question; that is, there
corresponds to our outer intuitions something real in space.
Space itself, with all its appearances, as representations, is,
indeed, only in me, but nevertheless the real, that is, the
material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this
space, independently of all imaginative invention. Also, it is
impossible that in this space anything outside us (in the tran-
scendental sense) should be given, space itself being nothing
outside our sensibility. Even the most rigid idealist cannot,
therefore, require a proof that the object outside us (taking
'outside' in the strict [transcendental] sense) corresponds to
our perception.
++ We must give full credence to this paradoxical but correct pro-
position, that there is nothing in space save what is represented in it.
For space is itself nothing but representation, and whatever is in it
must therefore be contained in the representation. Nothing whatso-
ever is in space, save in so far as it is actually represented in it. It is
a proposition which must indeed sound strange, that a thing can exist
only in the representation of it, but in this case the objection falls,
inasmuch as the things with which we are here concerned are not
things in themselves, but appearances only, that is, representations.
P 349
For if there be any such object, it could not be
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represented and intuited as outside us, because such repre-
sentation and intuition presuppose space, and reality in space,
being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing other
than perception itself. The real of outer appearances is there-
fore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way.
From perceptions knowledge of objects can be generated,
either by mere play of imagination or by way of experience;
and in the process there may, no doubt, arise illusory repre-
sentations to which the objects do not correspond, the decep-
tion being attributable sometimes to a delusion of imagination
(in dreams) and sometimes to an error of judgment in so-called
sense-deception). To avoid such deceptive illusion, we have
to proceed according to the rule: Whatever is connected with a
perception according to empirical laws, is actual. But such
deception, as well as the provision against it, affects idealism
quite as much as dualism, inasmuch as we are concerned only
with the form of experience. Empirical idealism, and its mis-
taken questionings as to the objective reality of our outer
perceptions, is already sufficiently refuted, when it has been
shown that outer perception yields immediate proof of some-
thing actual in space, and that this space, although in itself
only a mere form of representations, has objective reality in
relation to all outer appearances, which also are nothing else
than mere representations; and when it has likewise been
shown that in the absence of perception even imagining and
dreaming are not possible, and that our outer senses, as regards
the data from which experience can arise, have therefore their
actual corresponding objects in space.
The dogmatic idealist would be one who denies the exist-
ence of matter, the sceptical idealist one who doubts its exist-
ence, because holding it to be incapable of proof. The former
must base his view on supposed contradictions in the pos-
sibility of there being such a thing as matter at all -- a view
with which we have not yet been called upon to deal. The
following section on dialectical inferences, which represents
reason as in strife with itself in regard to the concepts which
it makes for itself of the possibility of what belongs to the
P 351
connection of experience, will remove this difficulty. The
sceptical idealist, however, who merely challenges the ground
of our assertion and denounces as insufficiently justified our
conviction of the existence of matter, which we thought to
base on immediate perception, is a benefactor of human
reason in so far as he compels us, even in the smallest ad-
vances of ordinary experience, to keep on the watch, lest we
consider as a well-earned possession what we perhaps obtain
only illegitimately. We are now in a position to appreciate
the value of these idealist objections. Unless we mean to
contradict ourselves in our commonest assertions, they drive
us by main force to view all our perceptions, whether we
call them inner or outer, as a consciousness only of what is
dependent on our sensibility. They also compel us to view the
outer objects of these perceptions not as things in themselves,
but only as representations, of which, as of every other repre-
sentation, we can become immediately conscious, and which
are entitled outer because they depend on what we call 'outer
sense', whose intuition is space. Space itself, however, is noth-
ing but an inner mode of representation in which certain
perceptions are connected with one another.
If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite
impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge
of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on
the representation which is in us. For we cannot be sentient
[of what is] outside ourselves, but only [of what is] in us, and
the whole of our self-consciousness therefore yields nothing
save merely our own determinations. Sceptical idealism thus
constrains us to have recourse to the only refuge still open,
namely, the ideality of all appearances, a doctrine which
has already been established in the Transcendental Aesthetic
independently of these consequences, which we could not at
that stage foresee. If then we ask, whether it follows that in the
doctrine of the soul dualism alone is tenable, we must answer:
'Yes, certainly; but dualism only in the empirical sense'. That
is to say, in the connection of experience matter, as substance
in the [field of] appearance, is really given to outer sense, just as
the thinking 'I', also as substance in the [field of] appearance,
is given to inner sense. Further, appearances in both fields
P 352
must be connected with each other according to the rules which
this category introduces into that connection of our outer as
well as of our inner perceptions whereby they constitute one ex-
perience. If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend
the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense,
neither it nor the two counter-alternatives -- pneumatism on
the one hand, materialism on the other -- would have any sort
of basis, since we should then have misapplied our concepts,
taking the difference in the mode of representing objects, which,
as regards what they are in themselves, still remain unknown
to us, as a difference in the things themselves. Though the 'I',
as represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space
outside me, are specifically quite distinct appearances, they
are not for that reason thought as being different things.
Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer ap-
pearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself
either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us un-
known) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical
concept of the former as well as of the latter mode of exist-
ence.
If then, as this critical argument obviously compels us to
do, we hold fast to the rule above established, and do not push
our questions beyond the limits within which possible experi-
ence can present us with its object, we shall never dream of
seeking to inform ourselves about the objects of our senses as
they are in themselves, that is, out of all relation to the senses.
But if the psychologist takes appearances for things in them-
selves, and as existing in and by themselves, then whether he
be a materialist who admits into his system nothing but matter
alone, or a spiritualist who admits only thinking beings (that
is, beings with the form of our inner sense), or a dualist who
accepts both, he will always, owing to this misunderstanding,
be entangled in pseudo-rational speculations as to how that
which is not a thing in itself, but only the appearance of a
thing in general, can exist by itself.
Consideration of Pure Psychology as a whole,
in view of these Paralogisms
If we compare the doctrine of the soul as the physiology of
inner sense, with the doctrine of the body as a physiology of
P 353
the object of the outer senses, we find that while in both much
can be learnt empirically, there is yet this notable difference
In the latter science much that is a priori can be synthetically
known from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable
being, but in the former nothing whatsoever that is a priori
can be known synthetically from the concept of a thinking
being. The cause is this. Although both are appearances,
the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding
which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory
determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely,
that of space and of an appearance in space; whereas time,
which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing
abiding, and therefore yields knowledge only of the change
of determinations, not of any object that can be thereby deter-
mined. For in what we entitle 'soul', everything is in con-
tinual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so
express ourselves) the 'I', which is simple solely because its
representation has no content, and therefore no manifold, and
for this reason seems to represent, or (to use a more correct
term) denote, a simple object. In order that it should be possible,
by pure reason, to obtain knowledge of the nature of a thinking
being in general, this 'I' would have to be an intuition which,
in being presupposed in all thought (prior to all experience),
might as intuition yield a priori synthetic propositions. This
'I' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any
object; it is the mere form of consciousness, which can accom-
pany the two kinds of representation and which is in a position
to elevate them to the rank of knowledge only in so far as some-
thing else is given in intuition which provides material for a
representation of an object. Thus the whole of rational psy-
chology, as a science surpassing all powers of human reason,
proves abortive, and nothing is left for us but to study our soul
under the guidance of experience, and to confine ourselves
to those questions which do not go beyond the limits within
which a content can be provided for them by possible inner
experience.
But although rational psychology cannot be used to extend
knowledge, and when so employed is entirely made up of
value, if it is taken as nothing more than a critical treatment
P 354
of our dialectical inferences, those that arise from the common
and natural reason of men.
Why do we have resort to a doctrine of the soul founded
exclusively on pure principles of reason? Beyond all doubt,
chiefly in order to secure our thinking self against the danger
of materialism. This is achieved by means of the pure con-
cept of our thinking self which we have just given. For by
this teaching so completely are we freed from the fear that on
the removal of matter all thought, and even the very existence
of thinking beings, would be destroyed, that on the contrary
it is clearly shown, that if I remove the thinking subject the
whole corporeal world must at once vanish: it is nothing save
an appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a mode
of its representations.
I admit that this does not give me any further knowledge
of the properties of this thinking self, nor does it enable me to
determine its permanence or even that it exists independently
of what we may conjecture to be the transcendental sub-
stratum of outer appearances; for the latter is just as un-
known to me as is the thinking self. But it is nevertheless
possible that I may find cause, on other than merely specu-
lative grounds, to hope for an independent and continuing
existence of my thinking nature, throughout all possible change
of my state. In that case much will already have been gained
if, while freely confessing my own ignorance, I am yet in a
position to repel the dogmatic assaults of a speculative op-
ponent, and to show him that he can never know more of the
nature of the self in denying the possibility of my expectations
than I can know in clinging to them.
Three other dialectical questions, constituting the real
goal of rational psychology, are grounded on this transcend-
ental illusion in our psychological concepts, and cannot be
decided except by means of the above enquiries: namely (1) of
the possibility of the communion of the soul with an organised
body, i.e. concerning animality and the state of the soul in the
life of man; (2) of the beginning of this communion, that is, of
the soul in and before birth; (3) of the end of this communion,
that is, of the soul in and after death (the question of im-
mortality).
P 355
Now I maintain that all the difficulties commonly found in
these questions, and by means of which, as dogmatic objections,
men seek to gain credit for a deeper insight into the nature of
things than any to which the ordinary understanding can
properly lay claim, rest on a mere delusion by which they
hypostatise what exists merely in thought, and take it as a real
object existing, in the same character, outside the thinking sub-
ject. In other words, they regard extension, which is nothing
but appearance, as a property of outer things that subsists
even apart from our sensibility, and hold that motion is
due to these things and really occurs in and by itself, apart
from our senses. For matter, the communion of which with
the soul arouses so much questioning, is nothing but a mere
form, or a particular way of representing an unknown object
by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. There
may well be something outside us to which this appearance,
which we call matter, corresponds; in its character of appear-
ance it is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us,
although this thought, owing to the above-mentioned outer
sense, represents it as existing outside us. Matter, therefore,
does not mean a kind of substance quite distinct and hetero-
geneous from the object of inner sense (the soul), but only the
distinctive nature of those appearances of objects -- in them-
selves unknown to us -- the representations of which we call
outer as compared with those which we count as belonging to
inner sense, although like all other thoughts these outer repre-
sentations belong only to the thinking subject. They have,
indeed, this deceptive property that, representing objects in
space, they detach themselves as it were from the soul and
appear to hover outside it. Yet the very space in which they
are intuited is nothing but a representation, and no counter-
part of the same quality is to be found outside the soul. Con-
sequently, the question is no longer of the communion of the
soul with other known substances of a different kind outside us,
but only of the connection of the representations of inner sense
with the modifications of our outer sensibility -- as to how these
can be so connected with each other according to settled laws
that they exhibit the unity of a coherent experience.
As long as we take inner and outer appearances together
as mere representations in experience, we find nothing absurd
P 356
and strange in the association of the two kinds of senses. But
as soon as we hypostatise outer appearances and come to re-
gard them not as representations but as things existing by them-
selves outside us, with the same quality as that with which they
exist in us, and as bringing to bear on our thinking subject the
activities which they exhibit as appearances in relation to each
other, then the efficient causes outside us assume a character
which is irreconcilable with their effects in us. For the cause re-
lates only to outer sense, the effect to inner sense -- senses which,
although combined in one subject, are extremely unlike each
other. In outer sense we find no other outer effects save changes
of place, and no forces except mere tendencies which issue in
spatial relations as their effects. Within us, on the other hand,
the effects are thoughts, among which is not to be found any
relation of place, motion, shape, or other spatial determina-
tion, and we altogether lose the thread of the causes in the
effects to which they are supposed to have given rise in inner
sense. We ought, however, to bear in mind that bodies are
not objects in themselves which are present to us, but a mere
appearance of we know not what unknown object; that motion
is not the effect of this unknown cause, but only the appearance
of its influence on our senses. Neither bodies nor motions are
anything outside us; both alike are mere representations in us;
and it is not, therefore, the motion of matter that produces re-
presentations in us; the motion itself is representation only, as
also is the matter which makes itself known in this way. Thus
in the end the whole difficulty which we have made for our-
selves comes to this, how and why the representations of our
sensibility are so interconnected that those which we entitle
outer intuitions can be represented according to empirical
laws as objects outside us -- a question which is not in any
way bound up with the supposed difficulty of explaining
the origin of our representations from quite heterogeneous
efficient causes outside us. That difficulty has arisen from
our taking the appearances of an unknown cause as being
the cause itself outside us, a view which can result in no-
thing but confusion. In the case of judgments in which a
misapprehension has taken deep root through long custom,
it is impossible at once to give to their correction that clarity
P 357
which can be achieved in other cases where no such inevitable
illusion confuses the concept. Our freeing of reason from
sophistical theories can hardly, therefore, at this stage have
the clearness which is necessary for its complete success.
The following comments will, I think, be helpful as contri-
buting towards this ultimate clarity.
All objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical, and
sceptical. A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposi-
tion, a critical objection against the proof of a proposition.
The former requires an insight into the nature of the object
such that we can maintain the opposite of what the proposi-
tion has alleged in regard to this object. It is therefore itself
dogmatic, claiming acquaintance with the constitution of the
object fuller than that of the counter-assertion. A critical objec-
tion, since it leaves the validity or invalidity of the proposition
unchallenged, and assails only the proof, does not presuppose
fuller acquaintance with the object or oblige us to claim
superior knowledge of its nature; it shows only that the asser-
tion is unsupported, not that it is wrong. A sceptical objec-
tion sets assertion and counter-assertion in mutual opposition
to each other as having equal weight, treating each in turn as
dogma and the other as the objection thereto. And the con-
flict, as the being thus seemingly dogmatic on both the oppos-
ing sides, is taken as showing that all judgment in regard
to the object is completely null and void. Thus dogmatic
and sceptical objections alike lay claim to such insight into
their object as is required to assert or to deny something in
regard to it. A critical objection, on the other hand, confines
itself to pointing out that in the making of the assertion some-
thing has been presupposed that is void and merely fictitious;
and it thus overthrows the theory by removing its alleged
foundation without claiming to establish anything that
bears directly upon the constitution of the object.
So long as we hold to the ordinary concepts of our
reason with regard to the communion in which our thinking
subject stands with the things outside us, we are dogmatic,
looking upon them as real objects existing independently of
us, in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism which
does not assign these outer appearances to the subject as
representations, but sets them, just as they are given us in
P 358
sensible intuition, as objects outside us, completely separ-
ating them from the thinking subject. This subreption is
the basis of all theories in regard to the communion between
soul and body. The objective reality thus assigned to ap-
pearances is never brought into question. On the contrary,
it is taken for granted; the theorising is merely as to the
mode in which it has to be explained and understood. There
are three usual systems devised on these lines, and they are
indeed the only possible systems: that of physical influence,
that of predetermined harmony, and that of supernatural
intervention.
The two last methods of explaining the communion be-
tween the soul and matter are based on objections to the first
view, which is that of common sense. It is argued, namely, that
what appears as matter cannot by its immediate influence be
the cause of representations, these being effects which are
quite different in kind from matter. Now those who take this
line cannot attach to what they understand by 'object of outer
senses' the concept of a matter which is nothing but ap-
pearance, and so itself a mere representation produced by
some sort of outer objects. For in that case they would be say-
ing that the representations of outer objects (appearances) can-
not be outer causes of the representations in our mind; and
this would be a quite meaningless objection, since no one could
dream of holding that what he has once come to recognise as
mere representation, is an outer cause. On our principles they
can establish their theory only by showing that that which is
the true (transcendental) object of our outer senses cannot be
the cause of those representations (appearances) which we
comprehend under the title 'matter'. No one, however, can
have the right to claim that he knows anything in regard to the
transcendental cause of our representations of the outer senses;
and their assertion is therefore entirely groundless. If, on the
other hand, those who profess to improve upon the doctrine of
physical influence keep to the ordinary outlook of transcend-
ental dualism, and suppose matter, as such, to be a thing-in-
itself (not the mere appearance of an unknown thing), they will
direct their objection to showing that such an outer object,
which in itself exhibits no causality save that of movements,
can never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a
P 359
third entity must intervene to establish, if not reciprocal inter-
action, at least correspondence and harmony between the two.
But in arguing in this way, they begin their refutation by ad-
mitting into their dualism the proton pseudos of [a doctrine of]
physical influence, and consequently their objection is not so
much a disproof of natural influence as of their own dualistic
presupposition. For the difficulties in regard to the connection
of our thinking nature with matter have their origin, one and
all, in the illicitly assumed dualistic view, that matter as such
is not appearance, that is, a mere representation of the mind
to which an unknown object corresponds, but is the object in
itself as it exists outside us independently of all sensibility.
As against the commonly accepted doctrine of physical in-
fluence, an objection of the dogmatic type is not, therefore,
practicable. For if the opponent of the doctrine accepts the
view that matter and its motion are mere appearances and so
themselves mere representations, his difficulty is then simply
this, that it is impossible that the unknown object of our sensi-
bility should be the cause of the representations in us. He can-
not, however, have the least justification for any such conten-
tion, since no one is in a position to decide what an unknown
object may or may not be able to do. And this transcendental
idealism, as we have just proved, he cannot but concede. His
only way of escape would be frankly to hypostatise representa-
tions, and to set them outside himself as real things.
The doctrine of physical influence, in its ordinary form,
is, however, subject to a well-founded critical objection. The
alleged communion between two kinds of substances, the
thinking and the extended, rests on a crude dualism, and
treats the extended substances, which are really nothing
but mere representations of the thinking subject, as existing
by themselves. This mistaken interpretation of physical in-
fluence can thus be effectively disposed of: we have shown
that the proof of it is void and illicit.
The much-discussed question of the communion between
the thinking and the extended, if we leave aside all that is
merely fictitious, comes then simply to this: how in a thinking
subject outer intuition, namely, that of space, with its filling-
in of shape and motion, is possible. And this is a question
which no man can possibly answer. This gap in our knowledge
P 360
can never be filled; all that can be done is to indicate it through
the ascription of outer appearances to that transcendental ob-
ject which is the cause of this species of representations, but of
which we can have no knowledge whatsoever and of which we
shall never acquire any concept. In all problems which may
arise in the field of experience we treat these appearances as
objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the
primary ground of their possibility (as appearances). But to
advance beyond these limits the concept of a transcendental
object would be indispensably required.
The settlement of all disputes or objections which concern
the state of the thinking nature prior to this communion (prior
to life), or after the cessation of such communion (in death),
rests upon these considerations regarding the communion
between thinking beings and extended beings. The opinion
that the thinking subject has been capable of thought prior to
any communion with bodies would now appear as an assertion
that, prior to the beginning of the species of sensibility in
virtue of which something appears to us in space, those tran-
scendental objects, which in our present state appear as bodies,
could have been intuited in an entirely different manner. The
opinion that the soul after the cessation of all communion with
the corporeal world could still continue to think, would be
formulated as the view that, if that species of sensibility, in
virtue of which transcendental objects, at present quite un-
known to us, appear as a material world, should cease, all in-
tuition of the transcendental objects would not for that reason
be removed, and it would still be quite possible that those same
unknown objects should continue to be known by the thinking
subject, though no longer, indeed, in the quality of bodies.
Now on speculative principles no one can give the least
ground for any such assertion. Even the possibility of what is
asserted cannot be established; it can only be assumed. But it
is equally impossible for anyone to bring any valid dogmatic
objection against it. For whoever he may be, he knows just as
little of the absolute, inner cause of outer corporeal appear-
ances as I or anybody else. Since he cannot, therefore, offer
any justification for claiming to know on what the outer ap-
pearances in our present state (that of life) really rest,
neither can he know that the condition of all outer intui-
P 361
tion or the thinking subject itself, will cease with this state
(in death).
Thus all controversy in regard to the nature of the thinking
being and its connection with the corporeal world is merely a re-
sult of filling the gap where knowledge is wholly lacking to us
with paralogisms of reason, treating our thoughts as things and
hypostatising them. Hence originates an imaginary science,
imaginary both in the case of him who affirms and of him
who denies, since all parties either suppose some knowledge
of objects of which no human being has any concept, or treat
their own representations as objects, and so revolve in a per-
petual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but
the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just, can free us from
this dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined
felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems.
Such a critique confines all our speculative claims rigidly to
the field of possible experience; and it does this not by shallow
scoffing at ever-repeated failures or pious sighs over the limits
of our reason, but by an effective determining of these limits
in accordance with established principles, inscribing its nihil
ulterius on those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has
erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be ex-
tended no further than the continuous coastline of experience
itself reaches -- a coast we cannot leave without venturing
upon a shoreless ocean which, after alluring us with ever-
deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as
hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour.
* * *
We still owe the reader a clear general exposition of the
transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of
pure reason, and also a justification of the systematic ordering
of them which runs parallel with the table of the categories.
We could not have attempted to do so at the beginning of this
section without running the risk of becoming obscure or of
clumsily anticipating the course of our argument. We shall
now try to fulfil this obligation.
All illusion may be said to consist in treating the subjective
condition of thinking as being knowledge of the object. Further
in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic we have
P 362
shown that pure reason concerns itself solely with the totality
of the synthesis of the conditions, for a given conditioned. Now
since the dialectical illusion of pure reason cannot be an em-
pirical illusion, such as occurs in certain specific instances of
empirical knowledge, it will relate to what is universal in the
conditions of thinking, and there will therefore be only three
cases of the dialectical employment of pure reason.
1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general.
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking.
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking.
In all these three cases pure reason occupies itself only
with the absolute totality of this synthesis, that is, with that
condition which is itself unconditioned. On this division is
founded the threefold transcendental illusion which gives
occasion for the three main sections of the Dialectic, and for
the three pretended sciences of pure reason -- transcendental
psychology, cosmology, and theology. Here we are concerned
only with the first.
Since, in thinking in general, we abstract from all relation
of the thought to any object (whether of the senses or of the
pure understanding), the synthesis of the conditions of a
thought in general (No. 1) is not objective at all, but merely a
synthesis of the thought with the subject, which is mistaken
for a synthetic representation of an object.
It follows from this that the dialectical inference to the
condition of all thought in general, which is itself uncon-
ditioned, does not commit a material error (for it abstracts
from all content or objects), but is defective in form alone, and
must therefore be called a paralogism.
Further, since the one condition which accompanies all
thought is the 'I' in the universal proposition 'I think',
reason has to deal with this condition in so far as it is itself
unconditioned. It is only the formal condition, namely, the
logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all
objects; but nevertheless it is represented as an object which I
think, namely, I myself and its unconditioned unity.
If anyone propounds to me the question, 'What is the con-
P 363
stitution of a thing which thinks? ', I have no a priori know-
ledge wherewith to reply. For the answer has to be synthetic --
an analytic answer will perhaps explain what is meant by
thought, but beyond this cannot yield any knowledge of that
upon which this thought depends for its possibility. For a
synthetic solution, however, intuition is always required; and
owing to the highly general character of the problem, intuition
has been left entirely out of account. Similarly no one can answer
in all its generality the question, 'What must a thing be, to be
movable? ' For the question contains no trace of the answer,
viz. impenetrable extension (matter). But although I have no
general answer to the former question, it still seems as if I
could reply in the special case of the proposition which ex-
presses self-consciousness -- 'I think'. For this 'I' is the primary
subject, that is, substance; it is simple, etc. But these would
then have to be propositions derived from experience, and in
the absence of a universal rule which expresses the conditions
of the possibility of thought in general and a priori, they could
not contain any such non-empirical predicates. Suspicion is
thus thrown on the view, which at first seemed to me so
plausible, that we can form judgments about the nature of a
thinking being, and can do so from concepts alone. But the
error in this way of thinking has not yet been detected.
Further investigation into the origin of the attributes which
I ascribe to myself as a thinking being in general can, however,
show in what the error consists. These attributes are nothing
but pure categories, by which I do not think a determinate ob-
ject but only the unity of the representations -- in order to deter-
mine an object for them. In the absence of an underlying intui-
tion the category cannot by itself yield a concept of an object; for
by intuition alone is the object given, which thereupon is thought
in accordance with the category. If I am to declare a thing to
be a substance in the [field of] appearance, predicates of its in-
tuition must first be given me, and I must be able to distinguish
in these the permanent from the transitory and the substratum
(the thing itself) from what is merely inherent in it. If I call a
thing in the [field of] appearance simple, I mean by this that
the intuition of it, although a part of the appearance, is not
P 364
itself capable of being divided into parts, etc. But if I know
something as simple in concept only and not in the [field of]
appearance, I have really no knowledge whatsoever of the
object, but only of the concept which I make for myself of a
something in general that does not allow of being intuited. I
say that I think something as completely simple, only because
I have really nothing more to say of it than merely that it is
something.
Now the bare apperception, 'I', is in concept substance, in
concept simple, etc. ; and in this sense all those psychological
doctrines are unquestionably true. Yet this does not give us
that knowledge of the soul for which we are seeking. For since
none of these predicates are valid of intuition, they cannot
have any consequences which are applicable to objects of
experience, and are therefore entirely void. The concept of
substance does not teach me that the soul endures by itself,
nor that it is a part of outer intuitions which cannot itself be
divided into parts, and cannot therefore arise or perish by any
natural alterations. These are properties which would make
the soul known to me in the context of experience and might
reveal something concerning its origin and future state. But
if I say, in terms of the mere category, 'The soul is a simple
substance', it is obvious that since the bare concept of sub-
stance (supplied by the understanding) contains nothing be-
yond the requirement that a thing be represented as being
subject in itself, and not in turn predicate of anything else,
nothing follows from this as regards the permanence of the
'I', and the attribute 'simple' certainly does not aid in adding
this permanence. Thus, from this source, we learn nothing
whatsoever as to what may happen to the soul in the changes
of the natural world. If we could be assured that the soul is a
simple part of matter, we could use this knowledge, with the
further assistance of what experience teaches in this regard, to
deduce the permanence, and, as involved in its simple nature,
the indestructibility of the soul. But of all this, the concept
of the 'I', in the psychological principle 'I think', tells us
nothing.
That the being which thinks in us is under the impression
that it knows itself through pure categories, and precisely
P 365
through those categories which in each type of category
express absolute unity, is due to the following reason. Apper-
ception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories,
which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the
manifold of intuition, in so far as the manifold has unity in
apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the
representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and
itself is unconditioned. We can thus say of the thinking 'I'
(the soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as
numerically identical at all times, and as the correlate of all
existence, from which all other existence must be inferred,
that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows
the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute
unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, in-
deed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which
I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the
determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self
that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in the same
way as knowledge is distinguished from its object. Neverthe-
less there is nothing more natural and more misleading than
the illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis
of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts.
We might call it the subreption of the hypostatised conscious-
ness (apperceptionis substantiatae).
If we desire to give a logical title to the paralogism con-
tained in the dialectical syllogisms of the rational doctrine of
the soul, then in view of the fact that their premisses are cor-
rect, we may call it a sophisma figurae dictionis. Whereas the
major premiss, in dealing with the condition, makes a merely
transcendental use of the category, the minor premiss and the
conclusion, in dealing with the soul which has been subsumed
under this condition, use the same category empirically. Thus,
for instance, in the paralogism of substantiality, the con-
cept of substance is a pure intellectual concept, which in the
absence of the conditions of sensible intuition admits only of
transcendental use, that is, admits of no use whatsoever. But in
the minor premiss the very same concept is applied to the object
P 366
of all inner experience without our having first ascertained
and established the condition of such employment in concreto,
namely, the permanence of this object. We are thus making an
empirical, but in this case inadmissible, employment of the
category.
Finally, in order to show the systematic interconnection of
all these dialectical assertions of a pseudo-rational doctrine of
the soul in an order determined by pure reason, and so to show
that we have them in their completeness, we may note that
apperception has been carried through all the classes of the
categories but only in reference to those concepts of under-
standing which in each class form the basis of the unity of the
others in a possible perception, namely, subsistence, reality,
unity (not plurality), and existence. Reason here represents all
of these as conditions, which are themselves unconditioned, of
the possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in
itself --
(1) the unconditioned unity of relation, i.e. that it itself is not
inherent [in something else] but self-subsistent.
(2) the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, that it is not a
real whole but simple.
(3) the unconditioned unity in the plurality in time, i.e. that
it is not numerically different at different times but one
and the very same subject.
(4) the unconditioned unity of existence in space, i.e. that it
is not the consciousness of many things outside it, but
the consciousness of the existence of itself only, and of
other things merely as its representations.
Reason is the faculty of principles. The assertions of pure
psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul but
those predicates, if there be any such, which are meant to de-
termine the object in itself independently of experience, and
so by mere reason. They ought, therefore, to be founded on
principles and universal concepts bearing on the nature of thinking beings in ge
neral.
++ How the simple here again corresponds to the category of
reality I am not yet in a position to explain. This will be shown in
the next chapter on the occasion of this same concept being put by
reason to yet another use.
P 367
But instead we find that the single
representation, 'I am', governs them all. This representation
just because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience
in general announces itself as a universal proposition valid
for all thinking beings; and since it is at the same time in all
respects unitary, it carries with it the illusion of an absolute
unity of the conditions of thought in general, and so extends
itself further than possible experience can reach.
P 368
THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON
SINCE the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) con-
tains the form of each and every judgment of understanding
and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident
that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental em-
ployment of the understanding. And since this employment
excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what
has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations
in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to
follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of
pure psychology. But for the sake of brevity the examination
had best proceed in an unbroken continuity.
The following general remark may, at the outset, aid us in
our scrutiny of this kind of argument. I do not know an object
merely in that I think, but only in so far as I determine a given
intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all
thought consists. Consequently, I do not know myself through
being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am con-
scious of the intuition of myself as determined with respect
to the function of thought. Modi of self-consciousness in
thought are not by themselves concepts of objects (categories),
but are mere functions which do not give thought an object
to be known, and accordingly do not give even myself as
object. The object is not the consciousness of the determining
self, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my
inner intuition (in so far as its manifold can be combined in
accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apper-
ception in thought).
P 369
(1) In all judgments I am the determining subject of that
relation which constitutes the judgment. That the 'I', the 'I'
that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something
which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be
granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed identical proposition;
but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-
subsistent being or substance. The latter statement goes very far
beyond the former, and demands for its proof data which are
not to be met with in thought, and perhaps (in so far as I have
regard to the thinking self merely as such) are more than I
shall ever find in it.
(2) That the 'I' of apperception, and therefore the 'I' in
every act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved into a
plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically
simple subject, is something already contained in the very
concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition.
But this does not mean that the thinking 'I' is a simple sub-
stance. That proposition would be synthetic. The concept of
substance always relates to intuitions which cannot in me be
other than sensible, and which therefore lie entirely outside
the field of the understanding and its thought. But it is of
this thought that we are speaking when we say that the 'I' in
thought is simple. It would, indeed, be surprising if what in
other cases requires so much labour to determine -- namely,
what, of all that is presented in intuition, is substance, and
further, whether this substance can be simple (e.g. in the
parts of matter) -- should be thus given me directly, as if by
revelation, in the poorest of all representations.
(3) The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am
conscious I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the
concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic proposition.
But this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in
all my representations, does not concern any intuition of the
subject, whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore
signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the
consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a
thinking being, in all change of its states. No mere analysis of
the proposition 'I think' will suffice to prove such a proposi-
P 370
tion; for that we should require various synthetic judgments,
based upon given intuition.
(4) That I distinguish my own existence as that of a
thinking being, from other things outside me--among them
my body -- is likewise an analytic proposition; for other things
are such as I think to be distinct from myself. But I do not
thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be
even possible apart from things outside me through which
representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I
could exist merely as thinking being (i.e. without existing in
human form).
The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in
thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the
knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of
thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical
determination of the object.
Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather
would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole cri-
tique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all
thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that
consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) per-
sonality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious
of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter.
For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond
the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena;
and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further
in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star
prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent posses-
sion. The proposition, 'Every thinking being is, as such, a
simple substance', is a synthetic a priori proposition; it is syn-
thetic in that it goes beyond the concept from which it starts,
and adds to the thought in general [i.e. to the concept of
a thinking being] the mode of [its] existence: it is a priori,
in that it adds to the concept a predicate (that of simplicity)
which cannot be given in any experience. It would then follow
that a priori synthetic propositions are possible and admis-
sible, not only, as we have asserted, in relation to objects of
possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility
of this experience, but that they are applicable to things in
general and to things in themselves -- a result that would make
P 371
an end of our whole critique, and would constrain us to ac-
quiesce in the old-time procedure. Upon closer consideration
we find, however, that there is no such serious danger.
The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined
by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the following syllogism:
That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore
substance.
A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be
thought otherwise than as subject.
Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance.
In the major premiss we speak of a being that can be
thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it
may be given in intuition. But in the minor premiss we speak
of it only in so far as it regards itself, as subject, simply in
relation to thought and the unity of consciousness, and not as
likewise in relation to the intuition through which it is given
as object to thought. Thus the conclusion is arrived at fallaci-
ously, per sophisma figurae dictionis.
That we are entirely right in resolving this famous argu-
ment into a paralogism will be clearly seen, if we call to mind
what has been said in the General Note to the Systematic
Representation of the Principles and in the Section on Nou-
mena.
++ 'Thought' is taken in the two premisses in totally different
senses: in the major premiss, as relating to an object in general and
therefore to an object as it may be given in intuition; in the minor
premiss, only as it consists in relation to self-consciousness. In
this latter sense, no object whatsoever is being thought; all that is
being represented is simply the relation to self as subject (as the
form of thought). In the former premiss we are speaking of things
which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects; but in the latter
premiss we speak not of things but of thought (abstraction being
made from all objects) in which the 'I' always serves as the subject
of consciousness. The conclusion cannot, therefore, be, 'I cannot
exist otherwise than as subject', but merely, 'In thinking my exist-
ence, I cannot employ myself, save as subject of the judgment
[therein involved]'. This is an identical proposition, and casts no
light whatsoever upon the mode of my existence.
P 371
For it has there been proved that the concept of a thing
P 372
which can exist by itself as subject and never as mere predi-
cate, carries with it no objective reality; in other words, that we
cannot know whether there is any object to which the concept
is applicable -- as to the possibility of such a mode of existence
we have no means of deciding -- and that the concept therefore
yields no knowledge whatsoever. If by the term 'substance' be
meant an object which can be given, and if it is to yield know-
ledge, it must be made to rest on a permanent intuition, as
being that through which alone the object of our concept can
be given, and as being, therefore, the indispensable condition
of the objective reality of the concept. Now in inner intuition
there is nothing permanent, for the 'I' is merely the conscious-
ness of my thought. So long, therefore, as we do not go beyond
mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for
applying the concept of substance, that is, of a self-subsistent
subject, to the self as a thinking being. And with the objective
reality of the concept of substance, the allied concept of
simplicity likewise vanishes; it is transformed into a merely
logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought in
general, which has to be present whether the subject be com-
posite or not.
REFUTATION OF MENDELSSOHN'S PROOF OF THE
PERMANENCE OF THE SOUL
This acute philosopher soon noticed that the usual argu-
ment by which it is sought to prove that the soul -- if it be
admitted to be a simple being -- cannot cease to be through
dissolution, is insufficient for its purpose, that of proving the
necessary continuance of the soul, since it may be supposed
to pass out of existence through simply vanishing. In his
Phaedo he endeavoured to prove that the soul cannot be
subject to such a process of vanishing, which would be a
true annihilation, by showing that a simple being cannot
cease to exist. His argument is that since the soul cannot
be diminished, and so gradually lose something of its exist-
ence, being by degrees changed into nothing (for since it
has no parts, it has no multiplicity in itself), there would be
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no time between a moment in which it is and another in which
it is not -- which is impossible. He failed, however, to observe
that even if we admit the simple nature of the soul, namely,
that it contains no manifold of constituents external to one
another, and therefore no extensive quantity, we yet cannot
deny to it, any more than to any other existence, intensive
quantity, that is, a degree of reality in respect of all its facul-
ties, nay, in respect of all that constitutes its existence, and
that this degree of reality may diminish through all the in-
finitely many smaller degrees. In this manner the supposed
substance -- the thing, the permanence of which has not yet
been proved -- may be changed into nothing, not indeed by
dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and
so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elanguescence.
For consciousness itself has always a degree, which always
allows of diminution, and the same must also hold of the
faculty of being conscious of the self, and likewise of all the
other faculties. Thus the permanence of the soul, regarded
merely as object of inner sense, remains undemonstrated, and
indeed indemonstrable. Its permanence during life is, of course,
evident per se, since the thinking being (as man) is itself like-
wise an object of the outer senses. But this is very far from
satisfying the rational psychologist who undertakes to prove
from mere concepts its absolute permanence beyond this life.
++ Clearness is not, as the logicians assert, the consciousness of
a representation. A certain degree of consciousness, though it be
insufficient for recollection, must be met with even in many obscure
representations, since in the absence of all consciousness we should
make no distinction between different combinations of obscure repre-
sentations, which yet we are able to do in respect of the characters
of many concepts, such as those of right or equity, or as when the
musician in improvising strikes several keys at once. But a repre-
sentation is clear, when the consciousness suffices for the conscious-
ness of the distinction of this representation from others. If it suffices
for distinguishing, but not for consciousness of the distinction, the
representation must still be entitled obscure. There are therefore
infinitely many degrees of consciousness, down to its complete
vanishing.
++ Some philosophers, in making out a case for a new possibility,
consider that they have done enough if they can defy others to show
any contradiction in their assumptions.
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If we take the above propositions in synthetic connec-
tion, as valid for all thinking beings, as indeed they must
be taken in the system of rational psychology, and proceed
from the category of relation, with the proposition, 'All think-
ing beings are, as such, substances', backwards through the
series of the propositions, until the circle is completed, we
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come at last to the existence of these thinking beings.
P 374n
++This is the procedure of all
those who profess to comprehend the possibility of thought -- of
which they have an example only in the empirical intuitions of our
human life -- even after this life has ceased. But those who resort to
such a method of argument can be quite nonplussed by the citation
of other possibilities which are not a whit more adventurous. Such
is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several
substances, and conversely the fusing together (coalition) of several
into one simple substance. For although divisibility presupposes a
composite, it does not necessarily require a composite of substances,
but only of degrees (of the manifold powers) of one and the same sub-
stance. Now just as we can think all powers and faculties of the soul,
even that of consciousness, as diminished by one half, but in such a
way that the substance still remains, so also, without contradiction,
we can represent this extinguished half as being preserved, not in
the soul, but outside it; and we can likewise hold that since every-
thing which is real in it, and which therefore has a degree -- in other
words, its entire existence, from which nothing is lacking -- has been
halved, another separate substance would then come into existence
outside it. For the multiplicity which has been divided existed
before, not indeed as a multiplicity of substances, but as the multi-
plicity of every reality proper to the substance, that is, of the quan-
tum of existence in it; and the unity of substance was therefore only
a mode of existence, which in virtue of this division has been trans-
formed into a plurality of subsistence. Similarly, several simple sub-
stances might be fused into one, without anything being lost except
only the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance
would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances to-
gether. We might perhaps also represent the simple substances which
yield us the appearance [which we entitle] matter as producing -- not
indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon one another, but
by an influence unknown to us, of which the former influence would
be merely the appearance -- the souls of children, that is, as pro-
ducing them through such dynamical division of the parent souls,
considered as intensive quantities, and those parent souls as making
good their loss through coalition with new material of the same kind.
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Now in
this system of rational psychology these beings are taken not
only as being conscious of their existence independently of
outer things, but as also being able, in and by themselves, to
determine that existence in respect of the permanence which
is a necessary characteristic of substance. This rationalist sys-
tem is thus unavoidably committed to idealism, or at least to
problematic idealism. For if the existence of outer things is
not in any way required for determination of one's own
existence in time, the assumption of their existence is a
quite gratuitous assumption, of which no proof can ever be
given.
If, on the other hand, we should proceed analytically,
starting from the proposition 'I think', as a proposition that
already in itself includes an existence as given, and therefore
modality, and analysing it in order to ascertain its content,
and so to discover whether and how this 'I' determines its
existence in space or time solely through that content, then
the propositions of the rational doctrine of the soul would not
begin with the concept of a thinking being in general, but with
a reality, and we should infer from the manner in which this
reality is thought, after everything empirical in it has been
removed, what it is that belongs to a thinking being in general.
This is shown in the following table:
++ I am far from allowing any serviceableness or validity to such fancies;
and as the principles of our Analytic have sufficiently demonstrated,
no other than an empirical employment of the categories (including
that of substance) is possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough,
out of the mere faculty of thought, without any permanent intuition
whereby an object might be given, to construct a self-subsistent being,
and this merely on the ground that the unity of apperception in thought
does not allow of its being explained [as arising] out of the composite,
instead of admitting, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain
the possibility of a thinking nature, why should not the materialist,
though he can as little appeal to experience in support of his [con-
jectured] possibilities, be justified in being equally daring, and in
using his principle to establish the opposite conclusion, while still
preserving the formal unity upon which his opponent has relied.
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1. I think,
2. as subject, 3. as simple subject,
4. as identical subject
in every state of my thought.
In the second proposition it has not been determined
whether I can exist and be thought as subject only, and not
also as a predicate of another being, and accordingly the con-
cept of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense, and it
remains undetermined whether or not we are to understand
by it a substance. Similarly, the third proposition establishes
nothing in regard to the constitution or subsistence of the sub-
ject; none the less in this proposition the absolute unity of apper-
ception, the simple 'I' in the representation to which all com-
bination or separation that constitutes thought relates, has its
own importance. For apperception is something real, and its
simplicity is already given in the mere fact of its possibility.
Now in space there is nothing real which can be simple; points,
which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits
not themselves anything that can as parts serve to constitute
space. From this follows the impossibility of any explana-
tion in materialist terms of the constitution of the self as a
merely thinking subject. But since my existence is taken in
the first proposition as given -- for it does not say that every
thinking being exists, which would be to assert its absolute
necessity and therefore to say too much, but only, 'I exist
thinking' -- the proposition is empirical, and can determine
my existence only in relation to my representations in time.
But since for this purpose I again require something perma-
nent, which, so far as I think myself, is in no way given to me
in inner intuition, it is quite impossible, by means of this simple
self-consciousness, to determine the manner in which I exist,
whether it be as substance or as accident. Thus, if materialism
is disqualified from explaining my existence, spiritualism is
equally incapable of doing so; and the conclusion is that in no
way whatsoever can we know anything of the constitution of
the soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is
concerned.
How, indeed, should it be possible, by means of the unity
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of consciousness -- which we only know because we cannot
but make use of it, as indispensable for the possibility of
experience -- to pass out beyond experience (our existence in
this life), and even to extend our knowledge to the nature of
all thinking beings in general, through the empirical, but in
respect of every sort of intuition the quite indeterminate pro-
position, 'I think'?
Rational psychology exists not as doctrine, furnishing an
addition to our knowledge of the self, but only as discipline.
It sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and
thus keeps us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into
the arms of a soulless materialism, or, on the other hand, from
losing ourselves in a spiritualism which must be quite un-
founded so long as we remain in this present life. But though
it furnishes no positive doctrine, it reminds us that we should
regard this refusal of reason to give satisfying response to our
inquisitive probings into what is beyond the limits of this
present life as reason's hint to divert our self-knowledge from
fruitless and extravagant speculation to fruitful practical em-
ployment. Though in such practical employment it is directed
always to objects of experience only, it derives its principles
from a higher source, and determines us to regulate our actions
as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond experience, and
therefore far beyond this present life.
From all this it is evident that rational psychology owes
its origin simply to misunderstanding. The unity of conscious-
ness, which underlies the categories, is here mistaken for an
intuition of the subject as object, and the category of sub-
stance is then applied to it. But this unity is only unity in
thought, by which alone no object is given, and to which,
therefore, the category of substance, which always presup-
poses a given intuition, cannot be applied. Consequently, this
subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories cannot
by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an
object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure
self-consciousness, which is what was to be explained, must
itself be presupposed. Similarly, the subject, in which the re-
presentation of time has its original ground, cannot thereby
determine its own existence in time. And if this latter is im-
possible, the former, as a determination of the self (as a
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thinking being in general) by means of the categories is
equally so.
Thus the expectation of obtaining knowledge which while
extending beyond the limits of possible experience is like-
wise to further the highest interests of humanity, is found,
so far as speculative philosophy professes to satisfy it, to
be grounded in deception, and to destroy itself in the attempt
at fulfilment. Yet the severity of our criticism has rendered
reason a not unimportant service in proving the impossibility
of dogmatically determining, in regard to an object of experi-
ence, anything that lies beyond the limits of experience. For in
so doing it has secured reason against all possible assertions of
the opposite. That cannot be achieved save in one or other of two ways.
++ The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposition,
and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'. But I cannot say
'Everything which thinks, exists'. For in that case the property of
thought would render all beings which possess it necessary beings.
My existence cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inference from
the proposition 'I think', as Descartes sought to contend -- for it
would then have to be preceded by the major premiss 'Everything
which thinks, exists' -- but is identical with it. The 'I think' ex-
presses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. perception (and
thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to sensibility, lies
at the basis of this existential proposition) But the 'I think'
precedes the experience which is required to determine the object
of perception through the category in respect of time; and the
existence here [referred to] is not a category. The category as
such does not apply to an indeterminately given object but only to
one of which we have a concept and about which we seek to know
whether it does or does not exist outside the concept. An indetermin-
ate perception here signifies only something real that is given, given
indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as thing
in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and
which in the proposition, 'I think', is denoted as such. For it must
be observed, that when I have called the proposition, 'I think', an
empirical proposition, I do not mean to say thereby, that the 'I' in
this proposition is an empirical representation. On the contrary,
it is purely intellectual, because belonging to thought in general.
Without some empirical representation to supply the material for
thought, the actus, 'I think', would not, indeed, take place; but the
empirical is only the condition of the application, or of the employ-
ment, of the pure intellectual faculty.
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Either we have to prove our proposition apo-
deictically; or, if we do not succeed in this, we have to seek out
the sources of this inability, which, if they are traceable to the
necessary limits of our reason, must constrain all opponents
to submit to this same law of renunciation in respect of all
claims to dogmatic assertion.
Yet nothing is thereby lost as regards the right, nay, the
necessity, of postulating a future life in accordance with the
principles of the practical employment of reason, which is
closely bound up with its speculative employment. For the
merely speculative proof has never been able to exercise any
influence upon the common reason of men. It so stands upon
the point of a hair, that even the schools preserve it from fall-
ing only so long as they keep it unceasingly spinning round
like a top; even in their own eyes it yields no abiding founda-
tion upon which anything could be built. The proofs which are
serviceable for the world at large all preserve their entire value
undiminished, and indeed, upon the surrender of these dog-
matic pretensions, gain in clearness and in natural force. For
reason is then located in its own peculiar sphere, namely, the
order of ends, which is also at the same time an order of nature;
and since it is in itself not only a theoretical but also a practical
faculty, and as such is not bound down to natural conditions,
it is justified in extending the order of ends, and therewith our
own existence, beyond the limits of experience and of life. If
we judged according to analogy with the nature of living
beings in this world, in dealing with which reason must
necessarily accept the principle that no organ, no faculty, no
impulse, indeed nothing whatsoever is either superfluous or
disproportioned to its use, and that therefore nothing is pur-
poseless, but everything exactly conformed to its destiny in
life -- if we judged by such an analogy we should have to re-
gard man, who alone can contain in himself the final end of
all this order, as the only creature that is excepted from it.
Man's natural endowments -- not merely his talents and the
impulses to enjoy them, but above all else the moral law within
him -- go so far beyond all the utility and advantage which he
may derive from them in this present life, that he learns there-
by to prize the mere consciousness of a righteous will as being,
apart from all advantageous consequences, apart even from the
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shadowy reward of posthumous fame, supreme over all other
values; and so feels an inner call to fit himself, by his conduct
in this world, and by the sacrifice of many of its advantages,
for citizenship in a better world upon which he lays hold in
idea. This powerful and incontrovertible proof is reinforced
by our ever-increasing knowledge of purposiveness in all that
we see around us, and by contemplation of the immensity of
creation, and therefore also by the consciousness of a certain
illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and
of a striving commensurate therewith. All this still remains to
us, but we must renounce the hope of comprehending, from
the merely theoretical knowledge of ourselves, the necessary
continuance of our existence.
CONCLUSION, IN REGARD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL PARALOGISM
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from
the confusion of an idea of reason -- the idea of a pure intelli-
gence -- with the completely undetermined concept of a think-
ing being in general. I think myself on behalf of a possible
experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual ex-
perience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of
my existence even apart from experience and its empirical
conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible abstrac-
tion from my empirically determined existence with the sup-
posed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my
thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have knowledge
that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject.
But all that I really have in thought is simply the unity of con-
sciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all
determination is based.
The task of explaining the communion of the soul with
the body does not properly belong to the psychology with
which we are here dealing. For this psychology proposes to
prove the personality of the soul even apart from this com-
munion (that is, after death), and is therefore transcendent in
the proper sense of that term. It does, indeed, occupy itself
with an object of experience, but only in that aspect in which
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it ceases to be an object of experience. Our teaching, on the
other hand, does supply a sufficient answer to this question.
The difficulty peculiar to the problem consists, as is generally
recognised, in the assumed heterogeneity of the object of inner
sense (the soul) and the objects of the outer senses, the formal
condition of their intuition being, in the case of the former, time
only, and in the case of the latter, also space. But if we consider
that the two kinds of objects thus differ from each other, not in-
wardly but only in so far as one appears outwardly to the other,
and that what, as thing in itself, underlies the appearance of
matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in
character, this difficulty vanishes, the only question that re-
mains being how in general a communion of substances is
possible. This, however, is a question which lies outside the
field of psychology, and which the reader, after what has been
said in the Analytic regarding fundamental powers and facul-
ties, will not hesitate to regard as likewise lying outside the
field of all human knowledge.
GENERAL NOTE ON THE TRANSITION FROM RATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY TO COSMOLOGY
The proposition, 'I think' or 'I exist thinking', is an em-
pirical proposition. Such a proposition, however, is conditioned
by empirical intuition, and is therefore also conditioned by the
object [that is, the self] which is thought [in its aspect] as
appearance. It would consequently seem that on our theory
the soul, even in thought, is completely transformed into
appearance, and that in this way our consciousness itself, as
being a mere illusion, must refer in fact to nothing.
Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function,
and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the
manifold of a merely possible intuition, and does not exhibit
the subject of consciousness as appearance; and this for the
sufficient reason that thought takes no account whatsoever of
the mode of intuition, whether it be sensible or intellectual. I
thereby represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I
appear to myself. I think myself only as I do any object in
general from whose mode of intuition I abstract. If I here re-
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present myself as subject of thoughts or as ground of thought,
these modes of representation do not signify the categories of
substance or of cause. For the categories are those functions
of thought (of judgment) as already applied to our sensible in-
tuition, such intuition being required if I seek to know myself.
If, on the other hand, I would be conscious of myself simply as
thinking, then since I am not considering how my own self
may be given in intuition, the self may be mere appearance to
me, the 'I' that thinks, but is no mere appearance in so far as
I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am
the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given
for thought.
The proposition, 'I think', in so far as it amounts to the
assertion, 'I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but
determines the subject (which is then at the same time object)
in respect of existence, and cannot take place without inner
sense, the intuition of which presents the object not as thing in
itself but merely as appearance. There is here, therefore, not
simply spontaneity of thought, but also receptivity of intui-
tion, that is, the thought of myself applied to the empirical
intuition of myself. Now it is to this intuition that the thinking
self would have to look for the conditions of the employment
of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, etc. ,
if it is not merely to distinguish itself as object in itself, through
the 'I', but is also to determine the mode of its existence, that
is, to know itself as noumenon. This, however, is impossible,
since the inner empirical intuition is sensible and yields only
data of appearance, which furnish nothing to the object of
pure consciousness for the knowledge of its separate existence,
but can serve only for the obtaining of experience.
Should it be granted that we may in due course discover,
not in experience but in certain laws of the pure employment
of reason -- laws which are not merely logical rules, but which
while holding a priori also concern our existence -- ground for
regarding ourselves as legislating completely a priori in re-
gard to our own existence, and as determining this existence,
there would thereby be revealed a spontaneity through which
our reality would be determinable, independently of the con-
ditions of empirical intuition. And we should also become
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aware that in the consciousness of our existence there is con-
tained a something a priori, which can serve to determine our
existence -- the complete determination of which is possible
only in sensible terms -- as being related, in respect of a certain
inner faculty, to a non-sensible intelligible world.
But this would not be of the least service in furthering
the attempts of rational psychology. In this marvellous faculty,
which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I
should indeed have, for the determination of my existence, a
principle which is purely intellectual. But through what predi-
cates would that determination have to be made? They could
be no other than those which must be given to me in sensible
intuition; and thus I should find myself, as regards rational
psychology, in precisely the same position as before, namely,
still in need of sensible intuitions to confer meaning on my
concepts of understanding (substance, cause, etc. ), through
which alone I can have knowledge of myself; and these in-
tuitions can never aid me in advancing beyond the field of
experience. Nevertheless, in respect of the practical employ-
ment, which is always directed to objects of experience, I
should be justified in applying these concepts, in conformity
with their analogical meaning when employed theoretically,
to freedom and the subject that is possessed of freedom. In so
doing, however, I should understand by these concepts the
merely logical functions of subject and predicate, of ground
and consequence, in accordance with which the acts or effects
are so determined conformably to those [moral] laws, that
they always allow of being explained, together with the laws
of nature, in accordance with the categories of substance and
cause, although they have their source in an entirely different
principle. These observations are designed merely to prevent
a misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition,
as appearance, is particularly liable. We shall have occasion
to make further application of them in the sequel.
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
CHAPTER II
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
WE have shown in the introduction to this part of our work
that all transcendental illusion of pure reason rests on dia-
lectical inferences whose schema is supplied by logic in the
three formal species of syllogisms -- just as the categories find
their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments. The
first type of these pseudo-rational inferences deals with the
unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all repre-
sentations in general (of the subject or soul), in correspondence
with the categorical syllogisms, the major premiss of which is
a principle asserting the relation of a predicate to a subject.
The second type of dialectical argument follows the analogy
of the hypothetical syllogisms. It has as its content the un-
conditioned unity of the objective conditions in the [field of]
appearance. In similar fashion, the third type, which will be
dealt with in the next chapter, has as its theme the un-
conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility
of objects in general.
But there is one point that calls for special notice.
Transcendental paralogism produced a purely one-sided
illusion in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought.
No illusion which will even in the slightest degree support the
opposing assertion is caused by the concepts of reason. Con-
sequently, although transcendental paralogism, in spite of a
favouring illusion, cannot disclaim the radical defect through
which in the fiery ordeal of critical investigation it dwindles
P 385
into mere semblance, such advantage as it offers is altogether
on the side of pneumatism.
A completely different situation arises when reason is ap-
plied to the objective synthesis of appearances. For in this
domain, however it may endeavour to establish its principle
of unconditioned unity, and though it indeed does so with
great though illusory appearance of success, it soon falls into
such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological
field, to desist from any such pretensions.
We have here presented to us a new phenomenon of human
reason -- an entirely natural antithetic, in which there is no
need of making subtle enquiries or of laying snares for the
unwary, but into which reason of itself quite unavoidably falls.
It certainly guards reason from the slumber of fictitious con-
viction such as is generated by a purely one-sided illusion, but
at the same time subjects it to the temptation either of aban-
doning itself to a sceptical despair, or of assuming an ob-
stinate attitude, dogmatically committing itself to certain
assertions, and refusing to grant a fair hearing to the argu-
ments for the counter-position. Either attitude is the death
of sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps be
entitled the euthanasia of pure reason.
Before considering the various forms of opposition and
dissension to which this conflict or antinomy of the laws of
pure reason gives rise, we may offer a few remarks in explana-
tion and justification of the method which we propose to
employ in the treatment of this subject. I entitle all tran-
scendental ideas, in so far as they refer to absolute totality in
the synthesis of appearances, cosmical concepts, partly be-
cause this unconditioned totality also underlies the concept
-- itself only an idea -- of the world-whole; partly because
they concern only the synthesis of appearances, therefore
only empirical synthesis When, on the contrary, the abso-
lute totality is that of the synthesis of the conditions of
all possible things in general, it gives rise to an ideal of
pure reason which, though it may indeed stand in a certain
relation to the cosmical concept, is quite distinct from it.
Accordingly, just as the paralogisms of pure reason formed
the basis of a dialectical psychology, so the antinomy of
pure reason will exhibit to us the transcendental principles
P 386
of a pretended pure rational cosmology. But it will not do
so in order to show this science to be valid and to adopt it.
As the title, conflict of reason, suffices to show, this pretended
science can be exhibited only in its bedazzling but false
illusoriness, as an idea which can never be reconciled with
appearances.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section I
SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS
In proceeding to enumerate these ideas with systematic
precision according to a principle, we must bear in mind two
points. In the first place we must recognise that pure and
transcendental concepts can issue only from the understand-
ing. Reason does not really generate any concept. The most
it can do is to free a concept of understanding from the
unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so to en-
deavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical, though
still, indeed, in terms of its relation to the empirical. This is
achieved in the following manner. For a given conditioned,
reason demands on the side of the conditions -- to which as
the conditions of synthetic unity the understanding subjects
all appearances -- absolute totality, and in so doing converts
the category into a transcendental idea. For only by carrying
the empirical synthesis as far as the unconditioned is it en-
abled to render it absolutely complete; and the unconditioned
is never to be met with in experience, but only in the idea.
Reason makes this demand in accordance with the principle
that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions,
and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which
alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given. The
transcendental ideas are thus, in the first place, simply cate-
gories extended to the unconditioned, and can be reduced to
a table arranged according to the [fourfold] headings of the
latter. In the second place, not all categories are fitted for such
employment, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes
a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with,
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one another, and generative of a [given] conditioned. Ab-
solute totality is demanded by reason only in so far as the
ascending series of conditions relates to a given conditioned.
It is not demanded in regard to the descending line of con-
sequences, nor in reference to the aggregate of co-ordinated
conditions of these consequences. For in the case of the given
conditioned, conditions are presupposed, and are considered
as given together with it. On the other hand, since conse-
quences do not make their conditions possible, but rather
presuppose them, we are not called upon, when we advance
to consequences or descend from a given condition to the con-
ditioned, to consider whether the series does or does not cease;
the question as to the totality of the series is not in any way a
presupposition of reason.
Thus we necessarily think time as having completely
elapsed up to the given moment, and as being itself given in
this completed form. This holds true, even though such com-
pletely elapsed time is not determinable by us. But since the
future is not the condition of our attaining to the present, it is
a matter of entire indifference, in our comprehension of the
latter, how we may think of future time, whether as coming
to an end or as flowing on to infinity. We have, as it were, the
series m, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned by m, and
at the same time as being the condition of o. The series ascends
from the conditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc. ), and also descends
from the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc. ). Now
I must presuppose the first series in order to be able to view
n as given. According to reason, with its demand for totality
of conditions, n is possible only by means of that series. Its
possibility does not, however, rest upon the subsequent series,
o, p, q, r. This latter series may not therefore be regarded as
given, but only as allowing of being given (dabilis).
I propose to name the synthesis of a series which begins, on
the side of the conditions, from the condition which stands near-
est to the given appearance and so passes to the more remote
conditions, the regressive synthesis; and that which advances,
on the side of the conditioned, from the first consequence to
the more distant, the progressive. The first proceeds in ante-
cedentia, the second in consequentia. The cosmological ideas
deal, therefore, with the totality of the regressive synthesis
P 388
proceeding in antecedentia, not in consequentia. The problem
of pure reason suggested by the progressive form of totality
is gratuitous and unnecessary, since the raising of it is not
required for the complete comprehension of what is given in
appearance. For that we require to consider only the grounds,
not the consequences.
In arranging the table of ideas in accordance with the
table of categories, we first take the two original quanta of
all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series, and
indeed the formal condition of all series. In it, in regard to a
given present, the antecedents can be a priori distinguished as
conditions (the past) from the consequents (the future). The
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of con-
ditions of any given conditioned therefore refers only to all
past time; and in conformity with the idea of reason past time,
as condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought as
being given in its entirety. Now in space, taken in and by itself,
there is no distinction between progress and regress. For as its
parts are co-existent, it is an aggregate, not a series. The present
moment can be regarded only as conditioned by past time,
never as conditioning it, because this moment comes into exist-
ence only through past time, or rather through the passing of
the preceding time. But as the parts of space are co-ordinated
with, not subordinated to, one another, one part is not the con-
dition of the possibility of another; and unlike time, space does
not in itself constitute a series. Nevertheless the synthesis of
the manifold parts of space, by means of which we apprehend
space, is successive, taking place in time and containing a
series. And since in this series of the aggregated spaces (as for
instance of the feet in a rood) of the given space, those which
are thought in extension of the given space are always the con-
dition of the limits of the given space, the measuring of a space
is also to be regarded as a synthesis of a series of the conditions
of a given conditioned, only with this difference that the side of
the conditions is not in itself distinct from that of the condi-
tioned, and that in space regressus and progressus would there-
fore seem to be one and the same. Inasmuch as one part of
space is not given through the others but only limited by them,
we must consider each space, in so far as it is limited, as being
also conditioned, in that it presupposes another space as the
P 389
condition of its limits, and so on. In respect of limitation the
advance in space is thus also a regress, and the transcendental
idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of con-
ditions likewise applies to space. I can as legitimately enquire
regarding the absolute totality of appearance in space as of
that in past time. Whether an answer to this question is ever
possible, is a point which will be decided later.
Secondly, reality in space, i.e. matter, is a conditioned. Its
internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of these parts its
remote conditions. There thus occurs a regressive synthesis,
the absolute totality of which is demanded by reason. This can
be obtained only by a completed division in virtue of which the
reality of matter vanishes either into nothing or into what is
no longer matter -- namely, the simple. Here also, then, we have
a series of conditions, and an advance to the unconditioned.
Thirdly, as regards the categories of real relation between
appearances, that of substance with its accidents is not adapted
to being a transcendental idea. That is to say, in it reason
finds no ground for proceeding regressively to conditions. Acci-
dents, in so far as they inhere in one and the same substance,
are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series.
Even in their relation to substance they are not really subordi-
nated to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance
itself. What in this category may still, however, seem to be an
idea of transcendental reason, is the concept of the substantial.
