

PREFACE TO 1787 EDITION¹

Whether the study of that knowledge which is the peculiar province of Reason, follows the sure course of a science or no, can be readily judged by the result. If, after repeatedly making elaborate arrangements and preparations, it comes to a standstill as it nears its goal, or must often retreat and pursue another path to reach it; or, if it is not possible to produce unanimity among those who are engaged in the same enterprise, as to the method by which the common object should be attained, we may be quite sure that such a study has not yet entered upon the sure course of science, but is still merely groping about in the dark; and we certainly shall confer upon Reason no small benefit by clearing the path, if we can, even though we must disburden ourselves of some vain and useless things—accepted, perhaps, in haste—along the way.

It can be seen that *Logic* has followed this sure course from ancient times, for since *Aristotle* it has not needed to retrace a step, unless, perhaps, one were to count as improvements the elimination of a few superfluous subtleties, or a clearer definition of its matter, although these pertain more to the elegance than to the certainty of the science. It is also remarkable that until now this science has been unable to advance a single step, and thus appears to be completed and perfected. If some *moderns* thought that they should augment it, through appending psychological chapters on the various cognitive faculties (imagination, wit); or through adding metaphysical ones about the origin of knowledge or of the various kinds of certainty that follow from the difference of the objects (Idealism, Scepticism, etc.), or through the introduction of anthropological ones concerning prejudices (their causes and remedies), it is because of their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science. It is not a furthering, but rather a disfiguring of the sciences, to allow their boundaries to become indistinct and encroach upon one another; the domain of Logic is, however, defined quite precisely: it is a science which provides, in the form of a detailed presentation and strict proof, nothing but the formal rules of all thought (whether this may be *a priori* or empirical thought, and whatever it has as a source or object, or would encounter within our mind, as accidental or natural hindrances).

That *Logic* has been so successful, is due to its advantage of limitation, by virtue of which it is entitled — nay obligated — to abstract itself from all objects of knowledge and their differences; and in Logic, therefore, the Understanding deals with nothing more than itself and its form. Naturally, it must be much harder for Reason to pursue the sure course of science when she has not only to deal with herself, but also with objects; Logic thus constitutes, as propaedeutic, only the vestibule of the sciences, and though a Logic certainly must be presupposed for any judgment of substantive truths, these must be sought out and acquired in the sciences themselves, properly and objectively so called.

Now insofar as these sciences are accounted rational, something in them must be known *a priori*, and such knowledge can be related to its object in two ways: either as merely *determining* this object and its concept (which then must be given in some other way), or also as *making it real*. This first is *theoretical* the other, *practical rational knowledge*.

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In both, the pure part, however much or little it may contain, wherein Reason determines her object in an altogether *a priori* manner, must be treated by itself first; in this way that which comes from other sources is not commingled; for it is poor business practice for one to spend blindly whatever comes in without subsequently being able to distinguish, when business difficulties arise, the portion of the revenue which is expendable from that which must be conserved through reducing expenditures.

Mathematics and *Physics* are two theoretical rational sciences which are supposed to determine their objects *a priori*, the former in an entirely pure manner, the latter at least partially so, but also in accordance with sources of knowledge other than Reason.

From the earliest times to which the history of human Reason extends, beginning with the remarkable people of Greece, *Mathematics* has followed the sure course of science. But one should not think that it was as easy with *Mathematics* as it was with *Logic* (where Reason has to deal with herself only) to find that royal road, or rather to clear the way for herself; I believe, rather, that there was a long period (especially among the Egyptians) in which *Mathematics* remained in a state of blind groping, and that this transformation must be ascribed to a *revolution* brought about by the happy thought of one man, in an experiment which showed unmistakably the road to be taken; and thus was the sure course of a science laid out and prescribed for all time to come. The history of this revolution in the way of thinking, which was far more important than the discovery of the route around that famous cape, [the Cape of Good Hope] and the name of the fortunate man who brought it about, are not preserved for us. Nonetheless, the tradition related to us by *Diogenes Laertius*, who names the alleged originator of the least significant elements of geometrical demonstrations, even those which, by common judgement, do not require proof, itself attests that preserving the memory of the transformation that was brought about in the first glimpse of this new path must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age, and thus was it secured against oblivion.

A great light dawned upon the first man (whether he was called Thales or known by some other name) who demonstrated the properties of the equilateral [isosceles] triangle, for he found that he should not enquire after what he saw in the figure, or even the mere concept of the figure, and, as it were, *learn* its properties therefrom; he found, on the contrary, that he must *produce* these properties from what he himself, according to concepts *a priori*, introduced into the figure and described, (through construction); and that, to know anything with certainty *a priori*, he must ascribe to the thing nothing but what follows necessarily from what he himself placed into it, in accordance with his concept.

