Critique of Pure Reason

(Antinomies)

P 384
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
CHAPTER II
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON 
WE have shown in the introduction to this part of our work
that all transcendental illusion of pure reason rests on dia-
lectical inferences whose schema is supplied by logic in the
three formal species of syllogisms -- just as the categories find
their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments. The
first type of these pseudo-rational inferences deals with the
unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all repre-
sentations in general (of the subject or soul), in correspondence
with the categorical syllogisms, the major premiss of which is
a principle asserting the relation of a predicate to a subject. 
The second type of dialectical argument follows the analogy
of the hypothetical syllogisms. It has as its content the un-
conditioned unity of the objective conditions in the [field of]
appearance. In similar fashion, the third type, which will be
dealt with in the next chapter, has as its theme the un-
conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility
of objects in general. 
But there is one point that calls for special notice. 
Transcendental paralogism produced a purely one-sided
illusion in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought. 
No illusion which will even in the slightest degree support the
opposing assertion is caused by the concepts of reason. Con-
sequently, although transcendental paralogism, in spite of a
favouring illusion, cannot disclaim the radical defect through
which in the fiery ordeal of critical investigation it dwindles
P 385
into mere semblance, such advantage as it offers is altogether
on the side of pneumatism. 
A completely different situation arises when reason is ap-
plied to the objective synthesis of appearances. For in this
domain, however it may endeavour to establish its principle
of unconditioned unity, and though it indeed does so with
great though illusory appearance of success, it soon falls into
such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological
field, to desist from any such pretensions. 
We have here presented to us a new phenomenon of human
reason -- an entirely natural antithetic, in which there is no
need of making subtle enquiries or of laying snares for the
unwary, but into which reason of itself quite unavoidably falls. 
It certainly guards reason from the slumber of fictitious con-
viction such as is generated by a purely one-sided illusion, but
at the same time subjects it to the temptation either of aban-
doning itself to a sceptical despair, or of assuming an ob-
stinate attitude, dogmatically committing itself to certain
assertions, and refusing to grant a fair hearing to the argu-
ments for the counter-position. Either attitude is the death
of sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps be
entitled the euthanasia of pure reason. 
Before considering the various forms of opposition and
dissension to which this conflict or antinomy of the laws of
pure reason gives rise, we may offer a few remarks in explana-
tion and justification of the method which we propose to
employ in the treatment of this subject. I entitle all tran-
scendental ideas, in so far as they refer to absolute totality in
the synthesis of appearances, cosmical concepts, partly be-
cause this unconditioned totality also underlies the concept
-- itself only an idea -- of the world-whole; partly because
they concern only the synthesis of appearances, therefore
only empirical synthesis When, on the contrary, the abso-
lute totality is that of the synthesis of the conditions of
all possible things in general, it gives rise to an ideal of
pure reason which, though it may indeed stand in a certain
relation to the cosmical concept, is quite distinct from it. 
Accordingly, just as the paralogisms of pure reason formed
the basis of a dialectical psychology, so the antinomy of
pure reason will exhibit to us the transcendental principles
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of a pretended pure rational cosmology. But it will not do
so in order to show this science to be valid and to adopt it. 
As the title, conflict of reason, suffices to show, this pretended
science can be exhibited only in its bedazzling but false
illusoriness, as an idea which can never be reconciled with
appearances. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section I
SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS 
In proceeding to enumerate these ideas with systematic
precision according to a principle, we must bear in mind two
points. In the first place we must recognise that pure and
transcendental concepts can issue only from the understand-
ing. Reason does not really generate any concept. The most
it can do is to free a concept of understanding from the
unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so to en-
deavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical, though
still, indeed, in terms of its relation to the empirical. This is
achieved in the following manner. For a given conditioned,
reason demands on the side of the conditions -- to which as
the conditions of synthetic unity the understanding subjects
all appearances -- absolute totality, and in so doing converts
the category into a transcendental idea. For only by carrying
the empirical synthesis as far as the unconditioned is it en-
abled to render it absolutely complete; and the unconditioned
is never to be met with in experience, but only in the idea. 
Reason makes this demand in accordance with the principle
that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions,
and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which
alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given. The
transcendental ideas are thus, in the first place, simply cate-
gories extended to the unconditioned, and can be reduced to
a table arranged according to the [fourfold] headings of the
latter. In the second place, not all categories are fitted for such
employment, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes
a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with,
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one another, and generative of a [given] conditioned. Ab-
solute totality is demanded by reason only in so far as the
ascending series of conditions relates to a given conditioned. 
It is not demanded in regard to the descending line of con-
sequences, nor in reference to the aggregate of co-ordinated
conditions of these consequences. For in the case of the given
conditioned, conditions are presupposed, and are considered
as given together with it. On the other hand, since conse-
quences do not make their conditions possible, but rather
presuppose them, we are not called upon, when we advance
to consequences or descend from a given condition to the con-
ditioned, to consider whether the series does or does not cease;
the question as to the totality of the series is not in any way a
presupposition of reason. 
Thus we necessarily think time as having completely
elapsed up to the given moment, and as being itself given in
this completed form. This holds true, even though such com-
pletely elapsed time is not determinable by us. But since the
future is not the condition of our attaining to the present, it is
a matter of entire indifference, in our comprehension of the
latter, how we may think of future time, whether as coming
to an end or as flowing on to infinity. We have, as it were, the
series m, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned by m, and
at the same time as being the condition of o. The series ascends
from the conditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc. ), and also descends
from the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc. ). Now
I must presuppose the first series in order to be able to view
n as given. According to reason, with its demand for totality
of conditions, n is possible only by means of that series. Its
possibility does not, however, rest upon the subsequent series,
o, p, q, r. This latter series may not therefore be regarded as
given, but only as allowing of being given (dabilis). 
I propose to name the synthesis of a series which begins, on
the side of the conditions, from the condition which stands near-
est to the given appearance and so passes to the more remote
conditions, the regressive synthesis; and that which advances,
on the side of the conditioned, from the first consequence to
the more distant, the progressive. The first proceeds in ante-
cedentia, the second in consequentia. The cosmological ideas
deal, therefore, with the totality of the regressive synthesis
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proceeding in antecedentia, not in consequentia. The problem
of pure reason suggested by the progressive form of totality
is gratuitous and unnecessary, since the raising of it is not
required for the complete comprehension of what is given in
appearance. For that we require to consider only the grounds,
not the consequences. 
In arranging the table of ideas in accordance with the
table of categories, we first take the two original quanta of
all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series, and
indeed the formal condition of all series. In it, in regard to a
given present, the antecedents can be a priori distinguished as
conditions (the past) from the consequents (the future). The
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of con-
ditions of any given conditioned therefore refers only to all
past time; and in conformity with the idea of reason past time,
as condition of the given moment, is necessarily thought as
being given in its entirety. Now in space, taken in and by itself,
there is no distinction between progress and regress. For as its
parts are co-existent, it is an aggregate, not a series. The present
moment can be regarded only as conditioned by past time,
never as conditioning it, because this moment comes into exist-
ence only through past time, or rather through the passing of
the preceding time. But as the parts of space are co-ordinated
with, not subordinated to, one another, one part is not the con-
dition of the possibility of another; and unlike time, space does
not in itself constitute a series. Nevertheless the synthesis of
the manifold parts of space, by means of which we apprehend
space, is successive, taking place in time and containing a
series. And since in this series of the aggregated spaces (as for
instance of the feet in a rood) of the given space, those which
are thought in extension of the given space are always the con-
dition of the limits of the given space, the measuring of a space
is also to be regarded as a synthesis of a series of the conditions
of a given conditioned, only with this difference that the side of
the conditions is not in itself distinct from that of the condi-
tioned, and that in space regressus and progressus would there-
fore seem to be one and the same. Inasmuch as one part of
space is not given through the others but only limited by them,
we must consider each space, in so far as it is limited, as being
also conditioned, in that it presupposes another space as the
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condition of its limits, and so on. In respect of limitation the
advance in space is thus also a regress, and the transcendental
idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of con-
ditions likewise applies to space. I can as legitimately enquire
regarding the absolute totality of appearance in space as of
that in past time. Whether an answer to this question is ever
possible, is a point which will be decided later. 
Secondly, reality in space, i.e. matter, is a conditioned. Its
internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of these parts its
remote conditions. There thus occurs a regressive synthesis,
the absolute totality of which is demanded by reason. This can
be obtained only by a completed division in virtue of which the
reality of matter vanishes either into nothing or into what is
no longer matter -- namely, the simple. Here also, then, we have
a series of conditions, and an advance to the unconditioned. 
Thirdly, as regards the categories of real relation between
appearances, that of substance with its accidents is not adapted
to being a transcendental idea. That is to say, in it reason
finds no ground for proceeding regressively to conditions. Acci-
dents, in so far as they inhere in one and the same substance,
are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. 
Even in their relation to substance they are not really subordi-
nated to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance
itself. What in this category may still, however, seem to be an
idea of transcendental reason, is the concept of the substantial. 
But since this means no more than the concept of object in
general, which subsists in so far as we think in it merely the
transcendental subject apart from all predicates, whereas
we are here dealing with the unconditioned only as it may
exist in the series of appearances, it is evident that the sub-
stantial cannot be a member of that series. This is also true
of substances in community. They are mere aggregates, and
contain nothing on which to base a series. For we cannot say
of them, as we can of spaces, whose limits are never deter-
mined in and by themselves but only through some other space,
that they are subordinated to each other as conditions of the
possibility of one another. There thus remains only the cate-
gory of causality. It presents a series of causes of a given
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effect such that we can proceed to ascend from the latter as the
conditioned to the former as conditions, and so to answer the
question of reason. 
 Fourthly, the concepts of the possible, the actual, and the
necessary do not lead to any series, save in so far as the acci-
dental in existence must always be regarded as conditioned,
and as pointing in conformity with the rule of the understand-
ing to a condition under which it is necessary, and this latter in
turn to a higher condition, until reason finally attains uncondi-
tioned necessity in the totality of the series. 
When we thus select out those categories which necessarily
lead to a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we find that
there are but four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the
four titles of the categories:
1. Absolute completeness
of the Composition
of the given whole of all appearances. 
2. Absolute completeness
in the Division
of a given whole in the [field of] appearance. 
3. Absolute completeness
in the Origination
of an appearance. 
4. Absolute completeness
as regards Dependence of Existence
of the changeable in the [field of] appearance. 
 There are several points which here call for notice. In the
first place, the idea of absolute totality concerns only the ex-
position of appearances, and does not therefore refer to the
pure concept, such as the understanding may form, of a total-
ity of things in general. Appearances are here regarded as
given; what reason demands is the absolute completeness of the
conditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions con-
stitute a series. What reason prescribes is therefore an abso-
lutely (that is to say, in every respect) complete synthesis,
whereby the appearance may be exhibited in accordance with
the laws of understanding. 
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Secondly, what reason is really seeking in this serial, re-
gressively continued, synthesis of conditions, is solely the un-
conditioned. What it aims at is, as it were, such a completeness
in the series of premisses as will dispense with the need of pre-
supposing other premisses. This unconditioned is always con-
tained in the absolute totality of the series as represented in
imagination. But this absolutely complete synthesis is again
only an idea; for we cannot know, at least at the start of this
enquiry, whether such a synthesis is possible in the case of ap-
pearance. If we represent everything exclusively through pure
concepts of understanding, and apart from conditions of sen-
sible intuition, we can indeed at once assert that for a given con-
ditioned, the whole series of conditions subordinated to each
other is likewise given. The former is given only through the
latter. When, however, it is with appearances that we are deal-
ing, we find a special limitation due to the manner in which
conditions are given, namely, through the successive synthesis
of the manifold of intuition -- a synthesis which has to be
made complete through the regress. Whether this complete-
ness is sensibly possible is a further problem; the idea of it
lies in reason, independently alike of the possibility or of the
impossibility of our connecting with it any adequate empirical
concepts. Since, then, the unconditioned is necessarily con-
tained in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of
the manifold in the [field of] appearance -- the synthesis being
executed in accordance with those categories which represent
appearance as a series of conditions to a given conditioned --
reason here adopts the method of starting from the idea of
totality, though what it really has in view is the unconditioned,
whether of the entire series or of a part of it. Meantime, also,
it leaves undecided whether and how this totality is attain-
able. 