But since this means no more than the concept of object in
general, which subsists in so far as we think in it merely the
transcendental subject apart from all predicates, whereas
we are here dealing with the unconditioned only as it may
exist in the series of appearances, it is evident that the sub-
stantial cannot be a member of that series. This is also true
of substances in community. They are mere aggregates, and
contain nothing on which to base a series. For we cannot say
of them, as we can of spaces, whose limits are never deter-
mined in and by themselves but only through some other space,
that they are subordinated to each other as conditions of the
possibility of one another. There thus remains only the cate-
gory of causality. It presents a series of causes of a given
P 390
effect such that we can proceed to ascend from the latter as the
conditioned to the former as conditions, and so to answer the
question of reason.
Fourthly, the concepts of the possible, the actual, and the
necessary do not lead to any series, save in so far as the acci-
dental in existence must always be regarded as conditioned,
and as pointing in conformity with the rule of the understand-
ing to a condition under which it is necessary, and this latter in
turn to a higher condition, until reason finally attains uncondi-
tioned necessity in the totality of the series.
When we thus select out those categories which necessarily
lead to a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we find that
there are but four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the
four titles of the categories:
1. Absolute completeness
of the Composition
of the given whole of all appearances.
2. Absolute completeness
in the Division
of a given whole in the [field of] appearance.
3. Absolute completeness
in the Origination
of an appearance.
4. Absolute completeness
as regards Dependence of Existence
of the changeable in the [field of] appearance.
There are several points which here call for notice. In the
first place, the idea of absolute totality concerns only the ex-
position of appearances, and does not therefore refer to the
pure concept, such as the understanding may form, of a total-
ity of things in general. Appearances are here regarded as
given; what reason demands is the absolute completeness of the
conditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions con-
stitute a series. What reason prescribes is therefore an abso-
lutely (that is to say, in every respect) complete synthesis,
whereby the appearance may be exhibited in accordance with
the laws of understanding.
P 391
Secondly, what reason is really seeking in this serial, re-
gressively continued, synthesis of conditions, is solely the un-
conditioned. What it aims at is, as it were, such a completeness
in the series of premisses as will dispense with the need of pre-
supposing other premisses. This unconditioned is always con-
tained in the absolute totality of the series as represented in
imagination. But this absolutely complete synthesis is again
only an idea; for we cannot know, at least at the start of this
enquiry, whether such a synthesis is possible in the case of ap-
pearance. If we represent everything exclusively through pure
concepts of understanding, and apart from conditions of sen-
sible intuition, we can indeed at once assert that for a given con-
ditioned, the whole series of conditions subordinated to each
other is likewise given. The former is given only through the
latter. When, however, it is with appearances that we are deal-
ing, we find a special limitation due to the manner in which
conditions are given, namely, through the successive synthesis
of the manifold of intuition -- a synthesis which has to be
made complete through the regress. Whether this complete-
ness is sensibly possible is a further problem; the idea of it
lies in reason, independently alike of the possibility or of the
impossibility of our connecting with it any adequate empirical
concepts. Since, then, the unconditioned is necessarily con-
tained in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of
the manifold in the [field of] appearance -- the synthesis being
executed in accordance with those categories which represent
appearance as a series of conditions to a given conditioned --
reason here adopts the method of starting from the idea of
totality, though what it really has in view is the unconditioned,
whether of the entire series or of a part of it. Meantime, also,
it leaves undecided whether and how this totality is attain-
able.
This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two
ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in
which all the members without exception are conditioned and
only the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This
regress is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, the absolutely
unconditioned is only a part of the series -- a part to which the
other members are subordinated, and which does not itself stand
P 392
under any other condition. On the first view, the series a parte -
priori is without limits or beginning, i.e. is infinite, and at the
same time is given in its entirety. But the regress in it is never
completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. On the
second view, there is a first member of the series which in
respect of past time is entitled, the beginning of the world, in
respect of space, the limit of the world, in respect of the parts
of a given limited whole, the simple, in respect of causes,
absolute self-activity (freedom), in respect of the existence of
alterable things, absolute natural necessity.
We have two expressions, world and nature, which some-
times coincide. The former signifies the mathematical sum-
total of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis, alike
in the great and in the small, that is, in the advance alike through
composition and through division. This same world is entitled
nature when it is viewed as a dynamical whole. We are not
then concerned with the aggregation in space and time, with
a view to determining it as a magnitude, but with the unity in
the existence of appearances. In this case the condition of that
which happens is entitled the cause. Its unconditioned caus-
ality in the [field of] appearance is called freedom, and its
conditioned causality is called natural cause in the narrower
[adjectival] sense. The conditioned in existence in general is
termed contingent and the unconditioned necessary.
++ The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given con-
ditioned is always unconditioned, since outside it there are no further
conditions in respect of which it could be conditioned. But this
absolute totality of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problem-
atic concept, the possibility of which has to be investigated, especi-
ally in regard to the manner in which the unconditioned (the tran-
scendental idea really at issue) is involved therein.
++ Nature, taken adjectivally (formaliter), signifies the connec-
tion of the determinations of a thing according to an inner principle
of causality. By nature, on the other hand, taken substantivally
(materialiter), is meant the sum of appearances in so far as they
stand, in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thorough-
going interconnection. In the first sense we speak of the nature of
fluid matter, of fire, etc. The word is then employed in an adjectival
manner. When, on the other hand, we speak of the things of nature,
we have in mind a self-subsisting whole.
P 393
The unconditioned necessity of appearances may be entitled natural
necessity.
The ideas with which we are now dealing I have above
entitled cosmological ideas, partly because by the term 'world'
we mean the sum of all appearances, and it is exclusively
to the unconditioned in the appearances that our ideas are
directed, partly also because the term 'world', in the tran-
scendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of all existing
things, and we direct our attention solely to the completeness
of the synthesis, even though that is only attainable in the
regress to its conditions. Thus despite the objection that these
ideas are one and all transcendent, and that although they do
not in kind surpass the object, namely, appearances, but are
concerned exclusively with the world of sense, not with nou-
mena, they yet carry the synthesis to a degree which tran-
scends all possible experience, I none the less still hold that
they may quite appropriately be entitled cosmical concepts. In
respect of the distinction between the mathematically and the
dynamically unconditioned at which the regress aims, I might,
however, call the first two concepts cosmical in the narrower
sense, as referring to the world of the great and the small, and
the other two transcendent concepts of nature. This distinction
has no special immediate value; its significance will appear
later.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 2
ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON
If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines,
antithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic assertions of
the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dog-
matic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which no one asser-
tion can establish superiority over another. The antithetic does
not, therefore, deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only
the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the
causes of this conflict. The transcendental antithetic is an en-
quiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and out-
P 394
come. If in employing the principles of understanding we do
not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but
venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of experi-
ence, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines which can neither
hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it.
Each of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but
finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason --
only that, unfortunately, the assertion of the opposite has, on
its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary.
The questions which naturally arise in connection with
such a dialectic of pure reason are the following: (1) In what
propositions is pure reason unavoidably subject to an anti-
nomy? (2) On what causes does this antinomy depend? (3)
Whether and in what way, despite this contradiction, does
there still remain open to reason a path to certainty?
A dialectical doctrine of pure reason must therefore be
distinguished from all sophistical propositions in two respects.
It must not refer to an arbitrary question such as may be raised
for some special purpose, but to one which human reason
must necessarily encounter in its progress. And secondly, both
it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial illusion such
as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and un-
avoidable illusion, which even after it has ceased to beguile
still continues to delude though not to deceive us, and which
though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be
eradicated.
Such dialectical doctrine relates not to the unity of under-
standing in empirical concepts, but to the unity of reason in
mere ideas. Since this unity of reason involves a synthesis ac-
cording to rules, it must conform to the understanding; and
yet as demanding absolute unity of synthesis it must at the
same time harmonise with reason. But the conditions of this
unity are such that when it is adequate to reason it is too great
for the understanding; and when suited to the understanding,
too small for reason. There thus arises a conflict which cannot
be avoided, do what we will.
These pseudo-rational assertions thus disclose a dialectical
battlefield in which the side permitted to open the attack is
invariably victorious, and the side constrained to act on the
defensive is always defeated. Accordingly, vigorous fighters, no
P 395
matter whether they support a good or a bad cause, if only they
contrive to secure the right to make the last attack, and are
not required to withstand a new onslaught from their oppo-
nents, may always count upon carrying off the laurels. We can
easily understand that while this arena should time and again
be contested, and that numerous triumphs should be gained
by both sides, the last decisive victory always leaves the
champion of the good cause master of the field, simply be-
cause his rival is forbidden to resume the combat. As im-
partial umpires, we must leave aside the question whether it
is for the good or the bad cause that the contestants are
fighting. They must be left to decide the issue for themselves.
After they have rather exhausted than injured one another,
they will perhaps themselves perceive the futility of their
quarrel, and part good friends.
This method of watching, or rather provoking, a conflict
of assertions, not for the purpose of deciding in favour of one
or other side, but of investigating whether the object of con-
troversy is not perhaps a deceptive appearance which each
vainly strives to grasp, and in regard to which, even if there
were no opposition to be overcome, neither can arrive at any
result, -- this procedure, I say, may be entitled the sceptical
method. It is altogether different from scepticism -- a principle
of technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the
foundations of all knowledge, and strives in all possible ways
to destroy its reliability and steadfastness. For the sceptical
method aims at certainty. It seeks to discover the point of
misunderstanding in the case of disputes which are sincerely
and competently conducted by both sides, just as from the
embarrassment of judges in cases of litigation wise legislators
contrive to obtain instruction regarding the defects and am-
biguities of their laws. The antinomy which discloses itself in
the application of laws is for our limited wisdom the best
criterion of the legislation that has given rise to them. Reason,
which does not in abstract speculation easily become aware
of its errors, is hereby awakened to consciousness of the
factors [that have to be reckoned with] in the determination
of its principles
P 396
But it is only for transcendental philosophy that this scep-
tical method is essential. Though in all other fields of enquiry
it can, perhaps, be dispensed with, it is not so in this field.
In mathematics its employment would, indeed, be absurd; for
in mathematics no false assertions can be concealed and ren-
dered invisible, inasmuch as the proofs must always proceed
under the guidance of pure intuition and by means of a syn-
thesis that is always evident. In experimental philosophy the
delay caused by doubt may indeed be useful; no misunder-
standing is, however, possible which cannot easily be re-
moved; and the final means of deciding the dispute, whether
found early or late, must in the end be supplied by experience.
Moral philosophy can also present its principles, together
with their practical consequences, one and all in concreto, in
what are at least possible experiences; and the misunder-
standing due to abstraction is thereby avoided. But it is quite
otherwise with transcendental assertions which lay claim to
insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences.
Their abstract synthesis can never be given in any a priori
intuition, and they are so constituted that what is erroneous
in them can never be detected by means of any experience.
Transcendental reason consequently admits of no other test
than the endeavour to harmonise its various assertions. But
for the successful application of this test the conflict into
which they fall with one another must first be left to develop
free and untrammelled. This we shall now set about arranging.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
Thesis
The world has a beginning
in time, and is also limited as
regards space.
++ The antinomies follow one another in the order of the tran-
scendental ideas above enumerated.
P 396a
Antithesis
The world has no begin-
ning, and no limits in space;
it is infinite as regards both
time and space.
P 397
Proof
If we assume that the world
has no beginning in time,
then up to every given mo-
ment an eternity has elapsed,
and there has passed away in
the world an infinite series of
successive states of things.
Now the infinity of a series
consists in the fact that it can
never be completed through
successive synthesis. It thus
follows that it is impossible for
an infinite world-series to have
passed away, and that a be-
ginning of the world is there-
fore a necessary condition of
the world's existence. This was
the first point that called for
proof.
As regards the second point,
let us again assume the oppo-
site, namely, that the world is
an infinite given whole of co-
existing things. Now the mag-
nitude of a quantum which is
not given in intuition as
within certain limits, can be
thought only through the
synthesis of its parts, and the
totality of such a quantum
only through a synthesis that
is brought to completion
through repeated addition of unit to unit.
++ An indeterminate quantum can be intuited as a whole when it
is such that though enclosed within limits we do not require to con-
struct its totality through measurement, that is, through the success-
ive synthesis of its parts. For the limits, in cutting off anything
further, themselves determine its completeness.
P 397a
Proof
For let us assume that it
has a beginning. Since the
beginning is an existence
which is preceded by a time
in which the thing is not,
there must have been a
preceding time in which the
world was not, i.e. an empty
time. Now no coming to be
of a thing is possible in an
empty time, because no part
of such a time possesses, as
compared with any other, a
distinguishing condition of
existence rather than of non-
existence; and this applies
whether the thing is sup-
posed to arise of itself or
through some other cause. In
the world many series of
things can, indeed, begin;
but the world itself cannot
have a beginning, and is
therefore infinite in respect
of past time.
As regards the second
point, let us start by assum-
ing the opposite, namely, that
the world in space is finite
and limited, and consequently
exists in an empty space
which is unlimited.
P 398
In order, there-
fore, to think, as a whole, the
world which fills all spaces,
the successive synthesis of
the parts of an infinite world
must be viewed as completed,
that is, an infinite time must
be viewed as having elapsed
in the enumeration of all co-
existing things. This, how-
ever, is impossible. An in-
finite aggregate of actual
things cannot therefore be
viewed as a given whole, nor
consequently as simultane-
ously given. The world is,
therefore, as regards exten-
sion in space, not infinite, but
is enclosed within limits. This
was the second point in
dispute.
++ The concept of totality is in this case simply the representa-
tion of the completed synthesis of its parts; for, since we cannot
obtain the concept from the intuition of the whole -- that being in
this case impossible -- we can apprehend it only through the syn-
thesis of the parts viewed as carried, at least in idea, to the comple-
tion of the infinite.
P 397a
Things
will therefore not only be
P 398a
related in space but also
related to space. Now since
the world is an absolute whole
beyond which there is no
object of intuition, and there-
fore no correlate with which
the world stands in relation,
the relation of the world
to empty space would be a
relation of it to no object.
But such a relation, and con-
sequently the limitation of
the world by empty space, is
nothing. The world cannot,
therefore, be limited in space;
that is, it is infinite in respect
of extension.
++ Space is merely the form of outer intuition (formal intuition).
It is not a real object which can be outwardly intuited. Space, as
prior to all things which determine (occupy or limit) it, or rather
which give an empirical intuition in accordance with its form, is,
under the name of absolute space, nothing but the mere possibility
of outer appearances in so far as they either exist in themselves or
can be added to given appearances. Empirical intuition is not, there-
fore, a composite of appearances and space (of perception and empty
intuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis;
they are connected in one and the same empirical intuition as
matter and form of the intuition. If we attempt to set one of these
two factors outside the other, space outside all appearances, there
arise all sorts of empty determinations of outer intuition, which yet
are not possible perceptions. For example, a determination of the
relation of the motion (or rest) of the world to infinite empty space
P 398n
is a determination which can never be perceived, and is therefore
the predicate of a mere thought-entity.
P 399
OBSERVATION ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY
I. On the Thesis
In stating these conflicting
arguments I have not sought
to elaborate sophisms. That
is to say, I have not resorted
to the method of the special
pleader who attempts to take
advantage of an opponent's
carelessness -- freely allowing
the appeal to a misunderstood
law, in order that he may be
in a position to establish his
own unrighteous claims by
the refutation of that law.
Each of the above proofs
arises naturally out of the
matter in dispute, and no ad-
vantage has been taken of
the openings afforded by er-
roneous conclusions arrived
at by dogmatists in either
party.
I might have made a
pretence of establishing the
thesis in the usual manner of
the dogmatists, by starting
from a defective concept of
the infinitude of a given mag-
nitude. I might have argued
that a magnitude is infinite
if a greater than itself, as
determined by the multipli-
city of given units which it contains, is not possible.
P 399a
II. On the Antithesis
The proof of the infinitude
of the given world-series and
of the world-whole, rests upon
the fact that, on the contrary
assumption, an empty time
and an empty space, must
constitute the limit of the
world. I am aware that
attempts have been made to
evade this conclusion by argu-
ing that a limit of the world
in time and space is quite
possible without our having
to make the impossible as-
sumption of an absolute
time prior to the beginning
of the world, or of an absolute
space extending beyond the
real world. With the latter
part of this doctrine, as held
by the philosophers of the
Leibnizian school, I am en-
tirely satisfied. Space is merely
the form of outer intuition;
it is not a real object which
can be outwardly intuited; it
is not a correlate of the ap-
pearances, but the form of
the appearances themselves.
And since space is thus no
object but only the form of
possible objects, it cannot be
P 400a
regarded as something abso-
lute in itself that determines
the existence of things.
P 400
Now
no multiplicity is the great-
est, since one or more units
can always be added to it.
Consequently an infinite given
magnitude, and therefore an
infinite world (infinite as re-
gards the elapsed series or as
regards extension) is impos-
sible; it must be limited in
both respects. Such is the
line that my proof might have
followed. But the above con-
cept is not adequate to what
we mean by an infinite whole.
It does not represent how
great it is, and consequently
is not the concept of a maxi-
mum. Through it we think
only its relation to any assign-
able unit in respect to which
it is greater than all num-
ber. According as the unit
chosen is greater or smaller,
the infinite would be greater
or smaller. Infinitude, how-
ever, as it consists solely
in the relation to the given
unit, would always remain
the same. The absolute mag-
nitude of the whole would
not, therefore, be known in
this way;
P 400a
Things,
as appearances, determine
space, that is, of all its pos-
sible predicates of magnitude
and relation they determine
this or that particular one to
belong to the real. Space, on
the other hand, viewed as a
self-subsistent something, is
nothing real in itself; and can-
not, therefore, determine the
magnitude or shape of real
things. Space, it further fol-
lows, whether full or empty,
may be limited by appear-
ances, but appearances can-
not be limited by an empty
space outside them. This is
likewise true of time. But
while all this may be granted,
it yet cannot be denied that
these two non-entities, empty
space outside the world and
empty time prior to it, have
to be assumed if we are to
assume a limit to the world
in space and in time.
++ It will be evident that what we here desire to say is that empty
space, so far as it is limited by appearances, that is, empty space
within the world, is at least not contradictory of transcendental
principles and may therefore, so far as they are concerned, be
admitted. This does not, however, amount to an assertion of its
possibility.
P 401
indeed, the above concept does not really deal
with it.
The true transcendental
concept of infinitude is this,
that the successive synthesis
of units required for the enu-
meration of a quantum can
never be completed. Hence
it follows with complete cer-
tainty that an eternity of
actual successive states lead-
ing up to a given (the pre-
sent) moment cannot have
elapsed, and that the world
must therefore have a begin-
ning.
In the second part of the
thesis the difficulty involved
in a series that is infinite and
yet has elapsed does not arise,
since the manifold of a world
which is infinite in respect of
extension is given as co-exist-
ing. But if we are to think the
totality of such a multiplicity,
and yet cannot appeal to
limits that of themselves con-
stitute it a totality in intuition,
we have to account for a con-
cept which in this case cannot
proceed from the whole to
the determinate multiplicity
of the parts, but which must
demonstrate the possibility of
a whole by means of the
successive synthesis of the
parts.
++ This quantum therefore contains a quantity (of given units)
which is greater than any number -- which is the mathematical con-
cept of the infinite.
P 400a
The method of argument
which professes to enable us
to avoid the above conse-
quence (that of having to
P 401a
assume that if the world has
limits in time and space, the
infinite void must determine
the magnitude in which actual
things are to exist) consists
in surreptitiously substituting
for the sensible world some
intelligible world of which
we know nothing; for the
first beginning (an exist-
ence preceded by a time of
non-existence) an existence
in general which presupposes
no other condition whatso-
ever; and for the limits of
extension boundaries of the
world-whole -- thus getting
rid of time and space. But we
are here treating only of the
mudus phaenomenon and
its magnitude, and cannot
therefore abstract from the
aforesaid conditions of sensi-
bility without destroying the
very being of that world. If
the sensible world is limited,
it must necessarily lie in the
infinite void. If that void, and
consequently space in general
as a priori condition of the
possibility of appearances, be
set aside, the entire sensible
world vanishes. This world
is all that is given us in
our problem.
P 402
Now since this synthesis must constitute a never
to be completed series, I can-
not think a totality either
prior to the synthesis or by
means of the synthesis. For
the concept of totality is in
this case itself the representa-
tion of a completed synthesis
of the parts. And since this
completion is impossible, so
likewise is the concept of it.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
SECOND CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
Thesis
Every composite substance
in the world is made up of
simple parts, and nothing any-
where exists save the simple
or what is composed of the
simple.
Proof
Let us assume that com-
posite substances are not
made up of simple parts. If
all composition be then re-
moved in thought, no com-
posite part, and (since we
admit no simple parts) also
no simple part, that is to say,
nothing at all, will remain,
and accordingly no substance
will be given. Either, there-
fore, it is impossible to remove
in thought all composition,
or after its removal there
must remain something which
P 403
exists without composition,
that is, the simple.
P 401a
The mundus
intelligibilis is nothing but
the general concept of a
P 402a
world in general, in which
abstraction is made from all
conditions of its intuition,
and in reference to which,
therefore, no synthetic pro-
position, either affirmative
or negative, can possibly be
asserted.
Antithesis
No composite thing in the
world is made up of simple
parts, and there nowhere
exists in the world anything
simple.
Proof
Assume that a composite
thing (as substance) is made
up of simple parts. Since all
external relation, and there-
fore all composition of sub-
stances, is possible only in
space, a space must be made
up of as many parts as are
contained in the composite
which occupies it. Space,
however, is not made up of
simple parts, but of spaces.
Every part of the composite
must therefore occupy a space.
But the absolutely first parts
P 403a
of every composite are simple.
P 403
In the for-
mer case the composite would
not be made up of substances;
composition, as applied to
substances, is only an acci-
dental relation in independ-
ence of which they must
still persist as self-subsistent
beings. Since this contradicts
our supposition, there remains
only the original supposition,
that a composite of sub-
stances in the world is made
up of simple parts.
If follows, as an immediate
consequence, that the things
in the world are all, without
exception, simple beings; that
composition is merely an
external state of these beings;
and that although we can
never so isolate these ele-
mentary substances as to
take them out of this state
of composition, reason must
think them as the primary
subjects of all composition,
and therefore, as simple be-
ings, prior to all composition.
P 403a
The simple therefore occupies
a space. Now since every-
thing real, which occupies a
space, contains in itself a
manifold of constituents ex-
ternal to one another, and is
therefore composite; and since
a real composite is not made
up of accidents (for accidents
could not exist outside one
another, in the absence of
substance) but of substances,
it follows that the simple
would be a composite of
substances -- which is self-
contradictory.
The second proposition of
the antithesis, that nowhere
in the world does there exist
anything simple, is intended
to mean only this, that the
existence of the absolutely
simple cannot be established
by any experience or percep-
tion, either outer or inner;
and that the absolutely simple
is therefore a mere idea, the
objective reality of which can
never be shown in any pos-
sible experience, and which,
as being without an object,
has no application in the
explanation of the appear-
ances. For if we assumed
that in experience an object
might be found for this tran-
scendental idea, the empiri-
cal intuition of such an object
P 404a
would have to be known as
one that contains no manifold
[factors] external to one an-
other and combined into
unity. But since from the
non-consciousness of such a
manifold we cannot conclude
to its complete impossibility
in every kind of intuition of
an object; and since without
such proof absolute simplicity
can never be established, it
follows that such simplicity
cannot be inferred from any
perception whatsoever. An
absolutely simple object can
never be given in any pos-
sible experience. And since
by the world of sense we
must mean the sum of all
possible experiences, it follows
that nothing simple is to be
found anywhere in it.
This second proposition of
the antithesis has a much
wider application than the
first. Whereas the first pro-
position banishes the simple
only from the intuition of the
composite, the second ex-
cludes it from the whole of
nature. Accordingly it has
not been possible to prove
this second proposition by
reference to the concept of
a given object of outer in-
tuition (of the composite), but
only by reference to its rela-
tion to a possible experience
in general.
P 405
OBSERVATION ON THE SECOND ANALOGY
I. On the Thesis
When I speak of a whole
as necessarily made up of
simple parts I am referring
only to a substantial whole
that is composite in the strict
sense of the term 'composite',
that is, to that accidental
unity of the manifold which,
given as separate (at least in
thought), is brought into a
mutual connection, and there-
by constitutes a unity. Space
should properly be called not
compositum but totum, since
its parts are possible only in
the whole, not the whole
through the parts. It might,
indeed, be called a composi-
tum ideale, but not reale.
This, however, is a mere
subtlety. Since space is not
a composite made up of
substances (nor even of
real accidents), if I remove
all compositeness from it,
nothing remains, not even the
point. For a point is possible
only as the limit of a space,
and so of a composite. Space
and time do not, therefore,
consist of simple parts. What
belongs only to the state of a
substance, even though it has
a magnitude, e.g. alteration,
does not consist of the simple;
P 405a
II. On the Antithesis
Against the doctrine of the
infinite divisibility of matter,
the proof of which is purely
mathematical, objections have
been raised by the monadists.
These objections, however, at
once lay the monadists open to
suspicion. For however evi-
dent mathematical proofs
may be, they decline to recog-
nise that the proofs are based
upon insight into the constitu-
tion of space, in so far as space
is in actual fact the formal
condition of the possibility of
all matter. They regard them
merely as inferences from ab-
stract but arbitrary concepts,
and so as not being applicable
to real things. How can it be
possible to invent a different
kind of intuition from that
given in the original intuition
of space, and how can the a -
priori determinations of space
fail to be directly applicable
to what is only possible in so
far as it fills this space! Were
we to give heed to them,
then beside the mathematical
point, which, while simple,
is not a part but only the
limit of a space, we should
have to conceive physical
points as being likewise
P 406a
simple,
P 406
that is to say, a certain degree
of alteration does not come
about through the accretion
of many simple alterations.
Our inference from the com-
posite to the simple applies
only to self-subsisting things.
Accidents of the state [of a
thing] are not self-subsisting.
Thus the proof of the neces-
sity of the simple, as the con-
stitutive parts of the sub-
stantially composite, can easily
be upset (and therewith the
thesis as a whole), if it be
extended too far and in the
absence of a limiting qualifi-
cation be made to apply to
everything composite -- as has
frequently happened.
Moreover I am here speak-
ing only of the simple in so
far as it is necessarily given
in the composite -- the latter
being resolvable into the
simple, as its constituent
parts. The word monas, in the
strict sense in which it is em-
ployed by Leibniz, should refer
only to the simple which is
immediately given as simple
substance e.g. in self-con-
sciousness), and not to an
element of the composite.
This latter is better entitled
atomus. As I am seeking
to prove the [existence of]
simple substances only as
elements in the composite, I
P 407
might entitle the thesis of
the second antinomy, tran-
scendental atomistic.
P 406a
and yet as having the
distinguishing characteristic
of being able, as parts of
space, to fill space through
their mere aggregation. With-
out repeating the many fa-
miliar and conclusive refuta-
tions of this absurdity -- it
being quite futile to attempt
to reason away by sophistical
manipulation of purely dis-
cursive concepts the evident
demonstrated truth of mathe-
matics -- I make only one ob-
servation, that when philo-
sophy here plays tricks with
mathematics, it does so be-
cause it forgets that in this
discussion we are concerned
only with appearances and
their condition. Here it is
not sufficient to find for the
pure concept of the com-
posite formed by the under-
standing the concept of the
simple; what has to be found
is an intuition of the simple
for the intuition of the com-
posite (matter). But by the
laws of sensibility, and there-
fore in objects of the senses,
this is quite impossible.
Though it may be true that
when a whole, made up of
substances, is thought by the
pure understanding alone, we
must, prior to all composi-
tion of it, have the simple,
P 407
But as
this word has long been ap-
propriated to signify a parti-
cular mode of explaining
bodily appearances (mole-
culae), and therefore pre-
supposes empirical concepts,
the thesis may more suitably
be entitled the dialectical
principle of monadology.
P 406a
this does not hold of the
P 407a
totum substantiale phaeno-
menon which, as empirical
intuition in space, carries
with it the necessary char-
acteristic that no part of it
is simple, because no part of
space is simple. The monad-
ists have, indeed, been suffi-
ciently acute to seek escape
from this difficulty by refusing
to treat space as a condition
of the possibility of the objects
of outer intuition (bodies),
and by taking instead these
and the dynamical relation of
substances as the condition of
the possibility of space. But
we have a concept of bodies
only as appearances; and as
such they necessarily pre-
suppose space as the condi-
tion of the possibility of all
outer appearance. This eva-
sion of the issue is therefore
futile, and has already been
sufficiently disposed of in
the Transcendental Aesthetic.
The argument of the monad-
ists would indeed be valid if
bodies were things in them-
selves.
The second dialectical as-
sertion has this peculiarity,
that over against it stands
a dogmatic assertion which
is the only one of all the
pseudo-rational assertions that
undertakes to afford mani-
fest evidence, in an empirical
P 408a
object, of the reality of that
which we have been ascrib-
ing only to transcendental
ideas, namely, the absolute
simplicity of substance -- I
refer to the assertion that
the object of inner sense,
the 'I' which there thinks,
is an absolutely simple sub-
stance. Without entering upon
this question (it has been
fully considered above), I
need only remark, that if (as
happens in the quite bare
representation, 'I') anything
is thought as object only,
without the addition of any
synthetic determination of its
intuition, nothing manifold
and no compositeness can be
perceived in such a representa-
tion. Besides, since the predi-
cates through which I think
this object are merely intui-
tions of inner sense, nothing
can there be found which
shows a manifold [of ele-
ments] external to one an-
other, and therefore real com-
positeness. Self-consciousness
is of such a nature that since
the subject which thinks is
at the same time its own
object, it cannot divide itself,
though it can divide the de-
terminations which inhere in
it; for in regard to itself
every object is absolute unity.
Nevertheless, when this sub-
ject is viewed outwardly, as
P 409a
an object of intuition, it must
exhibit [some sort of] com-
positeness in its appearance;
P 409
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
Thesis
Causality in accordance
with laws of nature is not the
only causality from which the
appearances of the world can
one and all be derived. To
explain these appearances it
is necessary to assume that
there is also another causality,
that of freedom.
Proof
Let us assume that there
is no other causality than that
in accordance with laws of
nature. This being so, every-
thing which takes place pre-
supposes a preceding state
upon which it inevitably fol-
lows according to a rule. But
the preceding state must it-
self be something which has
taken place (having come to
be in a time in which it
previously was not);
P 409a
and it must always be viewed
in this way if we wish to
know whether or not there
be in it a manifold [of ele-
ments] external to one an-
other.
Antithesis
There is no freedom; every-
thing in the world takes place
solely in accordance with
laws of nature.
Proof
Assume that there is free-
dom in the transcendental
sense, as a special kind of
causality in accordance with
which the events in the
world can have come about,
namely, a power of absolutely
beginning a state, and there-
fore also of absolutely begin-
ning a series of consequences
of that state;
P 410
for if it had always existed, its con-
sequence also would have
always existed, and would
not have only just arisen.
The causality of the cause
through which something
takes place is itself, therefore,
something that has taken
place, which again presup-
poses, in accordance with
the law of nature, a pre-
ceding state and its causality,
and this in similar manner a
still earlier state, and so on.
If, therefore, everything takes
place solely in accordance
with laws of nature, there
will always be only a relative
and never a first beginning,
and consequently no com-
pleteness of the series on the
side of the causes that arise
the one from the other. But
the law of nature is just this,
that nothing takes place with-
out a cause sufficiently deter-
mined a priori. The proposi-
tion that no causality is pos-
sible save in accordance with
laws of nature, when taken
in unlimited universality, is
therefore self-contradictory;
and this cannot, therefore,
be regarded as the sole kind
of causality.
P 409a
it then follows
that not only will a series
have its absolute beginning
P 410a
in this spontaneity, but that
the very determination of
this spontaneity to originate
the series, that is to say,
the causality itself, will have
an absolute beginning; there
will be no antecedent through
which this act, in taking
place, is determined in ac-
cordance with fixed laws.
But every beginning of action
presupposes a state of the
not yet acting cause; and a
dynamical beginning of the
action, if it is also a first be-
ginning, presupposes a state
which has no causal con-
nection with the preceding
state of the cause, that is to
say, in nowise follows from
it. Transcendental freedom
thus stands opposed to the
law of causality; and the kind
of connection which it as-
sumes as holding between the
successive states of the active
causes renders all unity of
experience impossible. It is
not to be met with in any
experience, and is therefore
an empty thought-entity.
In nature alone, therefore,
[not in freedom], must we
seek for the connection and
order of cosmical events.
Freedom (independence) from
the laws of nature is no doubt
a liberation from compulsion,
but also from the guidance
P 411a
of all rules.
P 410
We must, then, assume a
causality through which some-
thing takes place, the cause
of which is not itself
P 411
determined, in accordance with
necessary laws, by another
cause antecedent to it, that is
to say, an absolute spontaneity
of the cause, whereby a series
of appearances, which pro-
ceeds in accordance with laws
of nature, begins of itself.
This is transcendental free-
dom, without which, even in
the [ordinary] course of na-
ture, the series of appearances
on the side of the causes can
never be complete.
P 411a
For it is not
permissible to say that the
laws of freedom enter into
the causality exhibited in the
course of nature, and so take
the place of natural laws.
If freedom were determined
in accordance with laws,
it would not be freedom;
it would simply be nature
under another name. Nature
and transcendental freedom
differ as do conformity to
law and lawlessness. Nature
does indeed impose upon the
understanding the exacting
task of always seeking the
origin of events ever higher
in the series of causes, their
causality being always condi-
tioned. But in compensation
it holds out the promise of
thoroughgoing unity of ex-
perience in accordance with
laws. The illusion of freedom,
on the other hand, offers a
point of rest to the enquiring
understanding in the chain
of causes, conducting it to
an unconditioned causality
which begins to act of itself.
This causality is, however,
blind, and abrogates those
rules through which alone
a completely coherent ex-
perience is possible.
P 412
OBSERVATION ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY
I. On the Thesis
The transcendental idea of
freedom does not by any
means constitute the whole
content of the psychological
concept of that name, which
is mainly empirical. The tran-
scendental idea stands only
for the absolute spontaneity
of an action, as the proper
ground of its imputability.
This, however, is, for philo-
sophy, the real stumbling-
block; for there are insur-
mountable difficulties in the
way of admitting any such
type of unconditioned caus-
ality. What has always so
greatly embarrassed specula-
tive reason in dealing with
the question of the freedom
of the will, is its strictly
transcendental aspect. The
problem, properly viewed, is
solely this: whether we must
admit a power of spontane-
ously beginning a series of
successive things or states.
How such a power is possible
is not a question which re-
quires to be answered in this
case, any more than in regard
to causality in accordance
with the laws of nature. For,
[as we have found], we have
to remain satisfied with the
P 413
a priori knowledge that this
latter type of causality must be
presupposed;
P 412a
II. On the Antithesis
The defender of an om-
nipotent nature (transcend-
ental physiocracy), in main-
taining his position against
the pseudo-rational argu-
ments offered in support of the
counter-doctrine of freedom,
would argue as follows. If
you do not, as regards time,
admit anything as being
mathematically first in the
world, there is no necessity,
as regards causality, for seek-
ing something that is dynamic-
ally first. What authority
have you for inventing an
absolutely first state of the
world, and therefore an abso-
lute beginning of the ever-
flowing series of appearances,
and so of procuring a resting-
place for your imagination
by setting bounds to limitless
nature? Since the substances
in the world have always
existed -- at least the unity of
experience renders necessary
such a supposition -- there is
no difficulty in assuming that
change of their states, that is,
a series of their alterations, has
likewise always existed, and
therefore that a first begin-
ning, whether mathematical
or dynamical, is not to be looked for.
P 413
we are not in the
least able to comprehend how
it can be possible that through
one existence the existence
of another is determined, and
for this reason must be guided
by experience alone. The
necessity of a first beginning,
due to freedom, of a series of
appearances we have demon-
strated only in so far as it
is required to make an origin
of the world conceivable; for
all the later following states
can be taken as resulting ac-
cording to purely natural
laws. But since the power
of spontaneously beginning
a series in time is thereby
proved (though not under-
stood), it is now also per-
missible for us to admit
within the course of the
world different series as cap-
able in their causality of
beginning of themselves, and
so to attribute to their sub-
stances a power of acting
from freedom. And we must
not allow ourselves to be
prevented from drawing this
conclusion by a misapprehen-
sion, namely that, as a series
occurring in the world can
have only a relatively first
beginning, being always pre-
ceded in the world by some
other state of things, no
P 414
absolute first beginning of a
series is possible during the
course of the world.
P 413a
The possibility of
such an infinite derivation,
without a first member to
which all the rest is merely a
sequel, cannot indeed, in re-
spect of its possibility, be ren-
dered comprehensible. But
if for this reason you refuse
to recognise this enigma in
nature, you will find yourself
compelled to reject many
fundamental synthetic pro-
perties and forces, which as
little admit of comprehension.
The possibility even of altera-
tion itself would have to be
denied. For were you not
assured by experience that
alteration actually occurs,
you would never be able to
excogitate a priori the pos-
sibility of such a ceaseless
sequence of being and not-
being.
Even if a transcendental
power of freedom be allowed,
as supplying a beginning of
happenings in the world, this
power would in any case have
to be outside the world
(though any such assump-
tion that over and above the
sum of all possible intuitions
there exists an object which
cannot be given in any pos-
sible perception, is still a very
bold one). But to ascribe to
substances in the world itself
such a power, can never be
permissible;
P 414
For the
absolutely first beginning of
which we are here speaking
is not a beginning in time,
but in causality. If, for in-
stance, I at this moment
arise from my chair, in com-
plete freedom, without being
necessarily determined thereto
by the influence of natural
causes, a new series, with all
its natural consequences in
infinitum, has its absolute
beginning in this event, al-
though as regards time this
event is only the continuation
of a preceding series. For this
resolution and act of mine do
not form part of the succession
of purely natural effects, and
are not a mere continuation
of them. In respect of its
happening, natural causes
exercise over it no determin-
ing influence whatsoever. It
does indeed follow upon them,
but without arising out of
them; and accordingly, in
respect of causality though
not of time, must be entitled
an absolutely first beginning
of a series of appearances.
P 414a
for, should this be done, that connection of
appearances determining one
another with necessity ac-
cording to universal laws,
which we entitle nature, and
with it the criterion of em-
pirical truth, whereby experi-
ence is distinguished from
dreaming, would almost en-
tirely disappear. Side by side
with such a lawless faculty
of freedom, nature [as an
ordered system] is hardly
thinkable; the influences of
the former would so un-
ceasingly alter the laws of
the latter that the appear-
ances which in their natural
course are regular and uni-
form would be reduced to
disorder and incoherence.
P 414
This requirement of reason,
that we appeal in the series
of natural causes to a first
beginning, due to freedom,
is amply confirmed when
we observe that all the
P 415
philosophers of antiquity, with the
sole exception of the Epi-
curean School, felt them-
selves obliged, when explain-
ing cosmical movements, to
assume a prime mover, that
is, a freely acting cause, which
first and of itself began this
series of states. They made
no attempt to render a first be-
ginning conceivable through
nature's own resources.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
Thesis
There belongs to the world,
either as its part or as its
cause, a being that is abso-
lutely necessary.
Proof
The sensible world, as the
sum-total of all appearances,
contains a series of alterations.
For without such a series even
the representation of serial
time, as a condition of the
possibility of the sensible
world, would not be given us.
++ Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is
indeed objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual
consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given
only in connection with perceptions.
P 415a
Antithesis
An absolutely necessary
being nowhere exists in the
world, nor does it exist out-
side the world as its cause.
Proof
If we assume that the
world itself is necessary, or
that a necessary being exists
in it, there are then two alter-
natives. Either there is a be-
ginning in the series of alter-
ations which is absolutely
necessary, and therefore with-
out a cause, or the series it-
self is without any beginning,
and although contingent and
P 416a
conditioned in all its parts,
none the less, as a whole, is
absolutely necessary and un-
conditioned.
P 415
But every alteration stands
under its condition, which pre-
cedes it in time and renders
P 416
it necessary. Now every con-
ditioned that is given pre-
supposes, in respect of its
existence, a complete series of
conditions up to the uncon-
ditioned, which alone is abso-
lutely necessary. Alteration
thus existing as a consequence
of the absolutely necessary,
the existence of something
absolutely necessary must
be granted. But this neces-
sary existence itself belongs
to the sensible world. For if
it existed outside that world,
the series of alterations in the
world would derive its begin-
ning from a necessary cause
which would not itself belong
to the sensible world. This,
however, is impossible. For
since the beginning of a series
in time can be determined
only by that which precedes
it in time, the highest condi-
tion of the beginning of a
series of changes must exist
in the time when the series
as yet was not (for a begin-
ning is an existence preceded
by a time in which the thing
that begins did not yet exist).
P 416a
The former
alternative, however, conflicts
with the dynamical law of the
determination of all appear-
ances in time; and the latter
alternative contradicts itself,
since the existence of a series
cannot be necessary if no
single member of it is neces-
sary.
If, on the other hand, we
assume that an absolutely
necessary cause of the world
exists outside the world, then
this cause, as the highest
member in the series of the
causes of changes in the
world, must begin the exist-
ence of the latter and their
series. Now this cause must
itself begin to act, and its
causality would therefore be
in time, and so would be-
long to the sum of appear-
ances, that is, to the world. It
follows that it itself, the cause,
would not be outside the
world -- which contradicts our
hypothesis.
++ The word 'begin' is taken in two senses; first as active, signify-
ing that as cause it begins (infit) a series of states which is its effect;
secondly as passive, signifying the causality which begins to operate
(fit) in the cause itself. I reason here from the former to the latter
meaning.
P 416
Accordingly the causality
of the necessary cause of
P 417
alterations, and therefore the
cause itself, must belong to
time and so to appearance --
time being possible only as
the form of appearance. Such
causality cannot, therefore,
be thought apart from that
sum of all appearances which
constitutes the world of sense.
Something absolutely neces-
sary is therefore contained in
the world itself, whether this
something be the whole series
of alterations in the world or
a part of the series.
OBSERVATION ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY
I. On the Thesis
In proving the existence of
a necessary being I ought
not, in this connection, to
employ any but the cosmo-
logical argument, that,
namely, which ascends from
the conditioned in the [field
of] appearance to the un-
conditioned in concept, this
latter being regarded as the
necessary condition of the
absolute totality of the series.
To seek proof of this from the
mere idea of a supreme being
belongs to another principle
of reason, and will have to
be treated separately.
The pure cosmological
proof, in demonstrating the
existence of a necessary being,
P 418
has to leave unsettled whether
this being is the world itself
or a thing distinct from it.
P 416a
Therefore neither
in the world, nor outside the
world (though in causal
P 417a
connection with it), does there
exist any absolutely necessary
being.
II. On the Antithesis
The difficulties in the way
of asserting the existence of
an absolutely necessary high-
est cause, which we suppose
ourselves to meet as we
ascend in the series of appear-
ances, cannot be such as
arise in connection with mere
concepts of the necessary
existence of a thing in general.
The difficulties are not, there-
fore, ontological, but must
concern the causal connection
of a series of appearances for
which a condition has to be
assumed that is itself un-
conditioned, and so must be
cosmological, and relate to
empirical laws.
P 418
To establish the latter view,
we should require principles
which are no longer cosmo-
logical and do not continue in
the series of appearances. For
we should have to employ
concepts of contingent beings
in general (viewed as objects
of the understanding alone)
and a principle which will
enable us to connect these,
by means of mere concepts,
with a necessary being. But
all this belongs to a tran-
scendent philosophy; and
that we are not yet in a
position to discuss.
If we begin our proof
cosmologically, resting it upon
the series of appearances and
the regress therein according
to empirical laws of causality,
we must not afterwards sud-
denly deviate from this mode
of argument, passing over to
something that is not a mem-
ber of the series. Anything
taken as condition must be
viewed precisely in the same
manner in which we viewed
the relation of the condi-
tioned to its condition in the
series which is supposed to
carry us by continuous ad-
vance to the supreme condi-
tion.
P 417
It must be
shown that regress in the
P 418a
series of causes (in the
sensible world) can never
terminate in an empirically
unconditioned condition, and
that the cosmological argu-
ment from the contingency
of states of the world, as
evidenced by their alterations,
does not support the assump-
tion of a first and absolutely
originative cause of the series.
A strange situation is dis-
closed in this antinomy.
From the same ground on
which, in the thesis, the ex-
istence of an original being
was inferred, its non-exist-
ence is inferred in the anti-
thesis, and this with equal
stringency. We were first
assured that a necessary being
exists because the whole of
past time comprehends the
series of all conditions and
therefore also the uncondi-
tioned (that is, the necessary);
we are now assured that there
is no necessary being, and
precisely for the reason that
the whole of past time com-
prehends the series of all
conditions (which therefore
are one and all themselves
conditioned). The explana-
tion is this. The former argu-
ment takes account only of
the absolute totality of the
series of conditions deter-
mining each other in time,
P 419a
and so reaches what is un-
conditioned and necessary.
P 419
If, then, this relation is sensible and falls within the
province of the possible em-
pirical employment of under-
standing, the highest condi-
tion or cause can bring the
regress to a close only in
accordance with the laws of
sensibility, and therefore only
in so far as it itself belongs
to the temporal series. The
necessary being must there-
fore be regarded as the highest
member of the cosmical series.
Nevertheless certain think-
ers have allowed themselves
the liberty of making such a
saltus (metabasis eis allo
genos. From the alterations
in the world they have in-
ferred their empirical con-
tingency, that is, their de-
pendence on empirically de-
termining causes, and so have
obtained an ascending series
of empirical conditions. And
so far they were entirely in
the right. But since they
could not find in such a
series any first beginning, or
any highest member, they
passed suddenly from the
empirical concept of con-
tingency, and laid hold upon
the pure category, which then
gave rise to a strictly intelli-
gible series the completeness
of which rested on the exist-
ence of an absolutely neces-
sary cause.
P 419a
The latter argument, on the
other hand, takes into con-
sideration the contingency of
everything which is deter-
mined in the temporal series
(everything being preceded
by a time in which the condi-
tion must itself again be
determined as conditioned),
and from this point of view
everything unconditioned and
all absolute necessity com-
pletely vanish. Nevertheless,
the method of argument in
both cases is entirely in con-
formity even with ordinary
human reason, which fre-
quently falls into conflict with
itself through considering its
object from two different
points of view. M. de Mairan
regarded the controversy be-
tween two famous astrono-
mers, which arose from a
similar difficulty in regard to
choice of standpoint, as a
sufficiently remarkable phe-
nomenon to justify his writing
a special treatise upon it. The
one had argued that the
moon revolves on its own
axis, because it always turns
the same side towards the
earth. The other drew the
opposite conclusion that the
moon does not revolve on its
own axis, because it always
P 420a
turns the same side towards
the earth.
P 420
Since this cause was not bound down to any
sensible conditions, it was
freed from the temporal con-
dition which would require
that its causality should itself
have a beginning. But such
procedure is entirely illegiti-
mate, as may be gathered
from what follows.
In the strict meaning of the
category, the contingent is
so named because its contra-
dictory opposite is possible.
Now we cannot argue from
empirical contingency to in-
telligible contingency. When
anything is altered, the op-
posite of its state is actual
at another time, and is there-
fore possible. This present
state is not, however, the
contradictory opposite of the
preceding state. To obtain
such a contradictory opposite
we require to conceive, that
in the same time in which the
preceding state was, its op-
posite could have existed in
its place, and this can never
be inferred from [the fact of]
the alteration. A body which
was in motion (= A) comes
to rest (= non-A). Now from
the fact that a state opposite
to the state A follows upon
the state A, we cannot argue
that the contradictory op-
posite of A is possible, and
that A is therefore con-
tingent.
P 420a
Both inferences
were correct, according to the
point of view which each
chose in observing the moon's
motion.
P 421
To prove such a conclusion, it would have to
be shown that in place of the
motion, and at the time at
which it occurred, there could
have been rest. All that we
know is that rest was real in
the time that followed upon
the motion, and was therefore
likewise possible. Motion at
one time and rest at another
time are not related as contra-
dictory opposites. Accord-
ingly the succession of op-
posite determinations, that is,
alteration, in no way estab-
lishes contingency of the type
represented in the concepts of
pure understanding; and can-
not therefore carry us to the
existence of a necessary being,
similarly conceived in purely
intelligible terms. Alteration
proves only empirical con-
tingency; that is, that the
new state, in the absence of
a cause which belongs to the
preceding time, could never
of itself have taken place.
Such is the condition pre-
scribed by the law of causal-
ity. This cause, even if it be
viewed as absolutely neces-
sary, must be such as can be
thus met with in time, and
must belong to the series of
appearances.
P 422
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 3
THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE CONFLICTS
We have now completely before us the dialectic play of
cosmological ideas. The ideas are such that an object congruent
with them can never be given in any possible experience, and
that even in thought reason is unable to bring them into har-
mony with the universal laws of nature. Yet they are not
arbitrarily conceived. Reason, in the continuous advance of
empirical synthesis, is necessarily led up to them whenever
it endeavours to free from all conditions and apprehend in
its unconditioned totality that which according to the rules
of experience can never be determined save as conditioned.
These pseudo-rational assertions are so many attempts to
solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There
are just so many, neither more nor fewer, owing to the fact that
there are just four series of synthetic presuppositions which
impose a priori limitations on the empirical synthesis.
The proud pretensions of reason, when it strives to extend
its domain beyond all limits of experience, we have represented
only in dry formulas that contain merely the ground of their
legal claims. As befits a transcendental philosophy, they have
been divested of all empirical features, although only in con-
nection therewith can their full splendour be displayed. But
in this empirical application, and in the progressive extension
of the employment of reason, philosophy, beginning with the
field of our experiences and steadily soaring to these lofty ideas,
displays a dignity and worth such that, could it but make good
its pretensions, it would leave all other human science far
behind. For it promises a secure foundation for our high-
est expectations in respect of those ultimate ends towards
which all the endeavours of reason must ultimately converge.
Whether the world has a beginning [in time] and any limit to
its extension in space; whether there is anywhere, and perhaps
in my thinking self, an indivisible and indestructible unity,
or nothing but what is divisible and transitory; whether I am
free in my actions or, like other beings, am led by the hand of
P 423
nature and of fate; whether finally there is a supreme cause
of the world, or whether the things of nature and their order
must as the ultimate object terminate thought -- an object that
even in our speculations can never be transcended: these are
questions for the solution of which the mathematician would
gladly exchange the whole of his science. For mathematics
can yield no satisfaction in regard to those highest ends that
most closely concern humanity. And yet the very dignity of
mathematics (that pride of human reason) rests upon this,
that it guides reason to knowledge of nature in its order and
regularity -- alike in what is great in it and in what is small --
and in the extraordinary unity of its moving forces, thus
rising to a degree of insight far beyond what any philosophy
based on ordinary experience would lead us to expect; and
so gives occasion and encouragement to an employment of
reason that is extended beyond all experience, and at the same
time supplies it with the most excellent materials for support-
ing its investigations -- so far as the character of these permits
-- by appropriate intuitions.
Unfortunately for speculation, though fortunately perhaps
for the practical interests of humanity, reason, in the midst of
its highest expectations, finds itself so compromised by the
conflict of opposing arguments, that neither its honour nor
its security allows it to withdraw and treat the quarrel with
indifference as a mere mock fight; and still less is it in a posi-
tion to command peace, being itself directly interested in the
matters in dispute. Accordingly, nothing remains for reason
save to consider whether the origin of this conflict, whereby
it is divided against itself, may not have arisen from a mere
misunderstanding. In such an enquiry both parties, per chance,
may have to sacrifice proud claims; but a lasting and peaceful
reign of reason over understanding and the senses would
thereby be inaugurated.
For the present we shall defer this thorough enquiry, in
order first of all to consider upon which side we should prefer
to fight, should we be compelled to make choice between
the opposing parties. The raising of this question, how we
should proceed if we consulted only our interest and not
the logical criterion of truth, will decide nothing in regard to
P 424
the contested rights of the two parties, but has this advantage,
that it enables us to comprehend why the participants in this
quarrel, though not influenced by any superior insight into the
matter under dispute, have preferred to fight on one side
rather than on the other. It will also cast light on a number of
incidental points, for instance, the passionate zeal of the one
party and the calm assurance of the other; and will explain
why the world hails the one with eager approval, and is im-
placably prejudiced against the other.
Comparison of the principles which form the starting-
points of the two parties is what enables us, as we shall find,
to determine the standpoint from which alone this preliminary
enquiry can be carried out with the required thoroughness. In
the assertions of the antithesis we observe a perfect uniformity
in manner of thinking and complete unity of maxims, namely
a principle of pure empiricism, applied not only in explana-
tion of the appearances within the world, but also in the
solution of the transcendental ideas of the world itself, in its
totality. The assertions of the thesis, on the other hand, pre-
suppose, in addition to the empirical mode of explanation
employed within the series of appearances, intelligible begin-
nings; and to this extent its maxim is complex. But as its
essential and distinguishing characteristic is the presupposi-
tion of intelligible beginnings, I shall entitle it the dogmatism
of pure reason.
In the determination of the cosmological ideas, we find on
the side of dogmatism, that is, of the thesis:
First, a certain practical interest in which every right-
thinking man, if he has understanding of what truly concerns
him, heartily shares. That the world has a beginning, that my
thinking self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature,
that it is free in its voluntary actions and raised above the
compulsion of nature, and finally that all order in the things
constituting the world is due to a primordial being, from which
everything derives its unity and purposive connection -- these
are so many foundation stones of morals and religion. The
antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least appears to
do so.
Secondly, reason has a speculative interest on the side of
P 425
the thesis. When the transcendental ideas are postulated and
employed in the manner prescribed by the thesis, the entire
chain of conditions and the derivation of the conditioned can
be grasped completely a priori. For we then start from the
unconditioned. This is not done by the antithesis, which for
this reason is at a very serious disadvantage. To the question
as to the conditions of its synthesis it can give no answer which
does not lead to the endless renewal of the same enquiry.
According to the antithesis, every given beginning compels us
to advance to one still higher; every part leads to a still smaller
part; every event is preceded by another event as its cause; and
the conditions of existence in general rest always again upon
other conditions, without ever obtaining unconditioned foot-
ing and support in any self-subsistent thing, viewed as prim-
ordial being.
Thirdly, the thesis has also the advantage of popularity;
and this certainly forms no small part of its claim to favour.
The common understanding finds not the least difficulty in the
idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis. Being
more accustomed to descend to consequences than to ascend
to grounds, it does not puzzle over the possibility of the abso-
lutely first; on the contrary, it finds comfort in such concepts,
and at the same time a fixed point to which the thread by
which it guides its movements can be attached. In the restless
ascent from the conditioned to the condition, always with one
foot in the air, there can be no satisfaction.
In the determination of the cosmological ideas we find on
the side of empiricism, that is, of the antithesis: first, no such
practical interest (due to pure principles of reason) as is pro-
vided for the thesis by morals and religion. On the contrary,
pure empiricism appears to deprive them of all power and in-
fluence. If there is no primordial being distinct from the world,
if the world is without beginning and therefore without an
Author, if our will is not free, and the soul is divisible and
perishable like matter, moral ideas and principles lose all
validity, and share in the fate of the transcendental ideas
which served as their theoretical support.
But secondly, in compensation, empiricism yields advan-
tages to the speculative interest of reason, which are very
P 426
attractive and far surpass those which dogmatic teaching
bearing on the ideas of reason can offer. According to the
principle of empiricism the understanding is always on its own
proper ground, namely, the field of genuinely possible experi-
ences, investigating their laws, and by means of these laws
affording indefinite extension to the sure and comprehensible
knowledge which it supplies. Here every object, both in itself
and in its relations, can and ought to be represented in in-
tuition, or at least in concepts for which the corresponding
images can be clearly and distinctly provided in given similar
intuitions. There is no necessity to leave the chain of the
natural order and to resort to ideas, the objects of which are
not known, because, as mere thought-entities, they can never
be given. Indeed, the understanding is not permitted to leave
its proper business, and under the pretence of having brought
it to completion to pass over into the sphere of idealising
reason and of transcendent concepts -- a sphere in which it
is no longer necessary for it to observe and investigate in
accordance with the laws of nature, but only to think and to
invent in the assurance that it cannot be refuted by the facts
of nature, not being bound by the evidence which they yield,
but presuming to pass them by or even to subordinate them
to a higher authority, namely, that of pure reason.
The empiricist will never allow, therefore, that any epoch
of nature is to be taken as the absolutely first, or that any
limit of his insight into the extent of nature is to be regarded
as the widest possible. Nor does he permit any transition from
the objects of nature -- which he can analyse through observa-
tion and mathematics, and synthetically determine in intuition
(the extended) -- to those which neither sense nor imagination
can ever represent in concreto (the simple). Nor will he admit
the legitimacy of assuming in nature itself any power that
operates independently of the laws of nature (freedom), and
so of encroaching upon the business of the understanding,
which is that of investigating, according to necessary rules,
the origin of appearances. And, lastly, he will not grant
that a cause ought ever to be sought outside nature, in an
original being. We know nothing but nature, since it alone can
present objects to us and instruct us in regard to their laws.
P 427
If the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in pro-
pounding his antithesis than to subdue the rashness and pre-
sumption of those who so far misconstrue the true vocation of
reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true in-
sight and knowledge cease, and to represent as furthering spec-
ulative interests that which is valid only in relation to practical
interests (in order, as may suit their convenience, to break the
thread of physical enquiries, and then under the pretence of ex-
tending knowledge to fasten it to transcendental ideas, through
which we really know only that we know nothing); if, I say,
the empiricist were satisfied with this, his principle would be
a maxim urging moderation in our pretensions, modesty in
our assertions, and yet at the same time the greatest possible
extension of our understanding, through the teacher fittingly
assigned to us, namely, through experience. If such were our
procedure, we should not be cut off from employing intel-
lectual presuppositions and faith on behalf of our practical
interest; only they could never be permitted to assume the
title and dignity of science and rational insight. Knowledge,
which as such is speculative, can have no other object than
that supplied by experience; if we transcend the limits thus
imposed, the synthesis which seeks, independently of experi-
ence, new species of knowledge, lacks that substratum of
intuition upon which alone it can be exercised.
But when empiricism itself, as frequently happens, be-
comes dogmatic in its attitude towards ideas, and confidently
denies whatever lies beyond the sphere of its intuitive know-
ledge, it betrays the same lack of modesty; and this is all the
more reprehensible owing to the irreparable injury which is
thereby caused to the practical interests of reason.
The contrast between the teaching of Epicurus and that of
Plato is of this nature.
++ It is, however, open to question whether Epicurus ever pro-
pounded these principles as objective assertions. If perhaps they
were for him nothing more than maxims for the speculative employ-
ment of reason, then he showed in this regard a more genuine philo-
sophical spirit than any other of the philosophers of antiquity. That,
in explaining the appearances, we must proceed as if the field of our
enquiry were not circumscribed by any limit or beginning of the
world; that we must assume the material composing the world to
be such as it must be if we are to learn about it from experience;
P 428
Each of the two types of philosophy says more than it
knows. The former encourages and furthers knowledge,
though to the prejudice of the practical; the latter supplies
excellent practical principles, but it permits reason to indulge
in ideal explanations of natural appearances, in regard to
which a speculative knowledge is alone possible to us -- to the
neglect of physical investigation.
Finally, as regards the third factor which has to be con-
sidered in a preliminary choice between the two conflicting
parties, it is extremely surprising that empiricism should be so
universally unpopular. The common understanding, it might
be supposed, would eagerly adopt a programme which pro-
mises to satisfy it through exclusively empirical knowledge
and the rational connections there revealed -- in preference to
the transcendental dogmatism which compels it to rise to
concepts far outstripping the insight and rational faculties
of the most practised thinkers. But this is precisely what com-
mends such dogmatism to the common understanding. For it
then finds itself in a position in which the most learned can
claim no advantage over it. If it understands little or nothing
about these matters, no one can boast of understanding much
more; and though in regard to them it cannot express itself in
so scholastically correct a manner as those with special train-
ing, nevertheless there is no end to the plausible arguments
which it can propound, wandering as it does amidst mere ideas,
about which no one knows anything, and in regard to which
it is therefore free to be as eloquent as it pleases;
++ that we must postulate no other mode of the production of events
than one which will enable them to be [regarded as] determined
through unalterable laws of nature; and finally that no use must be
made of any cause distinct from the world -- all these principles still
[retain their value]. They are very sound principles (though seldom
observed) for extending the scope of speculative philosophy, while
at the same time [enabling us] to discover the principles of morality
without depending for this discovery upon alien [i.e. non-moral,
theoretical] sources; and it does not follow in the least that those
who require us, so long as we are occupied with mere speculation,
to ignore these dogmatic propositions [that there is a limit and
beginning to the world, a Divine Cause, etc. ], can justly be accused
of wishing to deny them.
P 429
whereas when matters that involve the investigation of nature are in
question, it has to stand silent and to admit its ignorance. Thus
indolence and vanity combine in sturdy support of these prin-
ciples. Besides, although the philosopher finds it extremely
hard to accept a principle for which he can give no justifica-
tion, still more to employ concepts the objective reality of which
he is unable to establish, nothing is more usual in the case of
the common understanding. It insists upon having something
from which it can make a confident start. The difficulty of even
conceiving this presupposed starting-point does not disquiet
it. Since it is unaware what conceiving really means, it never
occurs to it to reflect upon the assumption; it accepts as known
whatever is familiar to it through frequent use. For the
common understanding, indeed, all speculative interests pale
before the practical; and it imagines that it comprehends and
knows what its fears or hopes incite it to assume or to believe.
Thus empiricism is entirely devoid of the popularity of tran-
scendentally idealising reason; and however prejudicial such
empiricism may be to the highest practical principles, there
is no need to fear that it will ever pass the limits of the Schools,
and acquire any considerable influence in the general life or
any real favour among the multitude.
Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it
regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system,
and therefore allows only such principles as do not at any rate
make it impossible for any knowledge that we may attain to
combine into a system with other knowledge. But the proposi-
tions of the antithesis are of such a kind that they render the
completion of the edifice of knowledge quite impossible. They
maintain that there is always to be found beyond every state
of the world a more ancient state, in every part yet other parts
similarly divisible, prior to every event still another event
which itself again is likewise generated, and that in existence
in general everything is conditioned, an unconditioned and
first existence being nowhere discernible. Since, therefore,
the antithesis thus refuses to admit as first or as a beginning
anything that could serve as a foundation for building, a
P 430
complete edifice of knowledge is, on such assumptions, alto-
gether impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason --
the demand not for empirical but for pure a priori unity of
reason -- forms a natural recommendation for the assertions
of the thesis.