Physics entered much later to the high-way of science; for only about a century and a half has elapsed since the proposal of the brilliant *Bacon of Verulam* partly initiated this discovery, and partly stimulated it further; I say partly discovered only because others were already on the trail of this new discovery, one which can, as well, be explained only through a sudden revolution in their way of thinking. I intend here to take into consideration Natural Science only insofar as it is grounded on *empirical* principles.

When *Galileo* rolled balls of selected weights down an inclined surface, or *Toricelli* employed air to support a weight which he had determined beforehand to equal that of a known volume of water,

or in more recent times, when *Stahl** transformed metals into calx and then again into metal, by withdrawing some component and restoring it again: in this way a new light dawned upon all natural scientists. They grasped that Reason has insight into that only, which she produces herself according to her own plan, and that she must advance with the principles of her judgement according to established laws, and compel nature to answer her questions, but can not allow herself to be led about by nature like a child on leading-strings; for haphazard observations made according to no previously outlined plans can never form themselves into a necessary law: that which Reason seeks and requires. Reason, bearing in one hand her principles, by conformity to which alone concordant phenomena can be valid as laws, and with the experiment that she has devised according to these principles in the other, must approach nature, to learn from it — not, however, as a young pupil, who merely recites whatever the school master tells him — but rather in the rôle of an appointed judge, who compels witnesses to answer the questions which he presents to them. So, even Physics is indebted, for this so very beneficial revolution of its intellectual character, to the insight that, pursuant to that [law or order] which Reason herself has infused into nature, she is to seek in nature (not ascribe fictitiously to it) what she must learn from it, for otherwise Reason, of herself, would know nothing about nature. Through this revolution then, above all else, natural science [physics] was conducted into the sure course of science, after having been, throughout so many centuries, nothing more than mere groping about.

To *Metaphysics* a wholly isolated, speculative rational science, which has exalted itself completely beyond the tuition of experience, and which rests upon mere concepts, (not, as in Mathematics, upon the application of concepts in intuition), wherein Reason herself is supposed to be her own pupil, *Fate* has not been so kind as to allow it to enter upon the sure path of a science, though it is older than all the others, and would remain, even though the rest, as a body, should be swallowed up in the jaws of an all-consuming barbarism. For in *Metaphysics*, Reason continually comes to an impasse, even when she desires merely to understand *a priori* (as she purports to do) the laws which the commonest experience confirms. So in *Metaphysics* we are forced countless times to retrace our steps along the path, because we find it does not lead us where we wish to go; what is more, so far away from harmony are the voices of its adherents, that *Metaphysics* is, rather, a theatre of combat, one which appears to be set aside expressly for those who would exercise their fighting skills in mock engagements, and where no champion has ever emerged who could claim in victory, and hold as a permanent possession, even the smallest territory for which he has fought. There is thus no doubt that the procedure of *Metaphysics* hitherto has consisted simply of blind groping, and, worst of all, groping among mere concepts.

Wherein then lies the reason that until now no sure course of science has been found here? Shall we say that it is impossible? Why then has Nature afflicted our Reason with a restless desire to seek it out, as one of her most important concerns? Nay more, how little cause have we to place trust in our Reason, when she should not only forsake us in the pursuit of one of the most important objects of our curiosity, but lure us on through delusions and vain hopes, and in the end betray us! Or if the way has merely been overlooked, what indications are there to lead us to hope

* I am here not following closely the course of history of the experimental method, whose earliest beginnings are not well known.

that, with renewed application, we should be any more fortunate in finding it than the others who have gone before us?

I should think that the examples of Mathematics and Physics, which were brought into their present position through a sudden revolution, should be remarkable enough in themselves to cause us to reflect upon the essential aspect of this change in the manner of thinking, which has become so beneficial to them, and to emulate them, or at least to attempt it, to the extent that their analogy, as rational sciences, with Metaphysics allows. Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to objects; but under this presupposition, all attempts to establish, through concepts, anything *a priori* about objects, whereby our knowledge would be extended, have gone for nought. Let us then see whether we should not fare better in the problems of Metaphysics if we suppose that the objects must conform to our knowledge, as this would surely better agree with the requisite possibility of knowledge *a priori* of them: — a knowledge which is to determine something about objects before they are given to us. We have here the same case as with the novel thought of Copernicus, who, after not being able to advance as he desired in the account of the movements of the heavenly bodies, when he proceeded on the supposition that the whole multitude of stars rotated about the observer, sought to determine whether more success might not be obtained, were the observer to rotate, and the stars remain at rest. We may now attempt something similar in Metaphysics as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must conform to the nature of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of objects *a priori*; but if the object (as an object of the senses) were to conform to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can quite easily conceive such a possibility. Because I cannot confine myself to these intuitions if they are to become knowledge, but rather must relate them, as representations, to something as an object, and determine this object through these representations, I can thus make the supposition that the concepts through which I accomplish this determination conform to the object, in which case I am again at a loss as to how I can know anything *a priori*; but instead, if I proceed on the supposition that the objects, or the equivalent, the experience in which they alone can be known (as given objects) conforms to these concepts, I can immediately see an easy way out of my perplexity, because experience itself is a species of knowledge which requires the Understanding, whose rules I must presuppose as being present within me before objects are given to me, and thus in a manner *a priori*, rules which are expressed *a priori* in concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must be in agreement. Objects, regarded merely insofar as they are conceived through Reason, and indeed as necessary, however, cannot at all be given in experience (at least in the way Reason conceives them); so the attempts to conceive them (for they must lend themselves to being conceived) will hereafter furnish a splendid test of our modified way of thinking, namely, that we do not know of things anything *a priori* except what we ourselves put into them.*