This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two
ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in
which all the members without exception are conditioned and
only the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This
regress is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, the absolutely
unconditioned is only a part of the series -- a part to which the
other members are subordinated, and which does not itself stand
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under any other condition. On the first view, the series a parte -
priori is without limits or beginning, i.e. is infinite, and at the
same time is given in its entirety. But the regress in it is never
completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. On the
second view, there is a first member of the series which in
respect of past time is entitled, the beginning of the world, in
respect of space, the limit of the world, in respect of the parts
of a given limited whole, the simple, in respect of causes,
absolute self-activity (freedom), in respect of the existence of
alterable things, absolute natural necessity. 
We have two expressions, world and nature, which some-
times coincide. The former signifies the mathematical sum-
total of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis, alike
in the great and in the small, that is, in the advance alike through
composition and through division. This same world is entitled
nature when it is viewed as a dynamical whole. We are not
then concerned with the aggregation in space and time, with
a view to determining it as a magnitude, but with the unity in
the existence of appearances. In this case the condition of that
which happens is entitled the cause. Its unconditioned caus-
ality in the [field of] appearance is called freedom, and its
conditioned causality is called natural cause in the narrower
[adjectival] sense. The conditioned in existence in general is
termed contingent and the unconditioned necessary. 
++ The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given con-
ditioned is always unconditioned, since outside it there are no further
conditions in respect of which it could be conditioned. But this
absolute totality of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problem-
atic concept, the possibility of which has to be investigated, especi-
ally in regard to the manner in which the unconditioned (the tran-
scendental idea really at issue) is involved therein. 
++ Nature, taken adjectivally (formaliter), signifies the connec-
tion of the determinations of a thing according to an inner principle
of causality. By nature, on the other hand, taken substantivally
(materialiter), is meant the sum of appearances in so far as they
stand, in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thorough-
going interconnection. In the first sense we speak of the nature of
fluid matter, of fire, etc. The word is then employed in an adjectival
manner. When, on the other hand, we speak of the things of nature,
we have in mind a self-subsisting whole. 
P 393
The unconditioned necessity of appearances may be entitled natural
necessity. 
The ideas with which we are now dealing I have above
entitled cosmological ideas, partly because by the term 'world'
we mean the sum of all appearances, and it is exclusively
to the unconditioned in the appearances that our ideas are
directed, partly also because the term 'world', in the tran-
scendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of all existing
things, and we direct our attention solely to the completeness
of the synthesis, even though that is only attainable in the
regress to its conditions. Thus despite the objection that these
ideas are one and all transcendent, and that although they do
not in kind surpass the object, namely, appearances, but are
concerned exclusively with the world of sense, not with nou-
mena, they yet carry the synthesis to a degree which tran-
scends all possible experience, I none the less still hold that
they may quite appropriately be entitled cosmical concepts. In
respect of the distinction between the mathematically and the
dynamically unconditioned at which the regress aims, I might,
however, call the first two concepts cosmical in the narrower
sense, as referring to the world of the great and the small, and
the other two transcendent concepts of nature. This distinction
has no special immediate value; its significance will appear
later. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 2
ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON 
If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines,
antithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic assertions of
the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dog-
matic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which no one asser-
tion can establish superiority over another. The antithetic does
not, therefore, deal with one-sided assertions. It treats only
the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the
causes of this conflict. The transcendental antithetic is an en-
quiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and out-
P 394
come. If in employing the principles of understanding we do
not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but
venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of experi-
ence, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines which can neither
hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it. 
Each of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but
finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason --
only that, unfortunately, the assertion of the opposite has, on
its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary. 
The questions which naturally arise in connection with
such a dialectic of pure reason are the following: (1) In what
propositions is pure reason unavoidably subject to an anti-
nomy? (2) On what causes does this antinomy depend? (3)
Whether and in what way, despite this contradiction, does
there still remain open to reason a path to certainty? 
A dialectical doctrine of pure reason must therefore be
distinguished from all sophistical propositions in two respects. 
It must not refer to an arbitrary question such as may be raised
for some special purpose, but to one which human reason
must necessarily encounter in its progress. And secondly, both
it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial illusion such
as at once vanishes upon detection, but a natural and un-
avoidable illusion, which even after it has ceased to beguile
still continues to delude though not to deceive us, and which
though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be
eradicated. 
Such dialectical doctrine relates not to the unity of under-
standing in empirical concepts, but to the unity of reason in
mere ideas. Since this unity of reason involves a synthesis ac-
cording to rules, it must conform to the understanding; and
yet as demanding absolute unity of synthesis it must at the
same time harmonise with reason. But the conditions of this
unity are such that when it is adequate to reason it is too great
for the understanding; and when suited to the understanding,
too small for reason. There thus arises a conflict which cannot
be avoided, do what we will. 
These pseudo-rational assertions thus disclose a dialectical
battlefield in which the side permitted to open the attack is
invariably victorious, and the side constrained to act on the
defensive is always defeated. Accordingly, vigorous fighters, no
P 395
matter whether they support a good or a bad cause, if only they
contrive to secure the right to make the last attack, and are
not required to withstand a new onslaught from their oppo-
nents, may always count upon carrying off the laurels. We can
easily understand that while this arena should time and again
be contested, and that numerous triumphs should be gained
by both sides, the last decisive victory always leaves the
champion of the good cause master of the field, simply be-
cause his rival is forbidden to resume the combat. As im-
partial umpires, we must leave aside the question whether it
is for the good or the bad cause that the contestants are
fighting. They must be left to decide the issue for themselves. 
After they have rather exhausted than injured one another,
they will perhaps themselves perceive the futility of their
quarrel, and part good friends. 
This method of watching, or rather provoking, a conflict
of assertions, not for the purpose of deciding in favour of one
or other side, but of investigating whether the object of con-
troversy is not perhaps a deceptive appearance which each
vainly strives to grasp, and in regard to which, even if there
were no opposition to be overcome, neither can arrive at any
result, -- this procedure, I say, may be entitled the sceptical
method. It is altogether different from scepticism -- a principle
of technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the
foundations of all knowledge, and strives in all possible ways
to destroy its reliability and steadfastness. For the sceptical
method aims at certainty. It seeks to discover the point of
misunderstanding in the case of disputes which are sincerely
and competently conducted by both sides, just as from the
embarrassment of judges in cases of litigation wise legislators
contrive to obtain instruction regarding the defects and am-
biguities of their laws. The antinomy which discloses itself in
the application of laws is for our limited wisdom the best
criterion of the legislation that has given rise to them. Reason,
which does not in abstract speculation easily become aware
of its errors, is hereby awakened to consciousness of the
factors [that have to be reckoned with] in the determination
of its principles
P 396
But it is only for transcendental philosophy that this scep-
tical method is essential. Though in all other fields of enquiry
it can, perhaps, be dispensed with, it is not so in this field. 
In mathematics its employment would, indeed, be absurd; for
in mathematics no false assertions can be concealed and ren-
dered invisible, inasmuch as the proofs must always proceed
under the guidance of pure intuition and by means of a syn-
thesis that is always evident. In experimental philosophy the
delay caused by doubt may indeed be useful; no misunder-
standing is, however, possible which cannot easily be re-
moved; and the final means of deciding the dispute, whether
found early or late, must in the end be supplied by experience. 
Moral philosophy can also present its principles, together
with their practical consequences, one and all in concreto, in
what are at least possible experiences; and the misunder-
standing due to abstraction is thereby avoided. But it is quite
otherwise with transcendental assertions which lay claim to
insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences. 
Their abstract synthesis can never be given in any a priori
intuition, and they are so constituted that what is erroneous
in them can never be detected by means of any experience. 
Transcendental reason consequently admits of no other test
than the endeavour to harmonise its various assertions. But
for the successful application of this test the conflict into
which they fall with one another must first be left to develop
free and untrammelled. This we shall now set about arranging. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS 
Thesis
The world has a beginning
in time, and is also limited as
regards space. 
++ The antinomies follow one another in the order of the tran-
scendental ideas above enumerated. 
P 396a
Antithesis
The world has no begin-
ning, and no limits in space;
it is infinite as regards both
time and space. 
P 397
Proof 
If we assume that the world
has no beginning in time,
then up to every given mo-
ment an eternity has elapsed,
and there has passed away in
the world an infinite series of
successive states of things. 
Now the infinity of a series
consists in the fact that it can
never be completed through
successive synthesis. It thus
follows that it is impossible for
an infinite world-series to have
passed away, and that a be-
ginning of the world is there-
fore a necessary condition of
the world's existence. This was
the first point that called for
proof. 
 As regards the second point,
let us again assume the oppo-
site, namely, that the world is
an infinite given whole of co-
existing things. Now the mag-
nitude of a quantum which is
not given in intuition as
within certain limits, can be
thought only through the
synthesis of its parts, and the
totality of such a quantum
only through a synthesis that
is brought to completion
through repeated addition of unit to unit. 
++ An indeterminate quantum can be intuited as a whole when it
is such that though enclosed within limits we do not require to con-
struct its totality through measurement, that is, through the success-
ive synthesis of its parts. For the limits, in cutting off anything
further, themselves determine its completeness. 
P 397a
Proof 
 For let us assume that it
has a beginning. Since the
beginning is an existence
which is preceded by a time
in which the thing is not,
there must have been a
preceding time in which the
world was not, i.e. an empty
time. Now no coming to be
of a thing is possible in an
empty time, because no part
of such a time possesses, as
compared with any other, a
distinguishing condition of
existence rather than of non-
existence; and this applies
whether the thing is sup-
posed to arise of itself or
through some other cause. In
the world many series of
things can, indeed, begin;
but the world itself cannot
have a beginning, and is
therefore infinite in respect
of past time. 
 As regards the second
point, let us start by assum-
ing the opposite, namely, that
the world in space is finite
and limited, and consequently
exists in an empty space
which is unlimited. 
P 398
In order, there-
fore, to think, as a whole, the
world which fills all spaces,
the successive synthesis of
the parts of an infinite world
must be viewed as completed,
that is, an infinite time must
be viewed as having elapsed
in the enumeration of all co-
existing things. This, how-
ever, is impossible. An in-
finite aggregate of actual
things cannot therefore be
viewed as a given whole, nor
consequently as simultane-
ously given. The world is,
therefore, as regards exten-
sion in space, not infinite, but
is enclosed within limits. This
was the second point in
dispute. 
++ The concept of totality is in this case simply the representa-
tion of the completed synthesis of its parts; for, since we cannot
obtain the concept from the intuition of the whole -- that being in
this case impossible -- we can apprehend it only through the syn-
thesis of the parts viewed as carried, at least in idea, to the comple-
tion of the infinite. 
P 397a
Things
will therefore not only be
P 398a
related in space but also
related to space. Now since
the world is an absolute whole
beyond which there is no
object of intuition, and there-
fore no correlate with which
the world stands in relation,
the relation of the world
to empty space would be a
relation of it to no object. 
But such a relation, and con-
sequently the limitation of
the world by empty space, is
nothing. The world cannot,
therefore, be limited in space;
that is, it is infinite in respect
of extension. 
++ Space is merely the form of outer intuition (formal intuition). 
It is not a real object which can be outwardly intuited. Space, as
prior to all things which determine (occupy or limit) it, or rather
which give an empirical intuition in accordance with its form, is,
under the name of absolute space, nothing but the mere possibility
of outer appearances in so far as they either exist in themselves or
can be added to given appearances. Empirical intuition is not, there-
fore, a composite of appearances and space (of perception and empty
intuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis;
they are connected in one and the same empirical intuition as
matter and form of the intuition. If we attempt to set one of these
two factors outside the other, space outside all appearances, there
arise all sorts of empty determinations of outer intuition, which yet
are not possible perceptions. For example, a determination of the
relation of the motion (or rest) of the world to infinite empty space
P 398n
is a determination which can never be perceived, and is therefore
the predicate of a mere thought-entity. 