If men could free themselves from all such interests, and
consider the assertions of reason irrespective of their conse-
quences, solely in view of the intrinsic force of their grounds,
and were the only way of escape from their perplexities to
give adhesion to one or other of the opposing parties, their
state would be one of continuous vacillation. To-day it would
be their conviction that the human will is free; to-morrow,
dwelling in reflection upon the indissoluble chain of nature,
they would hold that freedom is nothing but self-deception,
that everything is simply nature. If, however, they were
summoned to action, this play of the merely speculative
reason would, like a dream, at once cease, and they would
choose their principles exclusively in accordance with practi-
cal interests. Since, however, it is fitting that a reflective and
enquiring being should devote a certain amount of time to
the examination of his own reason, entirely divesting himself
of all partiality and openly submitting his observations to the
judgment of others, no one can be blamed for, much less pro-
hibited from, presenting for trial the two opposing parties,
leaving them, terrorised by no threats, to defend themselves as
best they can, before a jury of like standing with themselves,
that is, before a jury of fallible men.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 4
THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF A SOLUTION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS OF PURE REASON
To profess to solve all problems and to answer all questions
would be impudent boasting, and would argue such extrava-
gant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all confidence. Neverthe-
less there are sciences the very nature of which requires that
every question arising within their domain should be com-
P 431
pletely answerable in terms of what is known, inasmuch as the
answer must issue from the same sources from which the
question proceeds. In these sciences it is not permissible to
plead unavoidable ignorance; the solution can be demanded.
We must be able, in every possible case, in accordance with a
rule, to know what is right and what is wrong, since this con-
cerns our obligation, and we have no obligation to that which
we cannot know. In the explanation of natural appearances,
on the other hand, much must remain uncertain and many
questions insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no
means sufficient, in all cases, to account for what has to be ex-
plained. The question, therefore, is whether in transcendental
philosophy there is any question relating to an object pre-
sented to pure reason which is unanswerable by this reason,
and whether we may rightly excuse ourselves from giving a
decisive answer. In thus excusing ourselves, we should have
to show that any knowledge which we can acquire still leaves
us in complete uncertainty as to what should be ascribed to
the object, and that while we do indeed have a concept suffi-
cient to raise a question, we are entirely lacking in materials
or power to answer the same.
Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy is unique
in the whole field of speculative knowledge, in that no ques-
tion which concerns an object given to pure reason can be
insoluble for this same human reason, and that no excuse of
an unavoidable ignorance, or of the problem's unfathomable
depth, can release us from the obligation to answer it thor-
oughly and completely. That very concept which puts us in a
position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it,
since, as in the case of right and wrong, the object is not to be
met with outside the concept.
In transcendental philosophy, however, the only questions
to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer
bearing on the constitution of the object, and from answering
which the philosopher is not permitted to excuse himself on
the plea of their impenetrable obscurity, are the cosmological.
These questions [bearing on the constitution of the object]
must refer exclusively to cosmological ideas. For the object
must be given empirically, the question being only as to its
conformity to an idea. If, on the other hand, the object is
P 432
transcendental, and therefore itself unknown; if, for instance,
the question be whether that something, the appearance of
which (in ourselves) is thought (soul), is in itself a simple being,
whether there is an absolutely necessary cause of all things,
and so forth, what we have then to do is in each case to seek
an object for our idea; and we may well confess that this object
is unknown to us, though not therefore impossible. The cos-
mological ideas alone have the peculiarity that they can pre-
suppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for
its concept, as being given. The question which arises out of
these ideas refers only to the advance in this synthesis, that
is, whether it should be carried so far as to contain absolute
totality -- such totality, since it cannot be given in any experi-
ence, being no longer empirical. Since we are here dealing
solely with a thing as object of a possible experience, not as a
thing in itself, the answer to the transcendent cosmological
question cannot lie anywhere save in the idea. We are not
asking what is the constitution of any object in itself, nor
as regards possible experience are we enquiring what can
be given in concreto in any experience. Our sole question
is as to what lies in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis
can do no more than merely approximate; the question must
therefore be capable of being solved entirely from the idea.
Since the idea is a mere creature of reason, reason cannot
disclaim its responsibility and saddle it upon the unknown
object.
++ Although to the question, what is the constitution of a tran-
scendental object, no answer can be given stating what it is, we can
yet reply that the question itself is nothing, because there is no
given object [corresponding] to it. Accordingly all questions dealt
with in the transcendental doctrine of the soul are answerable in
this latter manner, and have indeed been so answered; its
questions refer to the transcendental subject of all inner appear-
ances, which is not itself appearance and consequently not given
as object, and in which none of the categories (and it is to them
that the question is really directed) meet with the conditions re-
quired for their application. We have here a case where the com-
mon saying holds, that no answer is itself an answer. A question
as to the constitution of that something which cannot be thought
through any determinate predicate -- inasmuch as it is completely
outside the sphere of those objects which can be given to us -- is
entirely null and void.
P 433
It is not so extraordinary as at first seems the case, that a
science should be in a position to demand and expect none but
assured answers to all the questions within its domain (quae-
stiones domesticae), although up to the present they have per-
haps not been found. In addition to transcendental philosophy,
there are two pure rational sciences, one purely speculative,
the other with a practical content, namely, pure mathematics
and pure ethics. Has it ever been suggested that, because of
our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must remain un-
certain what exact relation, in rational or irrational numbers,
a diameter bears to a circle? Since no adequate solution in
terms of rational numbers is possible, and no solution in terms
of irrational numbers has yet been discovered, it was con-
cluded that at least the impossibility of a solution can be
known with certainty, and of this impossibility Lambert has
given the required proof. In the universal principles of morals
nothing can be uncertain, because the principles are either
altogether void and meaningless, or must be derived from
the concepts of our reason. In natural science, on the other
hand, there is endless conjecture, and certainty is not to be
counted upon. For the natural appearances are objects which
are given to us independently of our concepts, and the key to
them lies not in us and our pure thinking, but outside us; and
therefore in many cases, since the key is not to be found, an
assured solution is not to be expected. I am not, of course, here
referring to those questions of the Transcendental Analytic
which concern the deduction of our pure knowledge; we are
at present treating only of the certainty of judgments with
respect to their objects and not with respect to the source of
our concepts themselves.
The obligation of an at least critical solution of the ques-
tions which reason thus propounds to itself, we cannot, there-
fore, escape by complaints of the narrow limits of our reason,
and by confessing, under the pretext of a humility based on self-
knowledge, that it is beyond the power of our reason to deter-
mine whether the world exists from eternity or has a begin-
ning; whether cosmical space is filled with beings to infinitude,
P 434
or is enclosed within certain limits; whether anything in the
world is simple, or everything such as to be infinitely divisible;
whether there is generation and production through freedom,
or whether everything depends on the chain of events in the
natural order; and finally whether there exists any being com-
pletely unconditioned and necessary in itself, or whether every-
thing is conditioned in its existence and therefore dependent on
external things and itself contingent. All these questions refer
to an object which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts,
namely, to the absolutely unconditioned totality of the syn-
thesis of appearances. If from our own concepts we are unable
to assert and determine anything certain, we must not throw
the blame upon the object as concealing itself from us. Since
such an object is nowhere to be met with outside our idea, it is
not possible for it to be given. The cause of failure we must
seek in our idea itself. For so long as we obstinately persist
in assuming that there is an actual object corresponding to
the idea, the problem, as thus viewed, allows of no solution. A
clear exposition of the dialectic which lies within our concept
itself would soon yield us complete certainty how we ought
to judge in reference to such a question.
The pretext that we are unable to obtain certainty in regard
to these problems can be at once met with the following question
which certainly calls for a clear answer: Whence come those
ideas, the solution of which involves us in such difficulty? Is it,
perchance, appearances that demand explanation, and do we,
in accordance with these ideas, have to seek only the principles
or rules of their exposition? Even if we suppose the whole of
nature to be spread out before us, and that of all that is pre-
sented to our intuition nothing is concealed from our senses and
consciousness, yet still through no experience could the object
of our ideas be known by us in concreto. For that purpose, in
addition to this exhaustive intuition, we should require what
is not possible through any empirical knowledge, namely, a
completed synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute
totality. Accordingly our question does not require to be raised
in the explanation of any given appearance, and is therefore
not a question which can be regarded as imposed on us by
the object itself. The object can never come before us, since
it cannot be given through any possible experience. In all
P 435
possible perceptions we always remain involved in conditions,
whether in space or in time, and come upon nothing un-
conditioned requiring us to determine whether this uncondi-
tioned is to be located in an absolute beginning of synthesis,
or in an absolute totality of a series that has no beginning.
In its empirical meaning, the term 'whole' is always only com-
parative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe), the
whole of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence
in general, with all questions as to whether it is brought about
through finite synthesis or through a synthesis requiring infinite
extension, have nothing to do with any possible experience.
We should not, for instance, in any wise be able to explain the
appearances of a body better, or even differently, in assuming
that it consisted either of simple or of inexhaustibly com-
posite parts; for neither a simple appearance nor an infinite
composition can ever come before us. Appearances demand
explanation only so far as the conditions of their explanation
are given in perception; but all that may ever be given in this
way, when taken together in an absolute whole, is not itself
a perception. Yet it is just the explanation of this very
whole that is demanded in the transcendental problems of
reason.
Thus the solution of these problems can never be found
in experience, and this is precisely the reason why we should
not say that it is uncertain what should be ascribed to the
object [of our idea]. For as our object is only in our brain,
and cannot be given outside it, we have only to take care to
be at one with ourselves, and to avoid that amphiboly which
transforms our idea into a supposed representation of an
object that is empirically given and therefore to be known
according to the laws of experience. The dogmatic solution is
therefore not only uncertain, but impossible. The critical solu-
tion, which allows of complete certainty, does not consider the
question objectively, but in relation to the foundation of the
knowledge upon which the question is based.
P 436
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 5
SCEPTICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL
QUESTIONS IN THE FOUR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
We should of ourselves desist from the demand that our
questions be answered dogmatically, if from the start we
understood that whatever the dogmatic answer might turn out
to be it would only increase our ignorance, and cast us from
one inconceivability into another, from one obscurity into
another still greater, and perhaps even into contradictions. If
our question is directed simply to a yes or no, we are well
advised to leave aside the supposed grounds of the answer, and
first consider what we should gain according as the answer is
in the affirmative or in the negative. Should we then find that
in both cases the outcome is mere nonsense, there will be good
reason for instituting a critical examination of our question, to
determine whether the question does not itself rest on a ground-
less presupposition, in that it plays with an idea the falsity of
which can be more easily detected through study of its applica-
tion and consequences than in its own separate representation.
This is the great utility of the sceptical mode of dealing with
the questions which pure reason puts to pure reason. By its
means we can deliver ourselves, at but a small cost, from a
great body of sterile dogmatism, and set in its place a sober
critique, which as a true cathartic will effectively guard us
against such groundless beliefs and the supposed polymathy
to which they lead.
If therefore, in dealing with a cosmological idea, I were
able to appreciate beforehand that whatever view may be
taken of the unconditioned in the successive synthesis of ap-
pearances, it must either be too large or too small for any con-
cept of the understanding, I should be in a position to under-
stand that since the cosmological idea has no bearing save
upon an object of experience which has to be in conformity
with a possible concept of the understanding, it must be
P 437
entirely empty and without meaning; for its object, view it as
we may, cannot be made to agree with it. This is in fact the
case with all cosmical concepts; and this is why reason, so
long as it holds to them, is involved in an unavoidable
antinomy. For suppose: --
First, that the world has no beginning: it is then too large
for our concept, which, consisting as it does in a successive
regress, can never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed.
Or suppose that the world has a beginning, it will then, in the
necessary empirical regress, be too small for the concept of
the understanding. For since the beginning still presupposes a
time which precedes it, it is still not unconditioned; and the law
of the empirical employment of the understanding therefore
obliges us to look for a higher temporal condition; and the
world [as limited in time] is therefore obviously too small for
this law.
This is also true of the twofold answer to the question
regarding the magnitude of the world in space. If it is infinite
and unlimited, it is too large for any possible empirical con-
cept. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask what
determines these limits. Empty space is no self-subsistent
correlate of things, and cannot be a condition at which we
could stop; still less can it be an empirical condition, forming
part of a possible experience. (For how can there be any ex-
perience of the absolutely void? ) And yet to obtain absolute
totality in the empirical synthesis it is always necessary that
the unconditioned be an empirical concept. Consequently, a
limited world is too small for our concept.
Secondly, if every appearance in space (matter) consists of
infinitely many parts, the regress in the division will always
be too great for our concept; while if the division of space is
to stop at any member of the division (the simple), the regress
will be too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For this
member always still allows of a regress to further parts con-
tained in it.
Thirdly, if we suppose that nothing happens in the world
save in accordance with the laws of nature, the causality of
the cause will always itself be something that happens, making
necessary a regress to a still higher cause, and thus a con-
tinuation of the series of conditions a parte priori without end.
P 438
Nature, as working always through efficient causes, is thus
too large for any of the concepts which we can employ in the
synthesis of cosmical events.
If, in certain cases, we admit the occurrence of self-caused
events, that is, generation through freedom, then by an un-
avoidable law of nature the question 'why' still pursues us,
constraining us, in accordance with the law of causality
[which governs] experience, to pass beyond such events; and
we thus find that such totality of connection is too small for
our necessary empirical concept.
Fourthly, if we admit an absolutely necessary being
(whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or
the cause of the world), we set it in a time infinitely remote
from any given point of time, because otherwise it would be
dependent upon another and antecedent being. But such an
existence is then too large for our empirical concept, and is
unapproachable through any regress, however far this be
carried.
If, again, we hold that everything belonging to the world
(whether as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, any
and every given existence is too small for our concept. For
we are constrained always still to look about for some other
existence upon which it is dependent.
We have said that in all these cases the cosmical idea is
either too large or too small for the empirical regress, and
therefore for any possible concept of the understanding. We
have thus been maintaining that the fault lies with the idea, in
being too large or too small for that to which it is directed,
namely, possible experience. Why have we not expressed our-
selves in the opposite manner, saying that in the former case
the empirical concept is always too small for the idea, and in
the latter too large, and that the blame therefore attaches to
the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible experience
is that which can alone give reality to our concepts; in its
absence a concept is a mere idea, without truth, that is, without
relation to any object. The possible empirical concept is there-
fore the standard by which we must judge whether the idea
is a mere idea and thought-entity, or whether it finds its object
in the world. For we can say of anything that it is too large
P 439
or too small relatively to something else, only if the former is
required for the sake of the latter, and has to be adapted to it.
Among the puzzles propounded in the ancient dialectical
Schools was the question, whether, if a ball cannot pass
through a hole, we should say that the ball is too large or the
hole too small. In such a case it is a matter of indifference
how we choose to express ourselves, for we do not know which
exists for the sake of the other. In the case, however, of a man
and his coat, we do not say that a man is too tall for his coat,
but that the coat is too short for the man.
We have thus been led to what is at least a well-grounded
suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the
mutually conflicting pseudo-rational assertions, may perhaps
rest on an empty and merely fictitious concept of the manner
in which the object of these ideas is given to us; and this sus-
picion may set us on the right path for laying bare the illusion
which has so long led us astray.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 6
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC
We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic
that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all
objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but ap-
pearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner
in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of
alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts.
This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism. The realist, in
the transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifica-
tions of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats
mere representations as things in themselves.
++ I have also, elsewhere, sometimes entitled it formal idealism,
to distinguish it from material idealism, that is, from the usual type
of idealism which doubts or denies the existence of outer things
themselves.
P 439
It would be unjust to ascribe to us that long-decried
P 440
empirical idealism, which, while it admits the genuine reality
of space, denies the existence of the extended beings in it, or
at least considers their existence doubtful, and so does not
in this regard allow of any properly demonstrable distinction
between truth and dreams. As to the appearances of inner
sense in time, empirical idealism finds no difficulty in regard-
ing them as real things; indeed it even asserts that this inner
experience is the sufficient as well as the only proof of the
actual existence of its object (in itself, with all this time-
determination).
Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, admits the
reality of the objects of outer intuition, as intuited in space, and
of all changes in time, as represented by inner sense. For since
space is a form of that intuition which we entitle outer, and
since without objects in space there would be no empirical re-
presentation whatsoever, we can and must regard the extended
beings in it as real; and the same is true of time. But this space
and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in them-
selves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot
exist outside our mind. Even the inner and sensible intuition
of our mind (as object of consciousness) which is represented
as being determined by the succession of different states in
time, is not the self proper, as it exists in itself -- that is, is not
the transcendental subject -- but only an appearance that has
been given to the sensibility of this, to us unknown, being.
This inner appearance cannot be admitted to exist in any such
manner in and by itself; for it is conditioned by time, and time
cannot be a determination of a thing in itself. The empirical
truth of appearances in space and time is, however, sufficiently
secured; it is adequately distinguished from dreams, if both
dreams and genuine appearances cohere truly and completely
in one experience, in accordance with empirical laws.
The objects of experience, then, are never given in them-
selves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it.
That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one
has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted. This,
however, only means that in the possible advance of experi-
ence we may encounter them. For everything is real which
stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the
P 441
laws of empirical advance. They are therefore real if they
stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness,
although they are not for that reason real in themselves, that
is, outside this advance of experience.
Nothing is really given us save perception and the empiri-
cal advance from this to other possible perceptions. For the
appearances, as mere representations, are in themselves real
only in perception, which perception is in fact nothing but the
reality of an empirical representation, that is, appearance. To
call an appearance a real thing prior to our perceiving it, either
means that in the advance of experience we must meet with
such a perception, or it means nothing at all. For if we were
speaking of a thing in itself, we could indeed say that it exists
in itself apart from relation to our senses and possible experi-
ence. But we are here speaking only of an appearance in space
and time, which are not determinations of things in them-
selves but only of our sensibility. Accordingly, that which is in
space and time is an appearance; it is not anything in itself
but consists merely of representations, which, if not given in
us -- that is to say, in perception -- are nowhere to be met with.
The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a recep-
tivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with
representations, the relation of which to one another is a pure
intuition of space and of time (mere forms of our sensibility),
and which, in so far as they are connected in this manner in
space and time, and are determinable according to laws of the
unity of experience, are entitled objects. The non-sensible cause
of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot
therefore be intuited by us as object. For such an object would
have to be represented as neither in space nor in time (these
being merely conditions of sensible representation), and apart
from such conditions we cannot think any intuition. We may,
however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in
general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have
something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity.
To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent
and connection of our possible perceptions, and can say that it
is given in itself prior to all experience. But the appearances,
P 442
while conforming to it, are not given in themselves, but only in
this experience, being mere representations, which as percep-
tions can mark out a real object only in so far as the perception
connects with all others according to the rules of the unity of
experience. Thus we can say that the real things of past time
are given in the transcendental object of experience; but they
are objects for me and real in past time only in so far as I repre-
sent to myself (either by the light of history or by the guiding-
clues of causes and effects) that a regressive series of possible
perceptions in accordance with empirical laws, in a word, that
the course of the world, conducts us to a past time-series as con-
dition of the present time -- a series which, however, can be re-
presented as actual not in itself but only in the connection of a
possible experience. Accordingly, all events which have taken
place in the immense periods that have preceded my own ex-
istence mean really nothing but the possibility of extending the
chain of experience from the present perception back to the
conditions which determine this perception in respect of time.
If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of
the senses in all time and in all places, I do not set them in
space and time [as being there] prior to experience. This
representation is nothing but the thought of a possible ex-
perience in its absolute completeness. Since the objects are
nothing but mere representations, only in such a possible
experience are they given. To say that they exist prior to
all my experience is only to assert that they are to be met
with if, starting from perception, I advance to that part of
experience to which they belong. The cause of the empirical
conditions of this advance (that which determines what mem-
bers I shall meet with, or how far I can meet with any such
in my regress) is transcendental, and is therefore necessarily
unknown to me. We are not, however, concerned with this
transcendental cause, but only with the rule of the advance in
the experience in which objects, that is to say, appearances,
are given to me. Moreover, in outcome it is a matter of in-
difference whether I say that in the empirical advance in
space I can meet with stars a hundred times farther removed
than the outermost now perceptible to me, or whether I say
that they are perhaps to be met with in cosmical space even
P 443
though no human being has ever perceived or ever will per-
ceive them. For even supposing they were given as things in
themselves, without relation to possible experience, it still
remains true that they are nothing to me, and therefore are
not objects, save in so far as they are contained in the series of
the empirical regress. Only in another sort of relation, when
these appearances would be used for the cosmological idea of
an absolute whole, and when, therefore, we are dealing with a
question which oversteps the limits of possible experience,
does distinction of the mode in which we view the reality of
those objects of the senses become of importance, as serving
to guard us against a deceptive error which is bound to arise
if we misinterpret our empirical concepts.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 7
CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL CONFLICT
OF REASON WITH ITSELF
The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dia-
lectical argument: If the conditioned is given, the entire series
of all its conditions is likewise given; objects of the senses are
given as conditioned; therefore, etc. Through this syllogism,
the major premiss of which appears so natural and evident, as
many cosmological ideas are introduced as there are differ-
ences in the conditions (in the synthesis of appearances) that
constitute a series. The ideas postulate absolute totality of
these series; and thereby they set reason in unavoidable
conflict with itself. We shall be in a better position to detect
what is deceptive in this pseudo-rational argument, if we first
correct and define some of the concepts employed in it.
In the first place, it is evident beyond all possibility of
doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of
all its conditions is set us as a task. For it is involved in the
very concept of the conditioned that something is referred to a
condition, and if this condition is again itself conditioned, to a
more remote condition, and so through all the members of the
P 444
series. The above proposition is thus analytic, and has nothing
to fear from a transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate
of reason, that through the understanding we follow up and
extend as far as possible that connection of a concept with its
conditions which directly results from the concept itself.
Further, if the conditioned as well as its condition are
things in themselves, then upon the former being given, the
regress to the latter is not only set as a task, but therewith
already really given. And since this holds of all members of
the series, the complete series of the conditions, and therefore
the unconditioned, is given therewith, or rather is presupposed
in view of the fact that the conditioned, which is only possible
through the complete series, is given. The synthesis of the
conditioned with its condition is here a synthesis of the mere
understanding, which represents things as they are, without
considering whether and how we can obtain knowledge of
them. If, however, what we are dealing with are appearances
-- as mere representations appearances cannot be given save
in so far as I attain knowledge of them, or rather attain them
in themselves, for they are nothing but empirical modes of
knowledge -- I cannot say, in the same sense of the terms, that
if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as appearances)
are likewise given, and therefore cannot in any way infer the
absolute totality of the series of its conditions. The appear-
ances are in their apprehension themselves nothing but an
empirical synthesis in space and time, and are given only in
this synthesis. It does not, therefore, follow, that if the con-
ditioned, in the [field of] appearance, is given, the synthesis
which constitutes its empirical condition is given therewith
and is presupposed. This synthesis first occurs in the regress,
and never exists without it. What we can say is that a regress
to the conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis, on
the side of the conditions, is enjoined or set as a task, and that
in this regress there can be no lack of given conditions.
These considerations make it clear that the major premiss
of the cosmological inference takes the conditioned in the
transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor pre-
miss takes it in the empirical sense of a concept of the under-
standing applied to mere appearances. The argument thus
commits that dialectical fallacy which is entitled sophisma
P 445
figurae dictionis. This fallacy is not, however, an artificial
one; a quite natural illusion of our common reason leads
us, when anything is given as conditioned, thus to assume in
the major premiss, as it were without thought or question, its
conditions and their series. This assumption is indeed simply
the logical requirement that we should have adequate pre-
misses for any given conclusion. Also, there is no reference to a
time-order in the connection of the conditioned with its con-
dition; they are presupposed as given together with it. Further,
it is no less natural, in the minor premiss, to regard appear-
ances both as things in themselves and as objects given to the
pure understanding, than to proceed as we have done in the
major, in which we have [similarly] abstracted from all those
conditions of intuition under which alone objects can be given.
Yet in so doing we have overlooked an important distinction
between the concepts. The synthesis of the conditioned with
its conditions (and the whole series of the latter) does not in
the major premiss carry with it any limitation through time
or any concept of succession. The empirical synthesis, on the
other hand, that is, the series of the conditions in appearance,
as subsumed in the minor premiss, is necessarily successive,
the members of the series being given only as following upon
one another in time; and I have therefore, in this case, no right
to assume the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the
series thereby represented. In the major premiss all the mem-
bers of the series are given in themselves, without any condi-
tion of time, but in this minor premiss they are possible only
through the successive regress, which is given only in the
process in which it is actually carried out.
When this error has thus been shown to be involved in the
argument upon which both parties alike base their cosmo-
***********
unable to offer any sufficient title in support of their claims.
But the quarrel is not thereby ended -- as if one or both of the
parties had been proved to be wrong in the actual doctrines
they assert, that is, in the conclusions of their arguments. For
although they have failed to support their contentions by valid
grounds of proof, nothing seems to be clearer than that since
one of them asserts that the world has a beginning and the
other that it has no beginning and is from eternity, one of the
P 446
two must be in the right. But even if this be so, none the less,
since the arguments on both sides are equally clear, it is im-
possible to decide between them. The parties may be com-
manded to keep the peace before the tribunal of reason; but the
controversy none the less continues. There can therefore be no
way of settling it once for all and to the satisfaction of both
sides, save by their becoming convinced that the very fact of
their being able so admirably to refute one another is evidence
that they are really quarrelling about nothing, and that a
certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality
where none is to be found. This is the path which we shall now
proceed to follow in the settlement of a dispute that defies all
attempts to come to a decision.
* * *
Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely repri-
manded by Plato as a mischievous Sophist who, to show his
skill, would set out to prove a proposition through convincing
arguments and then immediately overthrow them by other
arguments equally strong. Zeno maintained, for example, that
God (probably conceived by him as simply the world) is
neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, neither
similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. To the critics of his
procedure he appeared to have the absurd intention of denying
both of two mutually contradictory propositions. But this ac-
cusation does not seem to me to be justified. The first of his
propositions I shall consider presently more in detail. As re-
gards the others, if by the word 'God' he meant the universe, he
would certainly have to say that it is neither abidingly present
in its place, that is, at rest, nor that it changes its place, that is,
is in motion; because all places are in the universe, and the
universe is not, therefore, itself in any place. Again, if the
universe comprehends in itself everything that exists, it cannot
be either similar or dissimilar to any other thing, because
there is no other thing, nothing outside it, with which it could
be compared. If two opposed judgments presuppose an inad-
missible condition, then in spite of their opposition, which does
not amount to a contradiction strictly so-called, both fall to the
ground, inasmuch as the condition, under which alone either
of them can be maintained, itself falls.
P 447
If it be said that all bodies have either a good smell or a
smell that is not good, a third case is possible, namely, that
a body has no smell at all; and both the conflicting proposi-
tions may therefore be false. If, however, I say: all bodies are
either good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel
non suaveolens), the two judgments are directly contradictory
to one another, and the former only is false, its contradictory
opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good-smelling,
comprehending those bodies also which have no smell at all.
Since, in the previous opposition (per disparata), smell, the
contingent condition of the concept of the body, was not
removed by the opposed judgment, but remained attached
to it, the two judgments were not related as contradictory
opposites.
If, therefore, we say that the world is either infinite in
extension or is not infinite (non est infinitus), and if the former
proposition is false, its contradictory opposite, that the world
is not infinite, must be true. And I should thus deny the exist-
ence of an infinite world, without affirming in its place a finite
world. But if we had said that the world is either infinite or finite
(non-infinite), both statements might be false. For in that case
we should be regarding the world in itself as determined in its
magnitude, and in the opposed judgment we do not merely
remove the infinitude, and with it perhaps the entire separate
existence of the world, but attach a determination to the world,
regarded as a thing actually existing in itself. This assertion
may, however, likewise be false; the world may not be given
as a thing in itself, nor as being in its magnitude either infinite
or finite. I beg permission to entitle this kind of opposition
dialectical, and that of contradictories analytical. Thus of
two dialectically opposed judgments both may be false; for
the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but says
something more than is required for a simple contradiction.
If we regard the two propositions, that the world is infinite
in magnitude and that it is finite in magnitude, as contra-
dictory opposites, we are assuming that the world, the com-
plete series of appearances, is a thing in itself that remains
even if I suspend the infinite or the finite regress in the series
of its appearances. If, however, I reject this assumption, or
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rather this accompanying transcendental illusion, and deny
that the world is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition
of the two assertions is converted into a merely dialectical
opposition. Since the world does not exist in itself, independ-
ently of the regressive series of my representations, it exists
in itself neither as an infinite whole nor as a finite whole. It
exists only in the empirical regress of the series of appear-
ances, and is not to be met with as something in itself. If, then,
this series is always conditioned, and therefore can never be
given as complete, the world is not an unconditioned whole,
and does not exist as such a whole, either of infinite or of
finite magnitude.
What we have here said of the first cosmological idea,
that is, of the absolute totality of magnitude in the [field
of] appearance, applies also to all the others. The series of
conditions is only to be met with in the regressive synthesis
itself, not in the [field of] appearance viewed as a thing given
in and by itself, prior to all regress. We must therefore say that
the number of parts in a given appearance is in itself neither
finite nor infinite. For an appearance is not something existing
in itself, and its parts are first given in and through the regress
of the decomposing synthesis, a regress which is never given
in absolute completeness, either as finite or as infinite. This
also holds of the series of subordinated causes, and of the
series that proceeds from the conditioned to unconditioned
necessary existence. These series can never be regarded as
being in themselves in their totality either finite or infinite.
Being series of subordinated representations, they exist only
in the dynamical regress, and prior to this regress can have no
existence in themselves as self-subsistent series of things.
Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas
vanishes when it is shown that it is merely dialectical, and
that it is a conflict due to an illusion which arises from our
applying to appearances that exist only in our representations,
and therefore, so far as they form a series, not otherwise than
in a successive regress, that idea of absolute totality which
holds only as a condition of things in themselves. From this
antinomy we can, however, obtain, not indeed a dogmatic, but
a critical and doctrinal advantage. It affords indirect proof of
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the transcendental ideality of appearances -- a proof which
ought to convince any who may not be satisfied by the direct
proof given in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This proof would
consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a whole exist-
ing in itself, it is either finite or infinite. But both alternatives
are false (as shown in the proofs of the antithesis and thesis
respectively). It is therefore also false that the world (the
sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in itself. From this
it then follows that appearances in general are nothing outside
our representations -- which is just what is meant by their
transcendental ideality.
This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see
that the proofs given in the fourfold antinomy are not merely
baseless deceptions. On the supposition that appearances, and
the sensible world which comprehends them all, are things
in themselves, these proofs are indeed well-grounded. The
conflict which results from the propositions thus obtained
shows, however, that there is a fallacy in this assumption, and
so leads us to the discovery of the true constitution of things,
as objects of the senses. While the transcendental dialectic does
not by any means favour scepticism, it certainly does favour
the sceptical method, which can point to such dialectic as an
example of its great services. For when the arguments of
reason are allowed to oppose one another in unrestricted
freedom, something advantageous, and likely to aid in the
correction of our judgments, will always accrue, though it
may not be what we set out to find.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 8
THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON IN ITS
APPLICATION TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS
Since no maximum of the series of conditions in a sensible
world, regarded as a thing in itself, is given through the cos-
mological principle of totality, but can only be set as a task
that calls for regress in the series of conditions, the principle
of pure reason has to be amended in these terms; and it
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then preserves its validity, not indeed as the axiom that we
think the totality as actually in the object, but as a problem for
the understanding, and therefore for the subject, leading it to
undertake and to carry on, in accordance with the completeness
prescribed by the idea, the regress in the series of conditions of
any given conditioned. For in our sensibility, that is, in space
and time, every condition to which we can attain in the
exposition of given appearances is again conditioned. For
they are not objects in themselves -- were they such, the abso-
lutely unconditioned might be found in them -- but simply
empirical representations which must always find in intui-
tion the condition that determines them in space and time.
The principle of reason is thus properly only a rule, pre-
scribing a regress in the series of the conditions of given
appearances, and forbidding it to bring the regress to a close
by treating anything at which it may arrive as absolutely un-
conditioned. It is not a principle of the possibility of experience
and of empirical knowledge of objects of the senses, and there-
fore not a principle of the understanding; for every experience,
in conformity with the given [forms of] intuition, is enclosed
within limits. Nor is it a constitutive principle of reason, en-
abling us to extend our concept of the sensible world beyond all
possible experience. It is rather a principle of the greatest pos-
sible continuation and extension of experience, allowing no em-
pirical limit to hold as absolute. Thus it is a principle of reason
which serves as a rule, postulating what we ought to do in the
regress, but not anticipating what is present in the object as
it is in itself, prior to all regress. Accordingly I entitle it a
regulative principle of reason, to distinguish it from the prin-
ciple of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, viewed
as actually present in the object (that is, in the appearances),
which would be a constitutive cosmological principle. I have
tried to show by this distinction that there is no such con-
stitutive principle, and so to prevent what otherwise, through
a transcendental subreption, inevitably takes place, namely,
the ascribing of objective reality to an idea that serves merely
as a rule.
In order properly to determine the meaning of this rule of
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pure reason, we must observe, first, that it cannot tell us what
the object is, but only how the empirical regress is to be carried
out so as to arrive at the complete concept of the object. If it
attempted the former task, it would be a constitutive principle,
such as pure reason can never supply. It cannot be regarded
as maintaining that the series of conditions for a given con-
ditioned is in itself either finite or infinite. That would be to
treat a mere idea of absolute totality, which is only produced
in the idea, as equivalent to thinking an object that cannot be
given in any experience. For in terms of it we should be as-
cribing to a series of appearances an objective reality which
is independent of empirical synthesis. This idea of reason can
therefore do no more than prescribe a rule to the regressive
synthesis in the series of conditions; and in accordance with
this rule the synthesis must proceed from the conditioned,
through all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned.
Yet it can never reach this goal, for the absolutely un-
conditioned is not to be met with in experience.
We must therefore first of all determine what we are to
mean by the synthesis of a series, in cases in which the syn-
thesis is never complete. In this connection two expressions
are commonly employed, which are intended to mark a dis-
tinction, though without correctly assigning the ground of the
distinction. Mathematicians speak solely of a progressus in
infinitum. Philosophers, whose task it is to examine concepts,
refuse to accept this expression as legitimate, substituting for
it the phrase progressus in indefinitum. We need not stop to
examine the reasons for such a distinction, or to enlarge upon
its useful or useless employment. We need only determine
these concepts with such accuracy as is required for our par-
ticular purposes.
Of a straight line we may rightly say that it can be pro-
duced to infinity. In this case the distinction between an in-
finite and an indeterminately great advance (progressus in in-
definitum) would be mere subtlety. When we say, ' Draw a line',
it sounds indeed more correct to add in indefinitum than in
infinitum. Whereas the latter means that you must not cease
producing it -- which is not what is intended -- the former means
only, produce it as far as you please; and if we are referring
only to what it is in our power to do, this expression is quite
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correct, for we can always make the line longer, without end.
So is it in all cases in which we speak only of the progress, that
is, of the advance from the condition to the conditioned: this
possible advance proceeds, without end, in the series of ap-
pearances. From a given pair of parents the descending line
of generation may proceed without end, and we can quite
well regard the line as actually so continuing in the world.
For in this case reason never requires an absolute totality
of the series, since it does not presuppose that totality as a
condition and as given (datum), but only as something con-
ditioned, that allows of being given (dabile), and is added to
without end.
Quite otherwise is it with the problem: how far the regress
extends, when it ascends in a series from something given as
conditioned to its conditions. Can we say that the regress is in
infinitum, or only that it is indeterminately far extended (in
indefinitum)? Can we, for instance, ascend from the men now
living, through the series of their ancestors, in infinitum; or
can we only say that, so far as we have gone back, we have
never met with an empirical ground for regarding the series as
limited at any point, and that we are therefore justified and at
the same time obliged, in the case of every ancestor, to search
further for progenitors, though not indeed to presuppose them?
We answer: when the whole is given in empirical intui-
tion, the regress in the series of its inner conditions pro-
ceeds in infinitum; but when a member only of the series is
given, starting from which the regress has to proceed to abso-
lute totality, the regress is only of indeterminate character (in
indefinitum). Accordingly, the division of a body, that is, of a
portion of matter given between certain limits, must be said to
proceed in infinitum. For this matter is given as a whole, and
therefore with all its possible parts, in empirical intuition.
Since the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition
of this part is the part of the part, and so on, and since in
this regress of decomposition an unconditioned (indivisible)
member of this series of conditions is never met with, not only
is there never any empirical ground for stopping in the divi-
sion, but the further members of any continued division are
themselves empirically given prior to the continuation of the
division. The division, that is to say, goes on in infinitum. On
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the other hand, since the series of ancestors of any given man
is not given in its absolute totality in any possible experience,
the regress proceeds from every member in the series of genera-
tions to a higher member, and no empirical limit is encoun-
tered which exhibits a member as absolutely unconditioned.
And since the members, which might supply the condition, are
not contained in an empirical intuition of the whole, prior to
the regress, this regress does not proceed in infinitum, by divi-
sion of the given, but only indefinitely far, searching for further
members additional to those that are given, and which are
themselves again always given as conditioned.
In neither case, whether the regress be in infinitum or in
indefinitum, may the series of conditions be regarded as being
given as infinite in the object. The series are not things in
themselves, but only appearances, which, as conditions of one
another, are given only in the regress itself. The question,
therefore, is no longer how great this series of conditions may
be in itself, whether it be finite or infinite, for it is nothing in
itself; but how we are to carry out the empirical regress, and
how far we should continue it. Here we find an important dis-
tinction in regard to the rule governing such procedure. When
the whole is empirically given; it is possible to proceed back in
the series of its inner conditions in infinitum. When the whole
is not given, but has first to be given through empirical regress,
we can only say that the search for still higher conditions of the
series is possible in infinitum. In the former case we could say:
there are always more members, empirically given, than I can
reach through the regress of decomposition; in the latter case,
however, the position is this: we can always proceed still further
in the regress, because no member is empirically given as abso-
lutely unconditioned; and since a higher member is therefore
always possible, the enquiry regarding it is necessary. In the
one case we necessarily find further members of the series; in
the other case, since no experience is absolutely limited, the
necessity is that we enquire for them. For either we have no
perception which sets an absolute limit to the empirical re-
gress, in which case we must not regard the regress as com-
pleted, or we have a perception limiting our series, in which
case the perception cannot be part of the series traversed
(for that which limits must be distinct from that which is
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thereby limited), and we must therefore continue our regress
to this condition also, and the regress is thus again resumed.
These observations will be set in their proper light by
their application in the following section.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 9
THE EMPIRICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE REGULATIVE
PRINCIPLE OF REASON, IN RESPECT OF ALL COSMO-
LOGICAL IDEAS
We have already, on several occasions, shown that no trans-
cendental employment can be made of the pure concepts either
of the understanding or of reason; that the [assertion of] abso-
lute totality of the series of conditions in the sensible world
rests on a transcendental employment of reason in which reason
demands this unconditioned completeness from what it assumes
to be a thing in itself; and that since the sensible world contains
no such completeness, we are never justified in enquiring, as
regards the absolute magnitude of the series in the sensible
world, whether it be limited or in itself unlimited, but only
how far we ought to go in the empirical regress, when we trace
experience back to its conditions, obeying the rule of reason,
and therefore resting content with no answer to its questions
save that which is in conformity with the object.
What therefore alone remains to us is the validity of the
principle of reason as a rule for the continuation and magnitude
of a possible experience; its invalidity as a constitutive prin-
ciple of appearances [viewed as things] in themselves has been
sufficiently demonstrated. If we can keep these conclusions
steadily in view, the self-conflict of reason will be entirely at an
end. For not only will this critical solution destroy the illusion
which set reason at variance with itself, but will replace it by
teaching which, in correcting the misinterpretation that has
been the sole source of the conflict, brings reason into agree-
ment with itself. A principle which otherwise would be dialec-
tical will thus be converted into a doctrinal principle. In fact,
if this principle can be upheld as determining, in accordance
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with its subjective significance, and yet also in conformity with
the objects of experience, the greatest possible empirical use of
understanding, the outcome will be much the same as if it
were -- what is impossible from pure reason -- an axiom which
determined a priori the objects in themselves. For only in pro-
portion as the principle is effective in directing the widest
possible empirical employment of the understanding, can it
exercise, in respect of the objects of experience, any influence
in extending and correcting our knowledge.
1.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
Composition of the Appearances of a Cosmic Whole
Here, as in the other cosmological questions, the regula-
tive principle of reason is grounded on the proposition that in
the empirical regress we can have no experience of an absolute
limit, that is, no experience of any condition as being one
that empirically is absolutely unconditioned. The reason is
this: such an experience would have to contain a limitation
of appearances by nothing, or by the void, and in the con-
tinued regress we should have to be able to encounter this
limitation in a perception -- which is impossible.
This proposition, which virtually states that the only con-
ditions which we can reach in the empirical regress are con-
ditions which must themselves again be regarded as empiric-
ally conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, that however
far we may have advanced in the ascending series, we must
always enquire for a still higher member of the series, which
may or may not become known to us through experience.
For the solution, therefore, of the first cosmological prob-
lem we have only to decide whether in the regress to the un-
conditioned magnitude of the universe, in time and space, this
never limited ascent can be called a regress to infinity, or only
an indeterminately continued regress (in indefinitum).
The quite general representation of the series of all past
states of the world, as well as of all the things which coexist
in cosmic space, is itself merely a possible empirical regress
which I think to myself, though in an indeterminate manner.
Only in this way can the concept of such a series of conditions
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for a given perception arise at all. Now we have the cosmic
whole only in concept, never, as a whole, in intuition. We
cannot, therefore, argue from the magnitude of the cosmic
whole to the magnitude of the regress, determining the
latter in accordance with the former; on the contrary, only
by reference to the magnitude of the empirical regress am I
in a position to make for myself a concept of the magnitude of
the world. But of this empirical regress the most that we can
ever know is that from every given member of the series of
conditions we have always still to advance empirically to a
higher and more remote member. The magnitude of the
whole of appearances is not thereby determined in any abso-
lute manner; and we cannot therefore say that this regress
proceeds to infinity. In doing so we should be anticipating
members which the regress has not yet reached, represent-
ing their number as so great that no empirical synthesis could
attain thereto, and so should be determining the magnitude of
the world (although only negatively) prior to the regress --
which is impossible. Since the world is not given me, in its
totality, through any intuition, neither is its magnitude given
me prior to the regress. We cannot, therefore, say anything at
all in regard to the magnitude of the world, not even that there
is in it a regress in infinitum. All that we can do is to seek
for the concept of its magnitude according to the rule which
determines the empirical regress in it. This rule says no more
than that, however far we may have attained in the series of
empirical conditions, we should never assume an absolute
limit, but should subordinate every appearance, as con-
ditioned, to another as its condition, and that we must
advance to this condition. This is the regressus in indefini-
tum, which, as it determines no magnitude in the object,
is clearly enough distinguishable from the regressus in infini-
tum.
++ This cosmic series can, therefore, be neither greater nor smaller
than the possible empirical regress upon which alone its concept
rests. And since this regress can yield neither a determinate infinite
nor a determinate finite (that is, anything absolutely limited), it is
evident that the magnitude of the world can be taken neither as
finite nor as infinite. The regress, through which it is represented,
allows of neither alternative.
P 457
I cannot say, therefore, that the world is infinite in space
or as regards past time. Any such concept of magnitude, as
being that of a given infinitude, is empirically impossible, and
therefore, in reference to the world as an object of the senses,
also absolutely impossible. Nor can I say that the regress from
a given perception to all that limits it in a series, whether in
space or in past time, proceeds to infinity; that would be to
presuppose that the world has infinite magnitude. I also can-
not say that the regress is finite; an absolute limit is likewise
empirically impossible. Thus I can say nothing regarding the
whole object of experience, the world of sense; I must limit
my assertions to the rule which determines how experience,
in conformity with its object, is to be obtained and further
extended.
Thus the first and negative answer to the cosmological
problem regarding the magnitude of the world is that the
world has no first beginning in time and no outermost limit
in space.
For if we suppose the opposite, the world would be limited
on the one hand by empty time and on the other by empty
space. Since, however, as appearance, it cannot in itself be
limited in either manner -- appearance not being a thing in
itself -- these limits of the world would have to be given in a
possible experience, that is to say, we should require to have
a perception of limitation by absolutely empty time or space.
But such an experience, as completely empty of content, is
impossible. Consequently, an absolute limit of the world is
impossible empirically, and therefore also absolutely.
The affirmative answer likewise directly follows, namely,
that the regress in the series of appearances, as a determina-
tion of the magnitude of the world, proceeds in indefinitum.
++ It may be noted that this proof is presented in a very different
manner from the dogmatic proof of the antithesis of the first
antinomy. In that argument we regarded the sensible world, in
accordance with the common and dogmatic view, as a thing given
in itself, in its totality, prior to any regress; and we asserted that
unless it occupies all time and all places, it cannot have any deter-
minate position whatsoever in them. The conclusion also was there-
fore different from that given above; for in the dogmatic proof we
inferred the actual infinity of the world.
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This is equivalent to saying that, although the sensible world
has no absolute magnitude, the empirical regress (through
which alone it can be given on the side of its conditions) has
its own rule, namely, that it must always advance from every
member of the series, as conditioned, to one still more remote;
doing so by means either of our own experience, or of the
guiding-thread of history, or of the chain of effects and causes.
And as the rule further demands, our sole and constant aim
must be the extension of the possible empirical employment
of the understanding, this being the only proper task of reason
in the application of its principles.
This rule does not prescribe a determinate empirical regress
that must proceed without end in some one kind of appearance,
e.g. that in proceeding from a living person through a series
of progenitors we must never expect to meet with a first pair,
or that in the series of cosmic bodies we must never admit an
outermost sun. All that the rule requires is that the advance
from appearances be to appearances; for even if these latter
yield no actual perception (as is the case when for our con-
sciousness they are too weak in degree to become experience),
as appearances they none the less still belong to a possible
experience.
All beginning is in time and all limits of the extended are
in space. But space and time belong only to the world of sense.
Accordingly, while appearances in the world are conditionally
limited, the world itself is neither conditionally nor uncon-
ditionally limited.
Similarly, since the world can never be given as complete,
and since even the series of conditions for that which is given
as conditioned cannot, as a cosmic series, be given as complete,
the concept of the magnitude of the world is given only through
the regress and not in a collective intuition prior to it. But the
regress consists only in the determining of the magnitude, and
does not give any determinate concept. It does not, therefore,
yield any concept of a magnitude which, in relation to a certain
[unit-] measure, can be described as infinite. In other words,
the regress does not proceed to the infinite, as if the infinite
could be given, but only indeterminately far, in order [by
means of the regress] to give that empirical magnitude which
first becomes actual in and through this very regress.
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II
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
Division of a Whole given in Intuition
If we divide a whole which is given in intuition, we pro-
ceed from something conditioned to the conditions of its pos-
sibility. The division of the parts (subdivisio or decompositio)
is a regress in the series of these conditions. The absolute
totality of this series would be given only if the regress could
reach simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuously pro-
gressing decomposition are themselves again divisible, the
division, that is, the regress from the conditioned to its con-
ditions, proceeds in infinitum. For the conditions (the parts)
are themselves contained in the conditioned, and since this
is given complete in an intuition that is enclosed between
limits the parts are one and all given together with the con-
ditioned. The regress may not, therefore, be entitled merely
a regress in indefinitum. This was permissible in regard to the
first cosmological idea, since it required an advance from the
conditioned to its conditions, which, as outside it, were not given
through and along with it, but were first added to it in the em-
pirical regress. We are not, however, entitled to say of a whole
which is divisible to infinity, that it is made up of infinitely
many parts. For although all parts are contained in the intuition
of the whole, the whole division is not so contained, but consists
only in the continuous decomposition, that is, in the regress
itself, whereby the series first becomes actual. Since this regress
is infinite, all the members or parts at which it arrives are
contained in the given whole, viewed as an aggregate. But the
whole series of the division is not so contained, for it is a
successive infinite and never whole, and cannot, therefore,
exhibit an infinite multiplicity, or any combination of an
infinite multiplicity in a whole.
This general statement is obviously applicable to space.
Every space intuited as within limits is such a whole, the parts
of which, as obtained by decomposition, are always themselves
spaces. Every limited space is therefore infinitely divisible.
From this a second application of the statement quite
naturally follows, namely, to an outer appearance enclosed
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within limits, that is, to body. Its divisibility is grounded in
the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the
body as an extended whole. Body is therefore infinitely divis-
ible, without consisting, however, of infinitely many parts.
It may seem, indeed, that a body, since it has to be repre-
sented in space as substance, will, as regards the law of the
divisibility of space, differ from space. We may certainly grant
that decomposition can never remove all compositeness from
space; for that would mean that space, in which there is
nothing self-subsistent, had ceased to be space, which is impos-
sible. On the other hand, the assertion that if all compositeness
of matter be thought away nothing at all will remain, does not
appear to be compatible with the concept of a substance which
is meant to be the subject of all compositeness, and which
must persist in the elements of the composite, even although
the connection in space, whereby they constitute a body, be
removed. But while this is true of a thing in itself, as thought
through a pure concept of the understanding, it does not hold
of that which we entitle substance in the [field of] appearance.
For this latter is not an absolute subject, but only an abiding
image of sensibility; it is nothing at all save as an intuition,
in which unconditionedness is never to be met with.
But although this rule of progress in infinitum undoubtedly
applies to the subdivision of an appearance, viewed as a mere
filling of space, it cannot be made to apply to a whole in which
already, as given, the parts are so definitely distinguished off
from one another that they constitute a quantum discretum.
We cannot assume that every part of an organised whole is
itself again so organised that, in the analysis of the parts to
infinity, still other organised parts are always to be met with;
in a word, that the whole is organised to infinity. This is not a
thinkable hypothesis. It is true, indeed, that the parts of matter,
[as found] in their decomposition in infinitum, may be organ-
ised. The infinitude of the division of a given appearance in
space is grounded solely on the fact that, through this infini-
tude, only the divisibility (in itself, as regards the number of its
parts, absolutely indeterminate) is given -- the parts themselves
being given and determined only through the subdivision. In
a word, the whole is not in itself already divided. The number
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of parts, therefore, which a division may determine in a whole,
will depend upon how far we care to advance in the regress of
the division. On the other hand, in the case of an organic body
conceived as organised in infinitum the whole is represented
as already divided into parts, and as yielding to us, prior to all
regress, a determinate and yet infinite number of parts. This,
however, is self-contradictory. This infinite involution is re-
garded as an infinite (that is, never to be completed) series,
and yet at the same time as completed in a [discrete] com-
plex. Infinite divisibility belongs to appearance only in so
far as it is a quantum continuum; it is inseparable from the
occupation of space, which is indeed its ground. To view any-
thing as being a quantum discretum, is to take the number of
units in it as being determined, and therefore as being in every
case equal to some number. How far organisation can go in an
organised body, only experience can show; and although, so
far as our experience has gone, we may not have arrived with
certainty at any inorganic part, the possibility of experiencing
such parts must at least be recognised. When, however, we
have in mind the transcendental division of an appearance
in general, the question how far it may extend does not await
an answer from experience; it is decided by a principle of
reason which prescribes that, in the decomposition of the ex-
tended, the empirical regress, in conformity with the nature of
this appearance, be never regarded as absolutely completed.
Concluding Note on the Solution of the Mathematical - trans-
cendental Ideas, and Preliminary Observation on the Solution of
the Dynamical - transcendental Ideas.
In representing the antinomy of pure reason, through all
the transcendental ideas, in tabular form, and in showing that
the ground of this conflict and the only means of removing it
is by declaring both the opposed assertions to be false, we have
represented the conditions as, in all cases, standing to the con-
ditioned in relations of space and time. This is the assumption
ordinarily made by the common understanding, and to it the
conflict is exclusively due. On this view all the dialectical
representations of totality, in the series of conditions for a
given conditioned, are throughout of the same character. The
P 462
condition is always a member of a series along with the con-
ditioned, and so is homogeneous with it. In such a series
the regress was never thought as completed, or if it had to be
so thought, a member, in itself conditioned, must have been
falsely supposed to be a first member, and therefore to be
unconditioned; the object, that is, the conditioned, might not
always be considered merely according to its magnitude, but at
least the series of its conditions was so regarded. Thus arose the
difficulty -- a difficulty which could not be disposed of by any
compromise but solely by cutting the knot -- that reason made
the series either too long or too short for the understanding, so
that the understanding could never be equal to the prescribed
idea.
But in all this we have been overlooking an essential dis-
tinction that obtains among the objects, that is, among those
concepts of understanding which reason endeavours to raise
to ideas. According to the table of categories given above, two
of these concepts imply a mathematical, the other two a
dynamical synthesis of appearances. Hitherto it has not been
necessary to take account of this distinction; for just as in the
general representation of all transcendental ideas we have
been conforming to conditions within the [field of] appearance,
so in the two mathematical - transcendental ideas the only
object we have had in mind is object as appearance. But now
that we are proceeding to consider how far dynamical con-
cepts of the understanding are adequate to the idea of reason,
the distinction becomes of importance, and opens up to us an
entirely new view of the suit in which reason is implicated.
This suit, in our previous trial of it, has been dismissed as
resting, on both sides, on false presuppositions. But since in
the dynamical antinomy a presupposition compatible with the
pretensions of reason may perhaps be found, and since the
judge may perhaps make good what is lacking in the pleas
which both sides have been guilty of misstating, the suit may
be settled to the satisfaction of both parties, a procedure im-
possible in the case of the mathematical antinomies.
If we consider solely the extension of the series of condi-
tions, and whether the series are adequate to the idea, or the
idea too large or too small for the series, the series are indeed in
P 463
these respects all homogeneous. But the concept of the under-
standing, which underlies these ideas, may contain either a
synthesis solely of the homogeneous (which is presupposed
alike in the composition and in the division of every magni-
tude), or a synthesis of the heterogeneous. For the hetero-
geneous can be admitted as at least possible in the case of
dynamical synthesis, alike in causal connection and in the
connection of the necessary with the contingent.
Hence in the mathematical connection of the series of
appearances no other than a sensible condition is admissible,
that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the
other hand, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions, a
heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but
purely intelligible, and as such outside the series, can be
allowed. In this way reason obtains satisfaction and the
unconditioned is set prior to the appearances, while yet the
invariably conditioned character of the appearances is not
obscured, nor their series cut short, in violation of the
principles prescribed by the understanding.
Inasmuch as the dynamical ideas allow of a condition of
appearances outside the series of the appearances, that is, a
condition which is not itself appearance, we arrive at a con-
clusion altogether different from any that was possible in the
case of the mathematical antinomy. In it we were obliged
to denounce both the opposed dialectical assertions as false.
In the dynamical series, on the other hand, the completely
conditioned, which is inseparable from the series considered
as appearances, is bound up with a condition which, while
indeed empirically unconditioned, is also non-sensible. We
are thus able to obtain satisfaction for understanding on
the one hand and for reason on the other.
++ Understanding does not admit among appearances any condi-
tion which can itself be empirically unconditioned. But if for some
conditioned in the [field of] appearance we can conceive an intellig-
ible condition, not belonging to the series of appearances as one of
its members, and can do so without in the least interrupting the
series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be accepted as
empirically unconditioned, without prejudice to the continuity of the
empirical regress.
P 464
The dialectical arguments, which in one or other way sought unconditioned
totality in mere appearances, fall to the ground, and the pro-
positions of reason, when thus given this more correct inter-
pretation, may both alike be true. This can never be the case
with those cosmological ideas which refer only to a mathe-
matically unconditioned unity; for in them no condition of the
series of appearances can be found that is not itself appear-
ance, and as appearance one of the members of the series.
III
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the
Derivation of Cosmical Events from their Causes
When we are dealing with what happens there are only two
kinds of causality conceivable by us; the causality is either
according to nature or arises from freedom. The former is
the connection in the sensible world of one state with a pre-
ceding state on which it follows according to a rule. Since the
causality of appearances rests on conditions of time, and the
preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have pro-
duced an effect which first comes into being in time, it follows
that the causality of the cause of that which happens or comes
into being must itself also have come into being, and that in
accordance with the principle of the understanding it must
in its turn itself require a cause.
By freedom, on the other hand, in its cosmological mean-
ing, I understand the power of beginning a state spontane-
ously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under
another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of
nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea,
which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from ex-
perience, and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot
be determined or given in any experience. That everything
which happens has a cause is a universal law, conditioning the
very possibility of all experience. Hence the causality of the
cause, which itself happens or comes to be, must itself in turn
have a cause; and thus the entire field of experience, however
far it may extend, is transformed into a sum-total of the
merely natural. But since in this way no absolute totality of
P 465
conditions determining causal relation can be obtained, reason
creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to
act of itself, without requiring to be determined to action by
an antecedent cause in accordance with the law of causality.
It should especially be noted that the practical concept of
freedom is based on this transcendental idea, and that in the
latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which the ques-
tion of the possibility of freedom has always been beset.
Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence of
coercion through sensuous impulses. For a will is sensuous, in
so far as it is pathologically affected, i.e. by sensuous motives;
it is animal (arbitrium brutum), if it can be pathologically
necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensi-
tivum, not, however, brutum but liberum. For sensibility does
not necessitate its action. There is in man a power of self-
determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous
impulses.
Obviously, if all causality in the sensible world were mere
nature, every event would be determined by another in time,
in accordance with necessary laws. Appearances, in determin-
ing the will, would have in the actions of the will their natural
effects, and would render the actions necessary. The denial of
transcendental freedom must, therefore, involve the elimina-
tion of all practical freedom. For practical freedom presup-
poses that although something has not happened, it ought to
have happened, and that its cause, [as found] in the [field of]
appearance, is not therefore, so determining that it excludes a
causality of our will -- a causality which, independently of those
natural causes, and even contrary to their force and influence,
can produce something that is determined in the time-order
in accordance with empirical laws, and which can therefore
begin a series of events entirely of itself.
Here then, as always happens when reason, in venturing
beyond the limits of possible experience, comes into conflict
with itself the problem is not really physiological but trans-
cendental. The question as to the possibility of freedom
does indeed concern psychology; since it rests on dialectical
arguments of pure reason, its treatment and solution belong
exclusively to transcendental philosophy. Before attempting
P 466
this solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot
decline, I must define somewhat more accurately the procedure
of transcendental philosophy in dealing with the problem.
If appearances were things in themselves, and space and
time forms of the existence of things in themselves, the condi-
tions would always be members of the same series as the con-
ditioned; and thus, in the present case, as in the other transcen-
dental ideas, the antinomy would arise, that the series must be
too large or too small for the understanding. But the dynami-
cal concepts of reason, with which we have to deal in this and
the following section, possess this peculiarity that they are not
concerned with an object considered as a magnitude, but only
with its existence. Accordingly we can abstract from the mag-
nitude of the series of conditions, and consider only the dynami-
cal relation of the condition to the conditioned. The difficulty
which then meets us, in dealing with the question regarding
nature and freedom, is whether freedom is possible at all, and
if it be possible, whether it can exist along with the universality
of the natural law of causality. Is it a truly disjunctive propo-
sition to say that every effect in the world must arise either
from nature or from freedom; or must we not rather say that
in one and the same event, in different relations, both can be
found? That all events in the sensible world stand in thorough-
going connection in accordance with unchangeable laws of
nature is an established principle of the Transcendental Ana-
lytic, and allows of no exception. The question, therefore, can
only be whether freedom is completely excluded by this inviol-
able rule, or whether an effect, notwithstanding its being thus
determined in accordance with nature, may not at the same
time be grounded in freedom. The common but fallacious pre-
supposition of the absolute reality of appearances here mani-
fests its injurious influence, to the confounding of reason. For
if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be up-
held. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient deter-
mining cause of every event. The condition of the event will be
such as can be found only in the series of appearances; both it
and its effect will be necessary in accordance with the law of
nature. If, on the other hand, appearances are not taken for
more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in
themselves, but merely as representations, connected accord-
P 467
ing to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds
which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible
cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through
other appearances, but its causality is not so determined.
While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical con-
ditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is
outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in
respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect
of appearances as resulting from them according to the neces-
sity of nature. This distinction, when stated in this quite general
and abstract manner, is bound to appear extremely subtle and
obscure, but will become clear in the course of its application.
My purpose has only been to point out that since the thorough-
going connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is
an inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately
insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all
freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never
been able to reconcile nature and freedom.
Possibility of Causality through Freedom, in Harmony with the
Universal Law of Natural Necessity.
Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance,
I entitle intelligible. If, therefore, that which in the sensible
world must be regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty
which is not an object of sensible intuition, but through which
it can be the cause of appearances, the causality of this being
can be regarded from two points of view. Regarded as the
causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; re-
garded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense,
it is sensible in its effects. We should therefore have to form both
an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of the
faculty of such a subject, and to regard both as referring to one
and the same effect. This twofold manner of conceiving the
faculty possessed by an object of the senses does not contradict
any of the concepts which we have to form of appearances and
of a possible experience. For since they are not things in them-
selves, they must rest upon a transcendental object which deter-
mines them as mere representations; and consequently there is
nothing to prevent us from ascribing to this transcendental
P 468
object, besides the quality in terms of which it appears, a
causality which is not appearance, although its effect is to be
met with in appearance. Every efficient cause must have a
character, that is, a law of its causality, without which it
would not be a cause. On the above supposition, we should,
therefore, in a subject belonging to the sensible world have,
first, an empirical character, whereby its actions, as appear-
ances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with other appear-
ances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature. And since
these actions can be derived from the other appearances, they
constitute together with them a single series in the order of
nature. Secondly, we should also have to allow the subject an
intelligible character, by which it is indeed the cause of those
same actions [in their quality] as appearances, but which does
not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not
itself appearance. We can entitle the former the character of
the thing in the [field of] appearance, and the latter its char-
acter as thing in itself.