* This method, following that of the students of nature, consists in seeking the elements of pure Reason in that which can be confirmed or refuted through an experiment. Now as it is not possible, for the purpose of testing the principles of pure Reason, particularly when they venture beyond all the limits of possible experience, to perform any sort of experiment with their objects (as in natural science), it will be feasible only to organise those concepts and propositions that we can assume *a priori* in such a manner that the same objects can be considered from two different aspects, on the one hand as objects of sense and of the Understanding, to accommodate experience, and on the

This experiment succeeds as well as we could wish, and promises to conduct Metaphysics to the sure course of a science in its first part², which is that concerned with concepts *a priori*, from which the corresponding objects can be given in experience. For, following this change of our way of thinking, we can explain quite well the possibility of knowledge *a priori*, and furthermore furnish satisfactory proof of the laws which are the *a priori* foundation of nature, considered as the sum total of objects of experience, whereas neither of these was possible following the previous procedure. A startling result emerges, though, from this deduction of our faculty of knowledge *a priori*, in the first part of Metaphysics, and, according to all appearances, a result quite inimical to the whole purpose of Metaphysics, with which the second part³ is concerned, namely, that we can never transcend the bounds of possible experience, whereas this very thing is the essential concern of this science. But herein we have exactly the experiment which could establish by disproving the opposite⁴ the truth of the result of that first assessment of our rational knowledge *a priori*, namely, that it applies to phenomena only, and that the thing in itself, however, is to be left as real for itself, but unknown to us. For that which compels us to go beyond the bounds of experience, and of all phenomena, is the *Unconditioned*, which Reason, out of necessity, and with justification, demands in things in themselves of everything conditioned, and through which the series of conditions is to be completed. Now we find, if we proceed on the supposition that our empirical knowledge conforms to objects as things in themselves, that the unconditioned cannot be conceived at all without contradiction; whereas, if we assume that our representation of things, as they are given to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but that these objects *as phenomena* conform to our form of representation, contradiction vanishes, and that consequently the unconditioned must be found in things not insofar as we know them, (as they are given to us), but rather must be found in them insofar as we do not know them, as things in themselves, then this shows that what we initially assumed only conjecturally would be confirmed*.

Although speculative Reason has been thus deprived of all progress in this field of the supersensuous, there still remains for us the task of ascertaining whether there are not to be found, in

other hand, as objects which are merely thought, as may be necessary to accommodate Reason, isolated and striving to escape beyond the limits of experience. If, when things are regarded dually, it is found that harmony with the principle of pure Reason results, while by admitting the single only, Reason is unable to avoid conflict with herself, the experiment decides in favour of the correctness of this distinction.

² Immanent metaphysics. [See Kemp-Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p 22, 33, 56, 66ff.]

³ Transcendent metaphysics. [See Kemp-Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p 22, 33, 56, 66ff.]

⁴ [*Gegenprobe*]

* This experiment of pure Reason has a great similarity with what chemists sometimes call the experiment of reduction, or more commonly the synthetic process. The analysis of metaphysicians separates pure knowledge *a priori* into two very dissimilar [heterogeneous] elements, namely knowledge of things as phenomena and knowledge of things in themselves. Dialectic combines both again into harmony with the necessary idea of the unconditioned demanded by Reason, and then finds that this harmony can never be obtained except by adopting that distinction:— which thus must be assumed to be the true one.

practical rational knowledge, data which may determine that transcendental concept of Reason of the undetermined, and do so in such a manner, in accordance with the wish of Metaphysics, so as to reach beyond the limits of all possible experience by means of the knowledge *a priori* that is possible for us:— but for practical purposes only. And with such a procedure, speculative Reason has at least made the room necessary for any such expansion of knowledge, though it must at the same time leave it empty, and thus we are not only at liberty to fill it, we are called upon to do so, when we are able, with [the] practical data of Reason.”