P 399
OBSERVATION ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY
I. On the Thesis 
 In stating these conflicting
arguments I have not sought
to elaborate sophisms. That
is to say, I have not resorted
to the method of the special
pleader who attempts to take
advantage of an opponent's
carelessness -- freely allowing
the appeal to a misunderstood
law, in order that he may be
in a position to establish his
own unrighteous claims by
the refutation of that law. 
Each of the above proofs
arises naturally out of the
matter in dispute, and no ad-
vantage has been taken of
the openings afforded by er-
roneous conclusions arrived
at by dogmatists in either
party. 
 I might have made a
pretence of establishing the
thesis in the usual manner of
the dogmatists, by starting
from a defective concept of
the infinitude of a given mag-
nitude. I might have argued
that a magnitude is infinite
if a greater than itself, as
determined by the multipli-
city of given units which it contains, is not possible. 
P 399a
II. On the Antithesis
 The proof of the infinitude
of the given world-series and
of the world-whole, rests upon
the fact that, on the contrary
assumption, an empty time
and an empty space, must
constitute the limit of the
world. I am aware that
attempts have been made to
evade this conclusion by argu-
ing that a limit of the world
in time and space is quite
possible without our having
to make the impossible as-
sumption of an absolute
time prior to the beginning
of the world, or of an absolute
space extending beyond the
real world. With the latter
part of this doctrine, as held
by the philosophers of the
Leibnizian school, I am en-
tirely satisfied. Space is merely
the form of outer intuition;
it is not a real object which
can be outwardly intuited; it
is not a correlate of the ap-
pearances, but the form of
the appearances themselves. 
And since space is thus no
object but only the form of
possible objects, it cannot be
P 400a
regarded as something abso-
lute in itself that determines
the existence of things. 
P 400
Now
no multiplicity is the great-
est, since one or more units
can always be added to it. 
Consequently an infinite given
magnitude, and therefore an
infinite world (infinite as re-
gards the elapsed series or as
regards extension) is impos-
sible; it must be limited in
both respects. Such is the
line that my proof might have
followed. But the above con-
cept is not adequate to what
we mean by an infinite whole. 
It does not represent how
great it is, and consequently
is not the concept of a maxi-
mum. Through it we think
only its relation to any assign-
able unit in respect to which
it is greater than all num-
ber. According as the unit
chosen is greater or smaller,
the infinite would be greater
or smaller. Infinitude, how-
ever, as it consists solely
in the relation to the given
unit, would always remain
the same. The absolute mag-
nitude of the whole would
not, therefore, be known in
this way; 
P 400a
Things,
as appearances, determine
space, that is, of all its pos-
sible predicates of magnitude
and relation they determine
this or that particular one to
belong to the real. Space, on
the other hand, viewed as a
self-subsistent something, is
nothing real in itself; and can-
not, therefore, determine the
magnitude or shape of real
things. Space, it further fol-
lows, whether full or empty,
may be limited by appear-
ances, but appearances can-
not be limited by an empty
space outside them. This is
likewise true of time. But
while all this may be granted,
it yet cannot be denied that
these two non-entities, empty
space outside the world and
empty time prior to it, have
to be assumed if we are to
assume a limit to the world
in space and in time. 
++ It will be evident that what we here desire to say is that empty
space, so far as it is limited by appearances, that is, empty space
within the world, is at least not contradictory of transcendental
principles and may therefore, so far as they are concerned, be
admitted. This does not, however, amount to an assertion of its
possibility. 
P 401
indeed, the above concept does not really deal
with it. 
The true transcendental
concept of infinitude is this,
that the successive synthesis
of units required for the enu-
meration of a quantum can
never be completed. Hence
it follows with complete cer-
tainty that an eternity of
actual successive states lead-
ing up to a given (the pre-
sent) moment cannot have
elapsed, and that the world
must therefore have a begin-
ning. 
In the second part of the
thesis the difficulty involved
in a series that is infinite and
yet has elapsed does not arise,
since the manifold of a world
which is infinite in respect of
extension is given as co-exist-
ing. But if we are to think the
totality of such a multiplicity,
and yet cannot appeal to
limits that of themselves con-
stitute it a totality in intuition,
we have to account for a con-
cept which in this case cannot
proceed from the whole to
the determinate multiplicity
of the parts, but which must
demonstrate the possibility of
a whole by means of the
successive synthesis of the
parts. 
++ This quantum therefore contains a quantity (of given units)
which is greater than any number -- which is the mathematical con-
cept of the infinite. 
P 400a
 The method of argument
which professes to enable us
to avoid the above conse-
quence (that of having to
P 401a
assume that if the world has
limits in time and space, the
infinite void must determine
the magnitude in which actual
things are to exist) consists
in surreptitiously substituting
for the sensible world some
intelligible world of which
we know nothing; for the
first beginning (an exist-
ence preceded by a time of
non-existence) an existence
in general which presupposes
no other condition whatso-
ever; and for the limits of
extension boundaries of the
world-whole -- thus getting
rid of time and space. But we
are here treating only of the
mudus phaenomenon and
its magnitude, and cannot
therefore abstract from the
aforesaid conditions of sensi-
bility without destroying the
very being of that world. If
the sensible world is limited,
it must necessarily lie in the
infinite void. If that void, and
consequently space in general
as a priori condition of the
possibility of appearances, be
set aside, the entire sensible
world vanishes. This world
is all that is given us in
our problem. 
P 402
 Now since this synthesis must constitute a never
to be completed series, I can-
not think a totality either
prior to the synthesis or by
means of the synthesis. For
the concept of totality is in
this case itself the representa-
tion of a completed synthesis
of the parts. And since this
completion is impossible, so
likewise is the concept of it. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
SECOND CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS 
Thesis
Every composite substance
in the world is made up of
simple parts, and nothing any-
where exists save the simple
or what is composed of the
simple. 
Proof 
Let us assume that com-
posite substances are not
made up of simple parts. If
all composition be then re-
moved in thought, no com-
posite part, and (since we
admit no simple parts) also
no simple part, that is to say,
nothing at all, will remain,
and accordingly no substance
will be given. Either, there-
fore, it is impossible to remove
in thought all composition,
or after its removal there
must remain something which
P 403
exists without composition,
that is, the simple. 
P 401a
The mundus
intelligibilis is nothing but
the general concept of a
P 402a
world in general, in which
abstraction is made from all
conditions of its intuition,
and in reference to which,
therefore, no synthetic pro-
position, either affirmative
or negative, can possibly be
asserted. 
Antithesis
No composite thing in the
world is made up of simple
parts, and there nowhere
exists in the world anything
simple. 
Proof 
Assume that a composite
thing (as substance) is made
up of simple parts. Since all
external relation, and there-
fore all composition of sub-
stances, is possible only in
space, a space must be made
up of as many parts as are
contained in the composite
which occupies it. Space,
however, is not made up of
simple parts, but of spaces. 
Every part of the composite
must therefore occupy a space. 
But the absolutely first parts
P 403a
of every composite are simple. 
P 403
In the for-
mer case the composite would
not be made up of substances;
composition, as applied to
substances, is only an acci-
dental relation in independ-
ence of which they must
still persist as self-subsistent
beings. Since this contradicts
our supposition, there remains
only the original supposition,
that a composite of sub-
stances in the world is made
up of simple parts. 
If follows, as an immediate
consequence, that the things
in the world are all, without
exception, simple beings; that
composition is merely an
external state of these beings;
and that although we can
never so isolate these ele-
mentary substances as to
take them out of this state
of composition, reason must
think them as the primary
subjects of all composition,
and therefore, as simple be-
ings, prior to all composition. 
P 403a
The simple therefore occupies
a space. Now since every-
thing real, which occupies a
space, contains in itself a
manifold of constituents ex-
ternal to one another, and is
therefore composite; and since
a real composite is not made
up of accidents (for accidents
could not exist outside one
another, in the absence of
substance) but of substances,
it follows that the simple
would be a composite of
substances -- which is self-
contradictory. 
The second proposition of
the antithesis, that nowhere
in the world does there exist
anything simple, is intended
to mean only this, that the
existence of the absolutely
simple cannot be established
by any experience or percep-
tion, either outer or inner;
and that the absolutely simple
is therefore a mere idea, the
objective reality of which can
never be shown in any pos-
sible experience, and which,
as being without an object,
has no application in the
explanation of the appear-
ances. For if we assumed
that in experience an object
might be found for this tran-
scendental idea, the empiri-
cal intuition of such an object
P 404a
would have to be known as
one that contains no manifold
[factors] external to one an-
other and combined into
unity. But since from the
non-consciousness of such a
manifold we cannot conclude
to its complete impossibility
in every kind of intuition of
an object; and since without
such proof absolute simplicity
can never be established, it
follows that such simplicity
cannot be inferred from any
perception whatsoever. An
absolutely simple object can
never be given in any pos-
sible experience. And since
by the world of sense we
must mean the sum of all
possible experiences, it follows
that nothing simple is to be
found anywhere in it. 
This second proposition of
the antithesis has a much
wider application than the
first. Whereas the first pro-
position banishes the simple
only from the intuition of the
composite, the second ex-
cludes it from the whole of
nature. Accordingly it has
not been possible to prove
this second proposition by
reference to the concept of
a given object of outer in-
tuition (of the composite), but
only by reference to its rela-
tion to a possible experience
in general. 
P 405
OBSERVATION ON THE SECOND ANALOGY 
I. On the Thesis 
When I speak of a whole
as necessarily made up of
simple parts I am referring
only to a substantial whole
that is composite in the strict
sense of the term 'composite',
that is, to that accidental
unity of the manifold which,
given as separate (at least in
thought), is brought into a
mutual connection, and there-
by constitutes a unity. Space
should properly be called not
compositum but totum, since
its parts are possible only in
the whole, not the whole
through the parts. It might,
indeed, be called a composi-
tum ideale, but not reale. 
This, however, is a mere
subtlety. Since space is not
a composite made up of
substances (nor even of
real accidents), if I remove
all compositeness from it,
nothing remains, not even the
point. For a point is possible
only as the limit of a space,
and so of a composite. Space
and time do not, therefore,
consist of simple parts. What
belongs only to the state of a
substance, even though it has
a magnitude, e.g. alteration,
does not consist of the simple; 
P 405a
II. On the Antithesis
Against the doctrine of the
infinite divisibility of matter,
the proof of which is purely
mathematical, objections have
been raised by the monadists. 
These objections, however, at
once lay the monadists open to
suspicion. For however evi-
dent mathematical proofs
may be, they decline to recog-
nise that the proofs are based
upon insight into the constitu-
tion of space, in so far as space
is in actual fact the formal
condition of the possibility of
all matter. They regard them
merely as inferences from ab-
stract but arbitrary concepts,
and so as not being applicable
to real things. How can it be
possible to invent a different
kind of intuition from that
given in the original intuition
of space, and how can the a -
priori determinations of space
fail to be directly applicable
to what is only possible in so
far as it fills this space! Were
we to give heed to them,
then beside the mathematical
point, which, while simple,
is not a part but only the
limit of a space, we should
have to conceive physical
points as being likewise
P 406a
simple, 
P 406
that is to say, a certain degree
of alteration does not come
about through the accretion
of many simple alterations. 
Our inference from the com-
posite to the simple applies
only to self-subsisting things. 
Accidents of the state [of a
thing] are not self-subsisting. 
Thus the proof of the neces-
sity of the simple, as the con-
stitutive parts of the sub-
stantially composite, can easily
be upset (and therewith the
thesis as a whole), if it be
extended too far and in the
absence of a limiting qualifi-
cation be made to apply to
everything composite -- as has
frequently happened. 
Moreover I am here speak-
ing only of the simple in so
far as it is necessarily given
in the composite -- the latter
being resolvable into the
simple, as its constituent
parts. The word monas, in the
strict sense in which it is em-
ployed by Leibniz, should refer
only to the simple which is
immediately given as simple
substance e.g. in self-con-
sciousness), and not to an
element of the composite. 
This latter is better entitled
atomus. As I am seeking
to prove the [existence of]
simple substances only as
elements in the composite, I
P 407
might entitle the thesis of
the second antinomy, tran-
scendental atomistic. 