Now this acting subject would not, in its intelligible
character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a
condition of appearances, not of things in themselves. In this
subject no action would begin or cease, and it would not, there-
fore, have to conform to the law of the determination of all that
is alterable in time, namely, that everything which happens
must have its cause in the appearances which precede it. In
a word, its causality, so far as it is intelligible, would not have
a place in the series of those empirical conditions through
which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense.
This intelligible character can never, indeed, be immediately
known, for nothing can be perceived except in so far as it
appears. It would have to be thought in accordance with the
empirical character-- just as we are constrained to think a
transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we
know nothing of what it is in itself.
In its empirical character, therefore, this subject, as ap-
pearance, would have to conform to all the laws of causal
determination. To this extent it could be nothing more than
a part of the world of sense, and its effects, like all other
P 469
appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature. In
proportion as outer appearances are found to influence it, and
in proportion as its empirical character, that is, the law of its
causality, becomes known through experience, all its actions
must admit of explanation in accordance with the laws of
nature. In other words, all that is required for their complete
and necessary determination must be found in a possible
experience.
In its intelligible character (though we can only have a
general concept of that character) this same subject must be
considered to be free from all influence of sensibility and from
all determination through appearances. Inasmuch as it is
noumenon, nothing happens in it; there can be no change
requiring dynamical determination in time, and therefore no
causal dependence upon appearances. And consequently,
since natural necessity is to be met with only in the sensible
world, this active being must in its actions be independent
of, and free from all such necessity. No action begins in this
active being itself; but we may yet quite correctly say that the
active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world. In
so doing, we should not be asserting that the effects in the
sensible world can begin of themselves; they are always prede-
termined through antecedent empirical conditions, though
solely through their empirical character (which is no more
than the appearance of the intelligible), and so are only pos-
sible as a continuation of the series of natural causes. In this
way freedom and nature, in the full sense of these terms, can
exist together, without any conflict, in the same actions, accord-
ing as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their
sensible cause.
Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in its con-
nection with Universal Natural Necessity.
I have thought it advisable to give this outline sketch of
the solution of our transcendental problem, so that we may
be the better enabled to survey the course which reason has
to adopt in arriving at the solution. I shall now proceed to set
forth the various factors involved in this solution, and to con-
sider each in detail.
That everything which happens has a cause, is a law of
nature. Since the causality of this cause, that is, the action of
P 470
the cause, is antecedent in time to the effect which has ensued
upon it, it cannot itself have always existed, but must have
happened, and among the appearances must have a cause by
which it in turn is determined. Consequently, all events are
empirically determined in an order of nature. Only in virtue
of this law can appearances constitute a nature and become
objects of experience. This law is a law of the understanding,
from which no departure can be permitted, and from which
no appearance may be exempted. To allow such exemption
would be to set an appearance outside all possible experience,
to distinguish it from all objects of possible experience, and so
to make of it a mere thought-entity, a phantom of the brain.
This would seem to imply the existence of a chain of causes
which in the regress to their conditions allows of no absolute tot-
ality. But that need not trouble us. The point has already been
dealt with in the general discussion of the antinomy into which
reason falls when in the series of appearances it proceeds to the
unconditioned. Were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental
realism, neither nature nor freedom would remain. The only
question here is this: -- Admitting that in the whole series of
events there is nothing but natural necessity, is it yet possible
to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely
an effect of nature and in another aspect an effect due to free-
dom; or is there between these two kinds of causality a direct
contradiction?
Among the causes in the [field of] appearance there cer-
tainly cannot be anything which could begin a series abso-
lutely and of itself. Every action, [viewed] as appearance, in so
far as it gives rise to an event, is itself an event or happening,
and presupposes another state wherein its cause is to be found.
Thus everything which happens is merely a continuation of
the series, and nothing that begins of itself is a possible mem-
ber of the series. The actions of natural causes in the time-
sequence are thus themselves effects; they presuppose causes
antecedent to them in the temporal series. An original act,
such as can by itself bring about what did not exist before, is
not to be looked for in the causally connected appearances.
Now granting that effects are appearances and that their
cause is likewise appearance, is it necessary that the causality
of their cause should be exclusively empirical? May it not
P 471
rather be, that while for every effect in the [field of] appear-
ance a connection with its cause in accordance with the
laws of empirical causality is indeed required, this empirical
causality, without the least violation of its connection with
natural causes, is itself an effect of a causality that is not
empirical but intelligible? This latter causality would be the
action of a cause which, in respect of appearances, is original,
and therefore, as pertaining to this faculty, not appearance but
intelligible; although it must otherwise, in so far as it is a link
in the chain of nature, be regarded as entirely belonging to
the world of sense.
The principle of the causal connection of appearances is
required in order that we may be able to look for and to
determine the natural conditions of natural events, that is to
say, their causes in the [field of] appearance. If this principle
be admitted, and be not weakened through any exception,
the requirements of the understanding, which in its empirical
employment sees in all happenings nothing but nature, and is
justified in so doing, are completely satisfied; and physical ex-
planations may proceed on their own lines without interference.
These requirements are not in any way infringed, if we assume,
even though the assumption should be a mere fiction, that some
among the natural causes have a faculty which is intelligible
only, inasmuch as its determination to action never rests upon
empirical conditions, but solely on grounds of understanding.
We must, of course, at the same time be able to assume that
the action of these causes in the [field of] appearance is in con-
formity with all the laws of empirical causality. In this way
the acting subject, as causa phaenomenon, would be bound up
with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all its
actions, and only as we ascend from the empirical object to
the transcendental should we find that this subject, together
with all its causality in the [field of] appearance, has in its
noumenon certain conditions which must be regarded as
purely intelligible. For if in determining in what ways appear-
ances can serve as causes we follow the rules of nature, we
need not concern ourselves what kind of ground for these
appearances and their connection may have to be thought as
existing in the transcendental subject, which is empirically
P 472
unknown to us. This intelligible ground does not have to be
considered in empirical enquiries; it concerns only thought
in the pure understanding; and although the effects of this
thought and action of the pure understanding are to be met
with in the appearances, these appearances must none the less
be capable of complete causal explanation in terms of other
appearances in accordance with natural laws. We have to take
their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground of
explanation, leaving entirely out of account their intelligible
character (that is, the transcendental cause of their empirical
character) as being completely unknown, save in so far as the
empirical serves for its sensible sign.
Let us apply this to experience. Man is one of the appear-
ances of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural
causes the causality of which must stand under empirical
laws. Like all other things in nature, he must have an em-
pirical character. This character we come to know through
the powers and faculties which he reveals in his actions. In
lifeless, or merely animal, nature we find no ground for
thinking that any faculty is conditioned otherwise than in a
merely sensible manner. Man, however, who knows all the
rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also
through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner
determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the
senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon,
and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the
action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of
sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these
faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular,
we distinguish in a quite peculiar and especial way from all
empirically conditioned powers. For it views its objects ex-
clusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them
determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make
an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.
That our reason has causality, or that we at least represent
it to ourselves as having causality, is evident from the impera-
tives which in all matters of conduct we impose as rules upon
our active powers. 'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and of
connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the
P 473
whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only
what is, what has been, or what will be. We cannot say that
anything in nature ought to be other than what in all these
time-relations it actually is. When we have the course of
nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever. It
is just as absurd to ask what ought to happen in the natural
world as to ask what properties a circle ought to have. All
that we are justified in asking is: what happens in nature?
what are the properties of the circle?
This 'ought' expresses a possible action the ground of
which cannot be anything but a mere concept; whereas in the
case of a merely natural action the ground must always be an
appearance. The action to which the 'ought' applies must in-
deed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions,
however, do not play any part in determining the will itself,
but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the
[field of] appearance. No matter how many natural grounds
or how many sensuous impulses may impel me to will, they
can never give rise to the 'ought', but only to a willing which,
while very far from being necessary, is always conditioned; and
the 'ought' pronounced by reason confronts such willing with a
limit and an end -- nay more, forbids or authorises it. Whether
what is willed be an object of mere sensibility (the pleasant) or
of pure reason (the good),reason will not give way to any ground
which is empirically given. Reason does not here follow the
order of things as they present themselves in appearance, but
frames to itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own ac-
cording to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions,
and according to which it declares actions to be necessary,
even although they have never taken place, and perhaps never
will take place. And at the same time reason also presupposes
that it can have causality in regard to all these actions, since
otherwise no empirical effects could be expected from its ideas.
Now, in view of these considerations, let us take our
stand, and regard it as at least possible for reason to have
causality with respect to appearances. Reason though it be,
it must none the less exhibit an empirical character. For every
cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appear-
ances follow as effects; and every rule requires uniformity in
the effects. This uniformity is, indeed, that upon which the
P 474
concept of cause (as a faculty) is based, and so far as it must
be exhibited by mere appearances may be named the em-
pirical character of the cause. This character is permanent,
but its effects, according to variation in the concomitant and
in part limiting conditions, appear in changeable forms.
Thus the will of every man has an empirical character,
which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, so far as
that causality exhibits, in its effects in the [field of] appearance,
a rule from which we may gather what, in their kind and de-
grees, are the actions of reason and the grounds thereof, and so
may form an estimate concerning the subjective principles of
his will. Since this empirical character must itself be dis-
covered from the appearances which are its effect and from
the rule to which experience shows them to conform, it
follows that all the actions of men in the [field of] appear-
ance are determined in conformity with the order of nature,
by their empirical character and by the other causes which co-
moderate with that character; and if we could exhaustively in-
vestigate all the appearances of men's wills, there would not
be found a single human action which we could not predict
with certainty, and recognise as proceeding necessarily from
its antecedent conditions. So far, then, as regards this em-
pirical character there is no freedom; and yet it is only in the
light of this character that man can be studied -- if, that is to
say, we are simply observing, and in the manner of anthro-
pology seeking to institute a physiological investigation into
the motive causes of his actions.
But when we consider these actions in their relation to
reason -- I do not mean speculative reason, by which we en-
deavour to explain their coming into being, but reason in so
far as it is itself the cause producing them -- if, that is to say,
we compare them with [the standards of] reason in its practical
bearing, we find a rule and order altogether different from the
order of nature. For it may be that all that has happened in the
course of nature, and in accordance with its empirical grounds
must inevitably have happened, ought not to have happened.
Sometimes, however, we find, or at least believe that we find,
that the ideas of reason have in actual fact proved their caus-
ality in respect of the actions of men, as appearances; and
that these actions have taken place, not because they were
P 475
determined by empirical causes, but because they were deter-
mined by grounds of reason.
Granted, then, that reason may be asserted to have caus-
ality in respect of appearance, its action can still be said to
be free, even although its empirical character (as a mode of
sense) is completely and necessarily determined in all its
detail. This empirical character is itself determined in the in-
telligible character (as a mode of thought). The latter, how-
ever, we do not know; we can only indicate its nature by
means of appearances; and these really yield an immediate
knowledge only of the mode of sense, the empirical char-
acter. The action, in so far as it can be ascribed to a mode
of thought as its cause, does not follow therefrom in accord-
ance with empirical laws; that is to say, it is not preceded
by the conditions of pure reason, but only by their effects in
the [field of] appearance of inner sense. Pure reason, as a
purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time,
nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The
causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in pro-
ducing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. For in
that case it would itself be subject to the natural law of appear-
ances, in accordance with which causal series are determined
in time; and its causality would then be nature, not freedom.
Thus all that we are justified in saying is that, if reason can
have causality in respect of appearances, it is a faculty through
which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects
first begins. For the condition which lies in reason is not
sensible, and therefore does not itself begin to be. And thus
what we failed to find in any empirical series is disclosed as
being possible, namely, that the condition of a successive
series of events may itself be empirically unconditioned.
++ The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of
our own conduct, thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our im-
putations can refer only to the empirical character. How much of
this character is ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much
to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is
no responsibility, or to its happy constitution (merito fortunae), can
never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judg-
ments can be passed.
P 476
For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the
intelligible), and therefore is not subject to any sensible con-
dition, and to no time-determination through an antecedent
cause.
The same cause does, indeed, in another relation, belong
to the series of appearances. Man is himself an appearance.
His will has an empirical character, which is the empirical
cause of all his actions. There is no condition determining
man in accordance with this character which is not contained
in the series of natural effects, or which is not subject to their
law -- the law according to which there can be no empirically
unconditioned causality of that which happens in time. There-
fore no given action (since it can be perceived only as appear-
ance) can begin absolutely of itself. But of pure reason we
cannot say that the state wherein the will is determined is
preceded and itself determined by some other state. For since
reason is not itself an appearance, and is not subject to any
conditions of sensibility, it follows that even as regards its
causality there is in it no time-sequence, and that the dyna-
mical law of nature, which determines succession in time in
accordance with rules, is not applicable to it.
Reason is the abiding condition of all those actions of the
will under [the guise of] which man appears. Before ever they
have happened, they are one and all predetermined in the
empirical character. In respect of the intelligible character, of
which the empirical character is the sensible schema, there can
be no before and after; every action, irrespective of its relation
in time to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the
intelligible character of pure reason. Reason therefore acts
freely; it is not dynamically determined in the chain of natural
causes through either outer or inner grounds antecedent in
time. This freedom ought not, therefore, to be conceived only
negatively as independence of empirical conditions. The
faculty of reason, so regarded, would cease to be a cause of
5852)appearances. It must also be described in positive terms, as
the power of originating a series of events. In reason itself
nothing begins; as unconditioned condition of every voluntary
act, it admits of no conditions antecedent to itself in time. Its
effect has, indeed, a beginning in the series of appearances,
but never in this series an absolutely first beginning.
P 477
In order to illustrate this regulative principle of reason by
an example of its empirical employment -- not, however, to con-
firm it, for it is useless to endeavour to prove transcendental
propositions by examples -- let us take a voluntary action, for
example, a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been
caused in society. First of all, we endeavour to discover the
motives to which it has been due, and then, secondly, in the
light of these, we proceed to determine how far the action and
its consequences can be imputed to the offender. As regards the
first question, we trace the empirical character of the action to
its sources, finding these in defective education, bad company,
in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition insensitive
to shame, in levity and thoughtlessness, not neglecting to take
into account also the occasional causes that may have inter-
vened. We proceed in this enquiry just as we should in ascer-
taining for a given natural effect the series of its determining
causes. But although we believe that the action is thus deter-
mined, we none the less blame the agent, not indeed on account
of his unhappy disposition, nor on account of the circum-
stances that have influenced him, nor even on account of his
previous way of life; for we presuppose that we can leave out of
consideration what this way of life may have been, that we can
regard the past series of conditions as not having occurred and
the act as being completely unconditioned by any preceding
state, just as if the agent in and by himself began in this action
an entirely new series of consequences. Our blame is based on
a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that
irrespective of all the above-mentioned empirical conditions
could have determined, and ought to have determined, the
agent to act otherwise. This causality of reason we do not re-
gard as only a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself,
even when the sensuous impulses do not favour but are directly
opposed to it; the action is ascribed to the agent's intelligible
character; in the moment when he utters the lie, the guilt is
entirely his. Reason, irrespective of all empirical conditions of
the act, is completely free, and the lie is entirely due to its
default.
Such imputation clearly shows that we consider reason to
be unaffected by these sensible influences, and not liable to
alteration. Its appearances -- the modes in which it manifests
P 478
itself in its effects -- do alter; but in itself [so we consider] there
is no preceding state determining the state that follows. That
is to say, it does not belong to the series of sensible conditions
which render appearances necessary in accordance with laws
of nature. Reason is present in all the actions of men at all
times and under all circumstances, and is always the same;
but it is not itself in time, and does not fall into any new state
in which it was not before. In respect to new states, it is deter-
mining, not determinable. We may not, therefore, ask why
reason has not determined itself differently, but only why it
has not through its causality determined the appearances differ-
ently. But to this question no answer is possible. For a different
intelligible character would have given a different empirical
character. When we say that in spite of his whole previous
course of life the agent could have refrained from lying, this
only means that the act is under the immediate power of reason,
and that reason in its causality is not subject to any conditions
of appearance or of time. Although difference of time makes a
fundamental difference to appearances in their relations to one
another -- for appearances are not things in themselves and
therefore not causes in themselves -- it can make no difference
to the relation in which the action stands to reason.
Thus in our judgments in regard to the causality of free
actions, we can get as far as the intelligible cause, but not be-
yond it. We can know that it is free, that is, that it is deter-
mined independently of sensibility, and that in this way it may
be the sensibly unconditioned condition of appearances. But
to explain why in the given circumstances the intelligible char-
acter should give just these appearances and this empirical
character transcends all the powers of our reason, indeed all
its rights of questioning, just as if we were to ask why the trans-
cendental object of our outer sensible intuition gives intuition
in space only and not some other mode of intuition. But the
problem which we have to solve does not require us to raise any
such questions. Our problem was this only: whether freedom
and natural necessity can exist without conflict in one and the
same action; and this we have sufficiently answered. We have
shown that since freedom may stand in relation to a quite
different kind of conditions from those of natural necessity,
the law of the latter does not affect the former, and that both
P 479
may exist, independently of one another and without inter-
fering with each other.
* * *
The reader should be careful to observe that in what has
been said our intention has not been to establish the reality
of freedom as one of the faculties which contain the cause of
the appearances of our sensible world. For that enquiry, as it
does not deal with concepts alone, would not have been trans-
cendental. And further, it could not have been successful,
since we can never infer from experience anything which can-
not be thought in accordance with the laws of experience. It
has not even been our intention to prove the possibility of
freedom. For in this also we should not have succeeded, since
we cannot from mere concepts a priori know the possibility
of any real ground and its causality. Freedom is here being
treated only as a transcendental idea whereby reason is led to
think that it can begin the series of conditions in the [field of]
appearance by means of the sensibly unconditioned, and so
becomes involved in an antinomy with those very laws which
it itself prescribes to the empirical employment of the under-
standing. What we have alone been able to show, and what we
have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests
on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at
least not incompatible with nature.
IV
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De-
pendence of Appearances as regards their Existence in
general
In the preceding subsection we have considered the changes
of the sensible world in so far as they form a dynamical
series, each member being subordinate to another as effect to
cause. We shall now employ this series of states merely to
guide us in our search for an existence that may serve as
the supreme condition of all that is alterable, that is, in
our search for necessary being. We are concerned here, not
with unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned
existence of substance itself. The series which we have in
P 480
view is, therefore, really a series of concepts, not a series
of intuitions in which one intuition is the condition of the
other.
But it is evident that since everything in the sum-total
of appearances is alterable, and therefore conditioned in its
existence, there cannot be in the whole series of dependent ex-
istence any unconditioned member the existence of which can
be regarded as absolutely necessary. Hence, if appearances
were things in themselves, and if, as would then follow, the
condition and the conditioned always belonged to one and the
same series of intuitions, by no possibility could a necessary
being exist as the condition of the existence of appearances in
the world of sense.
The dynamical regress is distinguished in an important re-
spect from the mathematical. Since the mathematical regress
is concerned only with the combining of parts to form a whole,
or the division of a whole into parts, the conditions of this
series must always be regarded as parts of the series, and there-
fore as homogeneous and as appearances. In the dynamical
regress, on the other hand, we are concerned, not with the pos-
sibility of an unconditioned whole of given parts, or with an
unconditioned part for a given whole, but with the derivation
of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of sub-
stance itself from necessary existence. In this latter regress, it
is not, therefore, necessary that the condition should form part
of an empirical series along with the conditioned.
A way of escape from this apparent antinomy thus lies
open to us. Both of the conflicting propositions may be true,
if taken in different connections. All things in the world of
sense may be contingent, and so have only an empirically
conditioned existence, while yet there may be a non-empirical
condition of the whole series; that is, there may exist an un-
conditionally necessary being. This necessary being, as the
intelligible condition of the series, would not belong to it as a
member, not even as the highest member of it, nor would it
render any member of the series empirically unconditioned.
The whole sensible world, so far as regards the empirically
conditioned existence of all its various members, would be left
unaffected. This way of conceiving how an unconditioned
P 481
being may serve as the ground of appearance differs from that
which we followed in the preceding subsection, in dealing with
the empirically unconditioned causality of freedom. For there
the thing itself was as cause (substantia phaenomenon) con-
ceived to belong to the series of conditions, and only its
causality was thought as intelligible. Here, on the other hand,
the necessary being must be thought as entirely outside the
series of the sensible world (as ens extramundanum), and as
purely intelligible. In no other way can it be secured against
the law which renders all appearances contingent and de-
pendent.
The regulative principle of reason, so far as it bears upon
our present problem, is therefore this, that everything in the
sensible world has an empirically conditioned existence, and
that in no one of its qualities can it be unconditionally neces-
sary; that for every member in the series of conditions we must
expect, and as far as possible seek, an empirical condition in
some possible experience; and that nothing justifies us in
deriving an existence from a condition outside the empirical
series or even in regarding it in its place within the series as
absolutely independent and self-sufficient. At the same time
this principle does not in any way debar us from recognis-
ing that the whole series may rest upon some intelligible being
that is free from all empirical conditions and itself contains
the ground of the possibility of all appearances.
In these remarks we have no intention of proving the un-
conditionally necessary existence of such a being, or even of
establishing the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of
the existence of appearances in the sensible world. Just as, on
the one hand, we limit reason, lest in leaving the guiding-
thread of the empirical conditions it should go straying into
the transcendent, adopting grounds of explanation that are
incapable of any representation in concreto, so, on the other
hand, we limit the law of the purely empirical employment of
the understanding, lest it should presume to decide as to the
possibility of things in general, and should declare the in-
telligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is
not of any use in explaining appearances. Thus all that we
have shown is that the thoroughgoing contingency of all
natural things, and of all their empirical conditions, is quite
P 482
consistent with the optional assumption of a necessary, though
purely intelligible, condition; and that as there is no real con-
tradiction between the two assertions, both may be true. Such
an absolutely necessary being, as conceived by the under-
standing, may be in itself impossible, but this can in no wise
be inferred from the universal contingency and dependence of
everything belonging to the sensible world, nor from the prin-
ciple which interdicts us from stopping at any one of its con-
tingent members and from appealing to a cause outside the
world. Reason proceeds by one path in its empirical use, and
by yet another path in its transcendental use.
The sensible world contains nothing but appearances, and
these are mere representations which are always sensibly con-
ditioned; in this field things in themselves are never objects to
us. It is not therefore surprising that in dealing with a member
of the empirical series, no matter what member it may be, we
are never justified in making a leap out beyond the context
of sensibility. To do so is to treat the appearances as if they
were things in themselves which exist apart from their tran-
scendental ground, and which can remain standing while we
seek an outside cause of their existence. This certainly would
ultimately be the case with contingent things, but not with
mere representations of things, the contingency of which is
itself merely phenomenon, and can lead to no other regress
than that which determines the phenomena, that is, solely to
the empirical regress. On the other hand, to think an intelli-
gible ground of the appearances, that is, of the sensible world,
and to think it as free from the contingency of appearances,
does not conflict either with the unlimited empirical regress in
the series of appearances nor with their thoroughgoing con-
tingency. That, indeed, is all that we had to do in order to
remove the apparent antinomy; and it can be done in this way
only. If for everything conditioned in its existence the con-
dition is always sensible, and therefore belongs to the series,
it must itself in turn be conditioned, as we have shown in the
antithesis of the fourth antinomy. Either, therefore, reason
through its demand for the unconditioned must remain in
conflict with itself, or this unconditioned must be posited out-
side the series, in the intelligible. Its necessity will not then
P 483
require, or allow of, any empirical condition; so far as appear-
ances are concerned, it will be unconditionally necessary.
The empirical employment of reason, in reference to the
conditions of existence in the sensible world, is not affected by
the admission of a purely intelligible being; it proceeds, in
accordance with the principle of thoroughgoing contingency,
from empirical conditions to higher conditions which are
always again empirical. But it is no less true, when what we
have in view is the pure employment of reason, in reference
to ends, that this regulative principle does not exclude the
assumption of an intelligible cause which is not in the series.
For the intelligible cause then signifies only the purely tran-
scendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of the
sensible series in general. Its existence as independent of all
sensible conditions and as in respect of these conditions un-
conditionally necessary, is not inconsistent with the unlimited
contingency of appearances, that is to say, with the never-
ending regress in the series of empirical conditions.
Concluding Note on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason.
So long as reason, in its concepts, has in view simply the
totality of conditions in the sensible world, and is considering
what satisfaction in this regard it can obtain for them, our
ideas are at once transcendental and cosmological. Immedi-
ately, however, the unconditioned (and it is with this that we
are really concerned) is posited in that which lies entirely outside
the sensible world, and therefore outside all possible experi-
ence, the ideas become transcendent. They then no longer serve
only for the completion of the empirical employment of reason
-- an idea [of completeness] which must always be pursued,
though it can never be completely achieved. On the contrary,
they detach themselves completely from experience, and make
for themselves objects for which experience supplies no
material, and whose objective reality is not based on comple-
tion of the empirical series but on pure a priori concepts. Such
transcendent ideas have a purely intelligible object; and this
object may indeed be admitted as a transcendental object, but
only if we likewise admit that, for the rest, we have no know-
P 484
ledge in regard to it, and that it cannot be thought as a deter-
minate thing in terms of distinctive inner predicates. As it is
independent of all empirical concepts, we are cut off from any
reasons that could establish the possibility of such an object,
and have not the least justification for assuming it. It is a mere
thought-entity. Nevertheless the cosmological idea which has
given rise to the fourth antinomy impels us to take this step. For
the existence of appearances, which is never self-grounded but
always conditioned, requires us to look around for something
different from all appearances, that is, for an intelligible object
in which this contingency may terminate. But once we have
allowed ourselves to assume a self-subsistent reality entirely
outside the field of sensibility, appearances can only be viewed
as contingent modes whereby beings that are themselves intelli-
gences represent intelligible objects. Consequently, the only
resource remaining to us is the use of analogy, by which we
employ the concepts of experience in order to form some
sort of concept of intelligible things -- things of which as
they are in themselves we have yet not the least knowledge.
Since the contingent is not to be known save through ex-
perience, and we are here concerned with things which are
not to be in any way objects of experience, we must derive
the knowledge of them from that which is in itself necessary,
that is, from pure concepts of things in general. Thus the
very first step which we take beyond the world of sense
obliges us, in seeking for such new knowledge, to begin with
an enquiry into absolutely necessary being, and to derive from
the concepts of it the concepts of all things in so far as they
are purely intelligible. This we propose to do in the next
chapter.
P 485
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
CHAPTER III
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section I
THE IDEAL IN GENERAL
WE have seen above that no objects can be represented
through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the con-
ditions of sensibility. For the conditions of the objective
reality of the concepts are then absent, and nothing is to be
found in them save the mere form of thought. If, however,
they are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited in
concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appro-
priate material for concepts of experience -- a concept of ex-
perience being nothing but a concept of understanding in
concreto. But ideas are even further removed from objective
reality than are categories, for no appearance can be found in
which they can be represented in concreto. They contain a
certain completeness to which no possible empirical know-
ledge ever attains. In them reason aims only at a systematic
unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is em-
pirically possible, without ever completely reaching it.
But what I entitle the ideal seems to be further removed
from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I under-
stand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is,
as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by
the idea alone.
Humanity [as an idea] in its complete perfection contains
not only all the essential qualities which belong to human
nature and constitute our concept of it -- and these so extended
P 486
as to be in that complete conformity with their ends which
would be our idea of perfect humanity -- but also everything
which, in addition to this concept, is required for the complete
determination of the idea. For of all contradictory predicates
one only [of each pair] can apply to the idea of the perfect
man. What to us is an ideal was in Plato's view an idea of
the divine understanding, an individual object of its pure
intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being,
and the archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.
Without soaring so high, we are yet bound to confess that
human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which
although they do not have, like the Platonic ideas, creative
power, yet have practical power (as regulative principles), and
form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions.
Moral concepts, as resting on something empirical (pleasure
or displeasure), are not completely pure concepts of reason.
None the less, in respect of the principle whereby reason sets
bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, these con-
cepts (when we attend merely to their form) may well serve as
examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue, and therewith
human wisdom in its complete purity, are ideas. The wise
man (of the Stoics) is, however, an ideal, that is, a man exist-
ing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea
of wisdom. As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a
case serves as the archetype for the complete determination
of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions
than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which
we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves,
although we can never attain to the perfection thereby pre-
scribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective
reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as
figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard
which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a
concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and
thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and
the defects of the incomplete. But to attempt to realise the
ideal in an example, that is, in the [field of] appearance, as, for
instance, to depict the [character of the perfectly] wise man in
a romance, is impracticable. There is indeed something absurd,
P 487
and far from edifying, in such an attempt, inasmuch as the
natural limitations, which are constantly doing violence to the
completeness of the idea, make the illusion that is aimed at
altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself
-- the good that has its source in the idea -- by giving it the air
of being a mere fiction.
Such is the nature of the ideal of reason, which must
always rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule and
archetype, alike in our actions and in our critical judgments.
The products of the imagination are of an entirely different
nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of
them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular
qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming
rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a
determinate image -- a representation such as painters and
physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they
treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image of their
creations or even of their critical judgments. Such repre-
sentations may be entitled, though improperly, ideals of
sensibility, inasmuch as they are viewed as being models
(not indeed realisable) of possible empirical intuitions, and yet
furnish no rules that allow of being explained and examined.
Reason, in its ideal, aims, on the contrary, at complete
determination in accordance with a priori rules. Accordingly
it thinks for itself an object which it regards as being com-
pletely determinable in accordance with principles. The
conditions that are required for such determination are not,
however, to be found in experience, and the concept itself is
therefore transcendent.
CHAPTER III
Section 2
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL
(Prototypon Transcendentale)
Every concept is, in respect of what is not contained in it,
undetermined, and is subject to the principle of determin-
P 488
ability. According to this principle, of every two contradict-
orily opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept.
This principle is based on the law of contradiction, and is
therefore a purely logical principle. As such, it abstracts from
the entire content of knowledge and is concerned solely with
its logical form.
But every thing, as regards its possibility, is likewise sub-
ject to the principle of complete determination, according to
which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together
with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of
contradictory opposites must belong to it. This principle does
not rest merely on the law of contradiction; for, besides con-
sidering each thing in its relation to the two contradictory
predicates, it also considers it in its relation to the sum of
all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all predicates of
things. Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition,
it proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own pos-
sibility from the share which it possesses in this sum of all
possibilities. The principle of complete determination con-
cerns, therefore, the content, and not merely the logical form.
It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are
intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not
simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely
to one of two contradictory predicates. It contains a transcend-
ental presupposition, namely, that of the material for all
possibility, which in turn is regarded as containing a priori
the data for the particular possibility of each and every thing.
The proposition, everything which exists is completely de-
termined, does not mean only that one of every pair of given
contradictory predicates, but that one of every [pair of] possible
P 489
predicates, must always belong to it.
P 488n
++ In accordance with this principle, each and every thing is there-
fore related to a common correlate, the sum of all possibilities. If this
correlate (that is, the material for all possible predicates) should be
found in the idea of some one thing, it would prove an affinity of all
possible things, through identity of the ground of their complete
determination. Whereas the determinability of every concept is sub-
ordinate to the universality (universalitas) of the principle of ex-
cluded middle, the determination of a thing is subordinate to the
totality (universitas) or sum of all possible predicates.
P 489
In terms of this proposi-
tion the predicates are not merely compared with one another
logically, but the thing itself is compared, in transcendental
fashion, with the sum of all possible predicates. What the pro-
position therefore asserts is this: that to know a thing com-
pletely, we must know every possible [predicate], and must
determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively. The
complete determination is thus a concept, which, in its
totality, can never be exhibited in concreto. It is based upon
an idea, which has its seat solely in the faculty of reason --
the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the rule of
its complete employment.
Although this idea of the sum of all possibility, in so far
as it serves as the condition of the complete determination of
each and every thing, is itself undetermined in respect of the
predicates which may constitute it, and is thought by us as
being nothing more than the sum of all possible predicates,
we yet find, on closer scrutiny, that this idea, as a primordial
concept, excludes a number of predicates which as derivative
are already given through other predicates or which are in-
compatible with others; and that it does, indeed, define itself
as a concept that is completely determinate a priori. It thus
becomes the concept of an individual object which is com-
pletely determined through the mere idea, and must there-
fore be entitled an ideal of pure reason.
When we consider all possible predicates, not merely
logically, but transcendentally, that is, with reference to such
content as can be thought a priori as belonging to them, we
find that through some of them we represent a being, through
others a mere not-being. Logical negation, which is indi-
cated simply through the word not, does not properly refer
to a concept, but only to its relation to another concept in a
judgment, and is therefore quite insufficient to determine a
concept in respect of its content. The expression non-mortal
does not enable us to declare that we are thereby representing
in the object a mere not-being; the expression leaves all con-
tent unaffected. A transcendental negation, on the other hand,
signifies not-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental
affirmation, which is a something the very concept of which
P 490
in itself expresses a being. Transcendental affirmation is there-
fore entitled reality, because through it alone, and so far only
as it reaches, are objects something (things), whereas its
opposite, negation, signifies a mere want, and, so far as it
alone is thought, represents the abrogation of all thinghood.
Now no one can think a negation determinately, save by
basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind can-
not have the least notion of darkness, since they have none of
light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has no
acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept of
their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge etc.
All concepts of negations are thus derivative; it is the realities
which contain the data, and, so to speak, the material or
transcendental content, for the possibility and complete
determination of all things.
If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determina-
tion of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as
it were, the whole store of material from which all possible
predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be
anything else than the idea of an omnitudo realitatis. All
true negations are nothing but limitations -- a title which
would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the
unlimited, that is, upon "the All. "
But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the
concept of a thing in itself as completely determined; and since
in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predi-
cate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be
found in its determination, the concept of an ens realissimum
is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a tran-
scendental ideal which serves as basis for the complete
P 491
determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists.
P 490n
++ The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught
us much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson that they
have taught us has been by revealing the abyss of our ignorance,
which otherwise we could never have conceived to be so great.
Reflection upon the ignorance thus disclosed must produce a great
change in our estimate of the purposes for which our reason should
be employed.
P 491
This ideal
is the supreme and complete material condition of the possi-
bility of all that exists -- the condition to which all thought of
objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be traced
back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is
capable. For only in this one case is a concept of a thing -- a con-
cept which is in itself universal -- completely determined in and
through itself, and known as the representation of an individual.
The logical determination of a concept by reason is based
upon a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premiss
contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a
universal concept), the minor premiss limiting this sphere to
a certain part, and the conclusion determining the concept by
means of this part. The universal concept of a reality in general
cannot be divided a priori, because without experience we do
not know any determinate kinds of reality which would be con-
tained under that genus. The transcendental major premiss
which is presupposed in the complete determination of all
things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum
of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its
transcendental content, comprehends all predicates under
itself; it also contains them within itself; and the complete
determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of
this total reality, inasmuch as part of it is ascribed to the thing,
and the rest is excluded -- a procedure which is in agreement
with the 'either-or' of the disjunctive major premiss and with
the determination of the object, in the minor premiss, through
one of the members of the division. Accordingly, reason, in em-
ploying the transcendental ideal as that by reference to which
it determines all possible things, is proceeding in a manner
analogous with its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms -- this,
indeed, is the principle upon which I have based the system-
atic division of all transcendental ideas, as parallel with, and
corresponding to, the three kinds of syllogism.
It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, that,
namely, of representing the necessary complete determination
of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being that
corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being, and
this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned
P 492
totality of complete determination the conditioned totality,
that is, the totality of the limited. The ideal is, therefore, the
archetype (prototypon) of all things, which one and all, as
imperfect copies (ectypa), derive from it the material of their
possibility, and while approximating to it in varying degrees,
yet always fall very far short of actually attaining it.
All possibility of things (that is, of the synthesis of the mani-
fold, in respect of its content) must therefore be regarded as
derivative, with only one exception, namely, the possibility of
that which includes in itself all reality. This latter possibility
must be regarded as original. For all negations (which are the
only predicates through which anything can be distinguished
from the ens realissimum) are merely limitations of a greater,
and ultimately of the highest, reality; and they therefore pre-
suppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived
from it. All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly
varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which
forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only pos-
sible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space. The
object of the ideal of reason, an object which is present to us only
in and through reason, is therefore entitled the primordial being
(ens originarium). As it has nothing above it, it is also entitled
the highest being (ens summum); and as everything that is con-
ditioned is subject to it, the being of all beings (ens entium).
These terms are not, however, to be taken as signifying the
objective relation of an actual object to other things, but of an
idea to concepts. We are left entirely without knowledge as to
the existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence.
We cannot say that a primordial being consists of a number
of derivative beings, for since the latter presuppose the former
they cannot themselves constitute it. The idea of the prim-
ordial being must therefore be thought as simple.
Consequently, the derivation of all other possibility from
this primordial being cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as
a limitation of its supreme reality, and, as it were, a division
of it. For in that case the primordial being would be treated as a
mere aggregate of derivative beings; and this, as we have just
shown, is impossible, although in our first rough statements
we have used such language. On the contrary, the supreme
P 493
reality must condition the possibility of all things as their
ground, not as their sum; and the manifoldness of things
must therefore rest, not on the limitation of the primordial
being itself, but on all that follows from it, including therein
all our sensibility, and all reality in the [field of] appearance
-- existences of a kind which cannot, as ingredients, belong
to the idea of the supreme being.
If, in following up this idea of ours, we proceed to hypos-
tatise it, we shall be able to determine the primordial being
through the mere concept of the highest reality, as a being that
is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc. In short, we shall be
able to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through
all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of
God, taken in the transcendental sense; and the ideal of pure
reason, as above defined, is thus the object of a transcendental
theology.
In any such use of the transcendental idea we should, how-
ever, be overstepping the limits of its purpose and validity.
For reason, in employing it as a basis for the complete deter-
mination of things, has used it only as the concept of all reality,
without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and
be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which we
combine and realise the manifold of our idea in an ideal,
as an individual being. But we have no right to do this,
nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis. Nor
do any of the consequences which flow from such an ideal have
any bearing upon the complete determination of things, or
exercise in that regard the least influence; and it is solely as
aiding in their determination that the idea has been shown to
be necessary.
But merely to describe the procedure of our reason and its
dialectic does not suffice; we must also endeavour to discover
the sources of this dialectic, that we may be able to explain, as
a phenomenon of the understanding, the illusion to which it
has given rise. For the ideal, of which we are speaking, is
based on a natural, not on a merely arbitrary idea. The ques-
tion to be raised is therefore this: how does it happen that
reason regards all possibility of things as derived from one
single fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest
P 494
reality, and thereupon presupposes this to be contained in an
individual primordial being?
The answer is obvious from the discussions in the Tran-
scendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of the senses
is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which some-
thing (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori,
while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of]
appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be
given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its
possibility represented. Now an object of the senses can be
completely determined only when it is compared with all the
predicates that are possible in the [field of] appearance, and
by means of them is represented either affirmatively or nega-
tively. But since that which constitutes the thing itself, namely,
the real in the [field of] appearance, must be given -- other-
wise the thing could not be conceived at all -- and since that
)wherein the real of all appearances is given is experience,
considered as single and all-embracing, the material for the
possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as
given in one whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole
that all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from
each other and their complete determination, can alone be
based. No other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a
matter of fact, be given to us, and nowhere save in the con-
text of a possible experience; and consequently nothing is an
object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical
reality as the condition of its possibility. Now owing to a
natural illusion we regard this principle, which applies only
to those things which are given as objects of our senses, as
being a principle which must be valid of things in general.
Accordingly, omitting this limitation, we treat the empirical
principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as
appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the pos-
sibility of things in general.
If we thereupon proceed to hypostatise this idea of the sum
of all reality, that is because we substitute dialectically for
the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the
understanding, the collective unity of experience as a whole;
P 495
and then thinking this whole [realm] of appearance as one
single thing that contains all empirical reality in itself; and
then again, in turn, by means of the above-mentioned tran-
scendental subreption, substituting for it the concept of a thing
which stands at the source of the possibility of all things, and
supplies the real conditions for their complete determination.
CHAPTER III
Section 3
THE ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON IN PROOF
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING
Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presup-
pose something that may afford the understanding a sufficient
foundation for the complete determination of its concepts, it
is yet much too easily conscious of the ideal and merely fic-
titious character of such a presupposition to allow itself, on
this ground alone, to be persuaded that a mere creature of its
own thought is a real being -- were it not that it is impelled from
another direction to seek a resting-place in the regress from
the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned. This
unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in itself real, nor
as having a reality that follows from its mere concept; it is,
however, what alone can complete the series of conditions
when we proceed to trace these conditions to their grounds.
This is the course which our human reason, by its very nature,
leads all of us, even the least reflective, to adopt, though not
everyone continues to pursue it.
++ This ideal of the ens realissimum, although it is indeed a mere
representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then
hypostatised, and finally, by the natural progress of reason towards
the completion of unity, is, as we shall presently show, personified.
For the regulative unity of experience is not based on the appear-
ances themselves (on sensibility alone), but on the connection of the
manifold through the understanding (in an apperception); and con-
sequently the unity of the supreme reality and the complete deter-
minability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme
understanding, and therefore in an intelligence.
P 495
It begins not with concepts,
but with common experience, and thus bases itself on something
P 496
actually existing. But if this ground does not rest upon
the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary, it yields be-
neath our feet. And this latter support is itself in turn without
support, if there be any empty space beyond and under it, and
if it does not itself so fill all things as to leave no room for any
further question -- unless, that is to say, it be infinite in its
reality.
If we admit something as existing, no matter what this
something may be, we must also admit that there is something
which exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under
the condition of some other contingent existence as its cause,
and from this again we must infer yet another cause, until we
are brought to a cause which is not contingent, and which is
therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument upon
which reason bases its advance to the primordial being.
Now reason looks around for a concept that squares with
so supreme a mode of existence as that of unconditioned ne-
cessity -- not for the purpose of inferring a priori from the con-
cept the existence of that for which it stands (for if that were
what it claimed to do, it ought to limit its enquiries to mere
concepts, and would not then require a given existence as its
basis), but solely in order to find among its various concepts
that concept which is in no respect incompatible with absolute
necessity. For that there must be something that exists with
absolute necessity, is regarded as having been established by
the first step in the argument. If, then, in removing every-
thing which is not compatible with this necessity, only one
existence remains, this existence must be the absolutely
necessary being, whether or not its necessity be comprehen-
sible, that is to say, deducible from its concept alone.
Now that which in its concept contains a therefore for
every wherefore, that which is in no respect defective, that
which is in every way sufficient as a condition, seems to be
precisely the being to which absolute necessity can fittingly
be ascribed. For while it contains the conditions of all that
is possible, it itself does not require and indeed does not
allow of any condition, and therefore satisfies, at least in this
one feature, the concept of unconditioned necessity. In this
respect all other concepts must fall short of it; for since they
are deficient and in need of completion, they cannot have as
P 497
their characteristic this independence of all further conditions.
We are not indeed justified in arguing that what does not con-
tain the highest and in all respects complete condition is there-
fore itself conditioned in its existence. But we are justified in
saying that it does not possess that one feature through which
alone reason is in a position, by means of an a priori concept,
to know, in regard to any being, that it is unconditioned.
The concept of an ens realissimum is therefore, of all con-
cepts of possible things, that which best squares with the con-
cept of an unconditionally necessary being; and though it may
not be completely adequate to it, we have no choice in the
matter, but find ourselves constrained to hold to it. For we
cannot afford to dispense with the existence of a necessary
being; and once its existence is granted, we cannot, in the
whole field of possibility, find anything that can make a
better grounded claim [than the ens realissimum] to such
pre-eminence in the mode of its existence.
Such, then, is the natural procedure of human reason. It
begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary
being. This being it apprehends as having an existence that
is unconditioned. It then looks around for the concept of that
which is independent of any condition, and finds it in that
which is itself the sufficient condition of all else, that is, in that
which contains all reality. But that which is all-containing and
without limits is absolute unity, and involves the concept of a
single being that is likewise the supreme being. Accordingly,
we conclude that the supreme being, as primordial ground
of all things, must exist by absolute necessity.
If what we have in view is the coming to a decision -- if, that
is to say, the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken
as granted, and if it be agreed further that we must come to
a decision as to what it is -- then the foregoing way of thinking
must be allowed to have a certain cogency. For in that case
no better choice can be made, or rather we have no choice
at all, but find ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the
absolute unity of complete reality, as the ultimate source of
possibility. If, however, we are not required to come to any
decision, and prefer to leave the issue open until the weight
of the evidence is such as to compel assent; if, in other words,
what we have to do is merely to estimate how much we really
P 498
know in the matter, and how much we merely flatter ourselves
that we know, then the foregoing argument is far from ap-
pearing in so advantageous a light, and special favour is
required to compensate for the defectiveness of its claims.
For if we take the issue as being that which is here stated,
namely first, that from any given existence (it may be, merely
my own existence) we can correctly infer the existence of an
unconditionally necessary being; secondly, that we must regard
a being which contains all reality, and therefore every condi-
tion, as being absolutely unconditioned, and that in this con-
cept of an ens realissimum we have therefore found the concept
of a thing to which we can also ascribe absolute necessity --
granting all this, it by no means follows that the concept of a
limited being which does not have the highest reality is for
that reason incompatible with absolute reality. For although
I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is in-
volved in the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not
justified in concluding that its existence must for this reason
be conditioned; just as I cannot say, in the case of a hypo-
thetical syllogism, that where a certain condition (in the case
under discussion, the condition of completeness in accordance
with [pure] concepts) does not hold, the conditioned also does
not hold. On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that
any limited beings whatsoever, notwithstanding their being
limited, may also be unconditionally necessary, although we
cannot infer their necessity from the universal concepts which
we have of them. Thus the argument has failed to give us the
least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and indeed
is utterly ineffective.
But this argument continues to have a certain importance
and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot,
simply on the ground of this objective insufficiency, at once
proceed to divest it. For granting that there are in the idea of
reason obligations which are completely valid, but which in
their application to ourselves would be lacking in all reality --
that is, obligations to which there would be no motives -- save
on the assumption that there exists a supreme being to give
effect and confirmation to the practical laws, in such a situa-
tion we should be under an obligation to follow those concepts
which, though they may not be objectively sufficient, are yet,
P 499
according to the standard of our reason, preponderant, and in
comparison with which we know of nothing that is better and
more convincing. The duty of deciding would thus, by a practi-
cal addition, incline the balance so delicately preserved by the
indecisiveness of speculation. Reason would indeed stand con-
demned in its own judgment -- and there is none more circum-
spect -- if, when impelled by such urgent motives, it should
fail, however incomplete its insight, to conform its judgment
to those pleas which are at least of greater weight than any
others known to us.
Though this argument, as resting on the inner insuffi-
ciency of the contingent, is in actual fact transcendental, it is
yet so simple and natural that, immediately it is propounded,
it commends itself to the commonest understanding. We see
things alter, come into being, and pass away; and these, or
at least their state, must therefore have a cause. But the same
question can be raised in regard to every cause that can be
given in experience. Where, therefore, can we more suitably
locate the ultimate causality than where there also exists the
highest causality, that is, in that being which contains prim-
ordially in itself the sufficient ground of every possible
effect, and the concept of which we can also very easily enter-
tain by means of the one attribute of an all-embracing per-
fection. This supreme cause we then proceed to regard as
absolutely necessary, inasmuch as we find it absolutely
necessary that we should ascend to it, and find no ground for
passing beyond it. And thus, in all peoples, there shine amidst
the most benighted polytheism some gleams of monotheism,
to which they have been led, not by reflection and profound
speculation, but simply by the natural bent of the common
understanding, as step by step it has come to apprehend its
own requirements.
There are only three possible ways of proving the existence
of God by means of speculative reason.
All the paths leading to this goal begin either from deter-
minate experience and the specific constitution of the world of
sense as thereby known, and ascend from it, in accordance
with laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the
P 500
world; or they start from experience which is purely indeter-
minate, that is, from experience of existence in general; or
finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely
a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme
cause. The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the
cosmological, the third the ontological. There are, and there
can be, no others.
I propose to show that reason is as little able to make pro-
gress on the one path, the empirical, as on the other path, the
transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain in thus
attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power
of speculation. As regards the order in which these arguments
should be dealt with, it will be exactly the reverse of that
which reason takes in the progress of its own development, and
therefore of that which we have ourselves followed in the above
account. For it will be shown that, although experience is what
first gives occasion to this enquiry, it is the transcendental
concept which in all such endeavours marks out the goal that
reason has set itself to attain, and which is indeed its sole
guide in its efforts to achieve that goal. I shall therefore
begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and
afterwards enquire what effect the addition of the empirical
factor can have in enhancing the force of the argument;
CHAPTER III
Section 4
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of
an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that
is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from
being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea
instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable complete-
ness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to
extend it to new objects. But we are here faced by what is
indeed strange and perplexing, namely, that while the infer-
P 501
ence from a given existence in general to some absolutely
necessary being seems to be both imperative and legitimate,
all those conditions under which alone the understanding can
form a concept of such a necessity are so many obstacles in
the way of our doing so.
In all ages men have spoken of an absolutely necessary
being, and in so doing have endeavoured, not so much to
understand whether and how a thing of this kind allows even
of being thought, but rather to prove its existence. There is,
of course, no difficulty in giving a verbal definition of the con-
cept, namely, that it is something the non-existence of which
is impossible. But this yields no insight into the conditions
which make it necessary to regard the non-existence of a
thing as absolutely unthinkable. It is precisely these condi-
tions that we desire to know, in order that we may determine
whether or not, in resorting to this concept, we are thinking
anything at all. The expedient of removing all those condi-
tions which the understanding indispensably requires in order
to regard something as necessary, simply through the intro-
duction of the word unconditioned, is very far from sufficing
to show whether I am still thinking anything in the concept
of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing
at all.
Nay more, this concept, at first ventured upon blindly,
and now become so completely familiar, has been supposed
to have its meaning exhibited in a number of examples; and
on this account all further enquiry into its intelligibility has
seemed to be quite needless. Thus the fact that every geo-
metrical proposition, as, for instance, that a triangle has three
angles, is absolutely necessary, has been taken as justifying us
in speaking of an object which lies entirely outside the sphere
of our understanding as if we understood perfectly what it is
that we intend to convey by the concept of that object.
All the alleged examples are, without exception, taken
from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the
unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same as an
absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of the
judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the
predicate in the judgment. The above proposition does not
P 502
declare that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that,
under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a tri-
angle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it. So
great, indeed, is the deluding influence exercised by this logi-
cal necessity that, by the simple device of forming an a priori
concept of a thing in such a manner as to include existence
within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves
to have justified the conclusion that because existence neces-
sarily belongs to the object of this concept -- always under the
condition that we posit the thing as given (as existing) -- we are
also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity, re-
quired to posit the existence of its object, and that this being
is therefore itself absolutely necessary -- and this, to repeat, for
the reason that the existence of this being has already been
thought in a concept which is assumed arbitrarily and on con-
dition that we posit its object.
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while
retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say
that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we
reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction;
for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a
triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory;
but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together
with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an
absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we re-
ject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of
contradiction can then arise. There is nothing outside it that
would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing
is not supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is
there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in
rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all
its internal properties. 'God is omnipotent' is a necessary
judgment. The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a
Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the two concepts are
identical. But if we say, 'There is no God', neither the omni-
potence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one
and all rejected together with the subject, and there is there-
fore not the least contradiction in such a judgment.
We have thus seen that if the predicate of a judgment is
rejected together with the subject, no internal contradiction
P 503
can result and that this holds no matter what the predicate
may be. The only way of evading this conclusion is to argue
that there are subjects which cannot be removed, and must
always remain. That, however, would only be another way of
saying that there are absolutely necessary subjects; and that is
the very assumption which I have called in question, and the
possibility of which the above argument professes to establish.
For I cannot form the least concept of a thing which, should
it be rejected with all its predicates, leaves behind a contra-
diction; and in the absence of contradiction I have, through
pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of impossibility.
Notwithstanding all these general considerations, in which
every one must concur, we may be challenged with a case
which is brought forward as proof that in actual fact the
contrary holds, namely, that there is one concept, and indeed
only one, in reference to which the not-being or rejection of its
object is in itself contradictory, namely, the concept of the ens
realissimum. It is declared that it possesses all reality, and
that we are justified in assuming that such a being is possible
(the fact that a concept does not contradict itself by no means
proves the possibility of its object: but the contrary assertion
I am for the moment willing to allow). Now [the argument
proceeds] 'all reality' includes existence; existence is therefore
contained in the concept of a thing that is possible. If, then,
this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing is
rejected -- which is self-contradictory.
My answer is as follows. There is already a contradiction
in introducing the concept of existence -- no matter under what
title it may be disguised -- into the concept of a thing which
we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility.
If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been won;
++ A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory.
This is the logical criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the
concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. But it may
none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the
synthesis through which the concept is generated has been specific-
ally proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on prin-
ciples of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis
(the law of contradiction). This is a warning against arguing
directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility
of things.
P 504
but in actual fact nothing at all is said: the assertion
is a mere tautology. We must ask: Is the proposition that
this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed
as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If
it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds
nothing to the thought of the thing; but in that case either
the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, or we have pre-
supposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible,
and have then, on that pretext, inferred its existence from its
internal possibility -- which is nothing but a miserable tauto-
logy. The word 'reality', which in the concept of the thing
sounds other than the word 'existence' in the concept of the
predicate, is of no avail in meeting this objection. For if all
positing (no matter what it may be that is posited) is entitled
reality, the thing with all its predicates is already posited in
the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the
predicate this is merely repeated. But if, on the other hand,
we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all existential
propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain
that the predicate of existence cannot be rejected without con-
tradiction? This is a feature which is found only in analytic
propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their
analytic character.
I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruit-
less disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate deter-
mination of the concept of existence, had I not found that
the illusion which is caused by the confusion of a logical with
a real predicate (that is, with a predicate which determines a
thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can
be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be
predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a
determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the con-
cept of the subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not
be already contained in the concept.
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a
concept of something which could be added to the concept of
a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain deter-
minations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the
copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent',
P 505
contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and
omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but
only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If,
now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among
which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we
attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being
an object that stands in relation to my concept. The content of
both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added
to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by
my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given
absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than
the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain
the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the
latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the
positing of the object, should the former contain more than the
latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole
object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it.
My financial position is, however, affected very differently by
a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them
(that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists,
is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my
concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically;
and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in
the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside
my concept.
By whatever and by however many predicates we may
think a thing -- even if we completely determine it -- we do not
make the least addition to the thing when we further declare
that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same
thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in
the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact
object of my concept exists. If we think in a thing every feature
of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my
saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it
exists with the same defect with which I have thought it, since
otherwise what exists would be something different from what
I thought. When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme
reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether
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it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be
lacking of the possible real content of a thing in general, some-
thing is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thought,
namely, [in so far as I am unable to assert] that knowledge of
this object is also possible a posteriori. And here we find the
source of our present difficulty. Were we dealing with an ob-
ject of the senses, we could not confound the existence of the
thing with the mere concept of it. For through the concept the
object is thought only as conforming to the universal condi-
tions of possible empirical knowledge in general, whereas
through its existence it is thought as belonging to the context
of experience as a whole. In being thus connected with the
content of experience as a whole, the concept of the object is
not, however, in the least enlarged; all that has happened is
that our thought has thereby obtained an additional possible
perception. It is not, therefore, surprising that, if we attempt
to think existence through the pure category alone, we cannot
specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an
object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe
existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses, this
takes place through their connection with some one of our per-
ceptions, in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing
with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever
of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known
in a completely a priori manner. Our consciousness of all
existence (whether immediately through perception, or medi-
ately through inferences which connect something with per-
ception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any
[alleged] existence outside this field, while not indeed such
as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the
nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position
to justify.
The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very
useful idea; but just because it is a mere idea, it is altogether
incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in re-
gard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us
as to the possibility of any existence beyond that which is
known in and through experience. The analytic criterion of
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possibility, as consisting in the principle that bare positives
(realities) give rise to no contradiction, cannot be denied to it.
But since the realities are not given to us in their specific char-
acters; since even if they were, we should still not be in a posi-
tion to pass judgment; since the criterion of the possibility of
synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in ex-
perience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong, the
connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, the
possibility of which we are unable to determine a priori. And
thus the celebrated Leibniz is far from having succeeded in
what he plumed himself on achieving -- the comprehension
a priori of the possibility of this sublime ideal being.
The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being
by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is
therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no
more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas,
than a merchant can better his position by adding a few
noughts to his cash account.
CHAPTER III
Section 5
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the
existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural
procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety. Such
an attempt would never have been made if there had not been
antecedently, on the part of our reason,the need to assume as
a basis of existence in general something necessary (in which
our regress may terminate); and if, since this necessity must
be unconditioned and certain a priori, reason had not, in con-
sequence, been forced to seek a concept which would satisfy, if
possible, such a demand, and enable us to know an existence
in a completely a priori manner. Such a concept was supposed
to have been found in the idea of an ens realissimum; and that
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idea was therefore used only for the more definite knowledge
of that necessary being, of the necessary existence of which
we were already convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds.
This natural procedure of reason was, however, concealed
from view, and instead of ending with this concept, the attempt
was made to begin with it, and so to deduce from it that
necessity of existence which it was only fitted to supplement.
Thus arose the unfortunate ontological proof, which yields
satisfaction neither to the natural and healthy understanding
nor to the more academic demands of strict proof.
The cosmological proof, which we are now about to ex-
amine, retains the connection of absolute necessity with the
highest reality, but instead of reasoning, like the former proof,
from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons
from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some
being to the unlimited reality of that being. It thus enters upon
a course of reasoning which, whether rational or only pseudo-
rational, is at any rate natural, and the most convincing not
only for common sense but even for speculative understand-
ing. It also sketches the first outline of all the proofs in natural
theology, an outline which has always been and always will
be followed, however much embellished and disguised by
superfluous additions. This proof, termed by Leibniz the proof
a contingentia mundi, we shall now proceed to expound and
examine.
It runs thus: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary
being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore an
absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premiss contains
an experience, the major premiss the inference from there
being any experience at all to the existence of the necessary.
The proof therefore really begins with experience, and is not
wholly a priori or ontological. For this reason, and because
the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is en-
titled the cosmological proof.
++ This inference is too well known to require detailed state-
ment. It depends on the supposedly transcendental law of natural
causality: that everything contingent has a cause, which, if itself
contingent, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate
causes ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it
would have no completeness.
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Since, in dealing with the objects
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of experience, the proof abstracts from all special properties
through which this world may differ from any other possible
world, the title also serves to distinguish it from the physico-
theological proof, which is based upon observations of the par-
ticular properties of the world disclosed to us by our senses.
The proof then proceeds as follows: The necessary being
can be determined in one way only, that is, by one out of each
possible pair of opposed predicates. It must therefore be com-
pletely determined through its own concept. Now there is only
one possible concept which determines a thing completely
a priori, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. The
concept of the ens realissimum is therefore the only concept
through which a necessary being can be thought. In other
words, a supreme being necessarily exists.
In this cosmological argument there are combined so many
pseudo-rational principles that speculative reason seems in
this case to have brought to bear all the resources of its dia-
lectical skill to produce the greatest possible transcendental
illusion. The testing of the argument may meantime be post-
poned while we detail in order the various devices whereby
an old argument is disguised as a new one, and by which
appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with
credentials of pure reason and the other with those of experi-
ence. In reality the only witness is that which speaks in the
name of pure reason; in the endeavour to pass as a second
witness it merely changes its dress and voice. In order to lay
a secure foundation for itself, this proof takes its stand on
experience, and thereby makes profession of being distinct
from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure
a priori concepts. But the cosmological proof uses this experi-
ence only for a single step in the argument, namely, to con-
clude the existence of a necessary being. What properties this
being may have, the empirical premiss cannot tell us. Reason
therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavours to
discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely
necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible
things contains in itself the conditions (requisita) essential to
absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, are nowhere to
be found save in the concept of an ens realissimum; and the
conclusion is therefore drawn, that the ens realissimum is the
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absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that we are here
presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is com-
pletely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence;
that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former. Now
this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it
is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed
made the basis of the proof; and yet it is an assumption with
which this latter proof has professed to dispense. For ab-
solute necessity is an existence determined from mere con-
cepts. If I say, the concept of the ens realissimum is a con-
cept, and indeed the only concept, which is appropriate and
adequate to necessary existence, I must also admit that neces-
sary existence can be inferred from this concept. Thus the so-
called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it
may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The
appeal to experience is quite superfluous; experience may per-
haps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but is unable
to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate
thing. For immediately we endeavour to do so, we must
abandon all experience and search among pure concepts
to discover whether any one of them contains the condi-
tions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. If
in this way we can determine the possibility of a necessary
being, we likewise establish its existence. For what we are
then saying is this: that of all possible beings there is one
which carries with it absolute necessity, that is, that this being
exists with absolute necessity.
Fallacious and misleading arguments are most easily
detected if set out in correct syllogistic form. This we now
proceed to do in the instance under discussion.
If the proposition, that every absolutely necessary being is
likewise the most real of all beings, is correct (and this is the
nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all
affirmative judgments, be convertible, at least per accidens.
It therefore follows that some entia realissima are likewise
absolutely necessary beings. But one ens realissimum is in no
respect different from another, and what is true of some under
this concept is true also of all. In this case, therefore, I can
convert the proposition simpliciter, not only per accidens,
and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But
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since this proposition is determined from its a priori concepts
alone, the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry
with it the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely
what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmo-
logical proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions
of the latter are indeed covertly based on it.
Thus the second path upon which speculative reason enters
in its attempt to prove the existence of a supreme being is not
only as deceptive as the first, but has this additional defect,
that it is guilty of an ignoratio elenchi. It professes to lead
us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings us back to
the very path which we had deserted at its bidding.
I have stated that in this cosmological argument there lies
hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions, which the
transcendental critique can easily detect and destroy. These
deceptive principles I shall merely enumerate, leaving to the
reader, who by this time will be sufficiently expert in these
matters, the task of investigating them further, and of re-
futing them.