It is this attempt to alter the previous procedure of Metaphysics, by undertaking, according to the example of geometers and natural scientists, a complete revolution of Metaphysics, [conducting it to the sure course of science] with which this Critique of Pure Speculative Reason is concerned. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of science itself; but it describes nonetheless the complete outline of this science, with respect to both its limits and entire internal organisation. For pure speculative Reason has a peculiarity, in that it can and should measure its own abilities according to the different ways in which it chooses objects of thought, and fully enumerate the various ways in which it presents problems to itself, and in this manner describe the complete outline of a system of Metaphysics; because with regard to the former, in knowledge *a priori*, nothing can be ascribed to objects except for that which the subject derives from itself, and with regard to the latter, that is, pure Reason, it is, with respect to the principles of knowledge, a wholly separate unity, existing unto it self, in which a particular member, as in an organic body, exists for all the others, and the others for the one, so that no principle can be applied with certainty in a single relation without having been examined, at the same time, in the entirety of its relation to the whole pure application of Reason. For that reason, however, Metaphysics also has the singular advantage, one which can be shared by no other science that also has to do with objects, (for Logic concerns itself only with the form of thought in general), that once it has been conducted, by this critique, to the sure course of science, it shall be able to devote itself entirely to the whole field of knowledge appropriate to it, and thus complete its work and set it aside for the use of posterity as a capital stock, never to be increased, because it has to do merely with principles and the limitations of their application, which are to be determined through those same principles themselves. It is obliged to attain this completeness, for it is to be the fundamental science, and one to which the maxim: *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*⁵ must apply.

Some will ask though, what kind of treasure is it that we propose to leave behind to our descendants in the form of a Metaphysics such as this, one which has been purified through critique,

** In this way the central laws of motion of heavenly bodies provided unquestionable certainty to what Copernicus initially accepted only as a hypothesis, and at the same time gave evidence of the invisible force (Newtonian gravitational attraction) which binds the universe together, and which would have remained forever undiscovered had he not ventured to look for these observed movements — in a manner contrary to sense but nonetheless true — not within the objects of the heavens, but within the observer himself. Now in this preface I am treating this change in the way of thinking which is recounted in the Critique, merely as an hypothesis, one analogous to that of Copernicus, although, in the treatise itself, it is proved not hypothetically, but apodictically, from the nature of our representations of space and time and the elements of the Understanding. I do this to make it possible to observe the first attempts at such a change, which are always hypothetical.

⁵ [Consider nothing done if anything remains to be done.]

and which consequently will endure, undiminished by the passage of time? A cursory inspection of this work might lead one to believe that it provides a negative benefit only, that is, to warn us never to venture out, with speculative Reason, beyond the limits of experience, and that is in fact its primary benefit. This benefit becomes, however, a positive one when we perceive that the principles with which speculative Reason ventures beyond its limits, in fact, (as can be seen upon closer examination) have the inevitable result not of extending, but rather in narrowing the application of our Reason, because they, in effect, serve to extend indefinitely the limits of sense to which these principles properly belong, and thus threaten completely to supersede the pure (practical) application of Reason. Thus our critique, inasmuch as it limits the former (speculative) application, is, no doubt, negative; yet, by thus removing a hindrance which limits or threatens to destroy the latter application, it provides in reality a *positive*, and very important benefit, once we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical application of pure Reason (the moral), in which Reason cannot avoid extending herself beyond the limits of sense, and while for that purpose she requires no assistance from the speculative application of Reason, she nevertheless must be secured against its opposition, so as to avoid lapsing into contradiction with herself. To deny any positive benefit to this service of critique would be exactly like saying that the police are of no positive benefit because their primary service is only to try to prevent the violence which citizens have to fear from one another, in order that every citizen can go about his business in peace and security.

In the analytical part of the Critique, the following points are proved: First, that space and time are only forms of sensuous intuition, and thus only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena; and secondly, that we have no concepts of the Understanding, nor hence any elements [of the Understanding] dedicated to the knowledge of things, except insofar as a corresponding intuition can be given to these concepts, and that consequently we can have knowledge of no object as thing in itself, but rather only insofar as it is an object of sensuous intuition (that is, as a phenomenon) from which the limitation of all possible speculative rational knowledge whatever merely to objects of experience naturally follows. Nonetheless, and this is to be noted carefully, there is a provision made that, while we cannot *know* them, we must at least be able to *conceive* these same objects as things in themselves, for otherwise would follow the absurd conclusion that there could be a phenomenal appearance, without there being something that appears.* Now if we were to suppose that the distinction made necessary through our critique, that is, the distinction between things as objects of experience and things as things in themselves, were not made at all, it would be necessary that the principle of causality, and consequently the mechanism of nature, in an enactment of causality, be valid throughout all things in general as efficient causes. Then regarding a being — let us take as an example the human soul — I would not be able to say that