P 406a
and yet as having the
distinguishing characteristic
of being able, as parts of
space, to fill space through
their mere aggregation. With-
out repeating the many fa-
miliar and conclusive refuta-
tions of this absurdity -- it
being quite futile to attempt
to reason away by sophistical
manipulation of purely dis-
cursive concepts the evident
demonstrated truth of mathe-
matics -- I make only one ob-
servation, that when philo-
sophy here plays tricks with
mathematics, it does so be-
cause it forgets that in this
discussion we are concerned
only with appearances and
their condition. Here it is
not sufficient to find for the
pure concept of the com-
posite formed by the under-
standing the concept of the
simple; what has to be found
is an intuition of the simple
for the intuition of the com-
posite (matter). But by the
laws of sensibility, and there-
fore in objects of the senses,
this is quite impossible. 
Though it may be true that
when a whole, made up of
substances, is thought by the
pure understanding alone, we
must, prior to all composi-
tion of it, have the simple, 
P 407
But as
this word has long been ap-
propriated to signify a parti-
cular mode of explaining
bodily appearances (mole-
culae), and therefore pre-
supposes empirical concepts,
the thesis may more suitably
be entitled the dialectical
principle of monadology. 
P 406a
 this does not hold of the
P 407a
totum substantiale phaeno-
menon which, as empirical
intuition in space, carries
with it the necessary char-
acteristic that no part of it
is simple, because no part of
space is simple. The monad-
ists have, indeed, been suffi-
ciently acute to seek escape
from this difficulty by refusing
to treat space as a condition
of the possibility of the objects
of outer intuition (bodies),
and by taking instead these
and the dynamical relation of
substances as the condition of
the possibility of space. But
we have a concept of bodies
only as appearances; and as
such they necessarily pre-
suppose space as the condi-
tion of the possibility of all
outer appearance. This eva-
sion of the issue is therefore
futile, and has already been
sufficiently disposed of in
the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
The argument of the monad-
ists would indeed be valid if
bodies were things in them-
selves. 
The second dialectical as-
sertion has this peculiarity,
that over against it stands
a dogmatic assertion which
is the only one of all the
pseudo-rational assertions that
undertakes to afford mani-
fest evidence, in an empirical
P 408a
object, of the reality of that
which we have been ascrib-
ing only to transcendental
ideas, namely, the absolute
simplicity of substance -- I
refer to the assertion that
the object of inner sense,
the 'I' which there thinks,
is an absolutely simple sub-
stance. Without entering upon
this question (it has been
fully considered above), I
need only remark, that if (as
happens in the quite bare
representation, 'I') anything
is thought as object only,
without the addition of any
synthetic determination of its
intuition, nothing manifold
and no compositeness can be
perceived in such a representa-
tion. Besides, since the predi-
cates through which I think
this object are merely intui-
tions of inner sense, nothing
can there be found which
shows a manifold [of ele-
ments] external to one an-
other, and therefore real com-
positeness. Self-consciousness
is of such a nature that since
the subject which thinks is
at the same time its own
object, it cannot divide itself,
though it can divide the de-
terminations which inhere in
it; for in regard to itself
every object is absolute unity. 
Nevertheless, when this sub-
ject is viewed outwardly, as
P 409a
an object of intuition, it must
exhibit [some sort of] com-
positeness in its appearance; 
P 409
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS 
Thesis
Causality in accordance
with laws of nature is not the
only causality from which the
appearances of the world can
one and all be derived. To
explain these appearances it
is necessary to assume that
there is also another causality,
that of freedom. 
Proof 
Let us assume that there
is no other causality than that
in accordance with laws of
nature. This being so, every-
thing which takes place pre-
supposes a preceding state
upon which it inevitably fol-
lows according to a rule. But
the preceding state must it-
self be something which has
taken place (having come to
be in a time in which it
previously was not); 
P 409a
and it must always be viewed
in this way if we wish to
know whether or not there
be in it a manifold [of ele-
ments] external to one an-
other. 
Antithesis
There is no freedom; every-
thing in the world takes place
solely in accordance with
laws of nature. 
Proof 
Assume that there is free-
dom in the transcendental
sense, as a special kind of
causality in accordance with
which the events in the
world can have come about,
namely, a power of absolutely
beginning a state, and there-
fore also of absolutely begin-
ning a series of consequences
of that state;
P 410
for if it had always existed, its con-
sequence also would have
always existed, and would
not have only just arisen. 
The causality of the cause
through which something
takes place is itself, therefore,
something that has taken
place, which again presup-
poses, in accordance with
the law of nature, a pre-
ceding state and its causality,
and this in similar manner a
still earlier state, and so on. 
If, therefore, everything takes
place solely in accordance
with laws of nature, there
will always be only a relative
and never a first beginning,
and consequently no com-
pleteness of the series on the
side of the causes that arise
the one from the other. But
the law of nature is just this,
that nothing takes place with-
out a cause sufficiently deter-
mined a priori. The proposi-
tion that no causality is pos-
sible save in accordance with
laws of nature, when taken
in unlimited universality, is
therefore self-contradictory;
and this cannot, therefore,
be regarded as the sole kind
of causality. 
P 409a
 it then follows
that not only will a series
have its absolute beginning
P 410a
in this spontaneity, but that
the very determination of
this spontaneity to originate
the series, that is to say,
the causality itself, will have
an absolute beginning; there
will be no antecedent through
which this act, in taking
place, is determined in ac-
cordance with fixed laws. 
But every beginning of action
presupposes a state of the
not yet acting cause; and a
dynamical beginning of the
action, if it is also a first be-
ginning, presupposes a state
which has no causal con-
nection with the preceding
state of the cause, that is to
say, in nowise follows from
it. Transcendental freedom
thus stands opposed to the
law of causality; and the kind
of connection which it as-
sumes as holding between the
successive states of the active
causes renders all unity of
experience impossible. It is
not to be met with in any
experience, and is therefore
an empty thought-entity. 
In nature alone, therefore,
[not in freedom], must we
seek for the connection and
order of cosmical events. 
Freedom (independence) from
the laws of nature is no doubt
a liberation from compulsion,
but also from the guidance
P 411a
of all rules. 
P 410
 We must, then, assume a
causality through which some-
thing takes place, the cause
of which is not itself
P 411
determined, in accordance with
necessary laws, by another
cause antecedent to it, that is
to say, an absolute spontaneity
of the cause, whereby a series
of appearances, which pro-
ceeds in accordance with laws
of nature, begins of itself. 
This is transcendental free-
dom, without which, even in
the [ordinary] course of na-
ture, the series of appearances
on the side of the causes can
never be complete. 
P 411a
For it is not
permissible to say that the
laws of freedom enter into
the causality exhibited in the
course of nature, and so take
the place of natural laws. 
If freedom were determined
in accordance with laws,
it would not be freedom;
it would simply be nature
under another name. Nature
and transcendental freedom
differ as do conformity to
law and lawlessness. Nature
does indeed impose upon the
understanding the exacting
task of always seeking the
origin of events ever higher
in the series of causes, their
causality being always condi-
tioned. But in compensation
it holds out the promise of
thoroughgoing unity of ex-
perience in accordance with
laws. The illusion of freedom,
on the other hand, offers a
point of rest to the enquiring
understanding in the chain
of causes, conducting it to
an unconditioned causality
which begins to act of itself. 
This causality is, however,
blind, and abrogates those
rules through which alone
a completely coherent ex-
perience is possible. 
P 412
OBSERVATION ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY 
I. On the Thesis
The transcendental idea of
freedom does not by any
means constitute the whole
content of the psychological
concept of that name, which
is mainly empirical. The tran-
scendental idea stands only
for the absolute spontaneity
of an action, as the proper
ground of its imputability. 
This, however, is, for philo-
sophy, the real stumbling-
block; for there are insur-
mountable difficulties in the
way of admitting any such
type of unconditioned caus-
ality. What has always so
greatly embarrassed specula-
tive reason in dealing with
the question of the freedom
of the will, is its strictly
transcendental aspect. The
problem, properly viewed, is
solely this: whether we must
admit a power of spontane-
ously beginning a series of
successive things or states. 
How such a power is possible
is not a question which re-
quires to be answered in this
case, any more than in regard
to causality in accordance
with the laws of nature. For,
[as we have found], we have
to remain satisfied with the
P 413
a priori knowledge that this
latter type of causality must be
presupposed; 
P 412a
II. On the Antithesis
The defender of an om-
nipotent nature (transcend-
ental physiocracy), in main-
taining his position against
the pseudo-rational argu-
ments offered in support of the
counter-doctrine of freedom,
would argue as follows. If
you do not, as regards time,
admit anything as being
mathematically first in the
world, there is no necessity,
as regards causality, for seek-
ing something that is dynamic-
ally first. What authority
have you for inventing an
absolutely first state of the
world, and therefore an abso-
lute beginning of the ever-
flowing series of appearances,
and so of procuring a resting-
place for your imagination
by setting bounds to limitless
nature? Since the substances
in the world have always
existed -- at least the unity of
experience renders necessary
such a supposition -- there is
no difficulty in assuming that
change of their states, that is,
a series of their alterations, has
likewise always existed, and
therefore that a first begin-
ning, whether mathematical
or dynamical, is not to be looked for. 
P 413
we are not in the
least able to comprehend how
it can be possible that through
one existence the existence
of another is determined, and
for this reason must be guided
by experience alone. The
necessity of a first beginning,
due to freedom, of a series of
appearances we have demon-
strated only in so far as it
is required to make an origin
of the world conceivable; for
all the later following states
can be taken as resulting ac-
cording to purely natural
laws. But since the power
of spontaneously beginning
a series in time is thereby
proved (though not under-
stood), it is now also per-
missible for us to admit
within the course of the
world different series as cap-
able in their causality of
beginning of themselves, and
so to attribute to their sub-
stances a power of acting
from freedom. And we must
not allow ourselves to be
prevented from drawing this
conclusion by a misapprehen-
sion, namely that, as a series
occurring in the world can
have only a relatively first
beginning, being always pre-
ceded in the world by some
other state of things, no
P 414
absolute first beginning of a
series is possible during the
course of the world. 
P 413a
The possibility of
such an infinite derivation,
without a first member to
which all the rest is merely a
sequel, cannot indeed, in re-
spect of its possibility, be ren-
dered comprehensible. But
if for this reason you refuse
to recognise this enigma in
nature, you will find yourself
compelled to reject many
fundamental synthetic pro-
perties and forces, which as
little admit of comprehension. 
The possibility even of altera-
tion itself would have to be
denied. For were you not
assured by experience that
alteration actually occurs,
you would never be able to
excogitate a priori the pos-
sibility of such a ceaseless
sequence of being and not-
being. 
Even if a transcendental
power of freedom be allowed,
as supplying a beginning of
happenings in the world, this
power would in any case have
to be outside the world
(though any such assump-
tion that over and above the
sum of all possible intuitions
there exists an object which
cannot be given in any pos-
sible perception, is still a very
bold one). But to ascribe to
substances in the world itself
such a power, can never be
permissible; 
P 414
For the
absolutely first beginning of
which we are here speaking
is not a beginning in time,
but in causality. If, for in-
stance, I at this moment
arise from my chair, in com-
plete freedom, without being
necessarily determined thereto
by the influence of natural
causes, a new series, with all
its natural consequences in
infinitum, has its absolute
beginning in this event, al-
though as regards time this
event is only the continuation
of a preceding series. For this
resolution and act of mine do
not form part of the succession
of purely natural effects, and
are not a mere continuation
of them. In respect of its
happening, natural causes
exercise over it no determin-
ing influence whatsoever. It
does indeed follow upon them,
but without arising out of
them; and accordingly, in
respect of causality though
not of time, must be entitled
an absolutely first beginning
of a series of appearances. 
P 414a
 for, should this be done, that connection of
appearances determining one
another with necessity ac-
cording to universal laws,
which we entitle nature, and
with it the criterion of em-
pirical truth, whereby experi-
ence is distinguished from
dreaming, would almost en-
tirely disappear. Side by side
with such a lawless faculty
of freedom, nature [as an
ordered system] is hardly
thinkable; the influences of
the former would so un-
ceasingly alter the laws of
the latter that the appear-
ances which in their natural
course are regular and uni-
form would be reduced to
disorder and incoherence. 