We find, for instance, (1) the transcendental principle
whereby from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle
is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it
has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept
of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic proposition,
such as that of causality. The principle of causality has no
meaning and no criterion for its application save only in the
sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in
order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that
it is employed. (2) The inference to a first cause, from the im-
possibility of an infinite series of causes, given one after the
other, in the sensible world. The principles of the employment
of reason do not justify this conclusion even within the world
of experience; still less beyond this world in a realm into
which this series can never be extended. (3) The unjustified
self-satisfaction of reason in respect of the completion of this
series. The removal of all the conditions without which no
concept of necessity is possible is taken by reason to be a com-
pletion of the concept of the series, on the ground that we can
then conceive nothing further. (4) The confusion between the
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logical possibility of a concept of all reality united into one
(without inner contradiction) and the transcendental possi-
bility of such a reality. In the case of the latter there is
needed a principle to establish the practicability of such a
synthesis, a principle which itself, however, can apply only
to the field of possible experiences -- etc.
The procedure of the cosmological proof is artfully designed
to enable us to escape having to prove the existence of a neces-
sary being a priori through mere concepts. Such proof would
require to be carried out in the ontological manner, and that
is an enterprise for which we feel ourselves to be altogether in-
competent. Accordingly, we take as the starting-point of our
inference an actual existence (an experience in general), and ad-
vance, in such manner as we can, to some absolutely necessary
condition of this existence. We have then no need to show the
possibility of this condition. For if it has been proved to exist,
the question as to its possibility is entirely superfluous. If now
we want to determine more fully the nature of this necessary
being, we do not endeavour to do so in the manner that would
be really adequate, namely, by discovering from its concept the
necessity of its existence. For could we do that, we should be
in no need of an empirical starting-point. No, all we seek is
the negative condition (conditio sine qua non), without which a
being would not be absolutely necessary. And in all other kinds
of reasoning from a given consequence to its ground this would
be legitimate; but in the present case it unfortunately happens
that the condition which is needed for absolute necessity is only
to be found in one single being. This being must therefore
contain in its concept all that is required for absolute necessity,
and consequently it enables me to infer this absolute necessity
a priori. I must therefore be able also to reverse the inference,
and to say: Anything to which this concept (of supreme reality)
applies is absolutely necessary. If I cannot make this inference
(as I must concede, if I am to avoid admitting the ontological
proof), I have come to grief in the new way that I have been
following, and am back again at my starting-point. The con-
cept of the supreme being satisfies all questions a priori which
can be raised regarding the inner determinations of a thing,
and is therefore an ideal that is quite unique, in that the con-
cept, while universal, also at the same time designates an
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individual as being among the things that are possible. But it
does not give satisfaction concerning the question of its own
existence -- though this is the real purpose of our enquiries --
and if anyone admitted the existence of a necessary being but
wanted to know which among all [existing] things is to be
identified with that being, we could not answer: "This, not
that. is the necessary being. "
We may indeed be allowed to postulate the existence of an
all-sufficient being, as the cause of all possible effects, with a
view to lightening the task of reason in its search for the unity
of the grounds of explanation. But in presuming so far as to
say that such a being necessarily exists, we are no longer
giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but
are confidently laying claim to apodeictic certainty. For the
knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely necessary
must itself carry with it absolute necessity.
The whole problem of the transcendental ideal amounts to
this: either, given absolute necessity, to find a concept which
possesses it, or, given the concept of something, to find that
something to be absolutely necessary. If either task be possible,
so must the other; for reason recognises that only as absolutely
necessary which follows of necessity from its concept. But both
tasks are quite beyond our utmost efforts to satisfy our under-
standing in this matter; and equally unavailing are all attempts
to induce it to acquiesce in its incapacity.
Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably re-
quire as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the
veritable abyss. Eternity itself, in all its terrible sublimity, as
depicted by a Haller, is far from making the same overwhelm-
ing impression on the mind; for it only measures the duration
of things, it does not support them. We cannot put aside, and
yet also cannot endure the thought, that a being, which we
represent to ourselves as supreme amongst all possible beings,
should, as it were, say to itself: 'I am from eternity to eternity,
and outside me there is nothing save what is through my will,
but whence then am I? ' All support here fails us; and the
greatest perfection, no less than the least perfection, is unsub-
stantial and baseless for the merely speculative reason, which
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makes not the least effort to retain either the one or the other,
and feels indeed no loss in allowing them to vanish entirely.
Many forces in nature, which manifest their existence
through certain effects, remain for us inscrutable; for we cannot
track them sufficiently far by observation. Also, the transcend-
ental object lying at the basis of appearances (and with it the
reason why our sensibility is subject to certain supreme con-
ditions rather than to others) is and remains for us inscrutable.
The thing itself is indeed given, but we can have no insight
into its nature. But it is quite otherwise with an ideal of pure
reason; it can never be said to be inscrutable. For since it is
not required to give any credentials of its reality save only
the need on the part of reason to complete all synthetic unity
by means of it; and since, therefore, it is in no wise given as
thinkable object, it cannot be inscrutable in the manner in
which an object is. On the contrary it must, as a mere idea,
find its place and its solution in the nature of reason, and
must therefore allow of investigation. For it is of the very
essence of reason that we should be able to give an account
of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either upon
objective or, in the case of mere illusion, upon subjective
grounds.
DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION
of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of
a Necessary Being
Both the above proofs were transcendental, that is, were
attempted independently of empirical principles. For although
the cosmological proof presupposes an experience in general,
it is not based on any particular property of this experience
but on pure principles of reason, as applied to an existence
given through empirical consciousness in general. Further, it
soon abandons this guidance and relies on pure concepts alone.
What, then, in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the
dialectical but natural illusion which connects the concepts of
necessity and supreme reality, and which realises and hypos-
tatises what can be an idea only? Why are we constrained
to assume that some one among existing things is in itself
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necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the
existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how are
we to secure that reason may come to an agreement with
itself in this matter, and that from the wavering condition of
a diffident approval, ever again withdrawn, it may arrive at
settled insight?
There is something very strange in the fact, that once we
assume something to exist we cannot avoid inferring that
something exists necessarily. The cosmological argument rests
on this quite natural (although not therefore certain) infer-
ence. On the other hand, if I take the concept of anything, no
matter what, I find that the existence of this thing can never
be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that, what-
ever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from think-
ing its non-existence. Thus while I may indeed be obliged to
assume something necessary as a condition of the existent in
general, I cannot think any particular thing as in itself neces-
sary. In other words, I can never complete the regress to the
conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being
and yet am never in a position to begin with such a being.
If I am constrained to think something necessary as a
condition of existing things, but am unable to think any
particular thing as in itself necessary, it inevitably follows that
necessity and contingency do not concern the things them-
selves; otherwise there would be a contradiction. Conse-
quently, neither of these two principles can be objective. They
may, however, be regarded as subjective principles of reason.
The one calls upon us to seek something necessary as a con-
dition of all that is given as existent, that is, to stop nowhere
until we have arrived at an explanation which is complete
a priori; the other forbids us ever to hope for this completion,
that is, forbids us to treat anything empirical as uncondi-
tioned and to exempt ourselves thereby from the toil of its
further derivation. Viewed in this manner, the two principles,
as merely heuristic and regulative, and as concerning only the
formal interest of reason, can very well stand side by side. The
one prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if
there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to
existence -- solely, however, for the purpose of bringing sys-
tematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such
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an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us
not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things
as such an ultimate ground, that is, as absolutely necessary,
but to keep the way always open for further derivation, and
so to treat each and every determination as always condi-
tioned by something else. But if everything which is perceived
in things must necessarily be treated by us as conditioned,
nothing that allows of being empirically given can be re-
garded as absolutely necessary.
Since, therefore, the absolutely necessary is only intended
to serve as a principle for obtaining the greatest possible
unity among appearances, as being their ultimate ground;
and since -- inasmuch as the second rule commands us al-
ways to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves
derived -- we can never reach this unity within the world, it
follows that we must regard the absolutely necessary as being
outside the world.
While the philosophers of antiquity regard all form in
nature as contingent, they follow the judgment of the common
man in their view of matter as original and necessary. But if,
instead of regarding matter relatively, as substratum of ap-
pearances, they had considered it in itself, and as regards its
existence, the idea of absolute necessity would at once have
disappeared. For there is nothing which absolutely binds
reason to accept such an existence; on the contrary it can al-
ways annihilate it in thought, without contradiction; absolute
necessity is a necessity that is to be found in thought alone.
This belief must therefore have been due to a certain regu-
lative principle. In fact extension and impenetrability (which
between them make up the concept of matter) constitute the
supreme empirical principle of the unity of appearances;
and this principle, so far as it is empirically unconditioned,
has the character of a regulative principle. Nevertheless,
since every determination of the matter which constitutes what
is real in appearances, including impenetrability, is an effect
(action) which must have its cause and which is therefore
always derivative in character, matter is not compatible with
the idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity.
(For its real properties, being derivative, are one and all only
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conditionally necessary, and so allow of being removed --
wherewith the whole existence of matter would be removed. )
If this were not the case, we should have reached the ulti-
mate ground of unity by empirical means -- which is for-
bidden by the second regulative principle. It therefore follows
that matter, and in general whatever belongs to the world,
is not compatible with the idea of a necessary original being,
even when the latter is regarded simply as a principle of the
greatest empirical unity. That being or principle must be set
outside the world, leaving us free to derive the appearances
of the world and their existence from other appearances, with
unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being,
while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the
completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were
presupposed as an ultimate ground.
As follows from these considerations, the ideal of the
supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason,
which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if
it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can
base upon the ideal the rule of a systematic and, in accord-
ance with universal laws, necessary unity in the explanation
of that connection; but the ideal is not an assertion of an
existence necessary in itself. At the same time we cannot avoid
the transcendental subreption, by which this formal principle
is represented as constitutive, and by which this unity is hypos-
tatised. We proceed here just as we do in the case of space.
Space is only a principle of sensibility, but since it is the
primary source and condition of all shapes, which are only so
many limitations of itself, it is taken as something absolutely
necessary, existing in its own right, and as an object given a -
priori in itself. In the same way, since the systematic unity of
nature cannot be prescribed as a principle for the empirical
employment of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose
the idea of an ens realissimum as the supreme cause, it is
quite natural that this latter idea should be represented as an
actual object, which, in its character of supreme condition, is
also necessary -- thus changing a regulative into a constitutive
principle. That such a substitution has been made becomes
evident, when we consider this supreme being, which relatively
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to the world is absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a
thing in and by itself. For we are then unable to conceive
what can be meant by its necessity. The concept of necessity
is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of
thought; it does not allow of being hypostatised as a material
condition of existence.
CHAPTER III
Section 6
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF
If, then, neither the concept of things in general nor the
experience of any existence in general can supply what is re-
quired, it remains only to try whether a determinate experience,
the experience of the things of the present world, and the con-
stitution and order of these, does not provide the basis of a
proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of a
supreme being. Such proof we propose to entitle the physico-
theological. Should this attempt also fail, it must follow that
no satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding
to our transcendental idea can be possible by pure speculative
reason.
In view of what has already been said, it is evident that we
can count upon a quite easy and conclusive answer to this
enquiry. For how can any experience ever be adequate to an
idea? The peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the fact
that no experience can ever be equal to it. The transcendental
idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so
overwhelmingly great, so high above everything empirical,
the latter being always conditioned, that it leaves us at a
loss, partly because we can never find in experience material
sufficient to satisfy such a concept, and partly because it is
always in the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out our
search, seeking there ever vainly for the unconditioned -- no
law of any empirical synthesis giving us an example of any
such unconditioned or providing the least guidance in its
pursuit.
If the supreme being should itself stand in this chain of
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conditions, it would be a member of the series, and like the
lower members which it precedes, would call for further en-
quiry as to the still higher ground from which it follows. If, on
the other hand, we propose to separate it from the chain, and
to conceive it as a purely intelligible being, existing apart from
the series of natural causes, by what bridge can reason contrive
to pass over to it? For all laws governing the transition from
effects to causes, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge,
refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore solely
to objects of the sensible world, and apart from them can have
no meaning whatsoever.
This world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of
variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty, as displayed alike in
its infinite extent and in the unlimited divisibility of its parts,
that even with such knowledge as our weak understanding
can acquire of it, we are brought face to face with so many
marvels immeasurably great, that all speech loses its force, all
numbers their power to measure, our thoughts themselves all
definiteness, and that our judgment of the whole resolves itself
into an amazement which is speechless, and only the more elo-
quent on that account. Everywhere we see a chain of effects
and causes, of ends and means, a regularity in origination and
dissolution. Nothing has of itself come into the condition in
which we find it to exist, but always points to something
else as its cause, while this in turn commits us to repetition
of the same enquiry. The whole universe must thus sink into
the abyss of nothingness, unless, over and above this infinite
chain of contingencies, we assume something to support it --
something which is original and independently self-subsistent,
and which as the cause of the origin of the universe secures
also at the same time its continuance. What magnitude are we
to ascribe to this supreme cause -- admitting that it is supreme
in respect of all things in the world? We are not acquainted
with the whole content of the world, still less do we know
how to estimate its magnitude by comparison with all that is
possible. But since we cannot, as regards causality, dispense
with an ultimate and supreme being, what is there to pre-
vent us ascribing to it a degree of perfection that sets it above
everything else that is possible? This we can easily do -- though
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only through the slender outline of an abstract concept -- by
representing this being to ourselves as combining in itself all
possible perfection, as in a single substance. This concept is
in conformity with the demand of our reason for parsimony
of principles; it is free from self-contradiction, and is never
decisively contradicted by any experience; and it is likewise
of such a character that it contributes to the extension of
the employment of reason within experience, through the
guidance which it yields in the discovery of order and
purposiveness.
This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect.
It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the
common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature,
just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour
from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our
observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends
our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a
special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This
knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the idea
which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme
Author [of nature] that the belief acquires the force of an irre-
sistible conviction.
It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly
vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this
argument. Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing
evidence, which, though empirical, is yet so powerful, can-
not be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and
abstruse speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the
indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from a dream, by
one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the
universe -- ascending from height to height up to the all-
highest, from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the
supreme and unconditioned Author [of all conditioned
being].
But although we have nothing to bring against the ration-
ality and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend
and to further it, we still cannot approve the claims, which this
mode of argument would fain advance, to apodeictic certainty
and to an assent founded on no special favour or support from
other quarters. It cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic
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language of the overweening sophist be toned down to the
more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate
to quieten our doubts, though not to command unconditional
submission. I therefore maintain that the physico-theological
proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme
being, but must always fall back upon the ontological argu-
ment to make good its deficiency. It only serves as an intro-
duction to the ontological argument; and the latter therefore
contains (in so far as a speculative proof is possible at all) the
one possible ground of proof with which human reason can
never dispense.
The chief points of the physico-theological proof are as
follows: (1) In the world we everywhere find clear signs of an
order in accordance with a determinate purpose, carried out
with great wisdom; and this in a universe which is indescrib-
ably varied in content and unlimited in extent. (2) This pur-
posive order is quite alien to the things of the world, and only
belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse things
could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a com-
bination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate
final purposes, had they not been chosen and designed for
these purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity
with underlying ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime
and wise cause (or more than one), which must be the cause
of the world not merely as a blindly working all-powerful
nature, by fecundity, but as intelligence, through freedom.
(4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of
the reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world,
as members of an artfully arranged structure -- inferred with
certainty in so far as our observation suffices for its verification
and beyond these limits with probability, in accordance with
the principles of analogy.
We need not here criticise natural reason too strictly in
regard to its conclusion from the analogy between certain
natural products and what our human art produces when we
do violence to nature, and constrain it to proceed not according
to its own ends but in conformity with ours -- appealing to the
similarity of these particular natural products with houses,
ships, watches. Nor need we here question its conclusion that
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there lies at the basis of nature a causality similar to that
responsible for artificial products, namely, an understand-
ing and a will; and that the inner possibility of a self-acting
nature (which is what makes all art, and even, it may be,
reason itself, possible) is therefore derived from another,
though superhuman, art -- a mode of reasoning which could
not perhaps withstand a searching transcendental criticism.
But at any rate we must admit that, if we are to specify a
cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by
analogy with those purposive productions of which alone the
cause and mode of action are fully known to us. Reason could
never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows
for grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it
does not have any knowledge, and which are incapable of
proof.
On this method of argument, the purposiveness and har-
monious adaptation of so much in nature can suffice to prove
the contingency of the form merely, not of the matter, that is,
not of the substance in the world. To prove the latter we should
have to demonstrate that the things in the world would not
of themselves be capable of such order and harmony, in
accordance with universal laws, if they were not in their
substance the product of supreme wisdom. But to prove this
we should require quite other grounds of proof than those
which are derived from the analogy with human art. The
utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an architect
of the world who is always very much hampered by the
adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator
of the world to whose idea everything is subject. This, how-
ever, is altogether inadequate to the lofty purpose which we
have before our eyes, namely, the proof of an all-sufficient
primordial being. To prove the contingency of matter itself,
we should have to resort to a transcendental argument, and
this is precisely what we have here set out to avoid.
The inference, therefore, is that the order and purposive-
ness everywhere observable throughout the world may be
regarded as a completely contingent arrangement, and that
we may argue to the existence of a cause proportioned to it.
But the concept of this cause must enable us to know some-
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thing quite determinate about it, and can therefore be no
other than the concept of a being who possesses all might,
wisdom, etc. , in a word, all the perfection which is proper to
an all-sufficient being. For the predicates -- 'very great', 'as-
tounding', 'immeasurable' in power and excellence -- give no
determinate concept at all, and do not really tell us what the
thing is in itself. They are only relative representations of the
magnitude of the object, which the observer, in contemplat-
ing the world, compares with himself and with his capacity
of comprehension, and which are equally terms of eulogy
whether we be magnifying the object or be depreciating the
observing subject in relation to that object. Where we are
concerned with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing,
there is no determinate concept except that which compre-
hends all possible perfection; and in that concept only the
allness (omnitudo) of the reality is completely determined.
Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he
comprehends the relation of the magnitude of the world as he
has observed it (alike as regards both extent and content) to
omnipotence, of the world order to supreme wisdom, of the
world unity to the absolute unity of its Author, etc. Physico-
theology is therefore unable to give any determinate concept
of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot therefore serve
as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to
form the basis of religion.
To advance to absolute totality by the empirical road is
utterly impossible. None the less this is what is attempted in
the physico-theological proof. What, then, are the means
which have been adopted to bridge this wide abyss?
The physico-theological argument can indeed lead us to
the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, power, etc. , of
the Author of the world, but can take us no further. Accord-
ingly, we then abandon the argument from empirical grounds
of proof, and fall back upon the contingency which, in the
first steps of the argument, we had inferred from the order and
purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as our sole
premiss, we then advance, by means of transcendental con-
cepts alone, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being,
and [as a final step] from the concept of the absolute necessity
of the first cause to the completely determinate or determin-
P 524
able concept of that necessary being, namely, to the concept of
an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological proof,
failing in its undertaking, has in face of this difficulty suddenly
fallen back upon the cosmological proof; and since the latter
is only a disguised ontological proof, it has really achieved
its purpose by pure reason alone -- although at the start it
disclaimed all kinship with pure reason and professed to
establish its conclusions on convincing evidence derived from
experience.
Those who propound the physico-theological argument
have therefore no ground for being so contemptuous in their
attitude to the transcendental mode of proof, posing as clear-
sighted students of nature, and complacently looking down
upon that proof as the artificial product of obscure speculative
refinements. For were they willing to scrutinise their own pro-
cedure, they would find that, after advancing some considerable
way on the solid ground of nature and experience, and finding
themselves just as far distant as ever from the object which dis-
closes itself to their reason, they suddenly leave this ground, and
pass over into the realm of mere possibilities, where they hope
upon the wings of ideas to draw near to the object -- the object
that has refused itself to all their empirical enquiries. For after
this tremendous leap, when they have, as they think, found firm
ground, they extend their concept -- the determinate concept,
into the possession of which they have now come, they know not
how -- over the whole sphere of creation. And the ideal, [which
this reasoning thus involves, and] which is entirely a product
of pure reason, they then elucidate by reference to experience,
though inadequately enough, and in a manner far below the
dignity of its object; and throughout they persist in refusing
to admit that they have arrived at this knowledge or hypo-
thesis by a road quite other than that of experience.
Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an
original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof,
and the cosmological upon the ontological. And since, besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason,
the ontological proof from pure concepts of reason is the only
possible one, if indeed any proof of a proposition so far exalted
above all empirical employment of the understanding is pos-
sible at all.
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CHAPTER III
Section 7
CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED UPON SPECULATIVE
PRINCIPLES OF REASON
If I understand by theology knowledge of the original
being, it is based either solely upon reason (theologia rationa-
lis) or upon revelation (revelata). The former thinks its object
either through pure reason, solely by means of transcendental
concepts (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium), in which
case it is entitled transcendental theology, or through a con-
cept borrowed from nature (from the nature of our soul) -- a
concept of the original being as a supreme intelligence -- and
it would then have to be called natural theology. Those who
accept only a transcendental theology are called deists; those
who also admit a natural theology are called theists. The
former grant that we can know the existence of an original
being solely through reason, but maintain that our concept
of it is transcendental only, namely, the concept of a being
which possesses all reality, but which we are unable to de-
termine in any more specific fashion. The latter assert that
reason is capable of determining its object more precisely
through analogy with nature, namely, as a being which,
through understanding and freedom, contains in itself the
ultimate ground of everything else. Thus the deist repre-
sents this being merely as a cause of the world (whether by
the necessity of its nature or through freedom, remains un-
decided), the theist as the Author of the world.
Transcendental theology, again, either proposes to deduce
the existence of the original being from an experience in
general (without determining in any more specific fashion the
nature of the world to which the experience belongs), and is
then entitled cosmo-theology; or it believes that it can know the
existence of such a being through mere concepts, without the
help of any experience whatsoever, and is then entitled onto-
theology.
Natural theology infers the properties and the existence of
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an Author of the world from the constitution, the order and
unity, exhibited in the world -- a world in which we have to
recognise two kinds of causality with their rules, namely,
nature and freedom. From this world natural theology ascends
to a supreme intelligence, as the principle either of all natural
or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is
entitled physico-theology, in the latter moral theology.
Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not
merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source
of all things, but a supreme being who through understanding
and freedom is the Author of all things; and since it is in this
sense only that the concept interests us, we could, strictly
speaking, deny to the deist any belief in God, allowing him
only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause. How-
ever, since no one ought to be accused of denying what he only
does not venture to assert, it is less harsh and more just to
say that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God
(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to enquire what
are the possible sources of all these endeavours of reason.
For the purposes of this enquiry, theoretical knowledge
may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge
as the representation of what ought to be. On this definition, the
theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know a -
priori (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that
by which it is known a priori what ought to happen. Now if it
is indubitably certain that something is or that something
ought to happen, but this certainty is at the same time only
conditional, then a certain determinate condition of it can be
absolutely necessary, or can be an optional and contingent
presupposition. In the former case the condition is postulated
(per thesin); in the latter case it is assumed (per hypothesin).
++ Not theological ethics: for this contains moral laws, which pre-
suppose the existence of a supreme ruler of the world. Moral theology,
on the other hand, is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being
-- a conviction which bases itself on moral laws.
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Now since there are practical laws which are absolutely neces-
sary, that is, moral laws, it must follow that if these neces-
sarily presuppose the existence of any being as the condition of
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the possibility of their obligatory power, this existence must
be postulated; and this for the sufficient reason that the condi-
tioned, from which the inference is drawn to this determinate
condition, is itself known a priori to be absolutely necessary.
At some future time we shall show that the moral laws do
not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but
also, as themselves in a different connection absolutely neces-
sary, justify us in postulating it, though, indeed, only from
a practical point of view. For the present, however, we are
leaving this mode of argument aside.
Where we are dealing merely with what is (not with what
ought to be), the conditioned, which is given to us in experi-
ence, is always thought as being likewise contingent. That
which conditions it is not, therefore, known as absolutely
necessary, but serves only as something relatively necessary
or rather as needful; in itself and a priori it is an arbitrary
presupposition, assumed by us in our attempt to know the
conditioned by means of reason. If, therefore in the field of
theoretical knowledge, the absolute necessity of a thing were
to be known, this could only be from a priori concepts, and
never by positing it as a cause relative to an existence given
in experience.
Theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an ob-
ject, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached
in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the
knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or pre-
dicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.
The principle by which, from that which happens (the em-
pirically contingent) [viewed] as [an] effect, we infer a cause,
is a principle of the knowledge of nature, but not of specula-
tive knowledge. For, if we abstract from what it is as a principle
that contains the condition of all possible experience, and leav-
ing aside all that is empirical attempt to assert it of the con-
tingent in general, there remains not the least justification for
any synthetic proposition such as might show us how to pass
from that which is before us to something quite different
(called its cause). In this merely speculative employment any
meaning whose objective reality admits of being made intelli-
gible in concreto, is taken away not only from the concept of
the contingent but from the concept of a cause.
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If we infer from the existence of things in the world the
existence of their cause, we are employing reason, not in the
knowledge of nature, but in speculation. For the former type
of knowledge treats as empirically contingent, and refers to a
cause, not the things themselves (substances), but only that
which happens, that is, their states. That substance (matter) is
itself contingent in its existence would have to be known in a
purely speculative manner. Again, even if we were speaking
only of the form of the world, the way in which things are con-
nected and change, and sought to infer from this a cause
entirely distinct from the world, this would again be a judg-
ment of purely speculative reason, since the object which we
are inferring is not an object of a possible experience. So em-
ployed, the principle of causality, which is only valid within
the field of experience, and outside this field has no applica-
tion, nay, is indeed meaningless, would be altogether diverted
from its proper use.
Now I maintain that all attempts to employ reason in theo-
logy in any merely speculative manner are altogether fruit-
less and by their very nature null and void, and that the prin-
ciples of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to
any theology whatsoever. Consequently, the only theology of
reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws
or seeks guidance from them. All synthetic principles of reason
allow only of an immanent employment; and in order to have
knowledge of a supreme being we should have to put them to
a transcendent use, for which our understanding is in no way
fitted. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the
original being, the latter must belong to the chain of objects of
experience, and in that case it would, like all appearances, be
itself again conditioned. But even if the leap beyond the limits
of experience, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of
effects to their causes, be regarded as permissible, what sort of
a concept could we obtain by this procedure? It is far from pro-
viding the concept of a supreme being, since experience never
gives us the greatest of all possible effects, such as would be re-
quired to provide the evidence for a cause of that kind. Should
we seek to make good this lack of determination in our concept,
by means of a mere idea of [a being that possesses] the highest
perfection and original necessity, this may indeed be granted
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as a favour; it cannot be demanded as a right on the strength
of an incontrovertible proof. The physico-theological proof, as
combining speculation and intuition, might therefore perhaps
give additional weight to other proofs (if such there be); but
taken alone, it serves only to prepare the understanding for
theological knowledge, and to give it a natural leaning in this
direction, not to complete the work in and by itself.
All this clearly points to the conclusion that transcendental
questions allow only of transcendental answers, that is, an-
swers exclusively based on concepts that are a priori, without
the least empirical admixture. But the question under con-
sideration is obviously synthetic, calling for an extension of our
knowledge beyond all limits of experience, namely, to the
existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea
of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience.
Now as we have already proved, synthetic a priori knowledge
is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions
of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore only
of immanent validity, that is, they are applicable only to ob-
jects of empirical knowledge, to appearances. Thus all attempts
to construct a theology through purely speculative reason, by
means of a transcendental procedure, are without result.
But even if anyone prefers to call in question all those
proofs which have been given in the Analytic, rather than
allow himself to be robbed of his conviction of the conclusive-
ness of the arguments upon which he has so long relied, he
still cannot refuse to meet my demand that he should at least
give a satisfactory account how, and by what kind of inner
illumination, he believes himself capable of soaring so far
above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas.
New proofs, or attempts to improve upon the old ones, I
would ask to be spared. There is not indeed, in this field, much
room for choice, since all merely speculative proofs in the
end bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely,
the ontological; and I have therefore no real ground to fear
the fertile ingenuity of the dogmatic champions of super-
sensible reason. I shall not, however, decline the challenge
to discover the fallacy in any attempt of this kind, and
so to nullify its claims; and this I can indeed do without
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considering myself a particularly combative person. But by
such means I should never succeed in eradicating the hope
of better fortune in those who have once become accustomed
to dogmatic modes of persuasion; and I therefore confine
myself to the moderate demand, that they give, in terms
which are universal and which are based on the nature of the
human understanding and of all our other sources of know-
ledge, a satisfactory answer to this one question: how we can
so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of ex-
tending our knowledge entirely a priori, and of carrying it
into a realm where no experience is possible to us, and in
which there is therefore no means of establishing the object-
ive reality of any concept that we have ourselves invented.
In whatever manner the understanding may have arrived at
a concept, the existence of its object is never, by any process
of analysis, discoverable within it; for the knowledge of the
existence of the object consists precisely in the fact that the
object is posited in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it.
Through concepts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to
the discovery of new objects and supernatural beings; and it
is useless to appeal to experience, which in all cases yields only
appearances.
But although reason, in its merely speculative employ-
ment, is very far from being equal to so great an undertak-
ing, namely, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being,
it is yet of very great utility in correcting any knowledge of this
being which may be derived from other sources, in making it
consistent with itself and with every point of view from which
intelligible objects may be regarded, and in freeing it from
everything incompatible with the concept of an original
being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.
Transcendental theology is still, therefore, in spite of all
its disabilities, of great importance in its negative employ-
ment, and serves as a permanent censor of our reason, in so
far as the latter deals merely with pure ideas which, as such,
allow of no criterion that is not transcendental. For if, in some
other relation, perhaps on practical grounds, the presupposi-
tion of a supreme and all-sufficient being, as highest intelli-
P 531
gence, established its validity beyond all question, it would be
of the greatest importance accurately to determine this con-
cept on its transcendental side, as the concept of a necessary
and supremely real being, to free it from whatever, as be-
longing to mere appearance (anthropomorphism in its wider
sense), is out of keeping with the supreme reality, and at
the same time to dispose of all counter-assertions, whether
atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. Such critical treatment
is, indeed, far from being difficult, inasmuch as the same
grounds which have enabled us to demonstrate the inability of
human reason to maintain the existence of such a being must
also suffice to prove the invalidity of all counter-assertions.
For from what source could we, through a purely speculative
employment of reason, derive the knowledge that there is no
supreme being as ultimate ground of all things, or that it has
none of the attributes which, arguing from their consequences,
we represent to ourselves as analogical with the dynamical
realities of a thinking being, or (as the anthropomorphists
contend) that it must be subject to all the limitations which
sensibility inevitably imposes on those intelligences which are
known to us through experience.
Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of
reason the supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an
ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and crowns
the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot
indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely
speculative reason. If, then, there should be a moral theology
that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology,
which before was problematic only, will prove itself indis-
pensable in determining the concept of this supreme being
and in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by
sensibility, and which is frequently out of harmony with its
own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the
world (and not as world-soul), eternity as free from conditions
of time, omnipresence as free from conditions of space, omni-
potence, etc. are purely transcendental predicates, and for
this reason the purified concepts of them, which every theology
finds so indispensable, are only to be obtained from tran-
scendental theology.
P 532
APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
THE REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS OF PURE
REASON
The outcome of all dialectical attempts of pure reason
does not merely confirm what we have already proved in the
Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all those conclusions of
ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of possible ex-
perience are deceptive and without foundation; it likewise
teaches us this further lesson, that human reason has a natural
tendency to transgress these limits, and that transcendental
ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to under-
standing -- though with this difference, that while the categories
lead to truth, that is, to the conformity of our concepts with
the object, the ideas produce what, though a mere illusion,
is none the less irresistible, and the harmful influence of
which we can barely succeed in neutralising even by means
of the severest criticism.
Everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers
must be appropriate to, and consistent with, their right em-
ployment -- if only we can guard against a certain misunder-
standing and so can discover the proper direction of these
powers. We are entitled, therefore, to suppose that tran-
scendental ideas have their own good, proper, and therefore
immanent use, although, when their meaning is misunder-
stood, and they are taken for concepts of real things, they
become transcendent in their application and for that very
reason can be delusive. For it is not the idea in itself, but its
use only, that can be either transcendent or immanent (that
is, either range beyond all possible experience or find em-
ployment within its limits), according as it is applied to an
object which is supposed to correspond to it, or is directed
solely to the use of understanding in general, in respect of
those objects that fall to be dealt with by the understand-
ing. All errors of subreption are to be ascribed to a defect
of judgment, never to understanding or to reason.
Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but
P 533
only to the understanding; and it is only through the under-
standing that it has its own [specific] empirical employment.
It does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only
orders them, and gives them that unity which they can have
only if they be employed in their widest possible application,
that is, with a view to obtaining totality in the various series.
The understanding does not concern itself with this totality,
but only with that connection through which, in accordance
with concepts, such series of conditions come into being.
Reason has, therefore, as its sole object, the understanding
and its effective application. Just as the understanding unifies
the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason
unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing
a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the
understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with
distributive unity.
I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas never
allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in
that mistaken manner, and therefore as supplying concepts
of certain objects, they are but pseudo-rational, merely dia-
lectical concepts. On the other hand, they have an excellent,
and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment,
namely, that of directing the understanding towards a certain
goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules con-
verge, as upon their point of intersection. This point is indeed
a mere idea, a focus imaginarius, from which, since it lies
quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts
of the understanding do not in reality proceed; none the less
it serves to give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity
combined with the greatest [possible] extension. Hence arises
the illusion that the lines have their source in a real object
lying outside the field of empirically possible knowledge -- just
as objects reflected in a mirror are seen as behind it. Never-
theless this illusion (which need not, however, be allowed
to deceive us) is indispensably necessary if we are to direct
the understanding beyond every given experience (as part of
the sum of possible experience), and thereby to secure its
greatest possible extension, just as, in the case of mirror-
vision, the illusion involved is indispensably necessary if,
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besides the objects which lie before our eyes, we are also to
see those which lie at a distance behind our back.
If we consider in its whole range the knowledge obtained
for us by the understanding, we find that what is peculiarly
distinctive of reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge,
is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematisation,
that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity
with a single principle. This unity of reason always presup-
poses an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of know-
ledge -- a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge
of the parts and which contains the conditions that deter-
mine a priori for every part its position and relation to
the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete
unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by
which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate,
but a system connected according to necessary laws. We may
not say that this idea is a concept of the object, but only of the
thoroughgoing unity of such concepts, in so far as that unity
serves as a rule for the understanding. These concepts of
reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we in-
terrogate nature in accordance with these ideas, and consider
our knowledge as defective so long as it is not adequate to
them. By general admission, pure earth, pure water, pure air,
etc. , are not to be found. We require, however, the concepts of
them (though, in so far as their complete purity is concerned,
they have their origin solely in reason) in order properly to
determine the share which each of these natural causes has in
producing appearances. Thus in order to explain the chemical
interactions of bodies in accordance with the idea of a mechan-
ism, every kind of matter is reduced to earths (qua mere
weight), to salts and inflammable substances (qua force), and
to water and air as vehicles (machines, as it were, by which
the first two produce their effects). The modes of expression
usually employed are, indeed, somewhat different; but the
influence of reason on the classifications of the natural
scientist is still easily detected.
If reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the
universal, and if the universal is already certain in itself and
given, only judgment is required to execute the process of
P 535
subsumption, and the particular is thereby determined in a
necessary manner. This I shall entitle the apodeictic use of
reason. If, however, the universal is admitted as problem-
atic only, and is a mere idea, the particular is certain, but
the universality of the rule of which it is a consequence
is still a problem. Several particular instances, which are
one and all certain, are scrutinised in view of the rule, to
see whether they follow from it. If it then appears that all
particular instances which can be cited follow from the rule,
we argue to its universality, and from this again to all particu-
lar instances, even to those which are not themselves given.
This I shall entitle the hypothetical employment of reason.
The hypothetical employment of reason, based upon ideas
viewed as problematic concepts, is not, properly speaking,
constitutive, that is, it is not of such a character that, judging
in all strictness, we can regard it as proving the truth of the
universal rule which we have adopted as hypothesis. For how
are we to know all the possible consequences which, as actually
following from the adopted principle, prove its universality?
The hypothetical employment of reason is regulative only; its
sole aim is, so far as may be possible, to bring unity into the
body of our detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate
the rule to universality.
The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as
its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understand-
ing, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules. The
systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected
unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem
only. This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the
understanding in its manifold and special modes of employ-
ment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and
thus rendering it more coherent.
But the only conclusion which we are justified in drawing
from these considerations is that the systematic unity of the
manifold knowledge of understanding, as prescribed by reason,
is a logical principle. Its function is to assist the understanding
by means of ideas, in those cases in which the understanding
cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time to give
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to the numerous and diverse rules of the understanding unity
or system under a single principle, and thus to secure co-
herence in every possible way. But to say that the constitu-
tion of the objects or the nature of the understanding which
knows them as such, is in itself determined to systematic
unity, and that we can in a certain measure postulate this
unity a priori, without reference to any such special interest
of reason, and that we are therefore in a position to maintain
that knowledge of the understanding in all its possible modes
(including empirical knowledge) has the unity required by
reason, and stands under common principles from which all
its various modes can, in spite of their diversity, be deduced
-- that would be to assert a transcendental principle of reason,
and would make the systematic unity necessary, not only
subjectively and logically, as method, but objectively also.
We may illustrate this by an instance of the employment
of reason. Among the various kinds of unity which conform
to the concepts of the understanding, is that of the causality
of a substance, which is called power. The various appear-
ances of one and the same substance show at first sight so
great a diversity, that at the start we have to assume just as
many different powers as there are different effects. For in-
stance in the human mind we have sensation, conscious-
ness, imagination, memory, wit, power of discrimination,
pleasure, desire, etc. Now there is a logical maxim which
requires that we should reduce, so far as may be possible, this
seeming diversity, by comparing these with one another and
detecting their hidden identity. We have to enquire whether
imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same
thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps
even identical with understanding and reason. Though logic
is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power
actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem in-
volved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of
powers. The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring
about such unity as completely as possible; and the more the
appearances of this and that power are found to be identical
with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are
simply different manifestations of one and the same power,
P 537
which may be entitled, relatively to the more specific powers,
the fundamental power. The same is done with the other
powers.
The relatively fundamental powers must in turn be com-
pared with one another, with a view to discovering their har-
mony, and so to bring them nearer to a single radical, that
is, absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is
purely hypothetical. We do not assert that such a power must
necessarily be met with, but that we must seek it in the
interests of reason, that is, of establishing certain principles
for the manifold rules which experience may supply to us.
We must endeavour, wherever possible, to bring in this way
systematic unity into our knowledge.
On passing, however, to the transcendental employment
of understanding, we find that this idea of a fundamental
power is not treated merely as a problem for the hypothetical
use of reason, but claims to have objective reality, as postulat-
ing the systematic unity of the various powers of a substance,
and as giving expression to an apodeictic principle of reason.
For without having made any attempt to show the harmony
of these various powers, nay, even after all attempts to do so
have failed, we yet presuppose that such a unity does actually
exist, and this not only, as in the case cited, on account of the
unity of the substance, but also in those cases in which, as with
matter in general, we encounter powers which, though to a
certain extent homogeneous, are likewise diverse. In all such
cases reason presupposes the systematic unity of the various
powers, on the ground that special natural laws fall under more
general laws, and that parsimony in principles is not only an
economical requirement of reason, but is one of nature's own
laws.
It is, indeed, difficult to understand how there can be a
logical principle by which reason prescribes the unity of rules,
unless we also presuppose a transcendental principle whereby
such a systematic unity is a priori assumed to be necessarily
inherent in the objects. For with what right can reason, in its
logical employment, call upon us to treat the multiplicity of
powers exhibited in nature as simply a disguised unity and
to derive this unity, so far as may be possible, from a funda-
mental power -- how can reason do this, if it be free to admit
P 538
as likewise possible that all powers may be heterogeneous, and
that such systematic unity of derivation may not be in con-
formity with nature? Reason would then run counter to its own
vocation, proposing as its aim an idea quite inconsistent with
the constitution of nature. Nor can we say that reason, while
proceeding in accordance with its own principles, has arrived at
knowledge of this unity through observation of the accidental
constitution of nature. The law of reason which requires us to
seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should
have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent em-
ployment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no
sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In order, therefore, to
secure an empirical criterion we have no option save to pre-
suppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and
necessary.
Although philosophers have not always acknowledged this
transcendental principle, even to themselves, or indeed been
conscious of employing it, we none the less find it covertly im-
plied, in remarkable fashion, in the principles upon which they
proceed. That the manifold respects in which individual things
differ do not exclude identity of species, that the various species
must be regarded merely as different determinations of a few
genera, and these, in turn, of still higher genera, and so on; in
short, that we must seek for a certain systematic unity of all
possible empirical concepts, in so far as they can be deduced
from higher and more general concepts -- this is a logical
principle, a rule of the Schools, without which there could
be no employment of reason. For we can conclude from the
universal to the particular, only in so far as universal pro-
perties are ascribed to things as being the foundation upon
which the particular properties rest.
That such unity is to be found in nature, is presupposed by
philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, that rudi-
ments or principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied (entia
praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim de-
clares that things by their very nature supply material for the
unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite variety need
not hinder us from assuming that behind this variety there is
a unity of fundamental properties -- properties from which the
P 539
diversity can be derived through repeated determination. This
unity, although it is a mere idea, has been at all times so eagerly
sought, that there has been need to moderate the desire for it,
not to encourage it. A great advance was made when chemists
succeeded in reducing all salts to two main genera, acids and
alkalies; and they endeavour to show that even this difference
is merely a variety, or diverse manifestation, of one and the
same fundamental material. Chemists have sought, step by
step, to reduce the different kinds of earths (the material of
stones and even of metals) to three, and at last to two; but, not
content with this, they are unable to banish the thought that
behind these varieties there is but one genus, nay, that there
may even be a common principle for the earths and the salts.
It might be supposed that this is merely an economical con-
trivance whereby reason seeks to save itself all possible trouble,
a hypothetical attempt, which, if it succeeds, will, through the
unity thus attained, impart probability to the presumed prin-
ciple of explanation. But such a selfish purpose can very easily
be distinguished from the idea. For in conformity with the
idea everyone presupposes that this unity of reason accords
with nature itself, and that reason -- although indeed unable
to determine the limits of this unity -- does not here beg but
command.
If among the appearances which present themselves to us,
there were so great a variety -- I do not say in form, for in that
respect the appearances might resemble one another; but in
content, that is, in the manifoldness of the existing entities --
that even the acutest human understanding could never by
comparison of them detect the slightest similarity (a possi-
bility which is quite conceivable), the logical law of genera
would have no sort of standing; we should not even have the
concept of a genus, or indeed any other universal concept; and
the understanding itself, which has to do solely with such con-
cepts, would be non-existent. If, therefore, the logical prin-
ciple of genera is to be applied to nature (by which I here under-
stand those objects only which are given to us), it presupposes
a transcendental principle. And in accordance with this latter
principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the mani-
fold of possible experience (although we are not in a position
to determine in a priori fashion its degree); for in the absence
P 540
of homogeneity, no empirical concepts, and therefore no ex-
perience, would be possible.
The logical principle of genera, which postulates identity,
is balanced by another principle, namely, that of species,
which calls for manifoldness and diversity in things, notwith-
standing their agreement as coming under the same genus,
and which prescribes to the understanding that it attend to the
diversity no less than to the identity. This principle (of discrimi-
native observation, that is, of the faculty of distinction) sets
a limit to possible indiscretion in the former principle (of the
faculty of wit); and reason thus exhibits a twofold, self-con-
flicting interest, on the one hand interest in extent (universal-
ity) in respect of genera, and on the other hand in content (de-
terminateness) in respect of the multiplicity of the species. In
the one case the understanding thinks more under its concepts,
in the other more in them. This twofold interest manifests it-
self also among students of nature in the diversity of their ways
of thinking. Those who are more especially speculative are,
we may almost say, hostile to heterogeneity, and are always on
the watch for the unity of the genus; those, on the other hand,
who are more especially empirical, are constantly endeavour-
ing to differentiate nature in such manifold fashion as almost
to extinguish the hope of ever being able to determine its ap-
pearances in accordance with universal principles.
This latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logi-
cal principle which aims at the systematic completeness of all
knowledge -- prescribing that, in beginning with the genus, we
descend to the manifold which may be contained thereunder,
in such fashion as to secure extension for the system, just as in
the alternative procedure, that of ascending to the genus, we
endeavour to secure the unity of the system. For if we limit
our attention to the sphere of the concept which marks out a
genus, we can no more determine how far it is possible to pro-
ceed in the [logical] division of it, than we can judge merely
from the space which a body occupies how far it is possible to
proceed in the [physical] division of its parts. Consequently,
P 541
every genus requires diversity of species, and these in turn
diversity of subspecies; and since no one of these subspecies is
ever itself without a sphere (extent as conceptus communis),
reason, in being carried to completion, demands that no
species be regarded as being in itself the lowest. For since the
species is always a concept, containing only what is common
to different things, it is not completely determined. It cannot,
therefore, be directly related to an individual, and other con-
cepts, that is, subspecies, must always be contained under it.
This law of specification can be formulated as being the prin-
ciple: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.
But it is easily seen that this logical law would be without
meaning and application if it did not rest upon a transcendental
law of specification, which does not indeed demand an actual
infinity of differences in the things which can be objects to us
-- the logical principle, as affirming only the indeterminateness
of the logical sphere in respect of possible division, gives no
occasion for any such assertion -- but which none the less im-
poses upon the understanding the obligation of seeking under
every discoverable species for subspecies, and under every dif-
ference for yet smaller differences. For if there were no lower
concepts, there could not be higher concepts. Now the under-
standing can have knowledge only through concepts, and
therefore, however far it carries the process of division, never
through mere intuition, but always again through lower
concepts. The knowledge of appearances in their complete
determination, which is possible only through the under-
standing, demands an endless progress in the specification of
our concepts, and an advance to yet other remaining differ-
ences, from which we have made abstraction in the concept of
the species, and still more so in that of the genus.
This law of specification cannot be derived from experi-
ence, which can never open to our view any such extensive
prospects. Empirical specification soon comes to a stop in the
distinction of the manifold, if it be not guided by the ante-
cedent transcendental law of specification, which, as a prin-
ciple of reason, leads us to seek always for further differences,
and to suspect their existence even when the senses are unable
to disclose them. That absorbent earths are of different kinds
(chalk and muriatic earths), is a discovery that was possible
P 542
only under the guidance of an antecedent rule of reason -- reason
proceeding on the assumption that nature is so richly diversi-
fied that we may presume the presence of such differences,
and therefore prescribing to the understanding the task of
searching for them. Indeed it is only on the assumption of
differences in nature, just as it is also only under the condition
that its objects exhibit homogeneity, that we can have any
faculty of understanding whatsoever. For the diversity of that
which is comprehended under a concept is precisely what gives
occasion for the employment of the concept and the exercise
of the understanding.
Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: (1)
through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under
higher genera; (2) through a principle of the variety of the
homogeneous under lower species; and (3) in order to complete
the systematic unity, a further law, that of the affinity of all
concepts -- a law which prescribes that we proceed from each
species to every other by gradual increase of the diversity.
These we may entitle the principles of homogeneity, specifica-
tion, and continuity of forms. The last named arises from
union of the other two, inasmuch as only through the pro-
cesses of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to
the lower species do we obtain the idea of systematic connec-
tion in its completeness. For all the manifold differences are
then related to one another, inasmuch as they one and all
spring from one highest genus, through all degrees of a more
and more widely extended determination.
The systematic unity, prescribed by the three logical
principles, can be illustrated in the following manner. Every
concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for
an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things
which can be represented, and, as it were, surveyed from that
standpoint. This horizon must be capable of containing an
infinite number of points, each of which has its own narrower
horizon; that is, every species contains subspecies, according
to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon con-
sists exclusively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of
points which possess no extent (individuals). But for different
horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by its
own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to
P 543
which, as from a common centre, they can all be surveyed; and
from this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the
highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon,
which is determined from the standpoint of the highest con-
cept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness --
genera, species, and subspecies.
We are carried to this highest standpoint by the law of
homogeneity, and to all lower standpoints, and their greatest
possible variety, by the law of specification. And since there
is thus no void in the whole sphere of all possible concepts,
and since nothing can be met with outside this sphere,
there arises from the presupposition of this universal horizon
and of its complete division, the principle: non datur vacuum
formarum, that is, that there are not different, original, first
genera, which are isolated from one another, separated, as it
were, by an empty intervening space; but that all the manifold
genera are simply divisions of one single highest and universal
genus. From this principle there follows, as its immediate con-
sequence: datur continuum formarum, that is, that all differ-
ences of species border upon one another, admitting of no
transition from one to another per saltum, but only through
all the smaller degrees of difference that mediate between
them. In short, there are no species or subspecies which (in
the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other; still
other intermediate species are always possible, the difference
of which from each of the former is always smaller than the
difference between these.
The first law thus keeps us from resting satisfied with an
excessive number of different original genera, and bids us pay
due regard to homogeneity; the second, in turn, imposes a
check upon this tendency towards unity, and insists that be-
fore we proceed to apply a universal concept to individuals we
distinguish subspecies within it. The third law combines these
two laws by prescribing that even amidst the utmost mani-
foldness we observe homogeneity in the gradual transition
from one species to another, and thus recognise a relationship
of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem.
This logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum
logicarum) presupposes, however, a transcendental law (lex
P 544
continui in natura), without which the former law would only
lead the understanding astray, causing it to follow a path
which is perhaps quite contrary to that prescribed by nature
itself. This law must therefore rest upon pure transcendental,
not on empirical, grounds. For if it rested on empirical
grounds, it would come later than the systems, whereas in
actual fact it has itself given rise to all that is systematic in
our knowledge of nature. The formulation of these laws is
not due to any secret design of making an experiment, by
putting them forward as merely tentative suggestions. Such
anticipations, when confirmed, yield strong evidence in sup-
port of the view that the hypothetically conceived unity is
well-grounded; and such evidence has therefore in this re-
spect a certain utility. But it is evident that the laws contem-
plate the parsimony of fundamental causes, the manifoldness
of effects, and the consequent affinity of the parts of nature
as being in themselves in accordance both with reason and
with nature. Hence these principles carry their recommend-
ation directly in themselves, and not merely as methodo-
logical devices.
But it is easily seen that this continuity of forms is a mere
idea, to which no congruent object can be discovered in ex-
perience. For in the first place, the species in nature are actually
divided, and must therefore constitute a quantum discretum.
Were the advance in the tracing of their affinity continuous,
there would be a true infinity of intermediate members be-
tween any two given species, which is impossible. And further,
in the second place, we could not make any determinate em-
pirical use of this law, since it instructs us only in quite general
terms that we are to seek for grades of affinity, and yields no
criterion whatsoever as to how far, and in what manner, we
are to prosecute the search for them.
If we place these principles of systematic unity in the order
appropriate to their empirical employment, they will stand
thus: manifoldness, affinity, unity, each being taken, as an
idea, in the highest degree of its completeness. Reason pre-
supposes the knowledge which is obtained by the understand-
ing and which stands in immediate relation to experience, and
P 545
seeks for the unity of this knowledge in accordance with ideas
which go far beyond all possible experience. The affinity of
the manifold (as, notwithstanding its diversity, coming under
a principle of unity) refers indeed to things, but still more to
their properties and powers. Thus, for instance, if at first our im-
perfect experience leads us to regard the orbits of the planets
as circular, and if we subsequently detect deviations therefrom,
we trace the deviations to that which can change the circle,
in accordance with a fixed law, through all the infinite inter-
mediate degrees, into one of these divergent orbits. That is to
say, we assume that the movements of the planets which are
not circular will more or less approximate to the properties of a
circle; and thus we come upon the idea of an ellipse. Since the
comets do not, so far as observation reaches, return in any such
courses, their paths exhibit still greater deviations. What we
then do is to suppose that they proceed in a parabolic course,
which is akin to the ellipse, and which in all our observation
is indistinguishable from an ellipse that has its major axis in-
definitely extended. Thus, under the guidance of these prin-
ciples, we discover a unity in the generic forms of the orbits,
and thereby a unity in the cause of all the laws of planetary
motion, namely, gravitation. And we then extend our con-
quests still further, endeavouring to explain by the same prin-
ciple all variations and seeming departures from these rules;
finally, we even go on to make additions such as experience
can never confirm, namely, to conceive, in accordance with
the rules of affinity, hyperbolic paths of comets, in the course
of which these bodies entirely leave our solar system, and
passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the
universe -- a universe which, though for us unlimited, is
throughout held together by one and the same moving force.
The remarkable feature of these principles, and what in
them alone concerns us, is that they seem to be transcendental,
and that although they contain mere ideas for the guidance of
the empirical employment of reason -- ideas which reason
follows only as it were asymptotically, i.e. ever more closely
without ever reaching them -- they yet possess, as synthetic
a priori propositions, objective but indeterminate validity, and
serve as rules for possible experience. They can also be em-
ployed with great advantage in the elaboration of experience,
P 546
as heuristic principles. A transcendental deduction of them
cannot, however, be effected; in the case of ideas, as we have
shown above, such a deduction is never possible.
In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished the
dynamical principles of the understanding, as merely regula-
tive principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which, as
regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dyna-
mical laws are constitutive in respect of experience, since they
render the concepts, without which there can be no experi-
ence, possible a priori. But principles of pure reason can
never be constitutive in respect of empirical concepts; for since
no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be
given, they can never have an object in concreto. If, then, we
disallow such empirical employment of them, as constitutive
principles, how are we to secure for them a regulative em-
ployment, and therewith some sort of objective validity, and
what can we mean by such regulative employment?
The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensi-
bility is for the understanding. It is the business of reason to
render the unity of all possible empirical acts of the under-
standing systematic; just as it is of the understanding to con-
nect the manifold of the appearances by means of concepts,
and to bring it under empirical laws. But the acts of the under-
standing are, without the schemata of sensibility, undeter-
mined; just as the unity of reason is in itself undetermined, as
regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which,
the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic
fashion. But although we are unable to find in intuition a
schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the
understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily
allow of being given. This analogon is the idea of the maxi-
mum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the
understanding under one principle. For what is greatest and
absolutely complete can be determinately thought, all re-
stricting conditions, which give rise to an indeterminate
manifoldness, being left aside. Thus the idea of reason is
an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this differ-
ence, that the application of the concepts of the understanding
to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object
itself (as is the case in the application of categories to their
P 547
sensible schemata) but only a rule or principle for the system-
atic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now
since every principle which prescribes a priori to the under-
standing thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds,
although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the
principles of pure reason must also have objective reality
in respect of that object, not, however, in order to determine
anything in it, but only in order to indicate the procedure
whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the
understanding can be brought into complete harmony with
itself. This is acheived by bringing its employment, so far as
may be possible, into connection with the principle of thorough-
going unity, and by determining its procedure in the light of
this principle.
I entitle all subjective principles which are derived, not
from the constitution of an object but from the interest of
reason in respect of a certain possible perfection of the
knowledge of the object, maxims of reason. There are there-
fore maxims of speculative reason, which rest entirely on its
speculative interest, although they may seem to be objective
principles.
When merely regulative principles are treated as constitu-
tive, and are therefore employed as objective principles, they
may come into conflict with one another. But when they
are treated merely as maxims, there is no real conflict, but
merely those differences in the interest of reason that give rise
to differing modes of thought. In actual fact, reason has only
one single interest, and the conflict of its maxims is only a
difference in, and a mutual limitation of, the methods where-
by this interest endeavours to obtain satisfaction.
Thus one thinker may be more particularly interested in
manifoldness (in accordance with the principle of specifica-
tion), another thinker in unity (in accordance with the prin-
ciple of aggregation). Each believes that his judgment has
been arrived at through insight into the object, whereas it really
rests entirely on the greater or lesser attachment to one of the
two principles. And since neither of these principles is based
on objective grounds, but solely on the interest of reason, the
P 548
title 'principles' is not strictly applicable; they may more fit-
tingly be entitled 'maxims'. When we observe intelligent people
disputing in regard to the characteristic properties of men,
animals, or plants -- even of bodies in the mineral realm -- some
assuming, for instance, that there are certain special heredit-
ary characteristics in each nation, certain well-defined inherited
differences in families, races, etc. , whereas others are bent upon
maintaining that in all such cases nature has made precisely
the same provision for all, and that it is solely to external
accidental conditions that the differences are due, we have
only to consider what sort of an object it is about which they
are making these assertions, to realise that it lies too deeply
hidden to allow of their speaking from insight into its nature.
The dispute is due simply to the twofold interest of reason,
the one party setting its heart upon, or at least adopting, the
one interest, and the other party the other. The differences
between the maxims of manifoldness and of unity in nature
thus easily allow of reconciliation. So long, however, as the
maxims are taken as yielding objective insight, and until a
way has been discovered of adjusting their conflicting claims,
and of satisfying reason in that regard, they will not only
give rise to disputes but will be a positive hindrance, and
cause long delays in the discovery of truth.
Similar observations are relevant in regard to the assertion
or denial of the widely discussed law of the continuous grada-
tion of created beings, which was propounded by Leibniz, and
admirably supported by Bonnet. It is simply the following
out of that principle of affinity which rests on the interest of
reason. For observation and insight into the constitution of
nature could never justify us in the objective assertion of the
law. The steps of this ladder, as they are presented to us in
experience, stand much too far apart; and what may seem to
us small differences are usually in nature itself such wide gaps,
that from any such observations we can come to no decision
in regard to nature's ultimate design -- especially if we bear in
mind that in so great a multiplicity of things there can never
be much difficulty in finding similarities and approximations.
On the other hand, the method of looking for order in nature
P 549
in accordance with such a principle, and the maxim which
prescribes that we regard such order -- leaving, however, un-
determined where and how far -- as grounded in nature as
such, is certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative prin-
ciple of reason. In this regulative capacity it goes far beyond
what experience or observation can verify; and though not
itself determining anything, yet serves to mark out the path
towards systematic unity.
THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC
OF HUMAN REASON
The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in them-
selves; any deceptive illusion to which they give occasion
must be due solely to their misemployment. For they arise
from the very nature of our reason; and it is impossible that
this highest tribunal of all the rights and claims of speculation
should itself be the source of deceptions and illusions. Pre-
sumably, therefore, the ideas have their own good and ap-
propriate vocation as determined by the natural disposition of
our reason. The mob of sophists, however, raise against reason
the usual cry of absurdities and contradictions, and though
unable to penetrate to its innermost designs, they none the less
inveigh against its prescriptions. Yet it is to the beneficent in-
fluences exercised by reason that they owe the possibility of
their own self-assertiveness, and indeed that very culture
which enables them to blame and to condemn what reason
requires of them.
We cannot employ an a priori concept with any certainty
without having first given a transcendental deduction of it.
The ideas of pure reason do not, indeed, admit of the kind of
deduction that is possible in the case of the categories. But if
they are to have the least objective validity, no matter how
indeterminate that validity may be, and are not to be mere
empty thought-entities (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduc-
tion of them must be possible, however greatly (as we admit)
it may differ from that which we have been able to give of the
categories. This will complete the critical work of pure reason,
and is what we now propose to undertake.
P 550
There is a great difference between something being given
to my reason as an object absolutely, or merely as an object in
the idea. In the former case our concepts are employed to deter-
mine the object; in the latter case there is in fact only a schema
which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly
given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves
other objects in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic
unity, by means of their relation to this idea. Thus I say that
the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is
to say, its objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in
its referring directly to an object (for in that sense we should
not be able to justify its objective validity). It is only a schema
constructed in accordance with the conditions of the greatest
possible unity of reason -- the schema of the concept of a thing
in general, which serves only to secure the greatest possible sys-
tematic unity in the empirical employment of our reason. We
then, as it were, derive the object of experience from the sup-
posed object of this idea, viewed as the ground or cause of the
object of experience. We declare, for instance, that the things
of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence
from a highest intelligence. The idea is thus really only a heur-
istic, not an ostensive concept. It does not show us how an
object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we should
seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects
of experience. If, then, it can be shown that the three transcen-
dental ideas (the psychological, the cosmological, and the theo-
logical), although they do not directly relate to, or determine,
any object corresponding to them, none the less, as rules of the
empirical employment of reason, lead us to systematic unity,
under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and
that they thus contribute to the extension of empirical know-
ledge, without ever being in a position to run counter to it,
we may conclude that it is a necessary maxim of reason to
proceed always in accordance with such ideas. This, indeed,
is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative
reason, not as constitutive principles for the extension of our
knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as
regulative principles of the systematic unity of the manifold
of empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical
P 551
knowledge is more adequately secured within its own Limits
and more effectively improved than would be possible, in the
absence of such ideas, through the employment merely of the
principles of the understanding.
I shall endeavour to make this clearer. In conformity with
these ideas as principles we shall, first, in psychology, under
the guidance of inner experience, connect all the appearances,
all the actions and receptivity of our mind, as if the mind were
a simple substance which persists with personal identity (in
this life at least), while its states, to which those of the body
belong only as outer conditions, are in continual change.
Secondly, in cosmology, we must follow up the conditions of
both inner and outer natural appearances, in an enquiry which
is to be regarded as never allowing of completion, just as if
the series of appearances were in itself endless, without any
first or supreme member. We need not, in so doing, deny that,
outside all appearances, there are purely intelligible grounds
of the appearances; but as we have no knowledge of these
whatsoever, we must never attempt to make use of them in our
explanations of nature. Thirdly, and finally, in the domain
of theology, we must view everything that can belong to the
context of possible experience as if this experience formed
an absolute but at the same time completely dependent and
sensibly conditioned unity, and yet also at the same time as if
the sum of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a
single, highest and all-sufficient ground beyond itself, namely,
a self-subsistent, original, creative reason. For it is in the light
of this idea of a creative reason that we so guide the empirical
employment of our reason as to secure its greatest possible
extension -- that is, by viewing all objects as if they drew their
origin from such an archetype. In other words, we ought not
to derive the inner appearances of the soul from a simple
thinking substance but from one another, in accordance with
the idea of a simple being; we ought not to derive the order
and systematic unity of the world from a supreme intelligence,
but to obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule
according to which reason in connecting empirical causes and
effects in the world may be employed to best advantage, and in
such manner as to secure satisfaction of its own demands.