* To claim knowledge of an object, it is required that I can demonstrate its possibility (whether this be from its reality, according to the evidence of experience, or *a priori* through Reason). But I can think whatever I will, provided only that I do not contradict myself, i.e., provided only that my concept is a possible thought, although I cannot guarantee whether or not an object would also correspond to this concept, in the sum of all possibilities. To ascribe to such a concept, however, objective validity (real possibility, for the former was merely logical), requires something more. This something more need not be sought merely in theoretical sources of knowledge: it can be found in the practical sources of knowledge as well.

its will would be free, and yet at the same time subject to the necessity of nature, that is, not free, without lapsing into a manifest contradiction, because I have taken the soul, in both propositions, in exactly the same sense, namely as thing in general (as thing in itself), which, without a critique beforehand, could be taken in no other way. If the critique has not erred when it teaches us to understand the object in a two fold sense, namely either as phenomenon or as thing in itself; if the *Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding* is correct, and if therefore the principle of causality is to be taken to apply only to things in the former sense, namely, insofar as they are objects of experience, and if these same objects are not, according to the second sense, subject to the principle of causality then this same will, which is conceived in the appearance (in its observable acts) as complying necessarily with the laws of nature, and as such not free, can, on the other hand, be conceived as free without contradiction, when considered as belonging to a thing in itself, and not subject to the principle of causality. Though I cannot claim knowledge of my soul, considered from the latter aspect, as a thing in itself, through speculative Reason (even less through empirical observation), nor claim knowledge of freedom as a property of a being to which I ascribe effects in the sensory world, because to do that I must know such a being as determined in its existence, and yet not determined in time (which, because I can attribute no intuition to my concept, is impossible), I can, nonetheless, still *conceive* freedom, which means merely that the representation of freedom at least contains no contradiction in itself, provided that our critical distinction as to the dual nature of representations (the sensuous and the intellectual), and the consequent limitation of pure concepts of the Understanding, and of the principles flowing from them, is observed. So if it were granted then, that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will, in that it cites or adduces practical principles lying originally within our Reason, as data of Reason *a priori*, which would be absolutely impossible without a presupposition of freedom; and had speculative Reason proved this freedom to be inconceivable, and thus that the former presupposition, namely the moral, would have been bound to yield to another one whose denial involves an obvious contradiction, then it would also follow that freedom, and with it morality, (for its denial contains no contradiction unless freedom has already been presupposed) would then be required to surrender its place to the mechanism of nature. So then what I require for morality is merely that freedom not be self contradictory, and thus, at least, be conceivable, without any further understanding being necessary; thus we can see that freedom places no impediment at all in the path of the mechanism of nature as applying to the self same act (taken in the other regard) [as a phenomenon]; so [the Doctrine of] Morality and the [Doctrine of] Nature can each retain their respective positions, which, however, would not have been possible had not the critique instructed us beforehand about our unavoidable ignorance regarding things in themselves, and limited everything of which we can theoretically claim knowledge to phenomena alone. Exactly the same argument as to the positive benefit of the critical principles of pure Reason, could be presented in regard to the concept of God and of the simple nature of the soul, but, for the sake of brevity, I shall mention it here only in passing. I cannot then, assume God, freedom, and immortality, even for the purpose of the necessary practical application of my Reason, unless, at the same time, I also deprive speculative Reason of its presumption to transcendent insight, since, to acquire this insight, Reason must avail herself of such principles, which, because they are in fact appropriate merely for the objects of possible experience, and are at the same time nonetheless applied to that which cannot