P 414
 This requirement of reason,
that we appeal in the series
of natural causes to a first
beginning, due to freedom,
is amply confirmed when
we observe that all the
P 415
philosophers of antiquity, with the
sole exception of the Epi-
curean School, felt them-
selves obliged, when explain-
ing cosmical movements, to
assume a prime mover, that
is, a freely acting cause, which
first and of itself began this
series of states. They made
no attempt to render a first be-
ginning conceivable through
nature's own resources. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS 
Thesis
There belongs to the world,
either as its part or as its
cause, a being that is abso-
lutely necessary. 
Proof 
The sensible world, as the
sum-total of all appearances,
contains a series of alterations. 
For without such a series even
the representation of serial
time, as a condition of the
possibility of the sensible
world, would not be given us. 
++ Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is
indeed objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual
consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given
only in connection with perceptions. 
P 415a
Antithesis
An absolutely necessary
being nowhere exists in the
world, nor does it exist out-
side the world as its cause. 
Proof 
If we assume that the
world itself is necessary, or
that a necessary being exists
in it, there are then two alter-
natives. Either there is a be-
ginning in the series of alter-
ations which is absolutely
necessary, and therefore with-
out a cause, or the series it-
self is without any beginning,
and although contingent and
P 416a
conditioned in all its parts,
none the less, as a whole, is
absolutely necessary and un-
conditioned. 
P 415
But every alteration stands
under its condition, which pre-
cedes it in time and renders
P 416
it necessary. Now every con-
ditioned that is given pre-
supposes, in respect of its
existence, a complete series of
conditions up to the uncon-
ditioned, which alone is abso-
lutely necessary. Alteration
thus existing as a consequence
of the absolutely necessary,
the existence of something
absolutely necessary must
be granted. But this neces-
sary existence itself belongs
to the sensible world. For if
it existed outside that world,
the series of alterations in the
world would derive its begin-
ning from a necessary cause
which would not itself belong
to the sensible world. This,
however, is impossible. For
since the beginning of a series
in time can be determined
only by that which precedes
it in time, the highest condi-
tion of the beginning of a
series of changes must exist
in the time when the series
as yet was not (for a begin-
ning is an existence preceded
by a time in which the thing
that begins did not yet exist). 
P 416a
The former
alternative, however, conflicts
with the dynamical law of the
determination of all appear-
ances in time; and the latter
alternative contradicts itself,
since the existence of a series
cannot be necessary if no
single member of it is neces-
sary. 
If, on the other hand, we
assume that an absolutely
necessary cause of the world
exists outside the world, then
this cause, as the highest
member in the series of the
causes of changes in the
world, must begin the exist-
ence of the latter and their
series. Now this cause must
itself begin to act, and its
causality would therefore be
in time, and so would be-
long to the sum of appear-
ances, that is, to the world. It
follows that it itself, the cause,
would not be outside the
world -- which contradicts our
hypothesis. 
++ The word 'begin' is taken in two senses; first as active, signify-
ing that as cause it begins (infit) a series of states which is its effect;
secondly as passive, signifying the causality which begins to operate
(fit) in the cause itself. I reason here from the former to the latter
meaning. 
P 416
Accordingly the causality
of the necessary cause of
P 417
alterations, and therefore the
cause itself, must belong to
time and so to appearance --
time being possible only as
the form of appearance. Such
causality cannot, therefore,
be thought apart from that
sum of all appearances which
constitutes the world of sense. 
Something absolutely neces-
sary is therefore contained in
the world itself, whether this
something be the whole series
of alterations in the world or
a part of the series. 
OBSERVATION ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY 
I. On the Thesis
In proving the existence of
a necessary being I ought
not, in this connection, to
employ any but the cosmo-
logical argument, that,
namely, which ascends from
the conditioned in the [field
of] appearance to the un-
conditioned in concept, this
latter being regarded as the
necessary condition of the
absolute totality of the series. 
To seek proof of this from the
mere idea of a supreme being
belongs to another principle
of reason, and will have to
be treated separately. 
The pure cosmological
proof, in demonstrating the
existence of a necessary being,
P 418
has to leave unsettled whether
this being is the world itself
or a thing distinct from it. 
P 416a
Therefore neither
in the world, nor outside the
world (though in causal
P 417a
connection with it), does there
exist any absolutely necessary
being. 
II. On the Antithesis
The difficulties in the way
of asserting the existence of
an absolutely necessary high-
est cause, which we suppose
ourselves to meet as we
ascend in the series of appear-
ances, cannot be such as
arise in connection with mere
concepts of the necessary
existence of a thing in general. 
The difficulties are not, there-
fore, ontological, but must
concern the causal connection
of a series of appearances for
which a condition has to be
assumed that is itself un-
conditioned, and so must be
cosmological, and relate to
empirical laws. 
P 418
To establish the latter view,
we should require principles
which are no longer cosmo-
logical and do not continue in
the series of appearances. For
we should have to employ
concepts of contingent beings
in general (viewed as objects
of the understanding alone)
and a principle which will
enable us to connect these,
by means of mere concepts,
with a necessary being. But
all this belongs to a tran-
scendent philosophy; and
that we are not yet in a
position to discuss. 
If we begin our proof
cosmologically, resting it upon
the series of appearances and
the regress therein according
to empirical laws of causality,
we must not afterwards sud-
denly deviate from this mode
of argument, passing over to
something that is not a mem-
ber of the series. Anything
taken as condition must be
viewed precisely in the same
manner in which we viewed
the relation of the condi-
tioned to its condition in the
series which is supposed to
carry us by continuous ad-
vance to the supreme condi-
tion. 
P 417
It must be
shown that regress in the
P 418a
series of causes (in the
sensible world) can never
terminate in an empirically
unconditioned condition, and
that the cosmological argu-
ment from the contingency
of states of the world, as
evidenced by their alterations,
does not support the assump-
tion of a first and absolutely
originative cause of the series. 
A strange situation is dis-
closed in this antinomy. 
From the same ground on
which, in the thesis, the ex-
istence of an original being
was inferred, its non-exist-
ence is inferred in the anti-
thesis, and this with equal
stringency. We were first
assured that a necessary being
exists because the whole of
past time comprehends the
series of all conditions and
therefore also the uncondi-
tioned (that is, the necessary);
we are now assured that there
is no necessary being, and
precisely for the reason that
the whole of past time com-
prehends the series of all
conditions (which therefore
are one and all themselves
conditioned). The explana-
tion is this. The former argu-
ment takes account only of
the absolute totality of the
series of conditions deter-
mining each other in time,
P 419a
and so reaches what is un-
conditioned and necessary. 
P 419
If, then, this relation is sensible and falls within the
province of the possible em-
pirical employment of under-
standing, the highest condi-
tion or cause can bring the
regress to a close only in
accordance with the laws of
sensibility, and therefore only
in so far as it itself belongs
to the temporal series. The
necessary being must there-
fore be regarded as the highest
member of the cosmical series. 
Nevertheless certain think-
ers have allowed themselves
the liberty of making such a
saltus (metabasis eis allo
genos. From the alterations
in the world they have in-
ferred their empirical con-
tingency, that is, their de-
pendence on empirically de-
termining causes, and so have
obtained an ascending series
of empirical conditions. And
so far they were entirely in
the right. But since they
could not find in such a
series any first beginning, or
any highest member, they
passed suddenly from the
empirical concept of con-
tingency, and laid hold upon
the pure category, which then
gave rise to a strictly intelli-
gible series the completeness
of which rested on the exist-
ence of an absolutely neces-
sary cause. 
P 419a
The latter argument, on the
other hand, takes into con-
sideration the contingency of
everything which is deter-
mined in the temporal series
(everything being preceded
by a time in which the condi-
tion must itself again be
determined as conditioned),
and from this point of view
everything unconditioned and
all absolute necessity com-
pletely vanish. Nevertheless,
the method of argument in
both cases is entirely in con-
formity even with ordinary
human reason, which fre-
quently falls into conflict with
itself through considering its
object from two different
points of view. M. de Mairan
regarded the controversy be-
tween two famous astrono-
mers, which arose from a
similar difficulty in regard to
choice of standpoint, as a
sufficiently remarkable phe-
nomenon to justify his writing
a special treatise upon it. The
one had argued that the
moon revolves on its own
axis, because it always turns
the same side towards the
earth. The other drew the
opposite conclusion that the
moon does not revolve on its
own axis, because it always
P 420a
turns the same side towards
the earth. 
P 420
Since this cause was not bound down to any
sensible conditions, it was
freed from the temporal con-
dition which would require
that its causality should itself
have a beginning. But such
procedure is entirely illegiti-
mate, as may be gathered
from what follows. 
In the strict meaning of the
category, the contingent is
so named because its contra-
dictory opposite is possible. 
Now we cannot argue from
empirical contingency to in-
telligible contingency. When
anything is altered, the op-
posite of its state is actual
at another time, and is there-
fore possible. This present
state is not, however, the
contradictory opposite of the
preceding state. To obtain
such a contradictory opposite
we require to conceive, that
in the same time in which the
preceding state was, its op-
posite could have existed in
its place, and this can never
be inferred from [the fact of]
the alteration. A body which
was in motion (= A) comes
to rest (= non-A). Now from
the fact that a state opposite
to the state A follows upon
the state A, we cannot argue
that the contradictory op-
posite of A is possible, and
that A is therefore con-
tingent. 
P 420a
Both inferences
were correct, according to the
point of view which each
chose in observing the moon's
motion. 
P 421
To prove such a conclusion, it would have to
be shown that in place of the
motion, and at the time at
which it occurred, there could
have been rest. All that we
know is that rest was real in
the time that followed upon
the motion, and was therefore
likewise possible. Motion at
one time and rest at another
time are not related as contra-
dictory opposites. Accord-
ingly the succession of op-
posite determinations, that is,
alteration, in no way estab-
lishes contingency of the type
represented in the concepts of
pure understanding; and can-
not therefore carry us to the
existence of a necessary being,
similarly conceived in purely
intelligible terms. Alteration
proves only empirical con-
tingency; that is, that the
new state, in the absence of
a cause which belongs to the
preceding time, could never
of itself have taken place. 
Such is the condition pre-
scribed by the law of causal-
ity. This cause, even if it be
viewed as absolutely neces-
sary, must be such as can be
thus met with in time, and
must belong to the series of
appearances. 
P 422
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 3
THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE CONFLICTS 
We have now completely before us the dialectic play of
cosmological ideas. The ideas are such that an object congruent
with them can never be given in any possible experience, and
that even in thought reason is unable to bring them into har-
mony with the universal laws of nature. Yet they are not
arbitrarily conceived. Reason, in the continuous advance of
empirical synthesis, is necessarily led up to them whenever
it endeavours to free from all conditions and apprehend in
its unconditioned totality that which according to the rules
of experience can never be determined save as conditioned. 
These pseudo-rational assertions are so many attempts to
solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There
are just so many, neither more nor fewer, owing to the fact that
there are just four series of synthetic presuppositions which
impose a priori limitations on the empirical synthesis. 
The proud pretensions of reason, when it strives to extend
its domain beyond all limits of experience, we have represented
only in dry formulas that contain merely the ground of their
legal claims. As befits a transcendental philosophy, they have
been divested of all empirical features, although only in con-
nection therewith can their full splendour be displayed. But
in this empirical application, and in the progressive extension
of the employment of reason, philosophy, beginning with the
field of our experiences and steadily soaring to these lofty ideas,
displays a dignity and worth such that, could it but make good
its pretensions, it would leave all other human science far
behind. For it promises a secure foundation for our high-
est expectations in respect of those ultimate ends towards
which all the endeavours of reason must ultimately converge. 