Now there is nothing whatsoever to hinder us from as-
P 552
suming these ideas to be also objective, that is, from hyposta-
tising them -- except in the case of the cosmological ideas,
where reason, in so proceeding, falls into antinomy. The
psychological and theological ideas contain no antinomy,
and involve no contradiction. How, then, can anyone dispute
their [possible] objective reality? He who denies their possi-
bility must do so with just as little knowledge [of this possi-
bility] as we can have in affirming it. It is not, however, a
sufficient ground for assuming anything, that there is no
positive hindrance to our so doing; we are not justified in
introducing thought-entities which transcend all our con-
cepts, though without contradicting them, as being real and
determinate objects, merely on the authority of a speculative
reason that is bent upon completing the tasks which it has
set itself. They ought not to be assumed as existing in
themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema -- the
schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of
all knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as
analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things. We
remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit
the concept provided by our understanding, but which also
alone make it possible for us to have a determinate con-
cept of anything. What we then think is a something of
which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but
which we none the less represent to ourselves as standing to
the sum of appearances in a relation analogous to that in
which appearances stand to one another.
If, in this manner, we assume such ideal beings, we do not
really extend our knowledge beyond the objects of possible
experience; we extend only the empirical unity of such experi-
ence, by means of the systematic unity for which the schema
is provided by the idea -- an idea which has therefore no claim
to be a constitutive, but only a regulative principle. For
to allow that we posit a thing, a something, a real being,
corresponding to the idea, is not to say that we profess
to extend our knowledge of things by means of transcen-
dental concepts. For this being is posited only in the idea and
not in itself; and therefore only as expressing the systematic
P 553
unity which is to serve as a rule for the empirical employ-
ment of reason. It decides nothing in regard to the ground of
this unity or as to what may be the inner character of the being
on which as cause the unity depends.
Thus the transcendental, and the only determinate, con-
cept which the purely speculative reason gives us of God is, in
the strictest sense, deistic; that is, reason does not determine
the objective validity of such a concept, but yields only the
idea of something which is the ground of the highest and
necessary unity of all empirical reality. This something we
cannot think otherwise than on the analogy of a real sub-
stance that, in conformity with laws of reason, is the cause
of all things. This, indeed, is how we must think it, in
so far as we venture to think it as a special object, and do
not rather remain satisfied with the mere idea of the regu-
lative principle of reason, leaving aside the completion of
all conditions of thought as being too surpassingly great
for the human understanding. The latter procedure is, how-
ever, inconsistent with the pursuit of that complete system-
atic unity in our knowledge to which reason at least sets
no limits.
This, then, is how matters stand: if we assume a divine
being, we have indeed no concept whatsoever either of the
inner possibility of its supreme perfection or of the necessity
of its existence; but, on the other hand, we are in a position
to give a satisfactory answer to all those questions which
relate to the contingent, and to afford reason the most com-
plete satisfaction in respect to that highest unity after which
it is seeking in its empirical employment. The fact, however,
that we are unable to satisfy reason in respect to the assump-
tion itself, shows that it is the speculative interest of reason,
not any insight, which justifies it in thus starting from a point
that lies so far above its sphere; and in endeavouring, by this
device, to survey its objects as constituting a complete whole.
We here come upon a distinction bearing on the procedure
of thought in dealing with one and the same assumption, a
distinction which is somewhat subtle, but of great importance
in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient ground to
assume something, in a relative sense (suppositio relativa), and
yet have no right to assume it absolutely (suppositio absoluta).
P 554
This distinction has to be reckoned with in the case of a
merely regulative principle. We recognise the necessity of the
principle, but have no knowledge of the source of its neces-
sity; and in assuming that it has a supreme ground, we do so
solely in order to think its universality more determinately.
Thus, for instance, when I think as existing a being that
corresponds to a mere idea, indeed to a transcendental idea,
I have no right to assume any such thing as in itself exist-
ing, since no concepts through which I am able to think any
object as determined suffice for such a purpose -- the condi-
tions which are required for the objective validity of my con-
cepts being excluded by the idea itself. The concepts of reality,
substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, apart
from their use in making possible the empirical knowledge of
an object, have no meaning whatsoever, such as might serve
to determine any object. They can be employed, therefore, to
explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not
to explain the possibility of the universe itself. Such a ground
of explanation would have to be outside the world, and could
not therefore be an object of a possible experience. None the
less, though I cannot assume such an inconceivable being [as
existing] in itself, I may yet assume it as the object of a mere
idea, relatively to the world of sense. For if the greatest
possible empirical employment of my reason rests upon an
idea (that of systematically complete unity, which I shall
presently be defining more precisely), an idea which, al-
though it can never itself be adequately exhibited in experi-
ence, is yet indispensably necessary in order that we may
approximate to the highest possible degree of empirical unity,
I shall not only be entitled, but shall also be constrained, to
realise this idea, that is, to posit for it a real object. But I may
posit it only as a something which I do not at all know in
itself, and to which, as a ground of that systematic unity, I
ascribe, in relation to this unity, such properties as are ana-
logous to the concepts employed by the understanding in the
empirical sphere. Accordingly, in analogy with realities in
the world, that is, with substances, with causality and with
necessity, I think a being which possesses all this in the
highest perfection; and since this idea depends merely on
my reason, I can think this being as self-subsistent reason,
P 555
which through ideas of the greatest harmony and unity is
the cause of the universe. I thus omit all conditions which
might limit the idea, solely in order, under countenance of
such an original ground, to make possible systematic unity
of the manifold in the universe, and thereby the greatest
possible empirical employment of reason. This I do by repre-
senting all connections as if they were the ordinances of a
supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint copy. I then
proceed to think this supreme being exclusively through con-
cepts which, properly, are applicable only in the world of
sense. But since I make none but a relative use of the trans-
cendental assumption, namely, as giving the substratum of
the greatest possible unity of experience, I am quite in order in
thinking a being which I distinguish from the world of sense,
through properties which belong solely to that world. For I
do not seek, nor am I justified in seeking, to know this object
of my idea according to what it may be in itself. There are no
concepts available for any such purpose; even the concepts of
reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in
existence, lose all meaning, and are empty titles for [possible]
concepts, themselves entirely without content, when we thus
venture with them outside the field of the senses. I think to
myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely un-
known to me, to the greatest possible systematic unity of the
universe, solely for the purpose of using it as a schema of the
regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical employ-
ment of my reason.
If it be the transcendental object of our idea that we have
in view, it is obvious that we cannot thus, in terms of the
concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc. , presuppose its
reality in itself, since these concepts have not the least applica-
tion to anything that is entirely distinct from the world of sense.
The supposition which reason makes of a supreme being, as
the highest cause, is, therefore relative only; it is devised solely
for the sake of systematic unity in the world of sense, and is a
mere something in idea, of which, as it may be in itself, we
have no concept. This explains why, in relation to what is
given to the senses as existing, we require the idea of a prim-
ordial being necessary in itself, and yet can never form the
slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity.
P 556
We are now in a position to have a clear view of the outcome
of the whole Transcendental Dialectic, and accurately to define
the final purpose of the ideas of pure reason, which become
dialectical only through heedlessness and misapprehension.
Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. It can
have no other vocation. For what is given to it does not consist
in objects that have to be brought to the unity of the empirical
concept, but in those modes of knowledge supplied by the
understanding that require to be brought to the unity of the
concept of reason -- that is, to unity of connection in conform-
ity with a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system;
and this systematic unity does not serve objectively as a prin-
ciple that extends the application of reason to objects, but sub-
jectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible
empirical knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, since the system-
atic connection which reason can give to the empirical em-
ployment of the understanding not only furthers its extension,
but also guarantees its correctness, the principle of such system-
atic unity is so far also objective, but in an indeterminate
manner (principium vagum). It is not a constitutive principle
that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct
object, but only a merely regulative principle and maxim, to
further and strengthen in infinitum (indeterminately) the
empirical employment of reason -- never in any way proceed-
ing counter to the laws of its empirical employment, and yet
at the same time opening out new paths which are not within
the cognisance of the understanding.
But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise
than by giving to the idea of this unity an object; and since
experience can never give an example of complete systematic
unity, the object which we have to assign to the idea is not
such as experience can ever supply. This object, as thus enter-
tained by reason (ens rationis ratiocinatae), is a mere idea;
it is not assumed as a something that is real absolutely and
in itself, but is postulated only problematically (since we
cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the under-
standing) in order that we may view all connection of the
things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in such
a being. In thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure
that systematic unity which is indispensable to reason, and
P 557
which while furthering in every way the empirical knowledge
obtainable by the understanding can never interfere to hinder
or obstruct it.
We misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard
it as the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing,
to which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the sys-
tematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground
which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent con-
stitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited only
as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which
is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understand-
ing, can be further extended. In short, this transcendental
thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which
reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity
over the whole field of experience.
The first object of such an idea is the 'I' itself, viewed
simply as thinking nature or soul. If I am to investigate the
properties with which a thinking being is in itself endowed, I
must interrogate experience. For I cannot even apply any one
of the categories to this object, except in so far as the schema
of the category is given in sensible intuition. But I never there-
by attain to a systematic unity of all appearances of inner sense.
Instead, then, of the empirical concept (of that which the soul
actually is), which cannot carry us far, reason takes the concept
of the empirical unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity
as unconditioned and original, it forms from it a concept of
reason, that is, the idea of a simple substance, which, unchange-
able in itself (personally identical), stands in association with
other real things outside it; in a word, the idea of a simple self-
subsisting intelligence. Yet in so doing it has nothing in view
save principles of systematic unity in the explanation of the
appearances of the soul. It is endeavouring to represent all
determinations as existing in a single subject, all powers, so
far as possible, as derived from a single fundamental power, all
change as belonging to the states of one and the same per-
manent being, and all appearances in space as completely dif-
ferent from the actions of thought. The simplicity and other
properties of substance are intended to be only the schema of
this regulative principle, and are not presupposed as being the
actual ground of the properties of the soul. For these may rest
P 558
on altogether different grounds, of which we can know nothing.
The soul in itself could not be known through these assumed
predicates, not even if we regarded them as absolutely valid
in respect of it. For they constitute a mere idea which cannot
be represented in concreto. Nothing but advantage can result
from the psychological idea thus conceived, if only we take
heed that it is not viewed as more than a mere idea, and that
it is therefore taken as valid only relatively to the systematic
employment of reason in determining the appearances of our
soul. For no empirical laws of bodily appearance, which are
of a totally different kind, will then intervene in the explana-
tion of what belongs exclusively to inner sense. No windy
hypotheses of generation, extinction, and palingenesis of souls
will be permitted. The consideration of this object of inner
sense will thus be kept completely pure and will not be con-
fused by the introduction of heterogeneous properties. Also,
reason's investigations will be directed to reducing the grounds
of explanation in this field, so far as may be possible, to a
single principle. All this will be best attained through such a
schema, viewed as if it were a real being; indeed it is attain-
able in no other way. The psychological idea can signify
nothing but the schema of a regulative concept. For were
I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature,
the question would have no meaning. In employing such a
concept I not only abstract from corporeal nature, but from
nature in general, that is, from all predicates of any possible
experience, and therefore from all conditions requisite for
thinking an object for such a concept; yet only as related to
an object can the concept be said to have a meaning.
The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason
is the concept of the world in general. For nature is properly
the only given object in regard to which reason requires regu-
lative principles. This nature is twofold, either thinking or
corporeal. To think the latter, so far as regards its inner
possibility, that is, to determine the application of the cate-
gories to it, we need no idea, that is, no representation which
transcends experience. Nor, indeed, is any idea possible in this
connection, since in dealing with corporeal nature we are
guided solely by sensible intuition. The case is different from
that of the fundamental psychological concept ('I'), which
P 559
contains a priori a certain form of thought, namely, the unity
of thought. There therefore remains for pure reason nothing
but nature in general, and the completeness of the conditions
in nature in accordance with some principle. The absolute
totality of the series of these conditions, in the derivation of
their members, is an idea which can never be completely
realised in the empirical employment of reason, but which
yet serves as a rule that prescribes how we ought to proceed
in dealing with such series, namely, that in explaining appear-
ances, whether in their regressive or in their ascending order,
we ought to treat the series as if it were in itself infinite, that
is, as if it proceeded in indefinitum. When, on the other hand,
reason is itself regarded as the determining cause, as in [the
sphere of] freedom, that is to say, in the case of practical prin-
ciples, we have to proceed as if we had before us an object, not
of the senses, but of the pure understanding. In this practical
sphere the conditions are no longer in the series of appear-
ances; they can be posited outside the series, and the series of
states can therefore be regarded as if it had an absolute be-
ginning, through an intelligible cause. All this shows that the
cosmological ideas are nothing but simply regulative prin-
ciples, and are very far from positing, in the manner of con-
stitutive principles, an actual totality of such series. The fuller
treatment of this subject will be found in the chapter on the
antinomy of pure reason.
The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely
relative supposition of a being that is the sole and sufficient
cause of all cosmological series, is the idea of God. We have
not the slightest ground to assume in an absolute manner (to
suppose in itself) the object of this idea; for what can enable
us to believe in or assert a being of the highest perfection and
one absolutely necessary by its very nature, merely on the basis
of its concept, or if we did how could we justify our procedure?
It is only by way of its relation to the world that we can attempt
to establish the necessity of this supposition; and it then becomes
evident that the idea of such a being, like all speculative ideas,
seeks only to formulate the command of reason, that all con-
nection in the world be viewed in accordance with the prin-
ciples of a systematic unity -- as if all such connection had its
source in one single all-embracing being, as the supreme and
P 560
all-sufficient cause. It is thus evident that reason has here no
other purpose than to prescribe its own formal rule for the
extension of its empirical employment, and not any extension
beyond all limits of empirical employment. Consequently it is
evident that this idea does not, in any concealed fashion, in-
volve any principle that claims, in its application to possible
experience, to be constitutive in character.
This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts
of reason, is the purposive unity of things. The speculative
interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the
world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme
reason. Such a principle opens out to our reason, as applied
in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the
things of the world may be connected according to teleological
laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic
unity. The assumption of a supreme intelligence, as the one
and only cause of the universe, though in the idea alone, can
therefore always benefit reason and can never injure it. Thus
if, in studying the shape of the earth (which is round, but some-
what flattened), of the mountains, seas, etc. , we assume it to be
the outcome of wise purposes on the part of an Author of the
world, we are enabled to make in this way a number of dis-
coveries. And provided we restrict ourselves to a merely regu-
lative use of this principle, even error cannot do us any serious
harm. For the worst that can happen would be that where we
expected a teleological connection (nexus finalis), we find only
a mechanical or physical connection (nexus effectivus). In such
a case, we merely fail to find the additional unity; we do not
destroy the unity upon which reason insists in its empirical employment.
++ The advantage arising from the spherical shape of the earth
is well known. But few are aware that its spheroidal flattening alone
prevents the continental elevations, or even the smaller hills, thrown
up perhaps by earthquakes, from continuously, and indeed quite
appreciably in a comparatively short time, altering the position of
the axis of the earth. The protuberance of the earth at the equator
forms so vast a mountain that the impetus of all the other moun-
tains can never produce any observable effect in changing the posi-
tion of the earth's axis. And yet, wise as this arrangement is, we feel
no scruples in explaining it from the equilibrium of the formerly
fluid mass of the earth.
P 561
But even a disappointment of this sort cannot
affect the teleological law itself, in its general bearing. For
although an anatomist can be convicted of error when he
assigns to some member of an animal body an end which
it can be clearly shown not to subserve, it is yet quite im-
possible to prove in any given case that an arrangement
of nature, be it what it may, subserves no end whatsoever.
Accordingly, medical physiology extends its very limited em-
pirical knowledge of the ends served by the articulation of an
organic body, by resorting to a principle for which pure reason
has alone been responsible; and it carries this principle so far as
to assume confidently, and with general approval, that every-
thing in an animal has its use, and subserves some good pur-
pose. If this assumption be treated as constitutive it goes much
further than observation has thus far been able to justify; and
we must therefore conclude that it is nothing more than a
regulative principle of reason, to aid us in securing the highest
possible systematic unity, by means of the idea of the pur-
posive causality of the supreme cause of the world -- as if this
being, as supreme intelligence, acting in accordance with a
supremely wise purpose, were the cause of all things.
If, however, we overlook this restriction of the idea to a
merely regulative use, reason is led away into mistaken paths.
For it then leaves the ground of experience, which alone can
contain the signs that mark out its proper course, and ventures
out beyond it to the incomprehensible and unsearchable,
rising to dizzy heights where it finds itself entirely cut off
from all possible action in conformity with experience.
The first error which arises from our using the idea of a
supreme being in a manner contrary to the nature of an idea,
that is, constitutively, and not regulatively only, is the error of
ignava ratio.
++ This was the title given by the ancient dialecticians to a
sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to recover
from this illness, you will recover, whether you employ a physician
or not. Cicero states that this mode of argument has been so named,
because, if we conformed to it, reason would be left without any use
in life. On the same ground I apply the name also to the sophistical
argument of pure reason.
P 561
We may so entitle every principle which makes
P 562
us regard our investigation into nature, on any subject, as
absolutely complete, disposing reason to cease from further
enquiry, as if it had entirely succeeded in the task which it had
set itself. Thus the psychological idea, when it is employed as
a constitutive principle to explain the appearances of our soul,
and thereby to extend our knowledge of the self beyond the
limits of experience (its state after death), does indeed simplify
the task of reason; but it interferes with, and entirely ruins,
our use of reason in dealing with nature under the guidance
of our experiences. The dogmatic spiritualist explains the
abiding and unchanging unity of a person throughout all
change of state, by the unity of the thinking substance, of
which, as he believes, he has immediate perception in the 'I';
or he explains the interest which we take in what can happen
only after our death, by means of our consciousness of the im-
material nature of the thinking subject; and so forth. He thus
dispenses with all empirical investigation of the cause of these
inner appearances, so far as that cause is to be found in physi-
cal grounds of explanation; and to his own great convenience,
though at the sacrifice of all real insight, he professes, in re-
liance upon the assumed authority of a transcendent reason, to
have the right to ignore those sources of knowledge which are
immanent in experience. These detrimental consequences are
even more obvious in the dogmatic treatment of our idea of a
supreme intelligence, and in the theological system of nature
(physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For in
this field of enquiry, if instead of looking for causes in the
universal laws of material mechanism, we appeal directly to
the unsearchable decree of supreme wisdom, all those ends
which are exhibited in nature, together with the many ends
which are only ascribed by us to nature, make our investi-
gation of the causes a very easy task, and so enable us to
regard the labour of reason as completed, when, as a matter
of fact, we have merely dispensed with its employment -- an
employment which is wholly dependent for guidance upon the
order of nature and the series of its alterations, in accordance
with the universal laws which they are found to exhibit. This
error can be avoided, if we consider from the teleological point
of view not merely certain parts of nature, such as the distribu-
P 563
tion of land, its structure, the constitution and location of
the mountains, or only the organisation of the vegetable and
animal kingdoms, but make this systematic unity of nature
completely universal, in relation to the idea of a supreme in-
telligence. For we then treat nature as resting upon a purpos-
iveness, in accordance with universal laws, from which no
special arrangement is exempt, however difficult it may be to
establish this in any given case. We then have a regulative
principle of the systematic unity of teleological connection --
a connection which we do not, however, predetermine. What
we may presume to do is to follow out the physico-mechanical
connection in accordance with universal laws in the hope of
discovering what the teleological connection actually is. In this
way alone can the principle of purposive unity aid always in
extending the employment of reason in reference to experience
without being in any instance prejudicial to it.
The second error arising from the misapprehension of the
above principle of systematic unity is that of perversa ratio
(husteron proteron). The idea of systematic unity should be
used only as a regulative principle to guide us in seeking for
such unity in the connection of things, according to universal
laws of nature; and we ought, therefore, to believe that we
have approximated to completeness in the employment of the
principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify
such unity in empirical fashion -- a completeness which is
never, of course, attainable. Instead of this the reverse pro-
cedure is adopted. The reality of a principle of purposive
unity is not only presupposed but hypostatised; and since the
concept of a supreme intelligence is in itself completely be-
yond our powers of comprehension, we proceed to determine
it in an anthropomorphic manner, and so to impose ends
upon nature, forcibly and dictatorially, instead of pursuing
the more reasonable course of searching for them by the path
of physical investigation. And thus teleology, which is in-
tended to aid us merely in completing the unity of nature in
accordance with universal laws, not only tends to abrogate
such unity, but also prevents reason from carrying out its own
professed purpose, that of proving from nature, in conformity
with these laws, the existence of a supreme intelligent cause.
P 564
For if the most complete purposiveness cannot be presupposed
a priori in nature, that is, as belonging to its essence, how can
we be required to search for it, and through all its gradations
to approximate to the supreme perfection of an Author of all
things, a perfection that, as absolutely necessary, must be
knowable a priori? The regulative principle prescribes that
systematic unity as a unity in nature, which is not known
merely empirically but is presupposed a priori (although in
an indeterminate manner), be presupposed absolutely, and
consequently as following from the essence of things. If,
however, I begin with a supreme purposive being as the
ground of all things, the unity of nature is really surrendered,
as being quite foreign and accidental to the nature of things,
and as not capable of being known from its own universal laws.
There then arises a vicious circle; we are assuming just that
very point which is mainly in dispute.
To take the regulative principle of the systematic unity of
nature as being a constitutive principle, and to hypostatise, and
presuppose as a cause, that which serves, merely in idea, as the
ground of the consistent employment of reason, is simply to
confound reason. The investigation of nature takes its own
independent course, keeping to the chain of natural causes
in conformity with their universal laws. It does indeed, in so
doing, proceed in accordance with the idea of an Author of the
universe, but not in order to deduce therefrom the purposive-
ness for which it is ever on the watch, but in order to obtain
knowledge of the existence of such an Author from this pur-
posiveness. And by seeking this purposiveness in the essence
of the things of nature, and so far as may be possible in the
essence of things in general, it seeks to know the existence of
this supreme being as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter
enterprise succeed or not, the idea remains always true in itself,
and justified in its use, provided it be restricted to the condi-
tions of a merely regulative principle.
Complete purposive unity constitutes what is, in the ab-
solute sense, perfection. If we do not find this unity in the
essence of the things which go to constitute the entire object of
experience, that is, of all our objectively valid knowledge, and
therefore do not find it in the universal and necessary laws of
nature, how can we profess to infer directly from this unity the
P 565
idea of a supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of an
original being, as the source of all causality? The greatest pos-
sible systematic unity, and consequently also purposive unity, is
the training school for the use of reason, and is indeed the very
foundation of the possibility of its greatest possible employ-
ment. The idea of such unity is, therefore, inseparably bound
up with the very nature of our reason. This same idea is on
that account legislative for us; and it is therefore very natural
that we should assume a corresponding legislative reason
(intellectus archetypus), from which, as the object of our reason,
all systematic unity of nature is to be derived.
In discussing the antinomy of pure reason we have stated
that the questions propounded by pure reason must in every
case admit of an answer, and that in their regard it is not per-
missible to plead the limits of our knowledge (a plea which
in many questions that concern nature is as unavoidable as
it is relevant). For we are not here asking questions in regard
to the nature of things, but only such questions as arise from
the very nature of reason, and which concern solely its own
inner constitution. We are now in a position to confirm this
assertion -- which at first sight may have appeared rash -- so
far as regards the two questions in which pure reason is most
of all interested; and thus finally to complete our discussion of
the dialectic of pure reason.
If, in connection with a transcendental theology, we ask,
first, whether there is anything distinct from the world, which
contains the ground of the order of the world and of its con-
nection in accordance with universal laws, the answer is that
there undoubtedly is. For the world is a sum of appearances;
and there must therefore be some transcendental ground of
the appearances, that is, a ground which is thinkable only by
the pure understanding. If, secondly, the question be, whether
this being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc. ,
++ After what I have already said regarding the psychological
idea and its proper vocation, as a principle for the merely regulative
employment of reason, I need not dwell at any length upon the
transcendental illusion by which the systematic unity of all the mani-
foldness of inner sense is hypostatised. The procedure is very similar
to that which is under discussion in our criticism of the theological
ideal.
P 566
we reply that this question is entirely without meaning. For
all categories through which we can attempt to form a concept
of such an object allow only of empirical employment, and
have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of
possible experience, that is, to the world of sense. Outside this
field they are merely titles of concepts, which we may admit,
but through which [in and by themselves] we can understand
nothing. If, thirdly, the question be, whether we may not at
least think this being, which is distinct from the world, in
analogy with the objects of experience, the answer is: cer-
tainly, but only as object in idea and not in reality, namely,
only as being a substratum, to us unknown, of the systematic
unity, order, and purposiveness of the arrangement of the
world -- an idea which reason is constrained to form as the
regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more,
we may freely, without laying ourselves open to censure, admit
into this idea certain anthropomorphisms which are helpful
to the principle in its regulative capacity. For it is always an
idea only, which does not relate directly to a being distinct
from the world, but to the regulative principle of the systematic
unity of the world, and only by means of a schema of this
unity, namely, through the schema of a supreme intelligence
which, in originating the world, acts in accordance with wise
purposes. What this primordial ground of the unity of the
world may be in itself, we should not profess to have thereby
decided, but only how we should use it, or rather its idea, in
relation to the systematic employment of reason in respect of
the things of the world.
But the question may still be pressed: Can we, on such
grounds, assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world?
Undoubtedly we may; and we not only may, but must, do so.
But do we then extend our knowledge beyond the field of pos-
sible experience? By no means. All that we have done is merely
to presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of
which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever. It is
only in relation to the systematic and purposive ordering of
the world, which, if we are to study nature, we are constrained
to presuppose, that we have thought this unknown being
by analogy with an intelligence (an empirical concept); that
is, have endowed it, in respect of the ends and perfection
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which are to be grounded upon it, with just those properties
which, in conformity with the conditions of our reason, can
be regarded as containing the ground of such systematic unity.
This idea is thus valid only in respect of the employment of our
reason in reference to the world. If we ascribed to it a validity
that is absolute and objective, we should be forgetting that
what we are thinking is a being in idea only; and in thus taking
our start from a ground which is not determinable through
observation of the world, we should no longer be in a position
to apply the principle in a manner suited to the empirical
employment of reason.
But, it will still be asked, can I make any such use of the
concept and of the presupposition of a supreme being in the
rational consideration of the world? Yes, it is precisely for
this purpose that reason has resorted to this idea. But may I
then proceed to regard seemingly purposive arrangements as
purposes, and so derive them from the divine will, though,
of course, mediately through certain special natural means,
themselves established in furtherance of that divine will? Yes,
we can indeed do so; but only on condition that we regard
it as a matter of indifference whether it be asserted that
divine wisdom has disposed all things in accordance with its
supreme ends, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regu-
lative principle in the investigation of nature and a principle
of its systematic and purposive unity, in accordance with
universal laws, even in those cases in which we are unable
to detect that unity. In other words, it must be a matter of
complete indifference to us, when we perceive such unity,
whether we say that God in his wisdom has willed it to be
so, or that nature has wisely arranged it thus. For what has
justified us in adopting the idea of a supreme intelligence as
a schema of the regulative principle is precisely this greatest
possible systematic and purposive unity -- a unity which our
reason has required as a regulative principle that must under-
lie all investigation of nature. The more, therefore, we dis-
cover purposiveness in the world, the more fully is the legiti-
macy of our idea confirmed. But since the sole aim of that
principle was to guide us in seeking a necessary unity of nature,
and that in the greatest possible degree, while we do indeed,
P 568
in so far as we attain that unity, owe it to the idea of a supreme
being, we cannot, without contradicting ourselves, ignore the
universal laws of nature -- with a view to discovering which the
idea was alone adopted -- and look upon this purposiveness
of nature as contingent and hyperphysical in its origin. For we
were not justified in assuming above nature a being with those
qualities, but only in adopting the idea of such a being in order
to view the appearances as systematically connected with one
another in accordance with the principle of a causal deter-
mination.
For the same reasons, in thinking the cause of the world,
we are justified in representing it in our idea not only in
terms of a certain subtle anthropomorphism (without which
we could not think anything whatsoever in regard to it),
namely, as a being that has understanding, feelings of pleasure
and displeasure, and desires and volitions corresponding to
these, but also in ascribing to it a perfection which, as infinite,
far transcends any perfection that our empirical knowledge of
the order of the world can justify us in attributing to it. For
the regulative law of systematic unity prescribes that we should
study nature as if systematic and purposive unity, combined
with the greatest possible manifoldness, were everywhere to be
met with, in infinitum. For although we may succeed in dis-
covering but little of this perfection of the world, it is never-
theless required by the legislation of our reason that we must
always search for and surmise it; and it must always be bene-
ficial, and can never be harmful, to direct our investigations
into nature in accordance with this principle. But it is evident
that in this way of representing the principle as involving the
idea of a supreme Author, I do not base the principle upon the
existence and upon the knowledge of such a being, but upon
its idea only, and that I do not really derive anything from this
being, but only from the idea of it -- that is, from the nature of
the things of the world, in accordance with such an idea. A
certain, unformulated consciousness of the true use of this
concept of reason seems indeed to have inspired the modest
and reasonable language of the philosophers of all times,
since they speak of the wisdom and providence of nature and
of divine wisdom, just as if nature and divine wisdom were
P 569
equivalent expressions -- indeed, so long as they are dealing
solely with speculative reason, giving preference to the former
mode of expression, on the ground that it enables us to avoid
making profession of more than we are justified in asserting,
and that it likewise directs reason to its own proper field,
namely, nature.
Thus pure reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing
less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of ex-
perience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regu-
lative principles, which, while indeed prescribing greater unity
than the empirical employment of understanding can achieve,
yet still, by the very fact that they place the goal of its
endeavours at so great a distance, carry its agreement with
itself, by means of systematic unity, to the highest possible
degree. But if, on the other hand, they be misunderstood,
and be treated as constitutive principles of transcendent
knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive
illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge,
and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes.
***
Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, pro-
ceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although
in respect of all three elements it possesses a priori sources of
knowledge, which on first consideration seem to scorn the
limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing critique convinces us
that reason, in its speculative employment, can never with
these elements transcend the field of possible experience, and
that the proper vocation of this supreme faculty of knowledge
is to use all methods, and the principles of these methods,
solely for the purpose of penetrating to the innermost secrets
of nature, in accordance with every possible principle of unity
-- that of ends being the most important -- but never to soar
beyond its limits, outside which there is for us nothing but
empty space. The critical examination, as carried out in the
Transcendental Analytic, of all propositions which may seem
to extend our knowledge beyond actual experience, has doubt-
less sufficed to convince us that they can never lead to any-
thing more than a possible experience. Were it not that we are
suspicious of abstract and general doctrines, however clear,
P 570
and were it not that specious and alluring prospects tempt us
to escape from the compulsion which these doctrines impose,
we might have been able to spare ourselves the laborious in-
terrogation of all those dialectical witnesses that a transcen-
dent reason brings forward in support of its pretensions. For
we should from the start have known with complete certainty
that all such pretensions, while perhaps honestly meant, must
be absolutely groundless, inasmuch as they relate to a kind
of knowledge to which man can never attain. But there is no
end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the true
cause of the illusion by which even the wisest are deceived.
Moreover, the resolution of all our transcendent knowledge
into its elements (as a study of our inner nature) is in itself
of no slight value, and to the philosopher is indeed a matter
of duty. Accordingly, fruitless as are all these endeavours of
speculative reason, we have none the less found it necessary
to follow them up to their primary sources. And since the
dialectical illusion does not merely deceive us in our judg-
ments, but also, because of the interest which we take in these
judgments, has a certain natural attraction which it will always
continue to possess, we have thought it advisable, with a view
to the prevention of such errors in the future, to draw up in
full detail what we may describe as being the records of this
lawsuit, and to deposit them in the archives of human reason.
P 571
II
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF
METHOD
P 573
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
IF we look upon the sum of all knowledge of pure speculative
reason as an edifice for which we have at least the idea within
ourselves, it can be said that in the Transcendental Doctrine
of Elements we have made an estimate of the materials, and
have determined for what sort of edifice and for what height
and strength of building they suffice. We have found, in-
deed, that although we had contemplated building a tower
which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials
suffices only for a dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious
for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently
high to allow of our overlooking it. The bold undertaking that
we had designed is thus bound to fail through lack of material
-- not to mention the babel of tongues, which inevitably gives
rise to disputes among the workers in regard to the plan to be
followed, and which must end by scattering them over all the
world, leaving each to erect a separate building for himself,
according to his own design. At present, however, we are con-
cerned not so much with the materials as with the plan; and
inasmuch as we have been warned not to venture at random
upon a blind project which may be altogether beyond our
capacities, and yet cannot well abstain from building a secure
home for ourselves, we must plan our building in conformity
with the material which is given to us, and which is also at
the same time appropriate to our needs.
I understand, therefore, by Transcendental Doctrine of
Method the determination of the formal conditions of a com-
plete system of pure reason. In this connection, we shall have
to treat of a discipline, a canon, an architectonic, and finally
a history of pure reason, and to provide (in its transcendental
reference) what, in relation to the use of the understanding
in general, the Schools have attempted, though very unsatis-
P 574
factorily, under the title of a practical logic. For since universal
logic is not confined to any particular kind of knowledge made
possible by the understanding (for instance, not to its pure
knowledge) and is also not confined to certain objects, it cannot,
save by borrowing knowledge from other sciences, do more
than present the titles of possible methods and the technical
terms which are used for purposes of systematisation in all
kinds of sciences; and this serves only to acquaint the novice
in advance with names the meaning and use of which he will
not learn till later.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
CHAPTER I
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON
Owing to the general desire for knowledge, negative judg-
ments, that is, those which are such not merely as regards their
form but also as regards their content, are not held in any very
high esteem. They are regarded rather as the jealous enemies
of our unceasing endeavour to extend our knowledge, and it
almost requires an apology to win for them even tolerance, not
to say favour and high repute.
As far as logical form is concerned, we can make negative
any proposition we like; but in respect to the content of our
knowledge in general, which is either extended or limited by
a judgment, the task peculiar to negative judgments is that of
rejecting error. Accordingly, negative propositions intended to
reject false knowledge, where yet no error is possible, are indeed
true but empty, that is, are not suited to their purpose, and
just for this reason are often quite absurd, like the proposition
of the Schoolman, that Alexander could not have conquered
any countries without an army.
But where the limits of our possible knowledge are very
narrow, where the temptation to judge is great, where the illu-
sion that besets us is very deceptive and the harm that results
from the error is considerable, there the negative instruction,
which serves solely to guard us from errors, has even more
importance than many a piece of positive information by
P 575
which our knowledge is increased. The compulsion, by which
the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and
finally extirpated, we entitle discipline. It is distinguished
from culture, which is intended solely to give a certain kind
of skill, and not to cancel any habitual mode of action already
present. Towards the development of a talent, which has al-
ready in itself an impulse to manifest itself, discipline will
therefore contribute in a negative, culture and doctrine in a
positive, fashion.
That temperament and our various talents (such as imagi-
nation and wit) which incline to allow themselves a free and
unlimited activity are in many respects in need of a discipline,
everyone will readily admit. But that reason, whose proper
duty it is to prescribe a discipline for all other endeavours,
should itself stand in need of such discipline may indeed seem
strange; and it has, in fact, hitherto escaped this humiliation,
only because, in view of its stately guise and established stand-
ing, nobody could lightly come to suspect it of idly substituting
fancies for concepts, and words for things.
There is no need of a critique of reason in its empirical em-
ployment, because in this field its principles are always sub-
ject to the test of experience. Nor is it needed in mathematics,
where the concepts of reason must be forthwith exhibited in
concreto in pure intuition, so that everything unfounded and
arbitrary in them is at once exposed. But where neither em-
pirical nor pure intuition keeps reason to a visible track, when,
that is to say, reason is being considered in its transcendental
employment, in accordance with mere concepts, it stands so
greatly in need of a discipline, to restrain its tendency towards
extension beyond the narrow limits of possible experience and
to guard it against extravagance and error, that the whole
P 576
philosophy of pure reason has no other than this strictly
negative utility.
P 575n
++ I am well aware that in the terminology of the Schools the title
discipline is commonly used as synonymous with instruction. How-
ever, there are so many other cases where discipline in the sense of
training by constraint is carefully distinguished from instruction in
the sense of teaching, and the very nature of things itself makes it so
imperative that we should preserve the only expressions suitable for
this distinction, that it is desirable that the former term should never
be used in any but the negative sense.
P 576
Particular errors can be got rid of by censure,
and their causes by criticism. But where, as in the case of pure
reason, we come upon a whole system of illusions and fallacies,
intimately bound together and united under common prin-
ciples, a quite special negative legislation seems to be required,
erecting a system of precautions and self-examination under
the title of a discipline, founded on the nature of reason and
the objects of its pure employment -- a system in face of
which no pseudo-rational illusion will be able to stand, but
will at once betray itself, no matter what claims it may ad-
vance for exceptional treatment.
But it is well to note that in this second main division of the
transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not
directed to the content but only to the method of knowledge
through pure reason. The former has already been considered
in the Doctrine of Elements. But there is so much similarity in
the mode of employing reason, whatever be the object to which
it is applied, while yet, at the same time, its transcendental
employment is so essentially different from every other, that
without the admonitory negative teaching of a discipline,
specially devised for the purpose, we cannot hope to avoid
the errors which inevitably arise from pursuing in improper
fashion methods which are indeed suitable to reason in other
fields, only not in this transcendental sphere.
CHAPTER I
Section I
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN ITS DOGMATIC
EMPLOYMENT
Mathematics presents the most splendid example of the suc-
cessful extension of pure reason, without the help of experience.
Examples are contagious, especially as they quite naturally
flatter a faculty which has been successful in one field, [leading
it] to expect the same good fortune in other fields. Thus pure
reason hopes to be able to extend its domain as successfully
and securely in its transcendental as in its mathematical em-
P 577
ployment, especially when it resorts to the same method as
has been of such obvious utility in mathematics. It is therefore
highly important for us to know whether the method of attain-
ing apodeictic certainty which is called mathematical is identi-
cal with the method by which we endeavour to obtain the
same certainty in philosophy, and which in that field would
have to be called dogmatic.
Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason
from concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge
gained by reason from the construction of concepts. To con-
struct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which
corresponds to the concept. For the construction of a concept
we therefore need a non-empirical intuition. The latter must,
as intuition, be a single object, and yet none the less, as the
construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must
in its representation express universal validity for all possible
intuitions which fall under the same concept. Thus I construct
a triangle by representing the object which corresponds to this
concept either by imagination alone, in pure intuition, or in
accordance therewith also on paper, in empirical intuition -- in
both cases completely a priori, without having borrowed the
pattern from any experience. The single figure which we draw
is empirical, and yet it serves to express the concept, without
impairing its universality. For in this empirical intuition we
consider only the act whereby we construct the concept, and
abstract from the many determinations (for instance, the mag-
nitude of the sides and of the angles), which are quite indif-
ferent, as not altering the concept 'triangle'.
Thus philosophical knowledge considers the particular
only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal
in the particular, or even in the single instance, though still
always a priori and by means of reason. Accordingly, just as
this single object is determined by certain universal conditions
of construction, so the object of the concept, to which the single
object corresponds merely as its schema, must likewise be
thought as universally determined.
The essential difference between these two kinds of know-
ledge through reason consists therefore in this formal differ-
ence, and does not depend on difference of their material or
objects. Those who propose to distinguish philosophy from
P 578
mathematics by saying that the former has as its object quality
only and the latter quantity only, have mistaken the effect for
the cause. The form of mathematical knowledge is the cause
why it is limited exclusively to quantities. For it is the concept
of quantities only that allows of being constructed, that is, ex-
hibited a priori in intuition; whereas qualities cannot be pre-
sented in any intuition that is not empirical. Consequently
reason can obtain a knowledge of qualities only through con-
cepts. No one can obtain an intuition corresponding to the con-
cept of reality otherwise than from experience; we can never
come into possession of it a priori out of our own resources,
and prior to the empirical consciousness of reality. The shape
of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by
any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour
of this cone must be previously given in some experience or
other. I cannot represent in intuition the concept of a cause
in general except in an example supplied by experience; and
similarly with other concepts. Philosophy, as well as mathe-
matics, does indeed treat of quantities, for instance, of totality,
infinity, etc. Mathematics also concerns itself with qualities,
for instance, the difference between lines and surfaces, as
spaces of different quality, and with the continuity of extension
as one of its qualities. But although in such cases they have a
common object, the mode in which reason handles that object
is wholly different in philosophy and in mathematics. Philo-
sophy confines itself to universal concepts; mathematics can
achieve nothing by concepts alone but hastens at once to intui-
tion, in which it considers the concept in concreto, though not
empirically, but only in an intuition which it presents a priori,
that is, which it has constructed, and in which whatever follows
from the universal conditions of the construction must be uni-
versally valid of the object of the concept thus constructed.
Suppose a philosopher be given the concept of a triangle
and he be left to find out, in his own way, what relation the
sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing
but the concept of a figure enclosed by three straight lines,
and possessing three angles. However long he meditates on
this concept, he will never produce anything new. He can
analyse and clarify the concept of a straight line or of an angle
or of the number three, but he can never arrive at any proper-
P 579
ties not already contained in these concepts. Now let the geo-
metrician take up these questions. He at once begins by con-
structing a triangle. Since he knows that the sum of two right
angles is exactly equal to the sum of all the adjacent angles
which can be constructed from a single point on a straight line,
he prolongs one side of his triangle and obtains two adjacent
angles, which together are equal to two right angles. He then
divides the external angle by drawing a line parallel to the
opposite side of the triangle, and observes that he has thus ob-
tained an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal
angle -- and so on. In this fashion, through a chain of in-
ferences guided throughout by intuition, he arrives at a full
evident and universally valid solution of the problem.
But mathematics does not only construct magnitudes
(quanta) as in geometry; it also constructs magnitude as such
(quantitas), as in algebra. In this it abstracts completely from
the properties of the object that is to be thought in terms of
such a concept of magnitude. It then chooses a certain nota-
tion for all constructions of magnitude as such (numbers),
that is, for addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, etc. Once
it has adopted a notation for the general concept of magni-
tudes so far as their different relations are concerned, it ex-
hibits in intuition, in accordance with certain universal rules,
all the various operations through which the magnitudes are
produced and modified. When, for instance, one magnitude is
to be divided by another, their symbols are placed together, in
accordance with the sign for division, and similarly in the other
processes; and thus in algebra by means of a symbolic construc-
tion, just as in geometry by means of an ostensive construction
(the geometrical construction of the objects themselves), we
succeed in arriving at results which discursive knowledge
could never have reached by means of mere concepts.
Now what can be the reason of this radical difference in
the fortunes of the philosopher and the mathematician, both
of whom practise the art of reason, the one making his way by
means of concepts, the other by means of intuitions which he
exhibits a priori in accordance with concepts? The cause is
evident from what has been said above, in our exposition of the
P 580
fundamental transcendental doctrines. We are not here con-
cerned with analytic propositions, which can be produced by
mere analysis of concepts (in this the philosopher would
certainly have the advantage over his rival), but with syn-
thetic propositions, and indeed with just those synthetic
propositions that can be known a priori. For I must not
restrict my attention to what I am actually thinking in my
concept of a triangle (this is nothing more than the mere
definition); I must pass beyond it to properties which are
not contained in this concept, but yet belong to it. Now
this is impossible unless I determine my object in accord-
ance with the conditions either of empirical or of pure
intuition. The former would only give us an empirical pro-
position (based on the measurement of the angles), which
would not have universality, still less necessity; and so would
not at all serve our purpose. The second method of procedure
is the mathematical one, and in this case is the method of geo-
metrical construction, by means of which I combine in a pure
intuition (just as I do in empirical intuition) the manifold
which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, and
therefore to its concept. It is by this method that universal
synthetic propositions must be constructed.
It would therefore be quite futile for me to philosophise
upon the triangle, that is, to think about it discursively. I
should not be able to advance a single step beyond the mere
definition, which was what I had to begin with. There is indeed
a transcendental synthesis [framed] from concepts alone, a
synthesis with which the philosopher is alone competent to
deal; but it relates only to a thing in general, as defining the
conditions under which the perception of it can belong to
possible experience. But in mathematical problems there is
no question of this, nor indeed of existence at all, but only of
the properties of the objects in themselves, [that is to say],
solely in so far as these properties are connected with the con-
cept of the objects.
In the above example we have endeavoured only to make
clear the great difference which exists between the discursive
employment of reason in accordance with concepts and its
intuitive employment by means of the construction of concepts.
This naturally leads on to the question, what can be the cause
P 581
which necessitates such a twofold employment of reason, and
how we are to recognise whether it is the first or the second
method that is being employed.
All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions,
for it is through them alone that an object is given. Now an a -
priori concept, that is, a concept which is not empirical, either
already includes in itself a pure intuition (and if so, it can
be constructed), or it includes nothing but the synthesis of
possible intuitions which are not given a priori. In this latter
case we can indeed make use of it in forming synthetic a -
priori judgments, but only discursively in accordance with
concepts, never intuitively through the construction of the
concept.
The only intuition that is given a priori is that of the mere
form of appearances, space and time. A concept of space and
time, as quanta, can be exhibited a priori in intuition, that is,
constructed, either in respect of the quality (figure) of the
quanta, or through number in their quantity only (the mere
synthesis of the homogeneous manifold). But the matter of
appearances, by which things are given us in space and time,
can only be represented in perception, and therefore a poste-
riori. The only concept which represents a priori this empirical
content of appearances is the concept of a thing in general,
and the a priori synthetic knowledge of this thing in general
can give us nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis
of that which perception may give a posteriori. It can never
yield an a priori intuition of the real object, since this must
necessarily be empirical.
Synthetic propositions in regard to things in general, the
intuition of which does not admit of being given a priori, are
transcendental. Transcendental propositions can never be
given through construction of concepts, but only in accordance
with concepts that are a priori. They contain nothing but the
rule according to which we are to seek empirically for a certain
synthetic unity of that which is incapable of intuitive repre-
sentation a priori (that is, of perceptions). But these synthetic
principles cannot exhibit a priori any one of their concepts
in a specific instance; they can only do this a posteriori, by
means of experience, which itself is possible only in con-
formity with these principles.
P 582
If we are to judge synthetically in regard to a concept,
we must go beyond this concept and appeal to the intui-
tion in which it is given. For should we confine ourselves to
what is contained in the concept, the judgment would be
merely analytic, serving only as an explanation of the thought,
in terms of what is actually contained in it. But I can pass
from the concept to the corresponding pure or empirical in-
tuition, in order to consider it in that intuition in concreto,
and so to know, either a priori or a posteriori, what are the
properties of the object of the concept. The a priori method
gives us our rational and mathematical knowledge through
the construction of the concept, the a posteriori method our
merely empirical (mechanical) knowledge, which is incapable
of yielding necessary and apodeictic propositions. Thus I might
analyse my empirical concept of gold without gaining anything
more than merely an enumeration of everything that I actually
think in using the word, thus improving the logical character
of my knowledge but not in any way adding to it. But I take
the material body, familiarly known by this name, and obtain
perceptions by means of it; and these perceptions yield various
propositions which are synthetic but empirical. When the con-
cept is mathematical, as in the concept of a triangle, I am in a
position to construct the concept, that is, to give it a priori in
intuition, and in this way to obtain knowledge which is at once
synthetic and rational. But if what is given me is the transcend-
ental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc. , it indicates
neither an empirical nor a pure intuition, but only the synthesis
of empirical intuitions, which, as being empirical, cannot be
given a priori. And since the synthesis is thus unable to ad-
vance a priori, beyond the concept, to the corresponding in-
tuition, the concept cannot yield any determining synthetic
proposition, but only a principle of the synthesis of possible empirical intuiti
ons.
++ With the concept of cause I do really go beyond the empirical
concept of an event (something happening), yet I do not pass to the
intuition which exhibits the concept of cause in concreto, but to the
time-conditions in general, which in experience may be found to be
in accord with this concept. I therefore proceed merely
with concepts; I cannot proceed by means of the construction of
concepts, since the concept is a rule of the synthesis of percep-
tions, and the latter are not pure intuitions, and so do not permit of
being given a priori.
P 583
A transcendental proposition is therefore
synthetic knowledge through reason, in accordance with mere
concepts; and it is discursive, in that while it is what alone
makes possible any synthetic unity of empirical knowledge, it
yet gives us no intuition a priori.
There is thus a twofold employment of reason; and while
the two modes of employment resemble each other in the uni-
versality and a priori origin of their knowledge, in outcome
they are very different. The reason is that in the [field of]
appearance, in terms of which all objects are given us,
there are two elements, the form of intuition (space and time),
which can be known and determined completely a priori, and
the matter (the physical element) or content -- the latter signi-
fying something which is met with in space and time and which
therefore contains an existent corresponding to sensation.
In respect to this material element, which can never be given
in any determinate fashion otherwise than empirically, we can
have nothing a priori except indeterminate concepts of the syn-
thesis of possible sensations, in so far as they belong, in a pos-
sible experience, to the unity of apperception. As regards the
formal element, we can determine our concepts in a priori
intuition, inasmuch as we create for ourselves, in space and
time, through a homogeneous synthesis, the objects themselves
-- these objects being viewed simply as quanta. The former
method is called the employment of reason in accordance with
concepts; in so employing it we can do nothing more than bring
appearances under concepts, according to their actual content.
The concepts cannot be made determinate in this manner,
save only empirically, that is, a posteriori (although always in
accordance with these concepts as rules of an empirical syn-
thesis). The other method is the employment of reason through
the construction of concepts; and since the concepts here re-
late to an a priori intuition, they are for this very reason them-
selves a priori and can be given in a quite determinate fashion
in pure intuition, without the help of any empirical data. The
consideration of everything which exists in space or time, in
regard to the questions, whether and how far it is a quantum
P 584
or not, whether we are to ascribe to it positive being or the ab-
sence of such, how far this something occupying space or time
is a primary substratum or a mere determination [of substance],
whether there be a relation of its existence to some other ex-
istence, as cause or effect, and finally in respect of its existence
whether it is isolated or is in reciprocal relation to and depend-
ence upon others -- these questions, as also the question of the
possibility of this existence, its actuality and necessity, or the
opposites of these, one and all belong altogether to knowledge
obtained by reason from concepts, such knowledge being
termed philosophical. But the determination of an intuition a -
priori in space (figure), the division of time (duration), or even
just the knowledge of the universal element in the synthesis of
one and the same thing in time and space, and the magnitude
of an intuition that is thereby generated (number), -- all this is
the work of reason through construction of concepts, and is
called mathematical.
The great success which attends reason in its mathematical
employment quite naturally gives rise to the expectation that
it, or at any rate its method, will have the same success in other
fields as in that of quantity. For this method has the advantage
of being able to realise all its concepts in intuitions, which it
can provide a priori, and by which it becomes, so to speak,
master of nature; whereas pure philosophy is all at sea when it
seeks through a priori discursive concepts to obtain insight in
regard to the natural world, being unable to intuit a priori
(and thereby to confirm) their reality. Nor does there seem
to be, on the part of the experts in mathematics, any lack
of self-confidence as to this procedure -- or on the part of the
vulgar of great expectations from their skill -- should they
apply themselves to carry out their project. For, since they
have hardly ever attempted to philosophise in regard to their
mathematics (a hard task! ), the specific difference between the
two employments of reason has never so much as occurred to
them. Current, empirical rules, which they borrow from ordin-
ary consciousness, they treat as being axiomatic. In the ques-
tion as to the source of the concepts of space and time they are
not in the least interested, although it is precisely with these
concepts (as the only original quanta) that they are themselves
occupied. Similarly, they think it unnecessary to investigate
P 585
the origin of the pure concepts of understanding and in so
doing to determine the extent of their validity; they care only
to make use of them. In all this they are entirely in the right,
provided only they do not overstep the proper limits, that is,
the limits of the natural world. But, unconsciously, they pass
from the field of sensibility to the precarious ground of pure and
even transcendental concepts, a ground (instabilis tellus, in-
nabilis unda) that permits them neither to stand nor to swim, and
where their hasty tracks are soon obliterated. In mathematics,
on the other hand, their passage gives rise to a broad highway,
which the latest posterity may still tread with confidence.
We have made it our duty to determine, with exactitude
and certainty, the limits of pure reason in its transcendental
employment. But the pursuit of such transcendental know-
ledge has this peculiarity, that in spite of the plainest and most
urgent warnings men still allow themselves to be deluded by
false hopes, and therefore to postpone the total abandonment
of all proposed attempts to advance beyond the bounds of ex-
perience into the enticing regions of the intellectual world. It
therefore becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of
these fantastic hopes, that is, to show that the pursuit of the
mathematical method cannot be of the least advantage in this
kind of knowledge (unless it be in exhibiting more plainly
the limitations of the method); and that mathematics and
philosophy, although in natural science they do, indeed, go
hand in hand, are none the less so completely different, that
the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.
The exactness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms
and demonstrations. I shall content myself with showing that
none of these, in the sense in which they are understood by the
mathematician, can be achieved or imitated by the philosopher.
I shall show that in philosophy the geometrician can by his
method build only so many houses of cards, just as in mathe-
matics the employment of a philosophical method results only
in mere talk. Indeed it is precisely in knowing its limits that
philosophy consists; and even the mathematician, unless his
talent is of such a specialised character that it naturally confines
itself to its proper field, cannot afford to ignore the warnings
of philosophy, or to behave as if he were superior to them.
P 586
1. Definitions. -- To define, as the word itself indicates,
really only means to present the complete, original concept of
a thing within the limits of its concept. If this be our standard,
an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but only made
explicit. For since we find in it only a few characteristics of a
certain species of sensible object, it is never certain that we
are not using the word, in denoting one and the same object,
sometimes so as to stand for more, and sometimes so as to
stand for fewer characteristics. Thus in the concept of gold
one man may think, in addition to its weight, colour, malle-
ability, also its property of resisting rust, while another will
perhaps know nothing of this quality. We make use of certain
characteristics only so long as they are adequate for the pur-
pose of making distinctions; new observations remove some
properties and add others; and thus the limits of the concept
are never assured. And indeed what useful purpose could be
served by defining an empirical concept, such, for instance, as
that of water? When we speak of water and its properties, we
do not stop short at what is thought in the word, water, but
proceed to experiments. The word, with the few characteristics
which we attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as
merely a designation than as a concept of the thing; the so-
called definition is nothing more than a determining of the
word. In the second place, it is also true that no concept given
a priori, such as substance, cause, right, equity, etc. , can,
strictly speaking, be defined. For I can never be certain that
the clear representation of a given concept, which as given may
still be confused, has been completely effected, unless I know that
it is adequate to its object. But since the concept of it may, as
given, include many obscure representations, which we over-
look in our analysis, although we are constantly making use of
them in our application of the concept, the completeness of the
analysis of my concept is always in doubt, and a multiplicity
P 587
of suitable examples suffices only to make the completeness
probable, never to make it apodeictically certain.
P 586n
++ Completeness means clearness and sufficiency of character-
istics; by limits is meant the precision shown in there not being more
of these characteristics than belong to the complete concept; by
original is meant that this determination of these limits is not
derived from anything else, and therefore does not require any proof;
for if it did, that would disqualify the supposed explanation from
standing at the head of all the judgments regarding its object.
P 587
Instead of the
term, definition, I prefer to use the term, exposition, as being a
more guarded term, which the critic can accept as being up to
a certain point valid, though still entertaining doubts as to the
completeness of the analysis. Since, then, neither empirical con-
cepts nor concepts given a priori allow of definition, the only
remaining kind of concepts, upon which this mental operation
can be tried, are arbitrarily invented concepts. A concept which
I have invented I can always define; for since it is not given to
me either by the nature of understanding or by experience, but
is such as I have myself deliberately made it to be, I must know
what I have intended to think in using it. I cannot, however,
say that I have thereby defined a true object. For if the concept
depends on empirical conditions, as e.g. the concept of a ship's
clock, this arbitrary concept of mine does not assure me of the
existence or of the possibility of its object. I do not even know
from it whether it has an object at all, and my explanation
may better be described as a declaration of my project than
as a definition of an object. There remain, therefore, no
concepts which allow of definition, except only those which
contain an arbitrary synthesis that admits of a priori construc-
tion. Consequently, mathematics is the only science that has
definitions. For the object which it thinks it exhibits a priori in
intuition, and this object certainly cannot contain either more
or less than the concept, since it is through the definition that
the concept of the object is given -- and given originally, that
is, without its being necessary to derive the definition from
any other source. The German language has for the [Latin]
terms exposition, explication, declaration, and definition only
one word, Erklarung, and we need not, therefore, be so
stringent in our requirements as altogether to refuse to philo-
sophical explanations the honourable title, definition. We
shall confine ourselves simply to remarking that while philo-
sophical definitions are never more than expositions of given
concepts, mathematical definitions are constructions of con-
P 588
cepts, originally framed by the mind itself; and that while the
former can be obtained only by analysis (the completeness of
which is never apodeictically certain), the latter are produced
synthetically. Whereas, therefore, mathematical definitions
make their concepts, in philosophical definitions concepts are
only explained. From this it follows:
(a) That in philosophy we must not imitate mathematics
by beginning with definitions, unless it be by way simply of
experiment. For since the definitions are analyses of given
concepts, they presuppose the prior presence of the concepts,
although in a confused state; and the incomplete exposition
must precede the complete. Consequently, we can infer a good
deal from a few characteristics, derived from an incomplete
analysis, without having yet reached the complete exposition,
that is, the definition. In short,the definition in all its precision
and clarity ought, in philosophy, to come rather at the end
than at the beginning of our enquiries. In mathematics, on
the other hand, we have no concept whatsoever prior to the
definition, through which the concept itself is first given. For
this reason mathematical science must always begin, and it can
always begin, with the definition.
(b) That mathematical definitions can never be in error.
For since the concept is first given through the definition, it
includes nothing except precisely what the definition intends
should be understood by it. But although nothing incorrect can
be introduced into its content, there may sometimes, though
rarely, be a defect in the form in which it is clothed, namely as
regards precision.
++ Philosophy is full of faulty definitions, especially of definitions
which, while indeed containing some of the elements required, are
yet not complete. If we could make no use of a concept till we
had defined it, all philosophy would be in a pitiable plight. But
since a good and safe use can still be made of the elements obtained
by analysis so far as they go, defective definitions, that is, propositions
which are properly not definitions, but are yet true, and are therefore
approximations to definitions, can be employed with great advantage.
In mathematics definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius
esse. It is desirable to attain an adequate definition, but often very
difficult. The jurists are still without a definition of their concept of
right.
P 588
Thus the common explanation of the circle
that it is a curved line every point in which is equidistant
P 589
from one and the same point (the centre), has the defect that
the determination, curved, is introduced unnecessarily. For
there must be a particular theorem, deduced from the de-
finition and easily capable of proof, namely, that if all points
in a line are equidistant from one and the same point, the line
is curved (no part of it straight). Analytic definitions, on the
other hand, may err in many ways, either through introducing
characteristics which do not really belong to the concept, or by
lacking that completeness which is the essential feature of a
definition. The latter defect is due to the fact that we can never
be quite certain of the completeness of the analysis. For these
reasons the mathematical method of definition does not admit
of imitation in philosophy.
2. Axioms. -- These, in so far as they are immediately
certain, are synthetic a priori principles. Now one concept
cannot be combined with another synthetically and also at the
same time immediately, since, to be able to pass beyond either
concept, a third something is required to mediate our know-
ledge. Accordingly, since philosophy is simply what reason
knows by means of concepts, no principle deserving the name
of an axiom is to be found in it. Mathematics, on the other
hand, can have axioms, since by means of the construction of
concepts in the intuition of the object it can combine the pre-
dicates of the object both a priori and immediately, as, for
instance, in the proposition that three points always lie in a
plane. But a synthetic principle derived from concepts alone
can never be immediately certain, for instance, the proposition
that everything which happens has a cause. Here I must look
round for a third something, namely, the condition of time-
determination in an experience; I cannot obtain knowledge of
such a principle directly and immediately from the concepts
alone. Discursive principles are therefore quite different from
intuitive principles, that is, from axioms; and always require
a deduction. Axioms, on the other hand, require no such de-
duction, and for the same reason are evident -- a claim which
the philosophical principles can never advance, however great
their certainty. Consequently, the synthetic propositions of pure,
transcendental reason are, one and all, infinitely removed from
being as evident -- which is yet so often arrogantly claimed
on their behalf -- as the proposition that twice two make four.
P 590
In the Analytic I have indeed introduced some axioms of in-
tuition into the table of the principles of pure understanding;
but the principle there applied is not itself an axiom, but
serves only to specify the principle of the possibility of axioms
in general, and is itself no more than a principle derived from
concepts. For the possibility of mathematics must itself be
demonstrated in transcendental philosophy. Philosophy has
therefore no axioms, and may never prescribe its a priori
principles in any such absolute manner, but must resign itself
to establishing its authority in their regard by a thorough
deduction.
3. Demonstrations. -- An apodeictic proof can be called a
demonstration, only in so far as it is intuitive. Experience
teaches us what is, but does not teach us that it could not
be other than what it is. Consequently, no empirical grounds
of proof can ever amount to apodeictic proof. Even from a -
priori concepts, as employed in discursive knowledge, there
can never arise intuitive certainty, that is, [demonstrative]
evidence, however apodeictically certain the judgment may
otherwise be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demon-
strations, since it derives its knowledge not from concepts
but from the construction of them, that is, from intuition,
which can be given a priori in accordance with the concepts.
Even the method of algebra with its equations, from which
the correct answer, together with its proof, is deduced by re-
duction, is not indeed geometrical in nature, but is still con-
structive in a way characteristic of the science. The concepts
attached to the symbols, especially concerning the relations
of magnitudes, are presented in intuition; and this method,
in addition to its heuristic advantages, secures all inferences
against error by setting each one before our eyes. While
philosophical knowledge must do without this advantage,
inasmuch as it has always to consider the universal in
abstracto (by means of concepts), mathematics can consider
the universal in concreto (in the single intuition) and yet at the
same time through pure a priori representation, whereby all
errors are at once made evident. I should therefore prefer to
P 591
call the first kind acroamatic (discursive) proofs, since they
may be conducted by the agency of words alone (the object
in thought), rather than demonstrations which, as the term
itself indicates, proceed in and through the intuition of the
object.