be an object of experience, in effect transform this object into a phenomenon, and in so doing, render all practical extension of pure Reason impossible. I thus had to unseat knowledge to have a place for faith; for the dogmatism of Metaphysics, i.e., the presumption that progress can be made in this science without a critique of pure Reason, is the true source of all unbelief, something which is inimical to morality and always extremely dogmatic.— Even though it may not exactly be difficult for someone to construct a systematic Metaphysics in accordance with a critique of pure Reason, and to leave this legacy behind to posterity, his is not a gift to be valued any the less, whether we look to the general refinement of Reason to be attained on the sure course of science, as compared to the feeble gropings and foolish squabbles that Reason must endure in the absence of critique, or perhaps to finding more profitable pastimes for our inquisitive youth, who, if brought up in the traditional dogmatism, receive so much encouragement to indulge in glib speculations regarding things of which they understand nothing, and into which they will never have any insight (nor for that matter, will anyone else in the world), or are so completely preoccupied with concocting new thoughts and opinions as to neglect the study of the fundamental sciences. Most of all, we must be mindful of the inestimable service that it will perform by putting to an end for ever all objections against morality and religion, in the Socratic manner: through clearly proving the ignorance of the opponents. For some sort of Metaphysics has always existed in the world, and always will, and along with it there exists a Dialectic of pure Reason, because this goes naturally with Metaphysics. It is therefore the first and most important responsibility of Philosophy to deprive Metaphysics, once and for all, of all pernicious influence, by closing up the source of its errors. Yet despite this important change in the field of the sciences, and the loss which speculative Reason must suffer of its hitherto vaunted possessions, everything connected with universal human concerns, and the benefits which the world hitherto has derived from the teachings of pure Reason, retain their preëminence, for the loss affects only the monopoly of the Schools, and in no way the interests of men. I ask here the most intransigent dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of our souls after death, derived from the simplicity of substance, or the proof of the freedom of the will, as opposed to universal mechanism, derived from the subtle but by no means cogent distinctions between subjective and objective practical necessity, or the proof of the existence of God, derived from the concept of an *ens realissimum* (the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a First Mover), after issuing from the Schools, have ever been taken up by the public, or exercised the slightest influence on public convictions? Can it be denied that this has not happened, and, because of the unfitness of the ordinary human Understanding for such subtle speculation, that it should never have been expected? On the contrary, with reference to the first point, does not the hope of a future life stem from a predisposition of human nature, one which is felt in every human heart, i.e., the inability ever to be satisfied by the merely temporal (as insufficient for the disposition of our ultimate destiny); and with respect to the second, does not the clear depiction of our duties, in opposition to all claims of the inclinations, give rise to the consciousness of freedom; and finally, with reference to the third, does not the glorious order, beauty and providence which are revealed everywhere in nature, alone stir the belief in a wise and great Author of the World? If such widespread conviction among the public, to the extent that it rests up on rational considerations, was bound to come about quite on its own, then this possession not only remains undisturbed, but wins even greater respect by the fact that the Schools have been warned that they

can henceforth legitimately claim no higher and profounder insight into any matter which touches universal human concerns than that insight to which the great mass of men (whom we should hold in the highest respect) can just as easily attain, but should confine their activities to cultivating these universally comprehensible and, for moral purposes, amply satisfactory proofs. The change thus affects merely the arrogant pretensions of the Schools, which would like to be looked upon as the sole masters and custodians of such truths (as they are, quite rightly, with regard to many other subjects), who are merely to advise the public as to their use, while keeping the key to themselves (*quod mecum nescit solus vult scire videri*)⁶. At the same time, a provision has been made for the more moderate claim of the speculative philosopher. He remains the exclusive custodian of a science beneficial to the public, though without their knowledge, namely the critique of pure Reason, which can never become popular, and need not be, because however little understanding the general public has of fine-spun arguments supporting useful truths, it is no more troubled by the equally subtle objections against them; it is different with the Schools, because, as with every man who has risen to the heights of speculation, who cannot avoid getting involved in both the supporting arguments and the objections against them, they are obligated to engage upon a fundamental examination of the rights of speculative Reason, and, through this examination, to prevent, once and for all, the scandal which sooner or later is bound to break out amongst the public, arising from the controversies in which metaphysicians (and, as such, ultimately even theologians) without the benefit of critique, inevitably become involved, and who themselves subsequently adulterate their doctrines. So then, through this critique alone can we strike at the root of *materialism*, *fatalism*, *atheism*, *free-thinking unbelief*, *fanaticism*, and *superstition*, all of which can inflict widespread harm, and lastly *idealism* and *scepticism*, though these threaten primarily the Schools, and scarcely extend to the public. If governments should deem it proper to concern themselves with the affairs of scholars, it would be far more appropriate, and more in keeping with a genuine concern for the sciences and for humanity, for them to encourage the free expression of a critique such as this, through which alone the study of Reason can be placed upon a firm footing, than to support the ridiculous dogmatism of the Schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public whenever anyone seeks to sweep away their cobwebs, of whose existence the public has never taken even the slightest notice, and whose loss they thus can never feel.