Whether the world has a beginning [in time] and any limit to
its extension in space; whether there is anywhere, and perhaps
in my thinking self, an indivisible and indestructible unity,
or nothing but what is divisible and transitory; whether I am
free in my actions or, like other beings, am led by the hand of
P 423
nature and of fate; whether finally there is a supreme cause
of the world, or whether the things of nature and their order
must as the ultimate object terminate thought -- an object that
even in our speculations can never be transcended: these are
questions for the solution of which the mathematician would
gladly exchange the whole of his science. For mathematics
can yield no satisfaction in regard to those highest ends that
most closely concern humanity. And yet the very dignity of
mathematics (that pride of human reason) rests upon this,
that it guides reason to knowledge of nature in its order and
regularity -- alike in what is great in it and in what is small --
and in the extraordinary unity of its moving forces, thus
rising to a degree of insight far beyond what any philosophy
based on ordinary experience would lead us to expect; and
so gives occasion and encouragement to an employment of
reason that is extended beyond all experience, and at the same
time supplies it with the most excellent materials for support-
ing its investigations -- so far as the character of these permits
-- by appropriate intuitions. 
Unfortunately for speculation, though fortunately perhaps
for the practical interests of humanity, reason, in the midst of
its highest expectations, finds itself so compromised by the
conflict of opposing arguments, that neither its honour nor
its security allows it to withdraw and treat the quarrel with
indifference as a mere mock fight; and still less is it in a posi-
tion to command peace, being itself directly interested in the
matters in dispute. Accordingly, nothing remains for reason
save to consider whether the origin of this conflict, whereby
it is divided against itself, may not have arisen from a mere
misunderstanding. In such an enquiry both parties, per chance,
may have to sacrifice proud claims; but a lasting and peaceful
reign of reason over understanding and the senses would
thereby be inaugurated. 
For the present we shall defer this thorough enquiry, in
order first of all to consider upon which side we should prefer
to fight, should we be compelled to make choice between
the opposing parties. The raising of this question, how we
should proceed if we consulted only our interest and not
the logical criterion of truth, will decide nothing in regard to
P 424
the contested rights of the two parties, but has this advantage,
that it enables us to comprehend why the participants in this
quarrel, though not influenced by any superior insight into the
matter under dispute, have preferred to fight on one side
rather than on the other. It will also cast light on a number of
incidental points, for instance, the passionate zeal of the one
party and the calm assurance of the other; and will explain
why the world hails the one with eager approval, and is im-
placably prejudiced against the other. 
Comparison of the principles which form the starting-
points of the two parties is what enables us, as we shall find,
to determine the standpoint from which alone this preliminary
enquiry can be carried out with the required thoroughness. In
the assertions of the antithesis we observe a perfect uniformity
in manner of thinking and complete unity of maxims, namely
a principle of pure empiricism, applied not only in explana-
tion of the appearances within the world, but also in the
solution of the transcendental ideas of the world itself, in its
totality. The assertions of the thesis, on the other hand, pre-
suppose, in addition to the empirical mode of explanation
employed within the series of appearances, intelligible begin-
nings; and to this extent its maxim is complex. But as its
essential and distinguishing characteristic is the presupposi-
tion of intelligible beginnings, I shall entitle it the dogmatism
of pure reason. 
In the determination of the cosmological ideas, we find on
the side of dogmatism, that is, of the thesis:
First, a certain practical interest in which every right-
thinking man, if he has understanding of what truly concerns
him, heartily shares. That the world has a beginning, that my
thinking self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature,
that it is free in its voluntary actions and raised above the
compulsion of nature, and finally that all order in the things
constituting the world is due to a primordial being, from which
everything derives its unity and purposive connection -- these
are so many foundation stones of morals and religion. The
antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least appears to
do so. 
Secondly, reason has a speculative interest on the side of
P 425
the thesis. When the transcendental ideas are postulated and
employed in the manner prescribed by the thesis, the entire
chain of conditions and the derivation of the conditioned can
be grasped completely a priori. For we then start from the
unconditioned. This is not done by the antithesis, which for
this reason is at a very serious disadvantage. To the question
as to the conditions of its synthesis it can give no answer which
does not lead to the endless renewal of the same enquiry. 
According to the antithesis, every given beginning compels us
to advance to one still higher; every part leads to a still smaller
part; every event is preceded by another event as its cause; and
the conditions of existence in general rest always again upon
other conditions, without ever obtaining unconditioned foot-
ing and support in any self-subsistent thing, viewed as prim-
ordial being. 
Thirdly, the thesis has also the advantage of popularity;
and this certainly forms no small part of its claim to favour. 
The common understanding finds not the least difficulty in the
idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis. Being
more accustomed to descend to consequences than to ascend
to grounds, it does not puzzle over the possibility of the abso-
lutely first; on the contrary, it finds comfort in such concepts,
and at the same time a fixed point to which the thread by
which it guides its movements can be attached. In the restless
ascent from the conditioned to the condition, always with one
foot in the air, there can be no satisfaction. 
In the determination of the cosmological ideas we find on
the side of empiricism, that is, of the antithesis: first, no such
practical interest (due to pure principles of reason) as is pro-
vided for the thesis by morals and religion. On the contrary,
pure empiricism appears to deprive them of all power and in-
fluence. If there is no primordial being distinct from the world,
if the world is without beginning and therefore without an
Author, if our will is not free, and the soul is divisible and
perishable like matter, moral ideas and principles lose all
validity, and share in the fate of the transcendental ideas
which served as their theoretical support. 
But secondly, in compensation, empiricism yields advan-
tages to the speculative interest of reason, which are very
P 426
attractive and far surpass those which dogmatic teaching
bearing on the ideas of reason can offer. According to the
principle of empiricism the understanding is always on its own
proper ground, namely, the field of genuinely possible experi-
ences, investigating their laws, and by means of these laws
affording indefinite extension to the sure and comprehensible
knowledge which it supplies. Here every object, both in itself
and in its relations, can and ought to be represented in in-
tuition, or at least in concepts for which the corresponding
images can be clearly and distinctly provided in given similar
intuitions. There is no necessity to leave the chain of the
natural order and to resort to ideas, the objects of which are
not known, because, as mere thought-entities, they can never
be given. Indeed, the understanding is not permitted to leave
its proper business, and under the pretence of having brought
it to completion to pass over into the sphere of idealising
reason and of transcendent concepts -- a sphere in which it
is no longer necessary for it to observe and investigate in
accordance with the laws of nature, but only to think and to
invent in the assurance that it cannot be refuted by the facts
of nature, not being bound by the evidence which they yield,
but presuming to pass them by or even to subordinate them
to a higher authority, namely, that of pure reason. 
The empiricist will never allow, therefore, that any epoch
of nature is to be taken as the absolutely first, or that any
limit of his insight into the extent of nature is to be regarded
as the widest possible. Nor does he permit any transition from
the objects of nature -- which he can analyse through observa-
tion and mathematics, and synthetically determine in intuition
(the extended) -- to those which neither sense nor imagination
can ever represent in concreto (the simple). Nor will he admit
the legitimacy of assuming in nature itself any power that
operates independently of the laws of nature (freedom), and
so of encroaching upon the business of the understanding,
which is that of investigating, according to necessary rules,
the origin of appearances. And, lastly, he will not grant
that a cause ought ever to be sought outside nature, in an
original being. We know nothing but nature, since it alone can
present objects to us and instruct us in regard to their laws. 
P 427
If the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in pro-
pounding his antithesis than to subdue the rashness and pre-
sumption of those who so far misconstrue the true vocation of
reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true in-
sight and knowledge cease, and to represent as furthering spec-
ulative interests that which is valid only in relation to practical
interests (in order, as may suit their convenience, to break the
thread of physical enquiries, and then under the pretence of ex-
tending knowledge to fasten it to transcendental ideas, through
which we really know only that we know nothing); if, I say,
the empiricist were satisfied with this, his principle would be
a maxim urging moderation in our pretensions, modesty in
our assertions, and yet at the same time the greatest possible
extension of our understanding, through the teacher fittingly
assigned to us, namely, through experience. If such were our
procedure, we should not be cut off from employing intel-
lectual presuppositions and faith on behalf of our practical
interest; only they could never be permitted to assume the
title and dignity of science and rational insight. Knowledge,
which as such is speculative, can have no other object than
that supplied by experience; if we transcend the limits thus
imposed, the synthesis which seeks, independently of experi-
ence, new species of knowledge, lacks that substratum of
intuition upon which alone it can be exercised. 
But when empiricism itself, as frequently happens, be-
comes dogmatic in its attitude towards ideas, and confidently
denies whatever lies beyond the sphere of its intuitive know-
ledge, it betrays the same lack of modesty; and this is all the
more reprehensible owing to the irreparable injury which is
thereby caused to the practical interests of reason. 
 The contrast between the teaching of Epicurus and that of
Plato is of this nature. 
++ It is, however, open to question whether Epicurus ever pro-
pounded these principles as objective assertions. If perhaps they
were for him nothing more than maxims for the speculative employ-
ment of reason, then he showed in this regard a more genuine philo-
sophical spirit than any other of the philosophers of antiquity. That,
in explaining the appearances, we must proceed as if the field of our
enquiry were not circumscribed by any limit or beginning of the
world; that we must assume the material composing the world to
be such as it must be if we are to learn about it from experience; 
P 428
 Each of the two types of philosophy says more than it
knows. The former encourages and furthers knowledge,
though to the prejudice of the practical; the latter supplies
excellent practical principles, but it permits reason to indulge
in ideal explanations of natural appearances, in regard to
which a speculative knowledge is alone possible to us -- to the
neglect of physical investigation. 
Finally, as regards the third factor which has to be con-
sidered in a preliminary choice between the two conflicting
parties, it is extremely surprising that empiricism should be so
universally unpopular. The common understanding, it might
be supposed, would eagerly adopt a programme which pro-
mises to satisfy it through exclusively empirical knowledge
and the rational connections there revealed -- in preference to
the transcendental dogmatism which compels it to rise to
concepts far outstripping the insight and rational faculties
of the most practised thinkers. But this is precisely what com-
mends such dogmatism to the common understanding. For it
then finds itself in a position in which the most learned can
claim no advantage over it. If it understands little or nothing
about these matters, no one can boast of understanding much
more; and though in regard to them it cannot express itself in
so scholastically correct a manner as those with special train-
ing, nevertheless there is no end to the plausible arguments
which it can propound, wandering as it does amidst mere ideas,
about which no one knows anything, and in regard to which
it is therefore free to be as eloquent as it pleases; 
++ that we must postulate no other mode of the production of events
than one which will enable them to be [regarded as] determined
through unalterable laws of nature; and finally that no use must be
made of any cause distinct from the world -- all these principles still
[retain their value]. They are very sound principles (though seldom
observed) for extending the scope of speculative philosophy, while
at the same time [enabling us] to discover the principles of morality
without depending for this discovery upon alien [i.e. non-moral,
theoretical] sources; and it does not follow in the least that those
who require us, so long as we are occupied with mere speculation,
to ignore these dogmatic propositions [that there is a limit and
beginning to the world, a Divine Cause, etc. ], can justly be accused
of wishing to deny them. 
P 429
whereas when matters that involve the investigation of nature are in
question, it has to stand silent and to admit its ignorance. Thus
indolence and vanity combine in sturdy support of these prin-
ciples. Besides, although the philosopher finds it extremely
hard to accept a principle for which he can give no justifica-
tion, still more to employ concepts the objective reality of which
he is unable to establish, nothing is more usual in the case of
the common understanding. It insists upon having something
from which it can make a confident start. The difficulty of even
conceiving this presupposed starting-point does not disquiet
it. Since it is unaware what conceiving really means, it never
occurs to it to reflect upon the assumption; it accepts as known
whatever is familiar to it through frequent use. For the
common understanding, indeed, all speculative interests pale
before the practical; and it imagines that it comprehends and
knows what its fears or hopes incite it to assume or to believe. 
Thus empiricism is entirely devoid of the popularity of tran-
scendentally idealising reason; and however prejudicial such
empiricism may be to the highest practical principles, there
is no need to fear that it will ever pass the limits of the Schools,
and acquire any considerable influence in the general life or
any real favour among the multitude. 
Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it
regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system,
and therefore allows only such principles as do not at any rate
make it impossible for any knowledge that we may attain to
combine into a system with other knowledge. But the proposi-
tions of the antithesis are of such a kind that they render the
completion of the edifice of knowledge quite impossible. They
maintain that there is always to be found beyond every state
of the world a more ancient state, in every part yet other parts
similarly divisible, prior to every event still another event
which itself again is likewise generated, and that in existence
in general everything is conditioned, an unconditioned and
first existence being nowhere discernible. Since, therefore,
the antithesis thus refuses to admit as first or as a beginning
anything that could serve as a foundation for building, a
P 430
complete edifice of knowledge is, on such assumptions, alto-
gether impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason --
the demand not for empirical but for pure a priori unity of
reason -- forms a natural recommendation for the assertions
of the thesis. 
If men could free themselves from all such interests, and
consider the assertions of reason irrespective of their conse-
quences, solely in view of the intrinsic force of their grounds,
and were the only way of escape from their perplexities to
give adhesion to one or other of the opposing parties, their
state would be one of continuous vacillation. To-day it would
be their conviction that the human will is free; to-morrow,
dwelling in reflection upon the indissoluble chain of nature,
they would hold that freedom is nothing but self-deception,
that everything is simply nature. If, however, they were
summoned to action, this play of the merely speculative
reason would, like a dream, at once cease, and they would
choose their principles exclusively in accordance with practi-
cal interests. Since, however, it is fitting that a reflective and
enquiring being should devote a certain amount of time to
the examination of his own reason, entirely divesting himself
of all partiality and openly submitting his observations to the
judgment of others, no one can be blamed for, much less pro-
hibited from, presenting for trial the two opposing parties,
leaving them, terrorised by no threats, to defend themselves as
best they can, before a jury of like standing with themselves,
that is, before a jury of fallible men. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 4
THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF A SOLUTION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS OF PURE REASON 
To profess to solve all problems and to answer all questions
would be impudent boasting, and would argue such extrava-
gant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all confidence. Neverthe-
less there are sciences the very nature of which requires that
every question arising within their domain should be com-
P 431
pletely answerable in terms of what is known, inasmuch as the
answer must issue from the same sources from which the
question proceeds. In these sciences it is not permissible to
plead unavoidable ignorance; the solution can be demanded. 
We must be able, in every possible case, in accordance with a
rule, to know what is right and what is wrong, since this con-
cerns our obligation, and we have no obligation to that which
we cannot know. In the explanation of natural appearances,
on the other hand, much must remain uncertain and many
questions insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no
means sufficient, in all cases, to account for what has to be ex-
plained. The question, therefore, is whether in transcendental
philosophy there is any question relating to an object pre-
sented to pure reason which is unanswerable by this reason,
and whether we may rightly excuse ourselves from giving a
decisive answer. In thus excusing ourselves, we should have
to show that any knowledge which we can acquire still leaves
us in complete uncertainty as to what should be ascribed to
the object, and that while we do indeed have a concept suffi-
cient to raise a question, we are entirely lacking in materials
or power to answer the same. 
Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy is unique
in the whole field of speculative knowledge, in that no ques-
tion which concerns an object given to pure reason can be
insoluble for this same human reason, and that no excuse of
an unavoidable ignorance, or of the problem's unfathomable
depth, can release us from the obligation to answer it thor-
oughly and completely. That very concept which puts us in a
position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it,
since, as in the case of right and wrong, the object is not to be
met with outside the concept. 
In transcendental philosophy, however, the only questions
to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer
bearing on the constitution of the object, and from answering
which the philosopher is not permitted to excuse himself on
the plea of their impenetrable obscurity, are the cosmological. 
These questions [bearing on the constitution of the object]
must refer exclusively to cosmological ideas. For the object
must be given empirically, the question being only as to its
conformity to an idea. If, on the other hand, the object is
P 432
transcendental, and therefore itself unknown; if, for instance,
the question be whether that something, the appearance of
which (in ourselves) is thought (soul), is in itself a simple being,
whether there is an absolutely necessary cause of all things,
and so forth, what we have then to do is in each case to seek
an object for our idea; and we may well confess that this object
is unknown to us, though not therefore impossible. The cos-
mological ideas alone have the peculiarity that they can pre-
suppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for
its concept, as being given. The question which arises out of
these ideas refers only to the advance in this synthesis, that
is, whether it should be carried so far as to contain absolute
totality -- such totality, since it cannot be given in any experi-
ence, being no longer empirical. Since we are here dealing
solely with a thing as object of a possible experience, not as a
thing in itself, the answer to the transcendent cosmological
question cannot lie anywhere save in the idea. We are not
asking what is the constitution of any object in itself, nor
as regards possible experience are we enquiring what can
be given in concreto in any experience. Our sole question
is as to what lies in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis
can do no more than merely approximate; the question must
therefore be capable of being solved entirely from the idea. 
Since the idea is a mere creature of reason, reason cannot
disclaim its responsibility and saddle it upon the unknown
object. 
++ Although to the question, what is the constitution of a tran-
scendental object, no answer can be given stating what it is, we can
yet reply that the question itself is nothing, because there is no
given object [corresponding] to it. Accordingly all questions dealt
with in the transcendental doctrine of the soul are answerable in
this latter manner, and have indeed been so answered; its
questions refer to the transcendental subject of all inner appear-
ances, which is not itself appearance and consequently not given
as object, and in which none of the categories (and it is to them
that the question is really directed) meet with the conditions re-
quired for their application. We have here a case where the com-
mon saying holds, that no answer is itself an answer. A question
as to the constitution of that something which cannot be thought
through any determinate predicate -- inasmuch as it is completely
outside the sphere of those objects which can be given to us -- is
entirely null and void. 
P 433
It is not so extraordinary as at first seems the case, that a
science should be in a position to demand and expect none but
assured answers to all the questions within its domain (quae-
stiones domesticae), although up to the present they have per-
haps not been found. In addition to transcendental philosophy,
there are two pure rational sciences, one purely speculative,
the other with a practical content, namely, pure mathematics
and pure ethics. Has it ever been suggested that, because of
our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must remain un-
certain what exact relation, in rational or irrational numbers,
a diameter bears to a circle? Since no adequate solution in
terms of rational numbers is possible, and no solution in terms
of irrational numbers has yet been discovered, it was con-
cluded that at least the impossibility of a solution can be
known with certainty, and of this impossibility Lambert has
given the required proof. In the universal principles of morals
nothing can be uncertain, because the principles are either
altogether void and meaningless, or must be derived from
the concepts of our reason. In natural science, on the other
hand, there is endless conjecture, and certainty is not to be
counted upon. For the natural appearances are objects which
are given to us independently of our concepts, and the key to
them lies not in us and our pure thinking, but outside us; and
therefore in many cases, since the key is not to be found, an
assured solution is not to be expected. I am not, of course, here
referring to those questions of the Transcendental Analytic
which concern the deduction of our pure knowledge; we are
at present treating only of the certainty of judgments with
respect to their objects and not with respect to the source of
our concepts themselves. 
The obligation of an at least critical solution of the ques-
tions which reason thus propounds to itself, we cannot, there-
fore, escape by complaints of the narrow limits of our reason,
and by confessing, under the pretext of a humility based on self-
knowledge, that it is beyond the power of our reason to deter-
mine whether the world exists from eternity or has a begin-
ning; whether cosmical space is filled with beings to infinitude,
P 434
or is enclosed within certain limits; whether anything in the
world is simple, or everything such as to be infinitely divisible;
whether there is generation and production through freedom,
or whether everything depends on the chain of events in the
natural order; and finally whether there exists any being com-
pletely unconditioned and necessary in itself, or whether every-
thing is conditioned in its existence and therefore dependent on
external things and itself contingent. All these questions refer
to an object which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts,
namely, to the absolutely unconditioned totality of the syn-
thesis of appearances. If from our own concepts we are unable
to assert and determine anything certain, we must not throw
the blame upon the object as concealing itself from us. Since
such an object is nowhere to be met with outside our idea, it is
not possible for it to be given. The cause of failure we must
seek in our idea itself. For so long as we obstinately persist
in assuming that there is an actual object corresponding to
the idea, the problem, as thus viewed, allows of no solution. A
clear exposition of the dialectic which lies within our concept
itself would soon yield us complete certainty how we ought
to judge in reference to such a question. 
The pretext that we are unable to obtain certainty in regard
to these problems can be at once met with the following question
which certainly calls for a clear answer: Whence come those
ideas, the solution of which involves us in such difficulty? Is it,
perchance, appearances that demand explanation, and do we,
in accordance with these ideas, have to seek only the principles
or rules of their exposition? Even if we suppose the whole of
nature to be spread out before us, and that of all that is pre-
sented to our intuition nothing is concealed from our senses and
consciousness, yet still through no experience could the object
of our ideas be known by us in concreto. For that purpose, in
addition to this exhaustive intuition, we should require what
is not possible through any empirical knowledge, namely, a
completed synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute
totality. Accordingly our question does not require to be raised
in the explanation of any given appearance, and is therefore
not a question which can be regarded as imposed on us by
the object itself. The object can never come before us, since
it cannot be given through any possible experience. In all
P 435
possible perceptions we always remain involved in conditions,
whether in space or in time, and come upon nothing un-
conditioned requiring us to determine whether this uncondi-
tioned is to be located in an absolute beginning of synthesis,
or in an absolute totality of a series that has no beginning. 
In its empirical meaning, the term 'whole' is always only com-
parative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe), the
whole of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence
in general, with all questions as to whether it is brought about
through finite synthesis or through a synthesis requiring infinite
extension, have nothing to do with any possible experience. 
We should not, for instance, in any wise be able to explain the
appearances of a body better, or even differently, in assuming
that it consisted either of simple or of inexhaustibly com-
posite parts; for neither a simple appearance nor an infinite
composition can ever come before us. Appearances demand
explanation only so far as the conditions of their explanation
are given in perception; but all that may ever be given in this
way, when taken together in an absolute whole, is not itself
a perception. Yet it is just the explanation of this very
whole that is demanded in the transcendental problems of
reason. 
Thus the solution of these problems can never be found
in experience, and this is precisely the reason why we should
not say that it is uncertain what should be ascribed to the
object [of our idea]. For as our object is only in our brain,
and cannot be given outside it, we have only to take care to
be at one with ourselves, and to avoid that amphiboly which
transforms our idea into a supposed representation of an
object that is empirically given and therefore to be known
according to the laws of experience. The dogmatic solution is
therefore not only uncertain, but impossible. The critical solu-
tion, which allows of complete certainty, does not consider the
question objectively, but in relation to the foundation of the
knowledge upon which the question is based. 
P 436
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 5
SCEPTICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL
QUESTIONS IN THE FOUR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS 
We should of ourselves desist from the demand that our
questions be answered dogmatically, if from the start we
understood that whatever the dogmatic answer might turn out
to be it would only increase our ignorance, and cast us from
one inconceivability into another, from one obscurity into
another still greater, and perhaps even into contradictions. If
our question is directed simply to a yes or no, we are well
advised to leave aside the supposed grounds of the answer, and
first consider what we should gain according as the answer is
in the affirmative or in the negative. Should we then find that
in both cases the outcome is mere nonsense, there will be good
reason for instituting a critical examination of our question, to
determine whether the question does not itself rest on a ground-
less presupposition, in that it plays with an idea the falsity of
which can be more easily detected through study of its applica-
tion and consequences than in its own separate representation. 
This is the great utility of the sceptical mode of dealing with
the questions which pure reason puts to pure reason. By its
means we can deliver ourselves, at but a small cost, from a
great body of sterile dogmatism, and set in its place a sober
critique, which as a true cathartic will effectively guard us
against such groundless beliefs and the supposed polymathy
to which they lead. 
If therefore, in dealing with a cosmological idea, I were
able to appreciate beforehand that whatever view may be
taken of the unconditioned in the successive synthesis of ap-
pearances, it must either be too large or too small for any con-
cept of the understanding, I should be in a position to under-
stand that since the cosmological idea has no bearing save
upon an object of experience which has to be in conformity
with a possible concept of the understanding, it must be
P 437
entirely empty and without meaning; for its object, view it as
we may, cannot be made to agree with it. This is in fact the
case with all cosmical concepts; and this is why reason, so
long as it holds to them, is involved in an unavoidable
antinomy. For suppose: --
First, that the world has no beginning: it is then too large
for our concept, which, consisting as it does in a successive
regress, can never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed. 