From all this it follows that it is not in keeping with the
nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to
take pride in a dogmatic procedure, and to deck itself out with
the title and insignia of mathematics, to whose ranks it does
not belong, though it has every ground to hope for a sisterly
union with it. Such pretensions are idle claims which can never
be satisfied, and indeed must divert philosophy from its true
purpose, namely, to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets
its limits, and by sufficiently clarifying our concepts to recall
it from its presumptuous speculative pursuits to modest but
thorough self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its
transcendental endeavours, hasten forward with sanguine
expectations, as though the path which it has traversed led
directly to the goal, and as though the accepted premisses
could be so securely relied upon that there can be no need of
constantly returning to them and of considering whether we
may not perhaps, in the course of the inferences, discover de-
fects which have been overlooked in the principles, and which
render it necessary either to determine these principles more
fully or to change them entirely.
I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable
or immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A syn-
thetic proposition directly derived from concepts is a dogma;
a synthetic proposition, when directly obtained through the
construction of concepts, is a mathema. Analytic judgments
really teach us nothing more about the object than what the
concept which we have of it already contains; they do not
extend our knowledge beyond the concept of the object, but
only clarify the concept. They cannot therefore rightly be
called dogmas (a word which might perhaps be translated
doctrines). Of the two kinds of synthetic a priori propositions
only those belonging to philosophical knowledge can, accord-
ing to the ordinary usage of words, be entitled dogmas; the
propositions of arithmetic or geometry would hardly be so
P 592
named. The customary use of words thus confirms our in-
terpretation of the term, namely, that only judgments derived
from concepts can be called dogmatic, not those based on the
construction of concepts.
Now in the whole domain of pure reason, in its merely
speculative employment, there is not to be found a single
synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, as we
have shown, ideas cannot form the basis of any objectively
valid synthetic judgment. Through concepts of understanding
pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not how-
ever directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly
through relation of these concepts to something altogether con-
tingent, namely, possible experience. When such experience
(that is, something as object of possible experiences) is pre-
supposed, these principles are indeed apodeictically certain;
but in themselves, directly, they can never be known a priori.
Thus no one can acquire insight into the proposition that
everything which happens has its cause, merely from the con-
cepts involved. It is not, therefore, a dogma, although from
another point of view, namely, from that of the sole field of
its possible employment, that is, experience, it can be proved
with complete apodeictic certainty. But though it needs proof,
it should be entitled a principle, not a theorem, because it has
the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experi-
ence which is its own ground of proof, and that in this ex-
perience it must always itself be presupposed.
Now if in the speculative employment of pure reason there
are no dogmas, to serve as its special subject-matter, all
dogmatic methods, whether borrowed from the mathematician
or specially invented, are as such inappropriate. For they only
serve to conceal defects and errors, and to mislead philosophy,
whose true purpose is to present every step of reason in the
clearest light. Nevertheless its method can always be system-
atic. For our reason is itself, subjectively, a system, though in
its pure employment, by means of mere concepts, it is no more
than a system whereby our investigations can be conducted
in accordance with principles of unity, the material being pro-
vided by experience alone. We cannot here discuss the method
peculiar to transcendental philosophy; we are at present con-
P 593
cerned only with a critical estimate of what may be expected
from our faculties -- whether we are in a position to build at all;
and to what height, with the material at our disposal (the pure
a priori concepts), we may hope to carry the edifice.
CHAPTER I
Section 2
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RESPECT OF ITS
POLEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criti-
cism; should it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibi-
tions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging
suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness,
nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this search-
ing examination, which knows no respect for persons. Reason
depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason
has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the
agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted
to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his
veto.
But while reason can never refuse to submit to criticism,
it does not always have cause to fear it. In its dogmatic (non-
mathematical) employment it is not, indeed, so thoroughly
conscious of such exact observation of its own supreme laws,
as not to feel constrained to present itself with diffidence, nay,
with entire renunciation of all assumed dogmatic authority,
to the critical scrutiny of a higher judicial reason.
The situation is, however, quite otherwise, when reason
has to deal not with the verdict of a judge, but with the claims
of a fellow-citizen, and against these has only to act in self-
defence. For since these are intended to be just as dogmatic
in denial as its own are in affirmation, it is able to justify itself
kat' anthropon, in a manner which ensures it against all inter-
ference, and provides it with a title to secure possession that
need fear no outside claims, although kat' alytheian the title
cannot itself be conclusively proved.
By the polemical employment of pure reason I mean the
P 594
defence of its propositions as against the dogmatic counter-
propositions through which they are denied. Here the conten-
tion is not that its own assertions may not, perhaps, be false,
but only that no one can assert the opposite with apodeictic
certainty, or even, indeed, with a greater degree of likelihood.
We do not here hold our possessions upon sufferance; for
although our title to them may not be satisfactory, it is yet
quite certain that no one can ever be in a position to prove the
illegality of the title.
It is grievous, indeed, and disheartening, that there should
be any such thing as an antithetic of pure reason, and that
reason, which is the highest tribunal for all conflicts, should
thus be at variance with itself. We had to deal, in a previous
chapter, with such an antithetic; but it turned out to be only
an apparent conflict, resting upon a misunderstanding. In ac-
cordance with the common prejudice, it took appearances as
being things in themselves, and then required an absolute
completeness of their synthesis in the one mode or in the other
(this being equally impossible in either way) -- a demand which
is not at all permissible in respect of appearances. There was,
therefore, no real self-contradiction of reason in the propound-
ing of the two propositions, that the series of appearances given
in themselves has an absolutely first beginning, and that this
series is absolutely and in itself without any beginning. For
the two propositions are quite consistent with each other, inas-
much as appearances, in respect of their existence (as appear-
ances), are in themselves nothing at all, that is, [so regarded]
are something self-contradictory; for the assumption [that
they do thus exist in themselves] must naturally lead to self-
contradictory inferences.
But there are other cases in which we cannot allege any
such misunderstanding, and in which we cannot, therefore,
dispose of the conflict of reason in the above manner -- when,
for instance, it is asserted, on the one hand, theistically, that
there is a supreme being, and on the other hand, atheistically,
that there is no supreme being; or as in psychology, that every-
thing which thinks is endowed with absolute and abiding unity
and is therefore distinct from all transitory material unity,
and, in opposition thereto, that the soul is not immaterial unity
P 595
and cannot be exempt from transitoriness. For since in these
cases the understanding has to deal only with things in them-
selves and not with appearances, the object of such questions
is free from any foreign element that is in contradiction with
its nature. There would indeed be a real conflict, if pure reason
had anything to say on the negative side which amounted to
a positive ground for its negative contentions. For so far as
concerns criticism of the grounds of proof offered by those
who make dogmatic affirmations, the criticism can be freely
admitted, without our having on that account to give up these
affirmations, which have at least the interest of reason in
their favour -- an interest to which the opposite party cannot
appeal.
I do not at all share the opinion which certain excel-
lent and thoughtful men (such as Sulzer), in face of the
weakness of the arguments hitherto employed, have so often
been led to express, that we may hope sometime to discover
conclusive demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of
our reason -- that there is a God, and that there is a future life.
On the contrary, I am certain that this will never happen. For
whence will reason obtain ground for such synthetic assertions,
which do not relate to objects of experience and their inner
possibility. But it is also apodeictically certain that there will
never be anyone who will be able to assert the opposite with
the least show [of proof], much less, dogmatically. For since he
could prove this only through pure reason, he must undertake
to prove that a supreme being, and the thinking subject in
us [viewed] as pure intelligence, are impossible. But whence
will he obtain the modes of knowledge which could justify
him in thus judging synthetically in regard to things that lie
beyond all possible experience. We may therefore be so com-
pletely assured that no one will ever prove the opposite, that
there is no need for us to concern ourselves with formal argu-
ments. We are always in a position to accept these propositions
-- propositions which are so very closely bound up with the
speculative interest of our reason in its empirical employment,
and which, moreover, are the sole means of reconciling the
P 596
speculative with the practical interest. As against our opponent
who must not be considered here as a critic only, we are equipped
with our non liquet, which cannot fail to disconcert him. At
the same time we do not mind his turning this argument
upon ourselves, since we always have in reserve the subjective
maxim of reason, which is necessarily lacking to our opponent,
and under its protection can look upon all his vain attacks with
a tranquil indifference.
There is thus no real antithetic of pure reason. For the
arena for such an antithetic would have to be located in the
domain of pure theology and psychology; and in that domain
no combatant can be adequately equipped, or have weapons
that we need fear. Ridicule and boasting form his whole
armoury, and these can be laughed at, as mere child's play.
This is a comforting consideration, and affords reason fresh
courage; for upon what could it rely, if, while it alone is called
upon to remove all errors, it should yet be at variance with
itself, and without hope of peace and quiet possession.
Everything which nature has itself instituted is good for
some purpose. Even poisons have their use. They serve to
counteract other poisons generated in our bodily humours,
and must have a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The
objections against the persuasions and complacency of our
purely speculative reason arise from the very nature of reason
itself, and must therefore have their own good use and purpose,
which ought not to be disdained. Why has Providence placed
many things which are closely bound up with our highest in-
terests so far beyond our reach that we are only permitted to
apprehend them in a manner lacking in clearness and subject
to doubt -- in such fashion that our enquiring gaze is more ex-
cited than satisfied? We may, indeed, be in doubt whether it
serves any useful purpose, and whether it is not perhaps even
harmful, to venture upon bold utterances in regard to such
uncertain matters. But there can be no manner of doubt that
it is always best to grant reason complete liberty, both of
enquiry and of criticism, so that it may not be hindered in
attending to its own proper interests. These interests are no
less furthered by the limitation than by the extension of its
speculations, and will always suffer when outside influences
P 597
intervene to divert it from its proper path, and to constrain
it by what is irrelevant to its own proper ends.
Allow, therefore, your opponent to speak in the name of
reason, and combat him only with weapons of reason. For the
rest, have no anxiety as to the outcome in its bearing upon
our practical interests, since in a merely speculative dispute
they are never in any way affected. The conflict serves only to
disclose a certain antinomy of reason which, inasmuch as it
is due to the very nature of reason, must receive a hearing
and be scrutinised. Reason is benefited by the consideration
of its object from both sides, and its judgment is corrected in
being thus limited. What is here in dispute is not the practical
interests of reason but the mode of their presentation. For
although we have to surrender the language of knowledge,
we still have sufficient ground to employ, in the presence of
the most exacting reason, the quite legitimate language of a
firm faith.
If we should ask the dispassionate David Hume, [by
temperament] so peculiarly fitted for balanced judgment,
what led him to undermine, through far-fetched subtleties
so elaborately thought out, the conviction which is so com-
forting and beneficial for mankind, that their reason has
sufficient insight for the assertion and for the determinate
conception of a supreme being, he would answer: 'Solely in
order to advance reason in its self-knowledge, and because of
a certain indignation at the violence that is done to reason by
those who, while boasting of its powers, yet hinder it from
candid admission of the weaknesses which have become ob-
vious to it through its own self-examination'. If, on the other
hand, we should ask Priestley, who was wholly devoted to the
empirical employment of reason and out of sympathy with
all transcendent speculation, what motives had induced him --
himself a pious and zealous teacher of religion -- to pull down
two such pillars of all religion as the freedom and immortality
of the soul (the hope of a future life is for him only the expecta-
tion of the miracle of resurrection), he would not be able to give
P 598
any other answer than that he was concerned for the interest
of reason, which must suffer when we seek to exempt certain
objects from the laws of material nature, the only laws which
we can know and determine with exactitude. It would be
unjust to decry the latter (who knew how to combine his para-
doxical teaching with the interests of religion), and so to give
pain to a well-intentioned man, simply because he is unable
to find his bearings, having strayed outside the field of natural
science. And the same favour must be accorded to the no
less well disposed and in his moral character quite blameless
Hume, when he insists upon the relevance, in this field, of
his subtly thought-out speculations. For, as he rightly held,
their object lies entirely outside the limits of natural science,
in the domain of pure ideas.
What, then, is to be done, especially in view of the danger
which would thus seem to threaten the best interests of man-
kind? Nothing is more natural, nothing is more reasonable,
than the decision which we are hereby called upon to make.
Leave such thinkers free to take their own line. If they exhibit
talent, if they initiate new and profound enquiries, in a word,
if they show reason, reason always stands to gain. If we resort to
other means than those of untrammelled reason, if we raise the
cry of high treason, and act as if we were summoning the vulgar
to extinguish a conflagration -- the vulgar who have no under-
standing of such subtle enquiries -- we make ourselves ridicu-
lous. For the question at issue is not as to what, in these enquiries,
is beneficial or detrimental to the best interests of mankind,
but only how far reason can advance by means of speculation
that abstracts from all interests, and whether such speculation
can count for anything, or must not rather be given up in ex-
change for the practical. Instead, therefore, of rushing into the
fight, sword in hand, we should rather play the part of the
peaceable onlooker, from the safe seat of the critic. The struggle
is indeed toilsome to the combatants, but for us can be enter-
taining; and its outcome -- certain to be quite bloodless -- must
be of advantage as contributing to our theoretical insight. For
it is indeed absurd to look to reason for enlightenment, and
yet to prescribe beforehand which side she must necessarily
favour. Besides, reason is already of itself so confined and held
P 599
within limits by reason, that we have no need to call out the
guard, with a view to bringing the civil power to bear upon
that party whose alarming superiority may seem to us to be
dangerous. In this dialectic no victory is gained that need give
us cause for anxiety.
Reason does indeed stand in sore need of such dialectical
debate; and it is greatly to be wished that the debate had been
instituted sooner and with unqualified public approval. For in
that case criticism would sooner have reached a ripe maturity,
and all these disputes would of necessity at once have come to
an end, the opposing parties having learned to recognise the
illusions and prejudices which have set them at variance.
There is in human nature a certain disingenuousness,
which, like everything that comes from nature, must finally
contribute to good ends, namely, a disposition to conceal our
real sentiments, and to make show of certain assumed senti-
ments which are regarded as good and creditable. This
tendency to conceal ourselves and to assume the appearance
of what contributes to our advantage, has, undoubtedly, not
only civilised us, but gradually, in a certain measure, moral-
ised us. For so long as we were not in a position to see
through the outward show of respectability, honesty, and
modesty, we found in the seemingly genuine examples of
goodness with which we were surrounded a school for self-
improvement. But this disposition to represent ourselves as
better than we are, and to give expression to sentiments which
we do not share, serves as a merely provisional arrangement,
to lead us from the state of savage rudeness, and to allow of
our assuming at least the outward bearing of what we know to
be good. But later, when true principles have been developed,
and have become part of our way of thought, this duplicity
must be more and more earnestly combated; otherwise it cor-
rupts the heart, and checks the growth of good sentiments
with the rank weeds of fair appearances.
I am sorry to observe the same disingenuousness, mis-
representation, and hypocrisy even in the utterances of specu-
lative thought, where there are far fewer hindrances to our
making, as is fitting, frank and unreserved admission of our
thoughts, and no advantage whatsoever in acting otherwise.
P 600
For what can be more prejudicial to the interests of knowledge
than to communicate even our very thoughts in a falsified
form, to conceal doubts which we feel in regard to our
own assertions, or to give an appearance of conclusiveness
to grounds of proofs which we ourselves recognise to be in-
sufficient. So long as mere personal vanity is what breeds
these secret devices -- and this is generally the case with those
speculative judgments which concern no special interest and
do not easily allow of apodeictic certainty -- it is counteracted,
in the process of enlisting general acceptance, by the vanity of
others; and thus in the end the result is the same as would have
been obtained, though much sooner, by entirely sincere and
honest procedure. When the common people are of opinion
that those who indulge in subtle questionings aim at nothing
less than to shake the very foundations of public welfare, it
may, indeed, seem not only prudent but permissible, and in-
deed even commendable, to further the good cause through so-
phistical arguments rather than allow its supposed antagonists
the advantage of having made us lower our tone to that of a
merely practical conviction, and of having compelled us to
admit our lack of speculative and apodeictic certainty. I
cannot, however, but think that nothing is so entirely incom-
patible with the purpose of maintaining a good cause as deceit,
hipocrisy and fraud. Surely the least that can be demanded
is that in a matter of pure speculation, when weighing the con-
siderations cited by reason, we should proceed in an entirely
sincere manner. If we could confidently count even upon this
little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the im-
portant questions of God, the immortality of the soul, and
freedom, would long ago have been decided, or would very
soon be brought to a conclusion. Thus it often happens that
purity of purpose is in inverse ratio to the goodness of the
cause, and that candour and honesty are perhaps more likely
to be found among its assailants than among its defenders.
I shall therefore assume that I have readers who do not
wish to see a righteous cause defended in an unrighteous
manner; and that they will consequently take it as agreed,
that, according to our principles of criticism, and having regard
not to what commonly happens, but to what ought to happen,
there can, properly speaking, be no polemic of pure reason.
P 601
For how can two persons carry on a dispute about a thing the
reality of which neither of them can present in actual or even in
possible experience -- a dispute in which they brood over the
mere idea of the thing, in order to extract from it something
more than the idea, namely, the reality of the object itself? What
means have they of ending the dispute, since neither of them
can make his thesis genuinely comprehensible and certain, but
only attack and refute that of his opponent? For this is the fate
of all assertions of pure reason: that since they transcend the
conditions of all possible experience, outside which the authen-
tication of truth is in no wise possible, while at the same time
they have to make use of the laws of the understanding -- laws
which are adapted only for empirical employment, but without
which no step can be taken in synthetic thought -- neither side
can avoid exposing its weakness, and each can therefore take
advantage of the weakness of the other.
The critique of pure reason can be regarded as the true
tribunal for all disputes of pure reason; for it is not involved
in these disputes -- disputes which are immediately concerned
with objects -- but is directed to the determining and esti-
mating of the rights of reason in general, in accordance with
the principles of their first institution.
In the absence of this critique reason is, as it were, in the
state of nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and
claims only through war. The critique, on the other hand,
arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental prin-
ciples of its own institution, the authority of which no one can
question, secures to us the peace of a legal order, in which our
disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognised methods
of legal action. In the former state, the disputes are ended by
a victory to which both sides lay claim, and which is generally
followed by a merely temporary armistice, arranged by some
mediating authority; in the latter, by a judicial sentence
which, as it strikes at the very root of the conflicts, effectively
secures an eternal peace. The endless disputes of a merely
dogmatic reason thus finally constrain us to seek relief in
some critique of reason itself, and in a legislation based upon
such criticism. As Hobbes maintains, the state of nature is a
state of injustice and violence, and we have no option save to
abandon it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which
P 602
limits our freedom solely in order that it may be consistent
with the freedom of others and with the common good of all.
This freedom will carry with it the right to submit openly
for discussion the thoughts and doubts with which we find our-
selves unable to deal, and to do so without being decried as
troublesome and dangerous citizens. This is one of the original
rights of human reason, which recognises no other judge than
that universal human reason in which everyone has his say. And
since all improvement of which our state is capable must be ob-
tained from this source, such a right is sacred and must not be
curtailed. Indeed we are very ill-advised in decrying as danger-
ous any bold assertions against, or audacious attacks upon,
the view which already has on its side the approval of the
largest and best portion of the community; in so doing we
are ascribing to them an importance which they are not
entitled to claim. Whenever I hear that a writer of real ability
has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the
hope of a future life, and the existence of God, I am eager to
read the book, for I expect him by his talents to increase my
insight into these matters. Already, before having opened it, I
am perfectly certain that he has not justified any one of his
specific claims; not because I believe that I am in possession
of conclusive proofs of these important propositions, but
because the transcendental critique, which has disclosed to
me all the resources of our pure reason, has completely con-
vinced me that, as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative
assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less
able, to establish any negative conclusion in regard to these
questions. For from what source will the free thinker derive his
professed knowledge that there is, for example, no supreme
being? This proposition is outside the field of possible experi-
ence, and therefore beyond the limits of all human insight.
The reply of the dogmatic defender of the good cause I should
not read at all. I know beforehand that he will attack the
sophistical arguments of his opponent simply in order to gain
acceptance for his own; and I also know that a quite familiar
line of false argument does not yield so much material for new
observations as one that is novel and ingeniously elaborated.
P 603
The opponent of religion is indeed, in his own way, no less
dogmatic, but he affords me a welcome opportunity of apply-
ing and, in this or that respect, amending the principles of my
Critique, while at the same time I need be in no fear of these
principles being in the least degree endangered.
But must not the young, at least, when entrusted to our
academical teaching, be warned against such writings, and
preserved from a premature knowledge of such dangerous
propositions, until their faculty of judgment is mature, or
rather until the doctrine which we seek to instil into them has
taken such firm root, that they are able effectively to with-
stand all persuasion to contrary views, from whatever quarter
it may come?
If we are to insist on holding to dogmatic procedure in
matters of pure reason, and on disposing of our opponents
in strictly polemical fashion, that is, by ourselves taking sides
in the controversy, and therefore equipping ourselves with
proofs in support of the opposite assertions, certainly this
procedure would for the time being be the most expedient; but
in the long run nothing would be more foolish and ineffective
than to keep youthful reason thus for a period under tutelage.
This will indeed guard the young temporarily against per-
version. But when, later, either curiosity or the fashion of the
age brings such writings under their notice, will their youthful
conviction then stand the test? Whoever, in withstanding the
attacks of his opponent, has at his disposal only dogmatic
weapons, and is unable to develop the dialectic which lies
concealed in his own breast no less than in that of his an-
tagonist, [is in a dangerous position]. He sees sophistical
arguments, which have the attraction of novelty, set in oppo-
sition to sophistical arguments which no longer have that
attraction, but, on the contrary, tend to arouse the suspicion
that advantage has been taken of his youthful credulity. And
accordingly he comes to believe that there can be no better
way of showing that he has outgrown childish discipline than
by casting aside these well-meant warnings; and accustomed
as he is to dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison,
which destroys his principles by a counter-dogmatism.
In academic teaching we ought to pursue the course
exactly opposite to that which is here recommended, pro-
P 604
vided always that the teaching is based on thorough instruc-
tion in the criticism of pure reason. For in order to bring the
principles of this criticism into operation as soon as possible,
and to show their sufficiency even when dialectical illusion is
at its height, it is absolutely necessary that the attacks which
seem so terrible to the dogmatist should be made to exercise
their full force upon the pupil's reason, which though still
weak has been enlightened through criticism, and that the pupil
should thus be allowed the opportunity of testing for himself,
one by one, by reference to the critical principles, how ground-
less are the assertions of those who have launched these attacks.
As it is by no means difficult for him to resolve these arguments
into thin air, he early begins to feel his own capacity to secure
himself against such injurious deceptions, which must finally
lose for him all their illusory power. Those same blows which
destroy the structures of the enemy must indeed be equally
destructive to any speculative structure which he may per-
chance himself wish to erect. This does not, however, in the
least disturb him, since he has no need of any such shelter,
being still in possession of good expectations in the practical
sphere, where he may confidently hope to find firmer ground
upon which to erect his own rational and beneficial system.
There is, therefore, properly speaking, no polemic in the
field of pure reason. Both parties beat the air, and wrestle with
their own shadows, since they go beyond the limits of nature,
where there is nothing that they can seize and hold with their
dogmatic grasp. Fight as they may, the shadows which they
cleave asunder grow together again forthwith, like the heroes
in Valhalla, to disport themselves anew in the bloodless con-
tests.
But neither can we admit that there is any sceptical em-
ployment of pure reason, such as might be entitled the prin-
ciple of neutrality in all its disputes. To set reason at variance
with itself, to supply it with weapons on both sides, and then
to look on, quietly and scoffingly, at the fierce struggle, is not,
from the dogmatic point of view, a seemly spectacle, but ap-
pears to suggest a mischievous and malevolent disposition.
If, however, we consider the invincible obstinacy and the
boastfulness of those who argue dogmatically, and who refuse
to allow their claims to be moderated by any criticism, there
P 605
is really no other available course of action than to set against
the boasting of the one side the no less justified boasting of the
other, in the hope that the resistance thus offered to reason
may at least serve to disconcert it, to awaken some doubts as
to its pretensions, and to make it willing to give a hearing to
criticism. But to allow ourselves simply to acquiesce in these
doubts, and thereupon to set out to commend the conviction
and admission of our ignorance not merely as a remedy against
the complacency of the dogmatists, but likewise as the right
method of putting an end to the conflict of reason with itself,
is a futile procedure, and can never suffice to overcome the
restlessness of reason. At best it is merely a means of awaken-
ing it from its sweet dogmatic dreams, and of inducing it to
enter upon a more careful examination of its own position.
Since, however, the sceptical method of escaping from the
troublesome affairs of reason appears to be, as it were, a short
cut by which we can arrive at a permanent peace in philosophy,
or [if it be not that], is at least the road favoured by those who
would feign make show of having a philosophical justification
for their contemptuous dislike of all enquiries of this kind, I
consider it necessary to exhibit this way of thinking in its true
light.
The Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of Pure
Reason in its Internal Conflicts
The consciousness of my ignorance (unless at the same
time this ignorance is recognised as being necessary), instead
of ending my enquiries, ought rather to be itself the reason
for entering upon them. All ignorance is either ignorance of
things or ignorance of the function and limits of knowledge.
If ignorance is only accidental, it must incite me, in the former
regard to a dogmatic enquiry concerning things (objects), in
the latter regard to a critical enquiry concerning the limits of
my possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely
necessary, and that I am therefore absolved from all further
enquiry, cannot be established empirically, from observation,
but only through an examination, critically conducted, of the
primary sources of our knowledge. The determination of the
limits of our reason cannot, therefore, be made save on a priori
P 606
grounds; on the other hand, that limitation of it which con-
sists merely in an indeterminate knowledge of an ignorance
never to be completely removed, can be recognised a posteriori
by reference to that which, notwithstanding all we know, still
remains to be known. The former knowledge of our ignor-
ance, which is possible only through criticism of reason itself,
is science; the latter is nothing but perception, and we can-
not say how far the inferences from perception may extend.
If I represent the earth as it appears to my senses, as a flat
surface, with a circular horizon, I cannot know how far it
extends. But experience teaches me that wherever I may go,
I always see a space around me in which I could proceed
further; and thus I know the limits of my actual knowledge
of the earth at any given time, but not the limits of all possible
geography. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth
is a sphere and that its surface is spherical, I am able even
from a small part of it, for instance, from the magnitude of a
degree, to know determinately, in accordance with principles
a priori, the diameter, and through it the total superficial area
of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the objects which
this surface may contain, I yet have knowledge in respect of
its circuit, magnitude, and limits.
The sum of all the possible objects of our knowledge ap-
pears to us to be a plane, with an apparent horizon -- namely,
that which in its sweep comprehends it all, and which has been
entitled by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach
this concept empirically is impossible, and all attempts to
determine it a priori in accordance with an assured principle
have proved vain. None the less all the questions raised by our
pure reason are as to what may be outside the horizon, or, it
may be, on its boundary line.
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers
of human reason who have imagined that they have sufficiently
disposed of all such questions by setting them outside the hori-
zon of human reason -- a horizon which yet he was not able
to determine. Hume dwelt in particular upon the principle of
causality, and quite rightly observed that its truth, and even
the objective validity of the concept of efficient cause in
P 607
general, is based on no insight, that is, on no a priori know-
ledge, and that its authority cannot therefore be ascribed to
its necessity, but merely to its general utility in the course of
experience, and to a certain subjective necessity which it
thereby acquires, and which he entitles custom. From the
incapacity of our reason to make use of this principle in any
manner that transcends experience, he inferred the nullity of
all pretensions of reason to advance beyond the empirical.
A procedure of this kind -- subjecting the facts of reason
to examination, and if necessary to blame -- may be entitled
the censorship of reason. This censorship must certainly lead
to doubt regarding all transcendent employment of principles.
But this is only the second step, and does not by any means
complete the work of enquiry. The first step in matters of pure
reason, marking its infancy, is dogmatic. The second step is
sceptical; and indicates that experience has rendered our judg-
ment wiser and more circumspect. But a third step, such as
can be taken only by fully matured judgment, based on as-
sured principles of proved universality, is now necessary,
namely, to subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but
reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and as regards
its aptitude for pure a priori modes of knowledge. This is not
the censorship but the criticism of reason, whereby not its
present bounds but its determinate [and necessary] limits,
not its ignorance on this or that point but its ignorance in
regard to all possible questions of a certain kind, are demon-
strated from principles, and not merely arrived at by way of
conjecture. Scepticism is thus a resting-place for human
reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and
make survey of the region in which it finds itself, so that for
the future it may be able to choose its path with more certainty.
But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement. Such can
be obtained only through perfect certainty in our knowledge,
alike of the objects themselves and of the limits within which
all our knowledge of objects is enclosed.
Our reason is not like a plane indefinitely far extended,
the limits of which we know in a general way only; but must
rather be compared to a sphere, the radius of which can be
determined from the curvature of the arc of its surface -- that
P 608
is to say, from the nature of synthetic a priori propositions
-- and whereby we can likewise specify with certainty its
volume and its limits. Outside this sphere (the field of experi-
ence) there is nothing that can be an object for reason; nay, the
very questions in regard to such supposed objects relate only
to subjective principles of a complete determination of those
relations which can come under the concepts of the under-
standing and which can be found within the empirical sphere.
We are actually in possession of a priori synthetic modes
of knowledge, as is shown by the principles of understanding
which anticipate experience. If anyone is quite unable to
comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may at first
be inclined to doubt whether they actually dwell in us a -
priori; but he cannot on this account declare that they are
beyond the powers of the understanding, and so represent all
the steps which reason takes under their guidance as being null
and void. All that he can say is that if we could have insight into
their origin and authenticity, we should be able to determine
the scope and limits of our reason, but that until we can have
such insight any assertions as to the limits of reason are made
at random. And on this ground a general doubt regarding all
dogmatic philosophy, proceeding as such philosophy does with-
out criticism of reason itself, is entirely justified; but we cannot
therefore altogether deny to reason the right to take such for-
ward steps, once we have prepared and secured the way for
them by a more thorough preparation of the ground. For all
the concepts, nay, all the questions, which pure reason presents
to us, have their source not in experience, but exclusively in
reason itself, and must therefore allow of solution and of being
determined in regard to their validity or invalidity. We have no
right to ignore these problems, as if their solution really de-
pended on the nature of things, and as if we might therefore,
on the plea of our incapacity, decline to occupy ourselves with
their further investigation; for since reason is the sole begetter
of these ideas, it is under obligation to give an account of their
validity or of their illusory, dialectical nature.
All sceptical polemic should properly be directed only
against the dogmatist, who, without any misgivings as to his
fundamental objective principles, that is, without criticism,
P 609
proceeds complacently upon his adopted path; it should be
designed simply to put him out of countenance and thus to
bring him to self-knowledge. In itself, however, this polemic
is of no avail whatsoever in enabling us to decide what it is
that we can and what it is that we cannot know. All unsuccess-
ful dogmatic attempts of reason are facts, and it is always of
advantage to submit them to the censorship of the sceptic.
But this can decide nothing regarding those expectations of
reason which lead it to hope for better success in its future
attempts, and to build claims on this foundation; and con-
sequently no mere censorship can put an end to the dispute
regarding the rights of human reason.
Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all the sceptics, and
beyond all question is without rival in respect of the influence
which the sceptical procedure can exercise in awakening
reason to a thorough self-examination. It will therefore well
repay us to make clear to ourselves, so far as may be relevant to
our purpose, the course of the reasoning, and the errors, of so
acute and estimable a man -- a course of reasoning which at
the start was certainly on the track of truth.
Hume was perhaps aware, although he never followed the
matter out, that in judgments of a certain kind we pass beyond
our concept of the object. I have entitled this kind of judg-
ments synthetic. There is no difficulty as to how, by means of
experience, I can pass beyond the concept which I previously
have. Experience is in itself a synthesis of perceptions,
whereby the concept which I have obtained by means of a
perception is increased through the addition of other per-
ceptions. But we suppose ourselves to be able to pass a priori
beyond our concept, and so to extend our knowledge. This we
attempt to do either through the pure understanding, in respect
of that which is at least capable of being an object of experi-
ence, or through pure reason, in respect of such properties of
things, or indeed even of the existence of such things, as can
never be met with in experience. Our sceptical philosopher did
not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he yet ought
to have done, but straightway proceeded to treat this self-
increment of concepts, and, as we may say, this spontaneous
generation on the part of our understanding and of our reason,
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without impregnation by experience, as being impossible.
He therefore regarded all the supposed a priori principles
of these faculties as fictitious, and concluded that they are
nothing but a custom-bred habit arising from experience
and its laws, and are consequently merely empirical, that is,
rules that are in themselves contingent, and to which we
ascribe a supposititious necessity and universality. In support
of his assertion of this startling thesis, he cited the universally
recognised principle of the relation between cause and effect.
For since no faculty of understanding can carry us from the
concept of a thing to the existence of something else that is
thereby universally and necessarily given, he believed that he
was therefore in a position to conclude that in the absence of
experience we have nothing that can increase our concept and
justify us in propounding a judgment which thus enlarges
itself a priori. That sunlight should melt wax and yet also
harden clay, no understanding, he pointed out, can discover
from the concepts which we previously possessed of these
things, much less infer them according to a law. Only experi-
ence is able to teach us such a law. But, as we have discovered
in the Transcendental Logic, although we can never pass
immediately beyond the content of the concept which is given
us, we are nevertheless able, in relation to a third thing,
namely, possible experience, to know the law of its connection
with other things, and to do so in an a priori manner. If,
therefore, wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know
a priori that something must have preceded, ([that something
being] for instance [in this case] the heat of the sun), upon which
the melting has followed according to a fixed law, although
a priori, independently of experience, I could not determine,
in any specific manner, either the cause from the effect, or the
effect from the cause. Hume was therefore in error in inferring
from the contingency of our determination in accordance with
the law the contingency of the law itself. The passing be-
yond the concept of a thing to possible experience (which
takes place a priori and constitutes the objective reality of the
concept) he confounded with the synthesis of the objects of
actual experience, which is always empirical. He thus con-
founds a principle of affinity, which has its seat in the under-
standing and affirms necessary connection, with a rule of
P 611
association, which exists only in the imitative faculty of im-
agination, and which can exhibit only contingent, not objective
connections.
The sceptical errors of this otherwise singularly acute
thinker arose chiefly from a defect which he shares in common
with all dogmatists, namely, that he did not make a system-
atic review of all the various kinds of a priori synthesis as-
cribable to the understanding. For he would then have found,
to mention only one of many possible examples, that the prin-
ciple of permanence is a principle of this character, and that,
like the principle of causality, it anticipates experience. He
would thus have been able to prescribe determinate limits
to the activities whereby the understanding and pure reason
extend themselves a priori. Instead of so doing, he merely
restricts the understanding, without defining its limits, and
while creating a general mistrust fails to supply any deter-
minate knowledge of the ignorance which for us is un-
avoidable. For while subjecting to censorship certain prin-
ciples of the understanding, he makes no attempt to assess
the understanding itself, in respect of all its powers, by
the assay-balance of criticism; while rightly denying to the
understanding what it cannot really supply, he goes on to
deny it all power of extending itself a priori, and this in
spite of his never having tested it as a whole. Thus the fate
that waits upon all scepticism likewise befalls Hume, namely,
that his own sceptical teaching comes to be doubted, as being
based only on facts which are contingent, not on principles
which can constrain to a necessary renunciation of all right
to dogmatic assertions.
Further, he draws no distinction between the well-
grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical
pretensions of reason, though it is indeed chiefly against
the latter that his attacks are directed. Accordingly that
peculiarly characteristic ardour with which reason insists
upon giving free rein to itself, has not in the least been disturbed
but only temporarily impeded. It does not feel that it has been
shut out from the field in which it is wont to disport itself;
and so, in spite of its being thwarted in this and that direc-
tion, it cannot be made entirely to desist from these ventures.
On the contrary, the attacks lead only to counter-preparations,
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and make us the more obstinate in insisting upon our own views.
But a complete review of all the powers of reason -- and the
conviction thereby obtained of the certainty of its claims to a
modest territory, as also of the vanity of higher pretensions --
puts an end to the conflict, and induces it to rest satisfied with
a limited but undisputed patrimony.
To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the
sphere of his understanding, and therefore has not determined,
in accordance with principles, the limits of his possible know-
ledge, these sceptical attacks are not only dangerous but even
destructive. For he does not know beforehand how far his
powers extend, and indeed believes that their limits can be
determined by the simple method of trial and failure. In con-
sequence of this, if on being attacked there is a single one of
his assertions that he is unable to justify, or which involves
illusion for which he also cannot account in terms of any
principles, suspicion falls on all his contentions, however
plausible they may appear.
The sceptic is thus the taskmaster who constrains the dog-
matic reasoner to develop a sound critique of the understand-
ing and reason. When we have advanced thus far, we need
fear no further challenge, since we have learned to distinguish
our real possessions from that which lies entirely outside them;
and as we make no claims in regard to this latter domain,
we cannot become involved in any dispute in respect to it.
While, therefore, the sceptical procedure cannot of itself yield
any satisfying answer to the questions of reason, none the
less it prepares the way by arousing reason to circumspection,
and by indicating the radical measures which are adequate
to secure it in its legitimate possessions.
CHAPTER I
Section 3
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN REGARD TO
HYPOTHESES
Since criticism of our reason has at last taught us that
we cannot by means of its pure and speculative employment
arrive at any knowledge whatsoever, may it not seem that a
P 613
proportionately wider field is opened for hypotheses? For are
we not at liberty, where we cannot make assertions, at least
to invent theories and to have opinions?
If the imagination is not simply to be visionary, but is to
be inventive under the strict surveillance of reason, there must
always previously be something that is completely certain, and
not invented or merely a matter of opinion, namely, the
possibility of the object itself. Once that is established, it is
then permissible to have recourse to opinion in regard to its
actuality; but this opinion, if it is not to be groundless, must
be brought into connection with what is actually given and so
far certain, as serving to account for what is thus given. Then,
and only then, can the supposition be entitled an hypothesis.
As we cannot form the least conception a priori of the
possibility of dynamical connection, and as the categories
of the pure understanding do not suffice for devising any such
conception, but only for apprehending it when met with in
experience, we cannot, in accordance with these categories,
creatively imagine any object in terms of any new quality
that does not allow of being given in experience; and we
cannot, therefore, make use of such an object in any legiti-
mate hypothesis; otherwise we should be resting reason on
empty figments of the brain, and not on concepts of things.
Thus it is not permissible to invent any new original powers,
as, for instance, an understanding capable of intuiting its
objects without the aid of senses; or a force of attraction with-
out any contact; or a new kind of substance existing in space
and yet not impenetrable. Nor is it legitimate to postulate
a form of communion of substances which is different from
any revealed in experience, a presence that is not spatial,
a duration that is not temporal. In a word, our reason can
employ as conditions of the possibility of things only the
conditions of possible experience; it can never proceed to
form concepts of things quite independently of these con-
ditions. Such concepts, though not self-contradictory, would
be without an object.
P 614
The concepts of reason are, as we have said, mere ideas,
and have no object that can be met with in any experience.
None the less they do not on this account signify objects
that having been invented are thereupon assumed to be
possible. They are thought only problematically, in order
that upon them (as heuristic fictions), we may base regu-
lative principles of the systematic employment of the under-
standing in the field of experience. Save in this connection
they are merely thought-entities, the possibility of which is
not demonstrable, and which therefore do not allow of being
employed, in the character of hypotheses, in explanation of
the actual appearances. It is quite permissible to think the
soul as simple, in order, in conformity with this idea, to employ
as the principle of our interpretation of its inner appearances
a complete and necessary unity of all its faculties; and this in
spite of the fact that this unity is such as can never be appre-
hended in concreto. But to assume the soul as a simple sub-
stance (a transcendent concept), would be [to propound] a
proposition which is not only indemonstrable -- as is the case
with many physical hypotheses -- but is hazarded in a quite
blind and arbitrary fashion. For the simple can never be
met with in any experience whatsoever; and if by substance
be here meant the permanent object of sensible intuition, the
possibility of a simple appearance is quite incomprehensible.
Reason does not afford any sufficient ground for assuming,
[even] as a matter of opinion, merely intelligible beings, or
merely intelligible properties of things belonging to the sen-
sible world, although (as we have no concepts of their pos-
sibility or impossibility) we also cannot lay claim to any insight
that justifies us in dogmatically denying them.
In the explanation of given appearances, no things or
grounds of explanation can be adduced other than those
which have been found to stand in connection with given
appearances in accordance with the already known laws of the
appearances. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere
idea of reason is used in explanation of natural existences
would really be no explanation; so to proceed would be to
explain something, which in terms of known empirical prin-
ciples we do not understand sufficiently, by something which
P 615
we do not understand at all. Moreover, the principle of such
an hypothesis would at most serve only for the satisfaction of
reason, not for the furtherance of the employment of the
understanding in respect of objects. Order and purposiveness
in nature must themselves be explained from natural grounds
and according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if
only they are physical, are here more tolerable than a hyper-
physical hypothesis, such as the appeal to a divine Author,
assumed simply in order that we may have an explanation.
That would be a principle of ignava ratio; for we should be
passing over all causes the objective reality of which, at least
as regards their possibility, can be ascertained in the course
of experience, in order to rest in a mere idea -- an idea that is
very comforting to reason. As regards the absolute totality of
the ground of explanation of the series of these causes, such
totality need suggest no difficulty in respect of natural exist-
ences; since these existences are nothing but appearances, we
need never look to them for any kind of completeness in the
synthesis of the series of conditions.
It can never be permissible, in the speculative employment
of reason, to resort to transcendental hypotheses, and to pre-
sume that we can make good the lack of physical grounds of
explanation by appealing to the hyperphysical. The objection
to such procedure is twofold: partly, that reason, so far from
being in the least advanced thereby, is cut off from all progress
in its own employment; partly, that this license would in the
end deprive reason of all the fruits that spring from the cul-
tivation of its own proper domain, namely, that of experience.
For whenever the explanation of natural existences is found
to be difficult, there is always at hand a transcendental ground
of explanation which relieves us from further investigation,
and our enquiry is brought to an end not through insight, but
by the aid of a principle which while utterly incomprehensible
has from the start been so constructed as necessarily to con-
tain the concept of what is absolutely primordial.
The second requirement for the admissibility of an hypo-
thesis is its adequacy in accounting a priori for those con-
sequences which are [de facto] given. If for this purpose we
have to call in auxiliary hypotheses, they give rise to the sus-
P 616
picion that they are mere fictions; for each of them requires the
same justification as is necessary in the case of the fundamental
hypothesis, and they are not, therefore, in a position to bear
reliable testimony. If we assume an absolutely perfect cause,
we need not be at a loss in explaining the purposiveness, order,
and vastness which are displayed in the world; but in view of
what, judged at least by our concepts, are the obvious devia-
tions and evils, other new hypotheses are required in order to
uphold the original hypothesis in face of the objections which
these suggest. If the simple self-sufficiency of the human soul
has been employed to account for its appearances, it is contro-
verted by certain difficulties, due to those phenomena which
are similar to the changes that take place in matter (growth
and decay), and we have therefore to seek the aid of new
hypotheses, which are not indeed without plausibility, but
which yet have no credentials save what is conferred upon
them by that opinion -- the fundamental hypothesis -- which
they have themselves been called in to support.
If the instances here cited as examples of the assertions
made by reason -- the incorporeal unity of the soul and the
existence of a supreme being -- are propounded not as hypo-
theses, but as dogmas proved a priori, I am not at present
concerned with them, save to remark that in that case care
must be taken that the proof has the apodeictic certainty of a
demonstration. For to set out to show no more than that the
reality of such ideas is probable is as absurd as to think of
proving a proposition of geometry merely as a probability.
Reason, when employed apart from all experience, can know
propositions entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can know
nothing at all. Its judgments, therefore, are never opinions;
either it must abstain from all judgment, or must affirm with
apodeictic certainty. Opinions and probable judgments as to
what belongs to things can be propounded only in explana-
tion of what is actually given, or as consequences that follow
in accordance with empirical laws from what underlies the
actually given. They are therefore concerned only with the
series of the objects of experience. Outside this field, to form
opinions is merely to play with thoughts. For we should then
have to presuppose yet another opinion -- the opinion that we
may perhaps arrive at the truth by a road that is uncertain.
P 617
But although, in dealing with the merely speculative ques-
tions of pure reason, hypotheses are not available for the
purposes of basing propositions upon them, they are yet entirely
permissible for the purposes of defending propositions; that is
to say, they may not be employed in any dogmatic, but only in
polemical fashion. By the defence of propositions I do not
mean the addition of fresh grounds for their assertion, but
merely the nullifying of the sophistical arguments by which
our opponent professes to invalidate this assertion. Now all
synthetic propositions of pure reason have this peculiarity, that
while in asserting the reality of this or that idea we can never
have knowledge sufficient to give certainty to our proposition,
our opponent is just as little able to assert the opposite. This
equality of fortune [in the ventures] of human reason does not,
in speculative modes of knowledge, favour either of the two
parties, and it is consequently the fitting battle-ground for
their never-ending feuds. But as will be shown, reason has, in
respect of its practical employment, the right to postulate what
in the field of mere speculation it can have no kind of right
to assume without sufficient proof. For while all such assump-
tions do violence to [the principle of] completeness of specu-
lation, that is a principle with which the practical interest is
not at all concerned. In the practical sphere reason has rights
of possession, of which it does not require to offer proof, and of
which, in fact, it could not supply proof. The burden of proof
accordingly rests upon the opponent. But since the latter knows
just as little of the object under question, in trying to prove its
non-existence, as does the former in maintaining its reality,
it is evident that the former, who is asserting something as a
practically necessary supposition, is at an advantage (melior
est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, as it
were in self-defence, on behalf of his own good cause, the very
same weapons that his opponent employs against that cause,
that is, hypotheses. These are not intended to strengthen the
proof of his position, but only to show that the opposing party
has much too little understanding of the matter in dispute
to allow of his flattering himself that he has the advantage
in respect of speculative insight.
Hypotheses are therefore, in the domain of pure reason,
permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose
P 618
of defending a right, not in order to establish it. But the oppos-
ing party we must always look for in ourselves. For specula-
tive reason in its transcendental employment is in itself
dialectical; the objections which we have to fear lie in our-
selves. We must seek them out, just as we would do in the
case of claims that, while old, have never become superannu-
ated, in order that by annulling them we may establish a
permanent peace. External quiescence is merely specious.
The root of these disturbances, which lies deep in the nature
of human reason, must be removed. But how can we do so,
unless we give it freedom, nay, nourishment, to send out
shoots so that it may discover itself to our eyes, and that it
may then be entirely destroyed? We must, therefore, bethink
ourselves of objections which have never yet occurred to any
opponent, and indeed lend him our weapons, and grant him
the most favourable position which he could possibly desire.
We have nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for;
namely, that we may gain for ourselves a possession which
can never again be contested.
Thus for our complete equipment we require among other
things the hypotheses of pure reason. For although they are
but leaden weapons, since they are not steeled by any law of ex-
perience, they are yet as effective as those which our opponents
can employ against us. If, therefore, having assumed (in some
non-speculative connection) the nature of the soul to be im-
material and not subject to any corporeal change, we are met
by the difficulty that nevertheless experience seems to prove
that the exaltation and the derangement of our mental powers
are alike in being merely diverse modifications of our organs,
we can weaken the force of this proof by postulating that our
body may be nothing more than a fundamental appearance
which in this our present state (in this life) serves as a condition
of our whole faculty of sensibility, and therewith of all our
thought, and that separation from the body may therefore
be regarded as the end of this sensible employment of our
faculty of knowledge and the beginning of its intellectual
employment. Thus regarded, the body would not be the cause
of thought, but merely a restrictive condition of it, and there-
fore, while indeed furthering the sensible and animal life, it
would because of this very fact have to be considered a hind-
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rance to the pure and spiritual life. The dependence of the
animal and sensible upon the bodily constitution would then
in nowise prove the dependence of our entire life upon the
state of our organs. We might go yet further, and discover
quite new objections, which either have never been suggested
or have never been sufficiently developed.
Generation, in man as in non-rational creatures, is de-
pendent upon opportunity, often indeed upon sufficiency of
food, upon the moods and caprices of rulers, nay, even upon
vice. And this makes it very difficult to suppose that a creature
whose life has its first beginning in circumstances so trivial
and so entirely dependent upon our own choice, should have
an existence that extends to all eternity. As regards the con-
tinuance (here on earth) of the species as a whole, this diffi-
culty is negligible, since accident in the individual case is still
subject to a general law, but as regards each individual it
certainly seems highly questionable to expect so potent an
effect from causes so insignificant. But to meet these objec-
tions we can propound a transcendental hypothesis, namely,
that all life is, strictly speaking, intelligible only, is not sub-
ject to changes of time, and neither begins in birth nor ends
in death; that this life is an appearance only, that is, a sen-
sible representation of the purely spiritual life, and that the
whole sensible world is a mere picture which in our present
mode of knowledge hovers before us, and like a dream has
in itself no objective reality; that if we could intuit our-
selves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in
a world of spiritual beings, our sole and true community
with which has not begun through birth and will not cease
through bodily death -- both birth and death being mere
appearances.
Now of all this we have not the least knowledge. We plead
it only in hypothetical fashion, to meet the attack; we are not
actually asserting it. For it is not even an idea of reason, but
is a concept devised merely for the purposes of self-defence.
None the less we are here proceeding in entire conformity
with reason. Our opponent falsely represents the absence of
empirical conditions as itself amounting to proof of the total
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impossibility of our belief, and is therefore proceeding on
the assumption that he has exhausted all the possibilities.
What we are doing is merely to show that it is just as little
possible for him to comprehend the whole field of possible
things through mere laws of experience as it is for us to reach,
outside experience, any conclusions justifiable for our reason.
Anyone who employs such hypothetical means of defence
against the rash and presumptuous negations of his opponent
must not be considered to intend the adoption of these opinions
as his own; he abandons them, as soon as he has disposed
of the dogmatic pretensions of his opponent. For though
a merely negative attitude to the assertions of others may
seem very modest and moderate, to proceed to represent
the objections to an assertion as proofs of the counter-asser-
tion is to make claims no less presumptuous and visionary
than if the positive position and its affirmations had been
adopted.
It is evident, therefore, that in the speculative employment
of reason hypotheses, regarded as opinions, have no validity
in themselves, but only relatively to the transcendent pre-
tensions of the opposite party. For to make principles of pos-
sible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general
is just as transcendent a procedure as to assert the objective
reality of [transcendent] concepts, the objects of which can-
not be found anywhere save outside the limits of all possible
experience. What pure reason judges assertorically, must
(like everything that reason knows) be necessary; otherwise
nothing at all is asserted. Accordingly, pure reason does
not, in point of fact, contain any opinions whatsoever. The
hypotheses, above referred to, are merely problematic judg-
ments, which at least cannot be refuted, although they do
not indeed allow of any proof. They are therefore nothing
but private opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot properly dis-
pense with them as weapons against the misgivings which
are apt to occur; they are necessary even to secure our inner
tranquillity. We must preserve to them this character, care-
fully guarding against the assumption of their independent
authority or absolute validity, since otherwise they would
drown reason in fictions and delusions.
P 621
CHAPTER I
Section 4
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN REGARD TO ITS
PROOFS
What distinguishes the proofs of transcendental synthetic
propositions from all other proofs which yield an a priori
synthetic knowledge is that, in the case of the former, reason
may not apply itself, by means of its concepts, directly to the
object, but must first establish the objective validity of the
concepts and the possibility of their a priori synthesis. This
rule is not made necessary merely by considerations of prud-
ence, but is essential to the very possibility of the proofs them-
selves. If I am to pass a priori beyond the concept of an object,
I can do so only with the help of some special guidance,
supplied from outside this concept. In mathematics it is a -
priori intuition which guides my synthesis; and thereby all
our conclusions can be drawn immediately from pure intuition.
In transcendental knowledge, so long as we are concerned
only with concepts of the understanding, our guide is the
possibility of experience. Such proof does not show that the
given concept (for instance, of that which happens) leads
directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transi-
tion would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof
proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the
object of experience, would be impossible without a connec-
tion of this kind. Accordingly, the proof must also at the
same time show the possibility of arriving synthetically
and a priori at some knowledge of things which was not
contained in the concepts of them. Unless this requirement
be met, the proofs, like streams which break their banks,
run wildly at random, whithersoever the current of hidden
association may chance to lead them. The semblance of con-
viction which rests upon subjective causes of association,
and which is regarded as insight into a natural affinity, can-
not balance the misgivings to which so hazardous a course
must rightly give rise. On this account, all attempts to prove
the principle of sufficient reason have, by the universal ad-
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mission of those concerned, been fruitless; and prior to our
own transcendental criticism it was considered better, since
that principle could not be surrendered, boldly to appeal to
the common sense of mankind -- an expedient which always
is a sign that the cause of reason is in desperate straits --
rather than to attempt new dogmatic proofs.
But if the proposition to be proved is an assertion of pure
reason, and if I am therefore proposing to pass beyond my em-
pirical concepts by means of mere ideas, justification of such a
step in synthesis (supposing it to be possible) is all the more
necessary as a precondition of any attempt to prove the proposi-
tion itself. However plausible the alleged proof of the simple
nature of our thinking substance, derived from the unity of
apperception, may be, it is faced by the unavoidable difficulty,
that since the [notion of] absolute simplicity is not a concept
which can be immediately related to a perception, but, as an
idea, would have to be inferred, there can be no understanding
how the bare consciousness (which is, or at least can be,
contained in all thought), though it is indeed so far a simple
representation, should conduct us to the consciousness and the
knowledge of a thing in which thought alone can be contained.
If I represent to myself the power of a body in motion, it is
so far for me absolute unity, and my representation of it is
simple; and I can therefore express this representation by the
motion of a point -- for the volume of the body is not here a
relevant consideration, and can be thought, without diminution
of the moving power, as small as we please, and therefore even
as existing in a point. But I may not therefore conclude that
if nothing be given to me but the moving power of a body, the
body can be thought as simple substance -- merely because its
representation abstracts from the magnitude of its volume
and is consequently simple. The simple arrived at by abstrac-
tion is entirely different from the simple as an object; though
the 'I', taken in abstraction, can contain in itself no manifold,
in its other meaning, as signifying the soul itself, it can be a
highly complex concept, as containing under itself, and as
denoting, what is very composite. I thus detect in these
arguments a paralogism. But in order to be armed against this
P 623
paralogism (for without some forewarning we should not
entertain any suspicion in regard to the proof), it is indis-
pensably necessary to have constantly at hand a criterion of
the possibility of those synthetic propositions which are in-
tended to prove more than experience yields. This criterion
consists in the requirement that proof should not proceed
directly to the desired predicate but only by means of a prin-
ciple that will demonstrate the possibility of extending our
given concept in an a priori manner to ideas, and of
realising the latter. If this precaution be always observed, if
before attempting any proof, we discreetly take thought as to
how, and with what ground for hope, we may expect such an
extension through pure reason, and whence, in such a case,
this insight, which is not developed from concepts, and
also cannot be anticipated in reference to any possible ex-
perience, is yet to be derived, we can by so doing spare our-
selves much difficult and yet fruitless labour, not expecting
from reason what obviously exceeds its power -- or rather, since
reason, when obsessed by passionate desire for the speculative
enlargement of its domain, is not easily to be restrained, by
subjecting it to the discipline of self-control.
The first rule is, therefore, not to attempt any tran-
scendental proofs until we have considered, with a view to
obtaining justification for them, from what source we propose
to derive the principles on which the proofs are to be based,
and with what right we may expect success in our inferences.
If they are principles of the understanding (for instance, that of
causality), it is useless to attempt, by means of them, to attain
to ideas of pure reason; such principles are valid only for
objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure
reason, it is again labour lost. Reason has indeed principles
of its own; but regarded as objective principles, they are one
and all dialectical, and can have no validity save as regulative
principles for its employment in experience, with a view to
making experience systematically coherent. But if such pro-
fessed proofs are propounded, we must meet their deceptive
power of persuasion with the non liquet of our matured
judgment; and although we may not be able to detect the
illusion involved, we are yet entirely within our rights in
demanding a deduction of the principles employed in them;
P 624
and if these principles have their source in reason alone,
the demand is one which can never be met. And there is
thus no need for us to concern ourselves with the particular
nature and with the refutation of each and every ground-
less illusion; at the tribunal of a critical reason, which insists
upon laws, this entire dialectic, so inexhaustible in its artifices,
can be disposed of in bulk.
The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is that
only one proof can be found for each transcendental proposi-
tion. If I am inferring not from concepts but from the intuition
which corresponds to a concept, be it a pure intuition as in
mathematics, or an empirical intuition as in natural science,
the intuition which serves as the basis of the inference supplies
me with manifold material for synthetic propositions, material
which I can connect in more than one way, so that, as it is
permissible for me to start from more than one point, I can
arrive at the same proposition by different paths.
In the case of transcendental propositions, however, we
start always from one concept only, and assert the synthetic
condition of the possibility of the object in accordance with
this concept. Since outside this concept there is nothing
further through which the object could be determined, there
can therefore be only one ground of proof. The proof can
contain nothing more than the determination of an object in
general in accordance with this one single concept. In the
Transcendental Analytic, for instance, we derived the prin-
ciple that everything which happens has a cause, from the
condition under which alone a concept of happening in general
is objectively possible -- namely, by showing that the determina-
tion of an event in time, and therefore the event as belonging
to experience, would be impossible save as standing under such
a dynamical rule. This is the sole possible ground of proof; for
the event, in being represented, has objective validity, that is,
truth, only in so far as an object is determined for the concept
by means of the law of causality. Other proofs of this principle
have, indeed, been attempted, for instance, from the con-
tingency [of that which happens]. But on examining this
argument, we can discover no mark of contingency save only
the happening, that is, the existence of the object preceded
by its non-existence, and thus are brought back to the same
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ground of proof as before. Similarly, if the proposition, that
everything which thinks is simple, is to be proved, we leave
out of account the manifold of thought, and hold only to the
concept of the 'I', which is simple and to which all thought
is related. The same is true of the transcendental proof of the
existence of God; it is based solely on the coincidence of the
concepts of the most real being and of necessary being, and
is not to be looked for anywhere else.
This caution reduces the criticism of the assertions of
reason to very small compass. When reason is conducting
its business through concepts only, there is but one possible
proof, if, that is to say, there be any possible proof at all. If,
therefore, we observe the dogmatist coming forward with ten
proofs, we can be quite sure that he really has none. For had
he one that yielded -- as must always be required in matters of
pure reason -- apodeictic proof, what need would he have of
the others? His purpose can only be that of the parliamentary
advocate, who intends his various arguments for different
groups, in order to take advantage of the weakness of those
before whom he is pleading -- hearers who, without entering
deeply into the matter, desire to be soon quit of it, and there-
fore seize upon whatever may first happen to attract their at-
tention, and decide accordingly.
The third rule peculiar to pure reason, in so far as it is to
be subjected to a discipline in respect of transcendental proofs,
is that its proofs must never be apagogical, but always osten-
sive. The direct or ostensive proof, in every kind of knowledge,
is that which combines with the conviction of its truth insight
into the sources of its truth; the apagogical proof, on the other
hand, while it can indeed yield certainty, cannot enable us
to comprehend truth in its connection with the grounds of its
possibility. The latter is therefore to be regarded rather as a
last resort than as a mode of procedure which satisfies all the
requirements of reason. In respect of convincing power, it has,
however, this advantage over the direct proofs, that contradic-
tion always carries with it more clearness of representation than
the best connection, and so approximates to the intuitional
certainty of a demonstration.
The real reason why apagogical proofs are employed in
P 626
various sciences would seem to be this. When the grounds
from which this or that knowledge has to be derived are too
numerous or too deeply concealed, we try whether we may not
arrive at the knowledge in question through its consequences.
Now this modus ponens, that is, the inference to the truth of an
assertion from the truth of its consequences, is only permissible
when all its possible consequences are [known to be] true; for
in that case there is only one possible ground for this being
so, and that ground must also be true. But this procedure
is impracticable; to discover all possible consequences of
any given proposition exceeds our powers. None the less this
mode of reasoning is resorted to, although indeed with a cer-
tain special modification, when we endeavour to prove some-
thing merely as an hypothesis. The modification made is that
we admit the conclusion as holding according to analogy,
namely, on the ground that if all the many consequences
examined by us agree with an assumed ground, all other
possible consequences will also agree with it. But from the
nature of the argument, it is obvious that an hypothesis can
never, on such evidence, be transformed into demonstrated
truth. The modus tollens of reasoning, which proceeds from
consequences to their grounds, is not only a quite rigorous but
also an extremely easy mode of proof. For if even a single false
consequence can be drawn from a proposition, the proposition
is itself false. Instead, then, as in an ostensive proof, of re-
viewing the whole series of grounds that can lead us to the
truth of a proposition, by means of a complete insight into its
possibility, we require only to show that a single one of the
consequences resulting from its opposite is false, in order to
prove that this opposite is itself false, and that the proposition
which we had to prove is therefore true.
The apagogic method of proof is, however, permissible
only in those sciences where it is impossible mistakenly to
substitute what is subjective in our representations for what is
objective, that is, for the knowledge of that which is in the
object. Where such substitution tends to occur, it must often
happen that the opposite of a given proposition contradicts
only the subjective conditions of thought, and not the object,
or that the two propositions contradict each other only under
a subjective condition which is falsely treated as being object-
P 627
ive; the condition being false, both can be false, without it
being possible to infer from the falsity of the one to the truth of
the other.
In mathematics this subreption is impossible; and it is
there, therefore, that apagogical proofs have their true place.
In natural science, where all our knowledge is based upon
empirical intuitions, the subreption can generally be guarded
against through repeated comparison of observations; but in
this field this mode of proof is for the most part of little im-
portance. The transcendental enterprises of pure reason,
however, are one and all carried on within the domain proper
to dialectical illusion, that is, within the domain of the sub-
jective, which in its premisses presents itself to reason, nay,
forces itself upon reason, as being objective. In this field, there-
fore, it can never be permissible, so far as synthetic propositions
are concerned, to justify assertions by disproving their opposite.