Our critique is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of as a science of pure knowledge, (for science must always be proved strictly dogmatically, that is, from principles which are certain *a priori*); on the contrary, our opposition is rather to dogmatism itself, that is, the presumption that progress can be made with pure knowledge alone, derived solely from concepts (i.e., philosophical), according to principles which Reason has long been accustomed to using without inquiry into the manner and legitimacy of her acquisition of them. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure Reason, without any prior critique of its own powers. This opposition is therefore not to be construed as a defence of any loquacious shallowness, under the alias of popularity, or of Scepticism, which summarily dismisses the whole of Metaphysics; on the contrary, critique is the necessary preparation for the advancement of a thoroughly grounded Metaphysics to the rank

⁶ [He wants to appear to know what he does not know.]

of a science, which, as such, must needs be executed in a manner which is at once dogmatic, and, in conformity with the most stringent demand, systematic, and hence rigorous, (not popular); for the demand which it has now taken upon itself to fulfil, which is to carry through its enterprise in a manner entirely *a priori*, to the full satisfaction of speculative Reason, cannot be remitted. In the execution of this plan which the critique prescribes, that is, in the future system of Metaphysics, we must follow the strict method of the celebrated Wolff, the greatest among all the dogmatic philosophers, who first furnished an example (and thereby called forth the spirit of diligence in Germany, not yet extinct) of how the sure course of a science may be attained only through the legitimate establishment of principles, clear definition of concepts, demonstrated strictness of proof, and the avoidance of rash *non sequiturs*. He was uniquely qualified to advance Metaphysics to the rank of a science, had it only occurred to him to prepare the field beforehand by a critique of the organ, that is to say, of pure Reason itself, an omission to be ascribed not so much to him alone but rather to the dogmatic way of thinking characteristic of his age, and concerning which the philosophers of his time, as well as previous times, have no right to reproach one another. Those who reject his method as well as the procedure of the Critique of Pure Reason, can have nothing in mind other than to discard the fetters of science altogether, and to transform work into play, certainty into opinion, and Philosophy into Philodoxy.

With regard to this second edition, I did not wish, as is only reasonable, to allow the opportunity of the re-issue to pass by without endeavouring to remedy, as much as possible, the difficulties and the obscurity from which may have arisen, not, perhaps, without my fault, those misunderstandings which even men of acumen have encountered in their assessment of this book. For in the propositions themselves, and their proofs, likewise in the form and comprehensiveness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter, something which can be ascribed partly to the lengthy examination to which I had subjected them before submitting the book to the public, and partly to the unique character of the subject itself, that is, to the nature of pure speculative Reason, which is informed by a true structure, one wherein everything is an organ, the whole existing for the sake of the one, and each individual part existing for the sake of the whole, so that any imperfection, however small, whether it be a fault (error) or omission, must inevitably betray itself in use. This system will, I trust, also remain insusceptible of change in the future. It is not self-conceit that entitles me to this confidence, but rather the fact that our experiment produces the identical result, whether we start out with the smallest elements of pure Reason, from which we proceed to the whole, or whether, in the reverse manner, we start out with the whole (for this is also provided for Reason through its ultimate object in the practical domain) and then regress to the individual parts, for any attempt to alter even the smallest item immediately introduces contradictions affecting not merely the system, but human Reason in general. As to the matter of presentation, however, there is still much remaining to be done, and toward this end I have attempted to introduce improvements into this edition which should, first: alleviate the misunderstanding of the Aesthetic, particularly in regard to the concept of time; secondly, remove the obscurity from the Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding; thirdly, supply the sufficient evidence allegedly wanting in the proof of the Principles of the Pure Understanding; and lastly, correct the misinterpretation of the Paralogisms with which Rational Psychology has been reproached. My revisions of the style of presentation extend to this point, (that is, only up to the end of the first chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic) and no further, because the time available was too short,

and with regard to the remaining material, I have been made aware of no misunderstanding on the part of competent and impartial critics, who, even though I may not presume to mention them here by name, nor give them the praise to which they are assuredly entitled, will certainly find, in the pertinent passages, that I have taken their suggestions into consideration.* This im-

* Footnote The only actual addition, if I could call it that, that I have made, though only in the method of proof, is a new refutation of Psychological Idealism, and a strict (also, as I believe, the only possible) proof of the objective reality of external intuition. S 273]. Though Idealism may be regarded, with respect to the essential purposes of Metaphysics, as quite harmless, (which, in fact, it is not) it nevertheless remains a scandal to Philosophy and to human Reason in general, for it demands the acceptance, merely on faith, of the existence of things external to us (from which we derive all the material of knowledge itself for our internal sense) and, should it occur to anyone to doubt it, we are unable to convince him otherwise, lacking sufficient proof. Because a little obscurity remains in the expressions of the proof, lines 3–6, I propose to amend the passage as follows:

‘This persistent, however cannot be an intuition within me. For all the determining grounds of my existence which can be found within me are representations and, as such require a persistent different from them in relation to which the change of representations hence also of my existence, in the time within which they change, can be determined.’

One could presumably argue against this proof: ‘I am directly conscious of only that which is within me, that is, of my representations of external things; consequently it remains always problematical whether or not there exists, external to me, something to which it corresponds. But through internal experience, I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of the determinability of my existence in time) and this is more than merely being conscious of my representation, yet is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is determinable only through relation to something which is outside of me and with which my existence is associated. This consciousness of my existence in time is thus connected with, as being identical to, the consciousness of a relation to something external to me, and thus it is experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, which inseparably connects the External with my internal sense; for external sense, considered in itself alone, is a relation of intuition to something real or actual outside of me, and what the reality of external sense rests exclusively upon, in contradistinction to the imagination, is that it is inseparably associated with internal experience itself, as the condition of its possibility, which is what happens here. If I could simultaneously connect a determination of my existence through intellectual intuition with the intellectual consciousness of my existence in the representation: *I am* which accompanies all my judgements and acts of Understanding, the consciousness of a relation to something outside of me would not necessarily be required for that determination. That intellectual consciousness indeed comes first, but internal intuition, in which my existence alone can be determined, is sensuous and subject to the condition of time; this determination, however, and therefore internal experience itself, depends on something persistent which is not in me, and, consequently, can only be outside of me, to which I must consider myself as standing in a relation: thus the reality of external sense is necessarily connected with that of internal sense, as being required for the possibility of experience in general: that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me which are related to my sense as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time. The specification as to which given intuitions are those to which objects external to me really correspond, and which thus belong to external sense, to which they are to be ascribed, and not to the faculty of imagination, must, in each particular case, be carried out according to the rules by which experience in general (even internal experience]) is to be distinguished from imagination, the proposition that there really is external experience being always assumed as fundamental. One might add to this the observation that the representation of something persistent in existence is not identical with a persistent representation; for the former is capable of considerable change and alteration, as are all our other representations, even the representations of matter, and yet relate to something persistent, which then must be a thing external to and distinct from all my representations, whose existence is included necessarily in the determination of my own existence, and which together with this determination constitutes but a single experience, which could not even occur internally, unless it were at the same time (in part) external. How this is accomplished can be explained

provement, however, entails a small loss for the reader, which unfortunately could not be prevented without making the book far too voluminous, for certain material which was not essential to the completeness of the whole, and which some readers might nonetheless miss, because it can be useful for other purposes, has had to be omitted or abridged to make room for what is now, I hope, a more intelligible presentation, one in which absolutely nothing fundamental to the propositions or even to the support for their proofs has been altered, but which in the method of exposition deviates at times so far from the preceding one that it could not have been accomplished merely through interpolation. This small loss, which in any event can be compensated for, if so desired, by referring to the first edition, is out-weighed by what I hope is the greater comprehensibility of the work as it now stands. I have been gratified to observe, in various published works, (in connection with reviews contained in books and in separate treatises), that the spirit of thoroughness in Germany has not become extinct, though its voice had been briefly overwhelmed by the clamour of a fashionable and pretentious license of thought, and that the thorns which beset the paths of critique, which lead to a science of pure Reason which is methodical, but can endure only as such, and which is therefore a most necessary science, have not hindered those possessed of intelligence and fortitude from mastering it. I now entrust the task of perfecting the exposition of my critique, wherever the revision may still occasionally be deficient, to these deserving men who are blessed with both profound insight and a talent for lucid exposition, (something in which I am not adept); for in this case the danger is not that of being refuted, but rather of not being understood. For my part, I can no longer enter into controversies, though I shall carefully attend to all suggestions, whether from friends or opponents, to employ them, in a manner consistent with this propaedeutic, for the future elaboration of the system. During these labours I have advanced significantly in age, (this month, into my sixty-fourth year), so I must spend my time sparingly if I wish to see to completion my plan to publish the *Metaphysics of Nature* as well as the *Metaphysics of Morals*, as the confirmation of the correctness of the *Critique of speculative*, as well as of practical, Reason, and I must await the clarification of the obscurities which, in the beginning, are almost unavoidable in this sort of work, and the defence of the whole as well, from those deserving men who have made it their own. While every philosophical treatise is subject to attack at isolated points, (for it cannot make its appearance, in the manner of a mathematical treatise, armed at all points) the articulation of the system, regarded as unity, is not in the least endangered; for only a few possess the dexterity of mind to apprehend it all when it is new; fewer still, however, those to whom anything novel is unwelcome, possess the desire. For if one compares passages taken out of context against one another, particularly in any writing which proceeds like a free discussion, apparent contradictions can be contrived, which, in the eyes of anyone who depends upon the judgement of others, can cast an unfavourable light on this work, but which to anyone who has grasped the idea in its entirety, are very easy to resolve. Nonetheless, if a theory has stability in itself, the reaction and counter-reaction, which initially seem to pose a great danger to it, will serve, in time, merely to polish out any roughness in it, and even to secure for it, in a short time, the elegance required of it, if men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity will devote themselves to its study.

no further than how we can think the stationary in time in general, whose co existence with the changing produces the concept of alteration.

Königsberg, in the month of April, 1787