For either this refutation is nothing but the mere representa-
tion of the conflict of the opposite opinion with the subjective
conditions under which alone anything can be conceived by
our reason, which does not in the least contribute to the dis-
proof of the thing itself-- just as, for instance, we must recog-
nise that while the unconditioned necessity of the existence of
a being is altogether inconceivable to us, and that every
speculative proof of a necessary supreme being is therefore
rightly to be opposed on subjective grounds, we have yet no
right to deny the possibility of such a primordial being in
itself -- or else both parties, those who adopt the affirmative
no less than those who adopt the negative position, have
been deceived by transcendental illusion, and base their asser-
tions upon an impossible concept of the object. In that case
we can apply the rule: non entis nulla sunt predicata; that
is, all that is asserted of the object, whether affirmatively or
negatively, is erroneous, and consequently we cannot arrive
apagogically at knowledge of the truth through refutation of
the opposite. If, for instance, it be assumed that the sensible
world is given in itself in its totality, it is false that it must be
either infinite in space or finite and limited. Both contentions
are false. For appearances (as mere representations) which yet
are to be given in themselves (as objects) are something impos-
sible; and though the infinitude of this imaginary whole would
P 628
indeed be unconditioned, it would contradict (since everything
in appearances is conditioned) the unconditioned determina-
tion of magnitude, [that is, of totality], which is presupposed
in the concept.
The apagogic method of proof is the real deluding influ-
ence by which those who reason dogmatically have always held
their admirers. It may be compared to a champion who seeks
to uphold the honour and incontestable rights of his adopted
party by offering battle to all who would question them. Such
boasting proves nothing, however, in regard to the merits of the
issue but only in regard to the respective strength of the com-
batants, and this indeed only in respect of those who take the
offensive. The spectators, observing that each party is alter-
nately conqueror and conquered, are often led to have scep-
tical doubts in regard to the very object of the dispute. They
are not, however, justified in adopting such an attitude; it is
sufficient to declare to the combatants: non defensoribus istis
tempus eget. Everyone must defend his position directly, by a
legitimate proof that carries with it a transcendental deduction
of the grounds upon which it is itself made to rest. Only when
this has been done, are we in a position to decide how far its
claims allow of rational justification. If an opponent relies on
subjective grounds, it is an easy matter to refute him. The
dogmatist cannot, however, profit by this advantage. His own
judgments are, as a rule, no less dependent upon subjective
influences; and he can himself in turn be similarly cornered by
his opponent. But if both parties proceed by the direct method,
either they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossi-
bility, of showing ground for their assertions, and will be left
with no resort save to appeal to some form of prescriptive
authority; or our criticism will easily discover the illusion to
which their dogmatic procedure is due, compelling pure
reason to relinquish its exaggerated pretensions in the realm
of speculation, and to withdraw within the limits of its proper
territory -- that of practical principles.
P 629
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
CHAPTER II
THE CANON OF PURE REASON
IT is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in
its pure employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline
to check its extravagances, and to guard it against the decep-
tions which arise therefrom. But, on the other hand, reason
is reassured and gains self-confidence, on finding that it itself
can and must apply this discipline, and that it is not called
upon to submit to any outside censorship; and, moreover, that
the limits which it is compelled to set to its speculative employ-
ment likewise limit the pseudo-rational pretensions of all its
opponents, and that it can secure against all attacks whatever
may remain over from its former exaggerated claims. The
greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure
reason is therefore only negative; since it serves not as an
organon for the extension but as a discipline for the limitation
of pure reason, and, instead of discovering truth, has only the
modest merit of guarding against error.
There must, however, be some source of positive modes of
knowledge which belong to the domain of pure reason, and
which, it may be, give occasion to error solely owing to mis-
understanding, while yet in actual fact they form the goal to-
wards which reason is directing its efforts. How else can we
account for our inextinguishable desire to find firm footing
somewhere beyond the limits of experience? Reason has a pre-
sentiment of objects which possess a great interest for it. But
when it follows the path of pure speculation, in order to ap-
proach them, they fly before it. Presumably it may look for
better fortune in the only other path which still remains open
to it, that of its practical employment.
P 630
I understand by a canon the sum-total of the a priori prin-
ciples of the correct employment of certain faculties of know-
ledge. Thus general logic, in its analytic portion, is a canon
for understanding and reason in general; but only in regard
to their form; it abstracts from all content. The transcendental
analytic has similarly been shown to be the canon of the pure
understanding; for understanding alone is capable of true syn-
thetic modes of knowledge a priori. But when no correct em-
ployment of a faculty of knowledge is possible there is no
canon. Now all synthetic knowledge through pure reason in
its speculative employment is, as has been shown by the proofs
given, completely impossible. There is therefore no canon of
its speculative employment; such employment is entirely dia-
lectical. All transcendental logic is, in this respect, simply a
discipline. Consequently, if there be any correct employment
of pure reason, in which case there must be a canon of its
employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but
with the practical employment of reason. This practical em-
ployment of reason we shall now proceed to investigate.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON
Section 1
THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE EMPLOYMENT OF
OUR REASON
Reason is impelled by a tendency of its nature to go out
beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture
in a pure employment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost
limits of all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through
the completion of its course in [the apprehension of] a self-
subsistent systematic whole. Is this endeavour the outcome
merely of the speculative interests of reason? Must we not
rather regard it as having its source exclusively in the prac-
tical interests of reason?
I shall, for the moment, leave aside all question as to the
success which attends pure reason in its speculative exercise,
and enquire only as to the problems the solution of which
P 631
constitutes its ultimate aim, whether reached or not, and in
respect of which all other aims are to be regarded only as
means. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason,
have a certain unity, in order that they may, as thus unified,
further that interest of humanity which is subordinate to no
higher interest.
The ultimate aim to which the speculation of reason in its
transcendental employment is directed concerns three objects:
the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the
existence of God. In respect of all three the merely speculative
interest of reason is very small; and for its sake alone we should
hardly have undertaken the labour of transcendental investiga-
tion -- a labour so fatiguing in its endless wrestling with in-
superable difficulties -- since whatever discoveries might be
made in regard to these matters, we should not be able to make
use of them in any helpful manner in concreto, that is, in the
study or nature. If the will be free, this can have a bearing only
on the intelligible cause of our volition. For as regards the phe-
nomena of its outward expressions, that is, of our actions, we
must account for them -- in accordance with a maxim which
is inviolable, and which is so fundamental that without it we
should not be able to employ reason in any empirical manner
whatsoever -- in the same manner as all other appearances of
nature, namely, in conformity with unchangeable laws. If,
again, we should be able to obtain insight into the spiritual
nature of the soul, and therewith of its immortality, we could
make no use of such insight in explaining either the appear-
ances of this present life or the specific nature of a future
state. For our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely nega-
tive, and does not in the least extend our knowledge, yielding
no sufficient material for inferences, save only such as are
merely fictitious and cannot be sanctioned by philosophy. If,
thirdly, the existence of a supreme intelligence be proved, by
its means we might indeed render what is purposive in the
constitution and ordering of the world comprehensible in a
general sort or way, but we should not be in the least war-
ranted in deriving from it any particular arrangement or dis-
position, or in boldly inferring any such, where it is not per-
ceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative employment
of reason, not to pass over natural causes, and, abandoning
P 632
that in regard to which we can be instructed by experience, to
deduce something which we know from something which en-
tirely transcends all our [possible] knowledge. In short, these
three propositions are for speculative reason always tran-
scendent, and allow of no immanent employment -- that is,
employment in reference to objects of experience, and so in
some manner really of service to us -- but are in themselves,
notwithstanding the very heavy labours which they impose
upon our reason, entirely useless.
If, then, these three cardinal propositions are not in any
way necessary for knowledge, and are yet strongly recom-
mended by our reason, their importance, properly regarded,
must concern only the practical.
By 'the practical' I mean everything that is possible
through freedom. When, however, the conditions of the exer-
cise of our free will are empirical, reason can have no other
than a regulative employment in regard to it, and can serve
only to effect unity in its empirical laws. Thus, for instance,
in the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason
consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed to us by
our desires in the one single end, happiness, and in co-
ordinating the means for attaining it. In this field, therefore,
reason can supply none but pragmatic laws of free action, for
the attainment of those ends which are commended to us by
the senses; it cannot yield us laws that are pure and deter-
mined completely a priori. Laws of this latter type, pure prac-
tical laws, whose end is given through reason completely a -
priori, and which are prescribed to us not in an empirically
conditioned but in an absolute manner, would be products of
pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone, there-
fore, belong to the practical employment of reason, and allow
of a canon.
The whole equipment of reason, in the discipline which
may be entitled pure philosophy, is in fact determined with
a view to the three above-mentioned problems. These, how-
ever, themselves in turn refer us yet further, namely, to the
problem what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is
a God and a future world. As this concerns our attitude to
the supreme end, it is evident that the ultimate intention
of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the
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constitution of our reason, been directed to moral interests
alone.
But we must be careful, in turning our attention to an
object which is foreign to transcendental philosophy, that we
do not indulge in digressions to the detriment of the unity of
the system, nor on the other hand, by saying too little on this
new topic, fail in producing conviction through lack of clear-
ness. I hope to avoid both dangers, by keeping as close as
possible to the transcendental, and by leaving entirely aside
any psychological, that is, empirical, factors that may per-
chance accompany it.
I must first remark that for the present I shall employ the
concept of freedom in this practical sense only, leaving aside
that other transcendental meaning which cannot be empiric-
ally made use of in explanation of appearances, but is itself
a problem for reason, as has been already shown. A will is
purely animal (arbitrium brutum), which cannot be deter-
mined save through sensuous impulses, that is, pathologically.
A will which can be determined independently of sensuous
impulses, and therefore through motives which are repre-
sented only by reason, is entitled free will (arbitrium liberum),
and everything which is bound up with this will, whether as
ground or as consequence, is entitled practical. [The fact of]
practical freedom can be proved through experience. For the
human will is not determined by that alone which stimulates,
that is, immediately affects the senses; we have the power to
overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by
calling up representations of what, in a more indirect manner,
is useful or injurious. But these considerations, as to what is
desirable in respect of our whole state, that is, as to what is
good and useful, are based on reason.
++ All practical concepts relate to objects of satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction, that is, of pleasure and pain, and therefore, at least
indirectly, to the objects of our feelings. But as feeling is not a faculty
whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole faculty of
knowledge, the elements of our judgments so far as they relate to
pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of practical judgments, do not
belong to transcendental philosophy, which is exclusively concerned
with pure a priori modes of knowledge.
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Reason therefore provides
P 634
laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom,
which tell us what ought to happen -- although perhaps it never
does happen -- therein differing from laws of nature, which
relate only to that which happens. These laws are therefore to
be entitled practical laws.
Whether reason is not, in the actions through which it
prescribes laws, itself again determined by other influences,
and whether that which, in relation to sensuous impulses, is
entitled freedom, may not, in relation to higher and more
remote operating causes, be nature again, is a question which
in the practical field does not concern us, since we are de-
manding of reason nothing but the rule of conduct; it is a
merely speculative question, which we can leave aside so long
as we are considering what ought or ought not to be done.
While we thus through experience know practical freedom to
be one of the causes in nature, namely, to be a causality of
reason in the determination of the will, transcendental free-
dom demands the independence of this reason -- in respect of
its causality, in beginning a series of appearances -- from all
determining causes of the sensible world. Transcendental
freedom is thus, as it would seem, contrary to the law of
nature, and therefore to all possible experience; and so re-
mains a problem. But this problem does not come within the
province of reason in its practical employment; and we have
therefore in a canon of pure reason to deal with only two
questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason,
and in regard to which a canon of its employment must be
possible -- Is there a God? and, Is there a future life? The
question of transcendental freedom is a matter for speculative
knowledge only, and when we are dealing with the practical
we can leave it aside as being an issue with which we have
no concern. Moreover, a quite sufficient discussion of it is to
be found in the antinomy of pure reason.
P 635
THE CANON OF PURE REASON
Section 2
THE IDEAL OF THE HIGHEST GOOD, AS A DETERMINING
GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON
Reason, in its speculative employment, conducted us
through the field of experience, and since it could not find
complete satisfaction there, from thence to speculative
ideas, which, however, in the end brought us back to experi-
ence. In so doing the ideas fulfilled their purpose, but in a
manner which, though useful, is not in accordance with our
expectation. One other line of enquiry still remains open to
us: namely, whether pure reason may not also be met with
in the practical sphere, and whether it may not there conduct
us to ideas which reach to those highest ends of pure reason
that we have just stated, and whether, therefore, reason may
not be able to supply to us from the standpoint of its practical
interest what it altogether refuses to supply in respect of its
speculative interest.
All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as
practical, combine in the three following questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
The first question is merely speculative. We have, as I
flatter myself, exhausted all the possible answers to it, and at
last have found the answer with which reason must perforce
content itself, and with which, so long as it takes no account of
the practical, it has also good cause to be satisfied. But from
the two great ends to which the whole endeavour of pure
reason was really directed, we have remained just as far re-
moved as if through love of ease we had declined this labour
of enquiry at the very outset. So far, then, as knowledge is
concerned, this much, at least, is certain and definitively
established, that in respect of these two latter problems, know-
ledge is unattainable by us.
The second question is purely practical. As such it can
P 636
indeed come within the scope of pure reason, but even so is not
transcendental but moral, and cannot, therefore, in and by
itself, form a proper subject for treatment in this Critique.
The third question -- If I do what I ought to do, what may
I then hope? -- is at once practical and theoretical, in such
fashion that the practical serves only as a clue that leads us to
the answer to the theoretical question, and when this is followed
out, to the speculative question. For all hoping is directed to
happiness, and stands in the same relation to the practical and
the law of morality as knowing and the law of nature to the
theoretical knowledge of things. The former arrives finally
at the conclusion that something is (which determines the
ultimate possible end) because something ought to happen;
the latter, that something is (which operates as the supreme
cause) because something happens.
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively,
in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of
their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration.
The practical law, derived from the motive of happiness, I
term pragmatic (rule of prudence), and that law, if there is
such a law, which has no other motive than worthiness of
being happy, I term moral (law of morality). The former
advises us what we have to do if we wish to achieve happiness;
the latter dictates to us how we must behave in order to de-
serve happiness. The former is based on empirical principles;
for only by means of experience can I know what desires there
are which call for satisfaction; or what those natural causes
are which are capable of satisfying them. The latter takes no
account of desires, and the natural means of satisfying them,
and considers only the freedom of a rational being in general,
and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom
can harmonise with a distribution of happiness that is made
in accordance with principles. This latter law can therefore be
based on mere ideas of pure reason, and known a priori.
I assume that there really are pure moral laws which de-
termine completely a priori (without regard to empirical
motives, that is, to happiness) what is and is not to be done,
that is, which determine the employment of the freedom of a
rational being in general; and that these laws command in an
absolute manner (not merely hypothetically, on the supposi-
P 637
tion of other empirical ends), and are therefore in every respect
necessary. I am justified in making this assumption, in that I
can appeal not only to the proofs employed by the most en-
lightened moralists, but to the moral judgment of every man,
in so far as he makes the effort to think such a law clearly.
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative
employment, but in that practical employment which is also
moral, principles of the possibility of experience, namely, of
such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might be
met with in the history of mankind. For since reason com-
mands that such actions should take place, it must be possible
for them to take place. Consequently, a special kind of system-
atic unity, namely the moral, must likewise be possible.
We have indeed found that the systematic unity of nature
cannot be proved in accordance with speculative principles
of reason. For although reason does indeed have causality in
respect of freedom in general, it does not have causality in
respect of nature as a whole; and although moral principles
of reason can indeed give rise to free actions, they cannot give
rise to laws of nature. Accordingly it is in their practical,
meaning thereby their moral, employment, that the principles
of pure reason have objective reality.
I entitle the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in
accordance with all moral laws; and this is what by means of
the freedom of the rational being it can be, and what according
to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. Owing to our
here leaving out of account all conditions (ends) and even all
the special difficulties to which morality is exposed (weakness
or depravity of human nature), this world is so far thought as
an intelligible world only. To this extent, therefore, it is a
mere idea, though at the same time a practical idea, which
really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the
sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible,
into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral world has,
therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of an
intelligible intuition (we are quite unable to think any such
object), but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however,
as being an object of pure reason in its practical employ-
ment, that is, as a corpus mysticum of the rational beings in it,
so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in
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complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom
of every other.
This is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure
reason that concern its practical interest: -- Do that through
which thou becomest worthy to be happy. The second question
is: -- If I so behave as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I
hope thereby to obtain happiness? In answering this question
we have to consider whether the principles of pure reason,
which prescribe the law a priori, likewise connect this hope
necessarily with it.
I maintain that just as the moral principles are necessary
according to reason in its practical employment, it is in the
view of reason, in the field of its theoretical employment, no
less necessary to assume that everyone has ground to hope
for happiness in the measure in which he has rendered himself
by his conduct worthy of it, and that the system of morality
is therefore inseparably -- though only in the idea of pure
reason -- bound up with that of happiness.
Now in an intelligible world, that is, in the moral world, in
the concept of which we leave out of account all the hindrances
to morality (the desires), such a system, in which happiness is
bound up with and proportioned to morality, can be con-
ceived as necessary, inasmuch as freedom, partly inspired and
partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of
general happiness, since rational beings, under the guidance
of such principles, would themselves be the authors both of
their own enduring well-being and of that of others. But such
a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carry-
ing out of which rests on the condition that everyone does
what he ought, that is, that all the actions of rational beings
take place just as if they had proceeded from a supreme will
that comprehends in itself, or under itself, all private wills.
But since the moral law remains binding for every one in the
use of his freedom, even although others do not act in con-
formity with the law, neither the nature of the things of the
world nor the causality of the actions themselves and their
relation to morality determine how the consequences of these
actions will be related to happiness. The alleged necessary
connection of the hope of happiness with the necessary en-
deavour to render the self worthy of happiness cannot there-
P 639
fore be known through reason. It can be counted upon only if
a Supreme Reason, that governs according to moral rules, be
likewise posited as underlying nature as its cause.
The idea of such an intelligence in which the most perfect
moral will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all
happiness in the world -- so far as happiness stands in exact re-
lation with morality, that is, with worthiness to be happy -- I
entitle the ideal of the supreme good. It is, therefore, only in the
ideal of the supreme original good that pure reason can find
the ground of this connection, which is necessary from the prac-
tical point of view, between the two elements of the supreme
derivative good -- the ground, namely, of an intelligible, that is,
moral world. Now since we are necessarily constrained by reason
to represent ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the
senses present to us nothing but a world of appearances, we
must assume that moral world to be a consequence of our con-
duct in the world of sense (in which no such connection be-
tween worthiness and happiness is exhibited), and therefore to
be for us a future world. Thus God and a future life are two
postulates which, according to the principles of pure reason,
are inseparable from the obligation which that same reason
imposes upon us.
Morality, by itself, constitutes a system. Happiness, how-
ever, does not do so, save in so far as it is distributed in exact
proportion to morality. But this is possible only in the intel-
ligible world, under a wise Author and Ruler. Such a Ruler,
together with life in such a world, which we must regard as a
future world, reason finds itself constrained to assume; other-
wise it would have to regard the moral laws as empty figments
of the brain, since without this postulate the necessary conse-
quence which it itself connects with these laws could not
follow. Hence also everyone regards the moral laws as com-
mands; and this the moral laws could not be if they did not
connect a priori suitable consequences with their rules, and
thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they
could not do, if they did not reside in a necessary being, as the
supreme good, which alone can make such a purposive unit
possible.
Leibniz entitled the world, in so far as we take account
only of the rational beings in it, and of their connection ac-
P 640
cording to moral laws under the government of the supreme
good, the kingdom of grace, distinguishing it from the king-
dom of nature, in which these rational beings do indeed stand
under moral laws, but expect no other consequences from
their actions than such as follow in accordance with the course
of nature in our world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as
in the world of grace, where all happiness awaits us, except in so
far as we ourselves limit our share in it through being unworthy
of happiness, is, from the practical standpoint, a necessary idea
of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of
actions, that is, subjective principles, are entitled maxims. The
estimation of morality, in regard to its purity and consequences,
is effected in accordance with ideas, the observance of its laws
in accordance with maxims.
It is necessary that the whole course of our life be sub-
ject to moral maxims; but it is impossible that this should
happen unless reason connects with the moral law, which is a
mere idea, an operative cause which determines for such con-
duct as is in accordance with the moral law an outcome, either
in this or in another life, that is in exact conformity with our
supreme ends. Thus without a God and without a world in-
visible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality
are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs
of purpose and action. For they do not fulfil in its complete-
ness that end which is natural to every rational being and
which is determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that
same pure reason.
Happiness, taken by itself, is, for our reason, far from
being the complete good. Reason does not approve happiness
(however inclination may desire it) except in so far as it is united
with worthiness to be happy, that is, with moral conduct.
Morality, taken by itself, and with it, the mere worthiness to
be happy, is also far from being the complete good. To make
the good complete, he who behaves in such a manner as not to
be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope that he will
participate in happiness. Even the reason that is free from all
private purposes, should it put itself in the place of a being that
had to distribute all happiness to others, cannot judge other-
wise; for in the practical idea both elements are essentially
P 641
connected, though in such a manner that it is the moral dis-
position which conditions and makes possible the participation
in happiness, and not conversely the prospect of happiness
that makes possible the moral disposition. For in the latter
case the disposition would not be moral, and therefore would
not be worthy of complete happiness -- happiness which in
the view of reason allows of no limitation save that which
arises from our own immoral conduct.
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality
of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it,
alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in
accordance with the commands of a pure but practical reason,
we are under obligation to place ourselves. This world is in-
deed an intelligible world only, since the sensible world holds
out no promise that any such systematic unity of ends can
arise from the nature of things. Nor is the reality of this unity
based on anything else than the postulate of a supreme ori-
ginal good. In a supreme good, thus conceived, self-subsistent
reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause,
establishes, maintains, and completes the universal order of
things, according to the most perfect design -- an order which
in the world of sense is in large part concealed from us.
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage over
speculative theology that it inevitably leads to the concept of
a sole, all-perfect, and rational primordial being, to which
speculative theology does not, on objective grounds, even so
much as point the way, and as to the existence of which it is
still less capable of yielding any conviction. For neither in
transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason
may carry us, do we find any considerable ground for assum-
ing only some one single being which we should be justi-
fied in placing prior to all natural causes, and upon which
we might make them in all respects dependent. On the
other hand, if we consider from the point of view of moral
unity, as a necessary law of the world, what the cause must
be that can alone give to this law its appropriate effect, and
so for us obligatory force, we conclude that there must be
one sole supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in
itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete
P 642
unity of ends. This Divine Being must be omnipotent, in
order that the whole of nature and its relation to morality
in the world may be subject to his will; omniscient, that
He may know our innermost sentiments and their moral
worth; omnipresent, that He may be immediately at hand for
the satisfying of every need which the highest good demands;
eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never
fail, etc.
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelli-
gences -- a world which is indeed, as mere nature, a sensible
world only, but which, as a system of freedom, can be entitled
an intelligible, that is, a moral world (regnum gratiae) -- leads in-
evitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute
this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just
as the former unity is in accordance with universal and neces-
sary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the
speculative reason. The world must be represented as having
originated from an idea if it is to be in harmony with that em-
ployment of reason without which we should indeed hold our-
selves to be unworthy of reason, namely, with the moral em-
ployment -- which is founded entirely on the idea of the supreme
good. In this way all investigation of nature tends to take the
form of a system of ends, and in its widest extension becomes a
physico-theology. But this, as it has its source in the moral order,
as a unity grounded in freedom's own essential nature, and not
accidentally instituted through external commands, connects
the purposiveness of nature with grounds which must be
inseparably connected a priori with the inner possibility of
things, and so leads to a transcendental theology -- a theology
which takes the ideal of supreme ontological perfection as a
principle of systematic unity. And since all things have their
origin in the absolute necessity of the one primordial being,
that principle connects them in accordance with universal and
necessary laws of nature.
What use can we make of our understanding, even in re-
spect of experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves?
But the highest ends are those of morality, and these we can
know only as they are given us by pure reason. But though
provided with these, and employing them as a clue, we cannot
make use of the knowledge of nature in any serviceable manner
P 643
in the building up of knowledge, unless nature has itself
shown unity of design. For without this unity we should our-
selves have no reason, inasmuch as there would be no school
for reason, and no fertilisation through objects such as might
afford materials for the necessary concepts. But the former
purposive unity is necessary, and founded on the will's own
essential nature, and this latter unity [of design in nature]
which contains the condition of its application in concreto,
must be so likewise. And thus the transcendental enlargement
of our knowledge, as secured through reason, is not to be
regarded as the cause, but merely as the effect of the practical
purposiveness which pure reason imposes upon us.
Accordingly we find, in the history of human reason, that
until the moral concepts were sufficiently purified and deter-
mined, and until the systematic unity of their ends was under-
stood in accordance with these concepts and from necessary
principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a quite con-
siderable development of reason in many other sciences, could
give rise only to crude and incoherent concepts of the Deity,
or as sometimes happened resulted in an astonishing in-
difference in regard to all such matters. A greater preoccupa-
tion with moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the
extraordinarily pure moral law of our religion, made reason
more acutely aware of its object, through the interest which it
was compelled to take in it. And this came about, independ-
ently of any influence exercised by more extended views of
nature or by correct and reliable transcendental insight (for
that has always been lacking). It was the moral ideas that gave
rise to that concept of the Divine Being which we now hold
to be correct -- and we so regard it not because speculative
reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it com-
pletely harmonises with the moral principles of reason. Thus it
is always only to pure reason, though only in its practical
employment, that we must finally ascribe the merit of having
connected with our highest interest a knowledge which reason
can think only, and cannot establish, and of having thereby
shown it to be, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a
postulate which is absolutely necessary in view of what are
reason's own most essential ends.
P 644
But when practical reason has reached this goal, namely,
the concept of a sole primordial being as the supreme good,
it must not presume to think that it has raised itself above all
empirical conditions of its application, and has attained to an
immediate knowledge of new objects, and can therefore start
from this concept, and can deduce from it the moral laws
themselves. For it is these very laws that have led us, in virtue
of their inner practical necessity, to the postulate of a self-
sufficient cause, or of a wise Ruler of the world, in order that
through such agency effect may be given to them. We may
not, therefore, in reversal of such procedure, regard them as
accidental and as derived from the mere will of the Ruler,
especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as
formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as prac-
tical reason has the right to serve as our guide, we shall not
look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands
of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because
we have an inward obligation to them. We shall study freedom
according to the purposive unity that is determined in accord-
ance with the principles of reason, and shall believe ourselves
to be acting in conformity with the divine will in so far only
as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from
the nature of the actions themselves; and we shall believe that
we can serve that will only by furthering what is best in the
world, alike in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is thus
of immanent use only. It enables us to fulfil our vocation in
this present world by showing us how to adapt ourselves to the
system of all ends, and by warning us against the fanaticism,
and indeed the impiety, of abandoning the guidance of a
morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in
order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme
Being. For we should then be making a transcendent em-
ployment of moral theology; and that, like a transcendent use
of pure speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate
ends of reason.
P 645
THE CANON OF PURE REASON
Section 3
OPINING, KNOWING, AND BELIEVING
The holding of a thing to be true is an occurrence in our
understanding which, though it may rest on objective grounds,
also requires subjective causes in the mind of the individual
who makes the judgment. If the judgment is valid for everyone,
provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is ob-
jectively sufficient, and the holding of it to be true is entitled
conviction. If it has its ground only in the special character of
the subject, it is entitled persuasion.
Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the
judgment, which lies solely in the subject, is regarded as objec-
tive. Such a judgment has only private validity, and the hold-
ing of it to be true does not allow of being communicated.
But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and in re-
spect of it the judgments of each and every understanding
must therefore be in agreement with each other (consentientia
uni tertio, consentiunt inter se). The touchstone whereby we
decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction
or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely, the possi-
bility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all
human reason. For there is then at least a presumption that
the ground of the agreement of all judgments with each other,
notwithstanding the differing characters of individuals, rests
upon the common ground, namely, upon the object, and that
it is for this reason that they are all in agreement with the
object -- the truth of the judgment being thereby proved.
So long, therefore, as the subject views the judgment merely
as an appearance of his mind, persuasion cannot be subject-
ively distinguished from conviction. The experiment, how-
ever, whereby we test upon the understanding of others
whether those grounds of the judgment which are valid for us
have the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, is
a means, although only a subjective means, not indeed of pro-
ducing conviction, but of detecting any merely private validity
P 646
in the judgment, that is, anything in it which is mere per-
suasion.
If, in addition, we can specify the subjective causes of the
judgment, which we have taken as being its objective grounds,
and can thus explain the deceptive judgment as an event in
our mind, and can do so without having to take account of the
character of the object, we expose the illusion and are no longer
deceived by it, although always still in some degree liable to
come under its influence, in so far as the subjective cause of
the illusion is inherent in our nature.
I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to be a judg-
ment necessarily valid for everyone, save as it gives rise to
conviction. Persuasion I can hold to on my own account, if it
so pleases me, but I cannot, and ought not, to profess to
impose it as binding on anyone but myself.
The holding of a thing to be true, or the subjective validity
of the judgment, in its relation to conviction (which is at the
same time objectively valid), has the following three degrees:
opining, believing, and knowing. Opining is such holding of a
judgment as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively,
but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be only
subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being
objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing.
Lastly, when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient
both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge. The sub-
jective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself), the
objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for everyone).
There is no call for me to spend further time on the ex-
planation of such easily understood terms.
I must never presume to opine, without knowing at least
something by means of which the judgment, in itself merely
problematic, secures connection with truth, a connection
which, although not complete, is yet more than arbitrary
fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be cer-
tain. For if, in respect of this law also, I have nothing but
opinion, it is all merely a play of the imagination, without the
least relation to truth. Again, opining is not in any way per-
missible in judging by means of pure reason. For since such
judging is not based on grounds of experience, but being in
P 647
every case necessary has all to be arrived at a priori, the prin-
ciple of the connection requires universality and necessity, and
therefore complete certainty; otherwise we should have no
guidance as to truth. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion
in pure mathematics; either we must know, or we must
abstain from all acts of judgment. It is so likewise in the case
of the principles of morality, since we must not venture upon
an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but must
know it to be so.
In the transcendental employment of reason, on the other
hand, while opining is doubtless too weak a term to be ap-
plicable, the term knowing is too strong. In the merely specu-
lative sphere we cannot therefore make any judgments what-
soever. For the subjective grounds upon which we may hold
something to be true, such as those which are able to produce
belief, are not permissible in speculative questions, inasmuch
as they do not hold independently of all empirical support,
and do not allow of being communicated in equal measure to
others.
But it is only from a practical point of view that the theo-
retically insufficient holding of a thing to be true can be
termed believing. This practical point of view is either in
reference to skill or in reference to morality, the former being
concerned with optional and contingent ends, the latter with
ends that are absolutely necessary.
Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment
are hypothetically necessary. This necessity is subjectively,
but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I know of no other
conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other
hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for everyone, if I know
with certainty that no one can have knowledge of any other
conditions which lead to the proposed end. In the former case
my assumption and the holding of certain conditions to be
true is a merely contingent belief; in the latter case it is a
necessary belief. The physician must do something for a
patient in danger, but does not know the nature of his illness.
He observes the symptoms, and if he can find no more likely
alternative, judges it to be a case of phthisis. Now even in his
own estimation his belief is contingent only; another observer
P 648
might perhaps come to a sounder conclusion. Such contingent
belief, which yet forms the ground for the actual employment
of means to certain actions, I entitle pragmatic belief.
The usual touchstone, whether that which someone asserts
is merely his persuasion -- or at least his subjective conviction,
that is, his firm belief -- is betting. It often happens that some-
one propounds his views with such positive and uncompromis-
ing assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all
thought of possible error. A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes
it turns out that he has a conviction which can be estimated at
a value of one ducat, but not of ten. For he is very willing to
venture one ducat, but when it is a question of ten he becomes
aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very well be
that he is in error. If, in a given case, we represent ourselves
as staking the happiness of our whole life, the triumphant
tone of our judgment is greatly abated; we become extremely
diffident, and discover for the first time that our belief does not
reach so far. Thus pragmatic belief always exists in some
specific degree, which, according to differences in the interests
at stake, may be large or may be small.
But in many cases, when we are dealing with an object
about which nothing can be done by us, and in regard to which
our judgment is therefore purely theoretical, we can conceive
and picture to ourselves an attitude for which we regard
ourselves as having sufficient grounds, while yet there is no
existing means of arriving at certainty in the matter. Thus
even in purely theoretical judgments there is an analogon
of practical judgments, to the mental entertaining of which
the term 'belief' is appropriate, and which we may entitle
doctrinal belief. I should be ready to stake my all on the con-
tention -- were it possible by means of any experience to settle
the question -- that at least one of the planets which we see is
inhabited. Hence I say that it is not merely opinion, but a
strong belief, on the correctness of which I should be prepared
to run great risks, that other worlds are inhabited.
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of
God belongs to doctrinal belief. For as regards theoretical
knowledge of the world, I can cite nothing which necessarily
presupposes this thought as the condition of my explanations
P 649
of the appearances exhibited by the world, but rather am
bound so to employ my reason as if everything were mere
nature. Purposive unity is, however, so important a condition
of the application of reason to nature that I cannot ignore it,
especially as experience supplies me so richly with examples of
it. But I know no other condition under which this unity can sup-
ply me with guidance in the investigation of nature, save only
the postulate that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
in accordance with the wisest ends. Consequently, as a condi-
tion of what is indeed a contingent, but still not unimportant
purpose, namely, to have guidance in the investigation of
nature, we must postulate a wise Author of the world. More-
over, the outcome of my attempts [in explanation of nature]
so frequently confirms the usefulness of this postulate, while
nothing decisive can be cited against it, that I am saying much
too little if I proceed to declare that I hold it merely as an
opinion. Even in this theoretical relation it can be said that I
firmly believe in God. This belief is not, therefore, strictly
speaking, practical; it must be entitled a doctrinal belief to
which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must always
necessarily give rise. In view of the magnificent equipment of
our human nature, and the shortness of life so ill-suited to the
full exercise of our powers, we can find in this same divine
wisdom a no less sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief in
the future life of the human soul.
In such cases the expression of belief is, from the objective
point of view, an expression of modesty, and yet at the same
time, from the subjective point of view, an expression of the
firmness of our confidence. Were I even to go the length of
describing the merely theoretical holding of the belief as an
hypothesis which I am justified in assuming, I should thereby
be pledging myself to have a more adequate concept of the
character of a cause of the world and of the character of
another world than I am really in a position to supply. For
if I assume anything, even merely as an hypothesis, I must
at least know so much of its properties that I require to
assume, not its concept, but only its existence. The term
'belief' refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me,
and to its subjective influence in that furthering of the activi-
ties of my reason which confirms me in the idea, and which
P 650
yet does so without my being in a position to give a specu-
lative account of it.
But the merely doctrinal belief is somewhat lacking in
stability; we often lose hold of it, owing to the speculative
difficulties which we encounter, although in the end we
always inevitably return to it.
It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For here it is abso-
lutely necessary that something must happen, namely, that I
must in all points conform to the moral law. The end is here
irrefragably established, and according to such insight as I
can have, there is only one possible condition under which this
end can connect with all other ends, and thereby have prac-
tical validity, namely, that there be a God and a future world.
I also know with complete certainty that no one can be ac-
quainted with any other conditions which lead to the same
unity of ends under the moral law. Since, therefore, the moral
precept is at the same time my maxim (reason prescribing that
it should be so), I inevitably believe in the existence of God
and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can shake
this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be them-
selves overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without be-
coming abhorrent in my own eyes.
Thus even after reason has failed in all its ambitious at-
tempts to pass beyond the limits of all experience, there is
still enough left to satisfy us, so far as our practical stand-
point is concerned. No one, indeed, will be able to boast
that he knows that there is a God, and a future life; if he
knows this, he is the very man for whom I have long [and
vainly] sought. All knowledge, if it concerns an object of
mere reason, can be communicated; and I might therefore
hope that under his instruction my own knowledge would be
extended in this wonderful fashion. No, my conviction is not
logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective
grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say, 'It is
morally certain that there is a God, etc. ', but 'I am morally
certain, etc. ' In other words, belief in a God and in another
world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that as there
is little danger of my losing the latter, there is equally little
cause for fear that the former can ever be taken from me.
P 651
The only point that may seem questionable is the basing
of this rational belief on the assumption of moral sentiments.
If we leave these aside, and take a man who is completely
indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question propounded
by reason then becomes merely a problem for speculation,
and can, indeed, be supported by strong grounds of analogy,
but not by such as must compel the most stubborn scepticism
to give way. But in these questions no man is free from all
interest. For although, through lack of good sentiments, he
may be cut off from moral interest, still even in this case
enough remains to make him fear the existence of a God
and a future life. Nothing more is required for this than that
he at least cannot pretend that there is any certainty that
there is no such being and no such life. Since that would have
to be proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically, he
would have to prove the impossibility of both, which assuredly
no one can reasonably undertake to do. This may therefore
serve as negative belief, which may not, indeed, give rise to
morality and good sentiments, but may still give rise to an
analogon of these, namely, a powerful check upon the out-
break of evil sentiments.
But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason acheives
in opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience?
Nothing more than two articles of belief? Surely the common
understanding could have achieved as much, without appeal-
ing to philosophers for counsel in the matter.
I shall not here dwell upon the service which philosophy
has done to human reason through the laborious efforts of its
criticism, granting even that in the end it should turn out to
be merely negative; something more will be said on this point
in the next section.
++ The human mind (as, I likewise believe, must necessarily be the
case with every rational being) takes a natural interest in morality,
although this interest is not undivided and practically preponderant.
If we confirm and increase this interest, we shall find reason very
teachable and in itself more enlightened as regards the uniting of the
speculative with the practical interest. But if we do not take care that
we first make men good, at least in some measure good, we shall never
make honest believers of them.
P 651
But I may at once reply: Do you really
require that a mode of knowledge which concerns all men
P 652
should transcend the common understanding, and should only
be revealed to you by philosophers? Precisely what you find
fault with is the best confirmation of the correctness of the
above assertions. For we have thereby revealed to us, what
could not at the start have been foreseen, namely, that in
matters which concern all men without distinction nature is
not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and that in
regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest
philosophy cannot advance further than is possible under the
guidance which nature has bestowed even upon the most
ordinary understanding.
P 653
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
CHAPTER III
THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON
BY an architectonic I understand the art of constructing sys-
tems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary know-
ledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a
mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of
the scientific in our knowledge, and therefore necessarily
forms part of the doctrine of method.
In accordance with reason's legislative prescriptions, our
diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a
mere rhapsody, but must form a system. Only so can they
further the essential ends of reason. By a system I understand
the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea.
This idea is the concept provided by reason -- of the form of a
whole -- in so far as the concept determines a priori not only
the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which
the parts occupy relatively to one another. The scientific con-
cept of reason contains, therefore, the end and the form of that
whole which is congruent with this requirement. The unity of
the end to which all the parts relate and in the idea of which
they all stand in relation to one another, makes it possible for
us to determine from our knowledge of the other parts whether
any part be missing, and to prevent any arbitrary addition, or
in respect of its completeness any indeterminateness that does
not conform to the limits which are thus determined a priori.
The whole is thus an organised unity (articulatio), and not an
aggregate (coacervatio). It may grow from within (per intus-
susceptionem), but not by external addition (per appositionem).
It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by
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the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each
member, without change of proportion, stronger and more
effective for its purposes.
The idea requires for its realisation a schema, that is, a
constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of which
must be determined a priori from the principle defined by its
end. The schema, which is not devised in accordance with an
idea, that is, in terms of the ultimate aim of reason, but em-
pirically in accordance with purposes that are contingently
occasioned (the number of which cannot be foreseen) yields
technical unity; whereas the schema which originates from an
idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, and does
not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis
of architectonic unity. Now that which we call science, the
schema of which must contain the outline (monogramma) and
the division of the whole into parts, in conformity with the
idea, that is, a priori, and in so doing must distinguish it with
certainty and according to principles from all other wholes, is
not formed in technical fashion, in view of the similarity of
its manifold constituents or of the contingent use of our know-
ledge in concreto for all sorts of optional external ends, but in
architectonic fashion, in view of the affinity of its parts and of
their derivation from a single supreme and inner end, through
which the whole is first made possible.
No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an
idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the
science the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start,
he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea.
For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the
parts are still undeveloped and barely recognisable even under
microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are de-
vised from the point of view of a certain universal interest,
we must not explain and determine them according to the
description which their founder gives of them, but in con-
formity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the
parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in
reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder, and often
even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they
have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that
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consequently they have not been in a position to determine the
proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits
of the science.
It is unfortunate that only after we have spent much time
in the collection of materials in somewhat random fashion at
the suggestion of an idea lying hidden in our minds, and after
we have, indeed, over a long period assembled the materials in
a merely technical manner, does it first become possible for
us to discern the idea in a clearer light, and to devise a whole
architectonically in accordance with the ends of reason.
Systems seem to be formed in the manner of lowly organisms
through a generatio aequivoca from the mere confluence of
assembled concepts, at first imperfect, and only gradually
attaining to completeness, although they one and all have had
their schema, as the original germ, in the sheer self-develop-
ment of reason. Hence, not only is each system articulated in
accordance with an idea, but they are one and all organically
united in a system of human knowledge, as members of one
whole, and so as admitting of an architectonic of all human
knowledge, which, at the present time, in view of the great
amount of material that has been collected, or which can be
obtained from the ruins of ancient systems, is not only pos-
sible, but would not indeed be difficult. We shall content our-
selves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to
outline the architectonic of all knowledge arising from pure
reason; and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which
the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and
throws out two stems, one of which is reason. By reason I here
understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am
therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical.
If I abstract from all the content of knowledge, objectively
regarded, then all knowledge, subjectively regarded, is either
historical or rational. Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis;
rational knowledge is cognitio ex principiis. However a mode
of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to
the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows
only so much of it as has been given to him from outside (and
this in the form in which it has been given to him), whether
through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case
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of general knowledge) through instruction. Anyone, therefore,
who has learnt (in the strict sense of that term) a system of
philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all
its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the
formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head,
and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a
complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy.
He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we
dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain
another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imi-
tative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his
knowledge has not in him arisen out of reason, and although,
objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason,
it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has
grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely
a plaster-cast of a living man. Modes of rational knowledge
which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their
first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled sub-
jectively also, only when they have been derived from uni-
versal sources of reason, that is, from principles -- the sources
from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejec-
tion of what has been learnt.
All knowledge arising out of reason is derived either from
concepts or from the construction of concepts. The former is
called philosophical, the latter mathematical. I have already
treated of the fundamental difference between these two modes
of knowledge in the first chapter [of this Transcendental Doc-
trine of Method]. Knowledge [as we have just noted] can be
objectively philosophical, and yet subjectively historical, as is
the case with most novices, and with all those who have never
looked beyond their School, and who remain novices all their
lives. But it is noteworthy that mathematical knowledge, in its
subjective character, and precisely as it has been learned, can
also be regarded as knowledge arising out of reason, and that
there is therefore in regard to mathematical knowledge no such
distinction as we have drawn in the case of philosophical know-
ledge. This is due to the fact that the sources of knowledge,
from which alone the teacher can derive his knowledge, lie no-
where but in the essential and genuine principles of reason, and
consequently cannot be acquired by the novice from any other
P 657
source, and cannot be disputed; and this, in turn, is owing to
the fact that the employment of reason is here in concreto only,
although likewise a priori, namely, in intuition which is pure,
and which precisely on that account is infallible, excluding
all illusion and error. Mathematics, therefore, alone of all the
sciences (a priori) arising from reason, can be learned; philo-
sophy can never be learned, save only in historical fashion;
as regards what concerns reason, we can at most learn to
philosophise.
Philosophy is the system of all philosophical knowledge.
If we are to understand by it the archetype for the estimation
of all attempts at philosophising, and if this archetype is to
serve for the estimation of each subjective philosophy, the struc-
ture of which is often so diverse and liable to alteration, it must
be taken objectively. Thus regarded, philosophy is a mere idea
of a possible science which nowhere exists in concreto, but to
which, by many different paths, we endeavour to approximate,
until the one true path, overgrown by the products of sen-
sibility, has at last been discovered, and the image, hitherto
so abortive, has achieved likeness to the archetype, so far as
this is granted to [mortal] man. Till then we cannot learn
philosophy; for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how
shall we recognise it? We can only learn to philosophise, that
is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its
universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at
philosophy, always, however, reserving the right of reason to
investigate, to confirm, or to reject these principles in their
very sources.
Hitherto the concept of philosophy has been a merely schol-
astic concept -- a concept of a system of knowledge which is
sought solely in its character as a science, and which has there-
fore in view only the systematic unity appropriate to science,
and consequently no more than the logical perfection of know-
ledge. But there is likewise another concept of philosophy, a
conceptus cosmicus, which has always formed the real basis of
the term 'philosophy', especially when it has been as it were
personified and its archetype represented in the ideal philo-
sopher. On this view, philosophy is the science of the relation
of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason
P 658
(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not an
artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of
human reason. In this sense of the term it would be very
vainglorious to entitle oneself a philosopher, and to pretend
to have equalled the pattern which exists in the idea alone.
The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the
logician, however successful the two former may have been in
their advances in the field of rational knowledge, and the two
latter more especially in philosophical knowledge, are yet only
artificers in the field of reason. There is a teacher, [conceived]
in the ideal, who sets them their tasks, and employs them as
instruments, to further the essential ends of human reason.
Him alone we must call philosopher; but as he nowhere exists,
while the idea of his legislation is to be found in that reason
with which every human being is endowed, we shall keep
entirely to the latter, determining more precisely what philo-
sophy prescribes as regards systematic unity, in accordance
with this cosmical concept, from the standpoint of its essential
ends.
Essential ends are not as such the highest ends; in view
of the demand of reason for complete systematic unity, only
one of them can be so described. Essential ends are therefore
either the ultimate end or subordinate ends which are neces-
sarily connected with the former as means. The former is no
other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy
which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy. On account
of this superiority which moral philosophy has over all other
occupations of reason, the ancients in their use of the term
'philosopher' always meant, more especially, the moralist; and
even at the present day we are led by a certain analogy to
entitle anyone a philosopher who appears to exhibit self-control
under the guidance of reason, however limited his knowledge
may be.
++ By 'cosmical concept' [Weltbegriff] is here meant the concept
which relates to that in which everyone necessarily has an interest;
and accordingly if a science is to be regarded merely as one of the
disciplines designed in view of certain optionally chosen ends, I must
determine it in conformity with scholastic concepts.
P 658
The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two
objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only
P 659
the law of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them
at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single
philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all
that is, the philosophy of morals with that which ought to be.
All philosophy is either knowledge arising out of pure
reason, or knowledge obtained by reason from empirical
principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical
philosophy.
The philosophy of pure reason is either a propaedeutic
(preparation), which investigates the faculty of reason in
respect of all its pure a priori knowledge, and is entitled
the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole
body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge
arising out of pure reason, and which is entitled metaphysics.
The title 'metaphysics' may also, however, be given to the
whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as com-
prehending the investigation of all that can ever be known
a priori as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a
system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this
type -- in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from
all mathematical employment of reason.
Metaphysics is divided into that of the speculative and that
of the practical employment of pure reason, and is there-
fore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals.
The former contains all the principles of pure reason that
are derived from mere concepts (therefore excluding mathe-
matics), and employed in the theoretical knowledge of all
things; the latter, the principles which in a priori fashion
determine and make necessary all our actions. Now morality
is the only code of laws applying to our actions which can
be derived completely a priori from principles. Accordingly,
the metaphysics of morals is really pure moral philosophy,
with no underlying basis of anthropology or of other empirical
conditions. The term 'metaphysics', in its strict sense, is com-
monly reserved for the metaphysics of speculative reason.
But as pure moral philosophy really forms part of this special
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branch of human and philosophical knowledge derived from
pure reason, we shall retain for it the title 'metaphysics'. We
are not, however, at present concerned with it, and may there-
fore leave it aside.
It is of the utmost importance to isolate the various modes
of knowledge according as they differ in kind and in origin,
and to secure that they be not confounded owing to the fact
that usually, in our employment of them, they are combined.
What the chemist does in the analysis of substances, and
the mathematician in his special disciplines, is in still greater
degree incumbent upon the philosopher, that he may be able
to determine with certainty the part which belongs to each
special kind of knowledge in the diversified employment of the
understanding and its special value and influence. Human
reason, since it first began to think, or rather to reflect, has never
been able to dispense with a metaphysics; but also has never
been able to obtain it in a form sufficiently free from all foreign
elements. The idea of such a science is as old as speculative
human reason; and what rational being does not speculate,
either in scholastic or in popular fashion? It must be admitted,
however, that the two elements of our knowledge -- that
which is in our power completely a priori, and that which is
obtainable only a posteriori from experience -- have never been
very clearly distinguished, not even by professional thinkers,
and that they have therefore failed to bring about the delimita-
tion of a special kind of knowledge, and thereby the true idea
of the science which has preoccupied human reason so long and
so greatly. When metaphysics was declared to be the science
of the first principles of human knowledge, the intention was
not to mark out a quite special kind of knowledge, but only
a certain precedence in respect of generality, which was not
sufficient to distinguish such knowledge from the empirical.
For among empirical principles we can distinguish some that
are more general, and so higher in rank than others; but
where in such a series of subordinated members -- a series in
which we do not distinguish what is completely a priori from
what is known only a posteriori -- are we to draw the line
which distinguishes the highest or first members from the
lower subordinate members? What should we say, if in the
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reckoning of time we could distinguish the epochs of the
world only by dividing them into the first centuries and those
that follow? We should ask: Does the fifth, the tenth century,
etc. , belong with the first centuries? So in like manner I ask:
Does the concept of the extended belong to metaphysics?
You answer, Yes. Then, that of body too? Yes. And that of
fluid body? You now become perplexed; for at this rate every-
thing will belong to metaphysics. It is evident, therefore, that
the mere degree of subordination (of the particular under
the general) cannot determine the limits of a science; in the
case under consideration, only complete difference of kind and
of origin will suffice. But the fundamental idea of metaphysics
was obscured on yet another side, owing to its exhibiting, as
a priori knowledge, a certain similarity to mathematics.
Certainly they are related, in so far as they both have an
a priori origin; but when we bear in mind the difference
between philosophical and mathematical knowledge, namely,
that the one is derived from concepts, whereas in the other
we arrive at a priori judgments only through the construction
which has indeed always been in a manner felt but could
never be defined by means of any clear criteria. Thus it
has come about that since philosophers failed in the task of
developing even the idea of their science, they could have
no determinate end or secure guidance in the elaboration
of it, and, accordingly, in this arbitrarily conceived enter-
prise, ignorant as they were of the path to be taken, they have
always been at odds with one another as regards the dis-
coveries which each claimed to have made on his own separate
path, with the result that their science has been brought into
contempt, first among outsiders, and finally even among
themselves.
All pure a priori knowledge, owing to the special faculty
of knowledge in which alone it can originate, has in itself a
peculiar unity; and metaphysics is the philosophy which has
as its task the statement of that knowledge in this systematic
unity. Its speculative part, which has especially appropriated
this name, namely, what we entitle metaphysics of nature, and
which considers everything in so far as it is (not that which
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ought to be) by means of a priori concepts, is divided in the
following manner.
Metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of the term, con-
sists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure
reason. The former treats only of the understanding and of
reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to
objects in general but take no account of objects that may be
given (Ontologia); the latter treats of nature, that is, of the
sum of given objects (whether given to the senses, or, if we will,
to some other kind of intuition) and is therefore physiology --
although only rationalis. The employment of reason in this
rational study of nature is either physical or hyperphysical,
or, in more adequate terms, is either immanent or transcen-
dent. The former is concerned with such knowledge of nature
as can be applied in experience (in concreto), the latter with
that connection of objects of experience which transcends
all experience. This transcendent physiology has as its object
either an inner connection or an outer connection, both, how-
ever, transcending possible experience. As dealing with an
inner connection it is the physiology of nature as a whole,
that is, the transcendental knowledge of the world; as dealing
with an outer connection, it is the physiology of the relation
of nature as a whole to a being above nature, that is to say,
it is the transcendental knowledge of God.
Immanent physiology, on the other hand, views nature as
the sum of all objects of the senses, and therefore just as it is
given us, but solely in accordance with a priori conditions,
under which alone it can ever be given us. There are only two
kinds of such objects. Those of the outer senses, and so
their sum, corporeal nature. The object of inner sense,
the soul, and in accordance with our fundamental concepts of
it, thinking nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is
entitled physics; and as it must contain only the principles of
an a priori knowledge of it, rational physics. The metaphysics
of thinking nature is entitled psychology, and on the same
ground is to be understood as being only the rational know-
ledge of it.
The whole system of metaphysics thus consists of four
main parts: (1) ontology; (2) rational physiology; (3) rational
cosmology; (4) rational theology. The second part, namely,
P 663
the doctrine of nature as developed by pure reason, contains
two divisions physica rationalis and psychologia rationalis.
The originative idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself
prescribes this division, which is therefore architectonic, in
accordance with the essential ends of reason, and not merely
technical, in accordance with accidentally observed simil-
arities, and so instituted as it were at haphazard. Accordingly
the division is also unchangeable and of legislative authority.
There are, however, some points which may well seem doubt-
ful, and may weaken our conviction as to the legitimacy of
its claims.
First of all, how can I expect to have knowledge a priori
(and therefore a metaphysics) of objects in so far as they are
given to our senses, that is, given in an a posteriori manner?
And how is it possible to know the nature of things and
to arrive at a rational physiology according to principles
a priori? The answer is this: we take nothing more from experi-
ence than is required to give us an object of outer or of inner
sense. The object of outer sense we obtain through the mere
concept of matter (impenetrable, lifeless extension), the object
of inner sense through the concept of a thinking being (in the
empirical inner representation, 'I think'). As to the rest, in the
whole metaphysical treatment of these objects, we must en-
tirely dispense with all empirical principles which profess to
add to these concepts any other more special experience, with
a view to our passing further judgments upon the objects.
++ I must not be taken as meaning thereby what is commonly
called physica generalis; the latter is rather mathematics than phil-
osophy of nature. The metaphysics of nature is quite distinct from
mathematics. It is very far from enlarging our knowledge in the
fruitful manner of mathematics, but still is very important as yield-
ing a criticism of the pure knowledge of understanding in its
application to nature. For lack of it, even mathematicians, holding
to certain common concepts, which though common are yet in
fact metaphysical, have unconsciously encumbered their doctrine
of nature with hypotheses which vanish upon criticism of the prin-
ciples involved, without, however, doing the least injury to the
employment of mathematics -- employment which is quite indis-
pensable in this field.
P 663
Secondly, how are we to regard empirical psychology,
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which has always claimed its place in metaphysics, and from
which in our times such great things have been expected for
the advancement of metaphysics, the hope of succeeding by
a priori methods having been abandoned. I answer that it be-
longs where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature belongs,
namely, by the side of applied philosophy, the a priori prin-
ciples of which are contained in pure philosophy; it is therefore
so far connected with applied philosophy, though not to be
confounded with it. Empirical psychology is thus completely
banished from the domain of metaphysics; it is indeed already
completely excluded by the very idea of the latter science. In
conformity, however, with scholastic usage we must allow it
some sort of a place (although as an episode only) in meta-
physics and this from economical motives, because it is not yet
so rich as to be able to form a subject of study by itself, and yet
is too important to be entirely excluded and forced to settle
elsewhere, in a neighbourhood that might well prove much
less congenial than that of metaphysics. Though it is but a
stranger it has long been accepted as a member of the house-
hold, and we allow it to stay for some time longer, until it is in
a position to set up an establishment of its own in a complete
anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.
Such, then, in general, is the idea of metaphysics. At first
more was expected from metaphysics than could reasonably be
demanded, and for some time it diverted itself with pleasant
anticipations. But these hopes having proved deceptive, it
has now fallen into general disrepute. The argument of our
Critique, taken as a whole, must have sufficiently convinced
the reader that although metaphysics cannot be the foundation
of religion, it must always continue to be a bulwark of it, and
that human reason, being by its very nature dialectical, can
never dispense with such a science, which curbs it, and by a
scientific and completely convincing self-knowledge, prevents
the devastations of which a lawless speculative reason would
otherwise quite inevitably be guilty in the field of morals as
well as in that of religion. We can therefore be sure that how-
ever cold or contemptuously critical may be the attitude of
those who judge a science not by its nature but by its acci-
dental effects, we shall always return to metaphysics as to a be-
loved one with whom we have had a quarrel. For here we are
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concerned with essential ends -- ends with which metaphysics
must ceaselessly occupy itself, either in striving for genuine
insight into them, or in refuting those who profess already to
have attained it.
Metaphysics, alike of nature and of morals, and especially
that criticism of our adventurous and self-reliant reason which
serves as an introduction or propaedeutic to metaphysics,
alone properly constitutes what may be entitled philosophy,
in the strict sense of the term. Its sole preoccupation is wisdom;
and it seeks it by the path of science, which, once it has been
trodden, can never be overgrown, and permits of no wander-
ing. Mathematics, natural science, even our empirical know-
ledge, have a high value as means, for the most part, to con-
tingent ends, but also, in the ultimate outcome, to ends that
are necessary and essential to humanity. This latter service,
however, they can discharge only as they are aided by a know-
ledge through reason from pure concepts, which, however we
may choose to entitle it, is really nothing but metaphysics.
For the same reason metaphysics is also the full and com-
plete development of human reason. Quite apart from its
influence, as science, in connection with certain specific ends
it is an indispensable discipline. For in dealing with reason it
treats of those elements and highest maxims which must form
the basis of the very possibility of some sciences, and of the
use of all. That, as mere speculation, it serves rather to prevent
errors than to extend knowledge, does not detract from its
value. On the contrary this gives it dignity and authority,
through that censorship which secures general order and har-
mony, and indeed the well-being of the scientific common-
wealth, preventing those who labour courageously and fruit-
fully on its behalf from losing sight of the supreme end, the
happiness of all mankind.
P 666
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD
CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON
THIS title stands here only in order to indicate one remaining
division of the system, which future workers must complete.
I content myself with casting a cursory glance, from a purely
transcendental point of view, namely, that of the nature of
pure reason, on the works of those who have laboured in this
field -- a glance which reveals [many stately] structures, but in
ruins only.
It is a very notable fact, although it could not have been
otherwise, that in the infancy of philosophy men began where
we should incline to end, namely, with the knowledge of God,
occupying themselves with the hope, or rather indeed with
the specific nature, of another world. However gross the
religious concepts generated by the ancient practices which
still persisted in each community from an earlier more
barbarous state, this did not prevent the more enlightened
members from devoting themselves to free investigation of
these matters; and they easily discerned that there could be
no better ground or more dependable way of pleasing the in-
visible power that governs the world, and so of being happy
in another world at least, than by living the good life. Ac-
cordingly theology and morals were the two motives, or rather
the two points of reference, in all those abstract enquiries of
reason to which men came to devote themselves. It was chiefly,
however, the former that step by step committed the purely
speculative reason to those labours which afterwards became
so renowned under the name of metaphysics.
P 667
I shall not here attempt to distinguish the periods of his-
tory in which this or that change in metaphysics came about,
but shall only give a cursory sketch of the various ideas which
gave rise to the chief revolutions [in metaphysical theory].
And here I find that there are three issues in regard to
which the most noteworthy changes have taken place in the
course of the resulting controversies.
1. In respect of the object of all our 'knowledge through
reason', some have been mere sensualists, others mere intel-
lectualists. Epicurus may be regarded as the outstanding
philosopher among the former, and Plato among the latter.
The distinction between the two schools, subtle as it is,
dates from the earliest times; and the two positions have
ever since been maintained in unbroken continuity. Those
of the former school maintained that reality is to be found
solely in the objects of the senses, and that all else is fiction;
those of the latter school, on the other hand, declared that
in the senses there is nothing but illusion, and that only
the understanding knows what is true. The former did not
indeed deny reality to the concepts of the understanding; but
this reality was for them merely logical, whereas for the others
it was mystical. The former conceded intellectual concepts, but
admitted sensible objects only. The latter required that true
objects should be purely intelligible, and maintained that by
means of the pure understanding we have an intuition that
is unaccompanied by the senses -- the senses, in their view,
serving only to confuse the understanding.
2. In respect of the origin of the modes of 'knowledge
through pure reason', the question is as to whether they are
derived from experience, or whether in independence of ex-
perience they have their origin in reason. Aristotle may be
regarded as the chief of the empiricists, and Plato as the
chief of the noologists. Locke, who in modern times followed
Aristotle, and Leibniz, who followed Plato (although in con-
siderable disagreement with his mystical system), have not
been able to bring this conflict to any definitive conclusion.
However we may regard Epicurus, he was at least much more
consistent in this sensual system than Aristotle and Locke,
inasmuch as he never sought to pass by inference beyond the
limits of experience. This is especially true as regards Locke,
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who, after having derived all concepts and principles from
experience, goes so far in the use of them as to assert that we
can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the
soul with the same conclusiveness as any mathematical pro-
position -- though both lie entirely outside the limits of
possible experience.
3. In respect of method. -- If anything is to receive the
title of method, it must be a procedure in accordance with
principles. We may divide the methods now prevailing in this
field of enquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The
naturalist of pure reason adopts as his principle that through
common reason, without science, that is, through what he
calls sound reason, he is able, in regard to those most sublime
questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve
more than is possible through speculation. Thus he is virtu-
ally asserting that we can determine the size and distance of
the moon with greater certainty by the naked eye than by
mathematical devices. This is mere misology, reduced to
principles; and what is most absurd of all, the neglect of all
artificial means is eulogised as a special method of extending
our knowledge. For as regards those who are naturalists from
lack of more insight, they cannot rightly be blamed. They
follow common reason, without boasting of their ignorance
as a method which contains the secret how we are to fetch
truth from the deep well of Democritus. Quod sapio, satis
est mihi, non ego curo, esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique
Solones is the motto with which they may lead a cheerful
and praiseworthy life, not troubling themselves about science,
nor by their interference bringing it into confusion.
As regards those who adopt a scientific method, they have
the choice of proceeding either dogmatically or sceptically;
but in any case they are under obligation to proceed system-
atically. I may cite the celebrated Wolff as a representative
of the former mode of procedure, and David Hume as a repre-
sentative of the latter, and may then, conformably with my
present purpose, leave all others unnamed. The critical path
alone is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and
patience to accompany me along this path, he may now judge
for himself whether, if he cares to lend his aid in making this
P 669
path into a high-road, it may not be possible to achieve be-
fore the end of the present century what many centuries have
not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human
reason complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it
has all along so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto
in vain.
P 668n
++ Persius.