Or suppose that the world has a beginning, it will then, in the
necessary empirical regress, be too small for the concept of
the understanding. For since the beginning still presupposes a
time which precedes it, it is still not unconditioned; and the law
of the empirical employment of the understanding therefore
obliges us to look for a higher temporal condition; and the
world [as limited in time] is therefore obviously too small for
this law. 
This is also true of the twofold answer to the question
regarding the magnitude of the world in space. If it is infinite
and unlimited, it is too large for any possible empirical con-
cept. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask what
determines these limits. Empty space is no self-subsistent
correlate of things, and cannot be a condition at which we
could stop; still less can it be an empirical condition, forming
part of a possible experience. (For how can there be any ex-
perience of the absolutely void? ) And yet to obtain absolute
totality in the empirical synthesis it is always necessary that
the unconditioned be an empirical concept. Consequently, a
limited world is too small for our concept. 
Secondly, if every appearance in space (matter) consists of
infinitely many parts, the regress in the division will always
be too great for our concept; while if the division of space is
to stop at any member of the division (the simple), the regress
will be too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For this
member always still allows of a regress to further parts con-
tained in it. 
Thirdly, if we suppose that nothing happens in the world
save in accordance with the laws of nature, the causality of
the cause will always itself be something that happens, making
necessary a regress to a still higher cause, and thus a con-
tinuation of the series of conditions a parte priori without end. 
P 438
Nature, as working always through efficient causes, is thus
too large for any of the concepts which we can employ in the
synthesis of cosmical events. 
If, in certain cases, we admit the occurrence of self-caused
events, that is, generation through freedom, then by an un-
avoidable law of nature the question 'why' still pursues us,
constraining us, in accordance with the law of causality
[which governs] experience, to pass beyond such events; and
we thus find that such totality of connection is too small for
our necessary empirical concept. 
Fourthly, if we admit an absolutely necessary being
(whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or
the cause of the world), we set it in a time infinitely remote
from any given point of time, because otherwise it would be
dependent upon another and antecedent being. But such an
existence is then too large for our empirical concept, and is
unapproachable through any regress, however far this be
carried. 
 If, again, we hold that everything belonging to the world
(whether as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, any
and every given existence is too small for our concept. For
we are constrained always still to look about for some other
existence upon which it is dependent. 
We have said that in all these cases the cosmical idea is
either too large or too small for the empirical regress, and
therefore for any possible concept of the understanding. We
have thus been maintaining that the fault lies with the idea, in
being too large or too small for that to which it is directed,
namely, possible experience. Why have we not expressed our-
selves in the opposite manner, saying that in the former case
the empirical concept is always too small for the idea, and in
the latter too large, and that the blame therefore attaches to
the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible experience
is that which can alone give reality to our concepts; in its
absence a concept is a mere idea, without truth, that is, without
relation to any object. The possible empirical concept is there-
fore the standard by which we must judge whether the idea
is a mere idea and thought-entity, or whether it finds its object
in the world. For we can say of anything that it is too large
P 439
or too small relatively to something else, only if the former is
required for the sake of the latter, and has to be adapted to it. 
Among the puzzles propounded in the ancient dialectical
Schools was the question, whether, if a ball cannot pass
through a hole, we should say that the ball is too large or the
hole too small. In such a case it is a matter of indifference
how we choose to express ourselves, for we do not know which
exists for the sake of the other. In the case, however, of a man
and his coat, we do not say that a man is too tall for his coat,
but that the coat is too short for the man. 
We have thus been led to what is at least a well-grounded
suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the
mutually conflicting pseudo-rational assertions, may perhaps
rest on an empty and merely fictitious concept of the manner
in which the object of these ideas is given to us; and this sus-
picion may set us on the right path for laying bare the illusion
which has so long led us astray. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 6
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC 
We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic
that everything intuited in space or time, and therefore all
objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but ap-
pearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner
in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as series of
alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. 
This doctrine I entitle transcendental idealism. The realist, in
the transcendental meaning of this term, treats these modifica-
tions of our sensibility as self-subsistent things, that is, treats
mere representations as things in themselves. 
++ I have also, elsewhere, sometimes entitled it formal idealism,
to distinguish it from material idealism, that is, from the usual type
of idealism which doubts or denies the existence of outer things
themselves. 
P 439
It would be unjust to ascribe to us that long-decried
P 440
empirical idealism, which, while it admits the genuine reality
of space, denies the existence of the extended beings in it, or
at least considers their existence doubtful, and so does not
in this regard allow of any properly demonstrable distinction
between truth and dreams. As to the appearances of inner
sense in time, empirical idealism finds no difficulty in regard-
ing them as real things; indeed it even asserts that this inner
experience is the sufficient as well as the only proof of the
actual existence of its object (in itself, with all this time-
determination). 
 Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, admits the
reality of the objects of outer intuition, as intuited in space, and
of all changes in time, as represented by inner sense. For since
space is a form of that intuition which we entitle outer, and
since without objects in space there would be no empirical re-
presentation whatsoever, we can and must regard the extended
beings in it as real; and the same is true of time. But this space
and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in them-
selves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot
exist outside our mind. Even the inner and sensible intuition
of our mind (as object of consciousness) which is represented
as being determined by the succession of different states in
time, is not the self proper, as it exists in itself -- that is, is not
the transcendental subject -- but only an appearance that has
been given to the sensibility of this, to us unknown, being. 
This inner appearance cannot be admitted to exist in any such
manner in and by itself; for it is conditioned by time, and time
cannot be a determination of a thing in itself. The empirical
truth of appearances in space and time is, however, sufficiently
secured; it is adequately distinguished from dreams, if both
dreams and genuine appearances cohere truly and completely
in one experience, in accordance with empirical laws. 
 The objects of experience, then, are never given in them-
selves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it. 
That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one
has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted. This,
however, only means that in the possible advance of experi-
ence we may encounter them. For everything is real which
stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the
P 441
laws of empirical advance. They are therefore real if they
stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness,
although they are not for that reason real in themselves, that
is, outside this advance of experience. 
Nothing is really given us save perception and the empiri-
cal advance from this to other possible perceptions. For the
appearances, as mere representations, are in themselves real
only in perception, which perception is in fact nothing but the
reality of an empirical representation, that is, appearance. To
call an appearance a real thing prior to our perceiving it, either
means that in the advance of experience we must meet with
such a perception, or it means nothing at all. For if we were
speaking of a thing in itself, we could indeed say that it exists
in itself apart from relation to our senses and possible experi-
ence. But we are here speaking only of an appearance in space
and time, which are not determinations of things in them-
selves but only of our sensibility. Accordingly, that which is in
space and time is an appearance; it is not anything in itself
but consists merely of representations, which, if not given in
us -- that is to say, in perception -- are nowhere to be met with. 
The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a recep-
tivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with
representations, the relation of which to one another is a pure
intuition of space and of time (mere forms of our sensibility),
and which, in so far as they are connected in this manner in
space and time, and are determinable according to laws of the
unity of experience, are entitled objects. The non-sensible cause
of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot
therefore be intuited by us as object. For such an object would
have to be represented as neither in space nor in time (these
being merely conditions of sensible representation), and apart
from such conditions we cannot think any intuition. We may,
however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in
general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have
something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity. 
To this transcendental object we can ascribe the whole extent
and connection of our possible perceptions, and can say that it
is given in itself prior to all experience. But the appearances,
P 442
while conforming to it, are not given in themselves, but only in
this experience, being mere representations, which as percep-
tions can mark out a real object only in so far as the perception
connects with all others according to the rules of the unity of
experience. Thus we can say that the real things of past time
are given in the transcendental object of experience; but they
are objects for me and real in past time only in so far as I repre-
sent to myself (either by the light of history or by the guiding-
clues of causes and effects) that a regressive series of possible
perceptions in accordance with empirical laws, in a word, that
the course of the world, conducts us to a past time-series as con-
dition of the present time -- a series which, however, can be re-
presented as actual not in itself but only in the connection of a
possible experience. Accordingly, all events which have taken
place in the immense periods that have preceded my own ex-
istence mean really nothing but the possibility of extending the
chain of experience from the present perception back to the
conditions which determine this perception in respect of time. 
If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of
the senses in all time and in all places, I do not set them in
space and time [as being there] prior to experience. This
representation is nothing but the thought of a possible ex-
perience in its absolute completeness. Since the objects are
nothing but mere representations, only in such a possible
experience are they given. To say that they exist prior to
all my experience is only to assert that they are to be met
with if, starting from perception, I advance to that part of
experience to which they belong. The cause of the empirical
conditions of this advance (that which determines what mem-
bers I shall meet with, or how far I can meet with any such
in my regress) is transcendental, and is therefore necessarily
unknown to me. We are not, however, concerned with this
transcendental cause, but only with the rule of the advance in
the experience in which objects, that is to say, appearances,
are given to me. Moreover, in outcome it is a matter of in-
difference whether I say that in the empirical advance in
space I can meet with stars a hundred times farther removed
than the outermost now perceptible to me, or whether I say
that they are perhaps to be met with in cosmical space even
P 443
though no human being has ever perceived or ever will per-
ceive them. For even supposing they were given as things in
themselves, without relation to possible experience, it still
remains true that they are nothing to me, and therefore are
not objects, save in so far as they are contained in the series of
the empirical regress. Only in another sort of relation, when
these appearances would be used for the cosmological idea of
an absolute whole, and when, therefore, we are dealing with a
question which oversteps the limits of possible experience,
does distinction of the mode in which we view the reality of
those objects of the senses become of importance, as serving
to guard us against a deceptive error which is bound to arise
if we misinterpret our empirical concepts. 
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section 7
CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL CONFLICT
OF REASON WITH ITSELF 
The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dia-
lectical argument: If the conditioned is given, the entire series
of all its conditions is likewise given; objects of the senses are
given as conditioned; therefore, etc. Through this syllogism,
the major premiss of which appears so natural and evident, as
many cosmological ideas are introduced as there are differ-
ences in the conditions (in the synthesis of appearances) that
constitute a series. The ideas postulate absolute totality of
these series; and thereby they set reason in unavoidable
conflict with itself. We shall be in a better position to detect
what is deceptive in this pseudo-rational argument, if we first
correct and define some of the concepts employed in it. 
In the first place, it is evident beyond all possibility of
doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of
all its conditions is set us as a task. For it is involved in the
very concept of the conditioned that something is referred to a
condition, and if this condition is again itself conditioned, to a
more remote condition, and so through all the members of the
P 444
series. The above proposition is thus analytic, and has nothing
to fear from a transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate
of reason, that through the understanding we follow up and
extend as far as possible that connection of a concept with its
conditions which directly results from the concept itself. 
Further, if the conditioned as well as its condition are
things in themselves, then upon the former being given, the
regress to the latter is not only set as a task, but therewith
already really given. And since this holds of all members of
the series, the complete series of the conditions, and therefore
the unconditioned, is given therewith, or rather is presupposed
in view of the fact that the conditioned, which is only possible
through the complete series, is given. The synthesis of the
conditioned with its condition is here a synthesis of the mere
understanding, which represents things as they are, without
considering whether and how we can obtain knowledge of
them. If, however, what we are dealing with are appearances
-- as mere representations appearances cannot be given save
in so far as I attain knowledge of them, or rather attain them
in themselves, for they are nothing but empirical modes of
knowledge -- I cannot say, in the same sense of the terms, that
if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as appearances)
are likewise given, and therefore cannot in any way infer the
absolute totality of the series of its conditions. The appear-
ances are in their apprehension themselves nothing but an
empirical synthesis in space and time, and are given only in
this synthesis. It does not, therefore, follow, that if the con-
ditioned, in the [field of] appearance, is given, the synthesis
which constitutes its empirical condition is given therewith
and is presupposed. This synthesis first occurs in the regress,
and never exists without it. What we can say is that a regress
to the conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis, on
the side of the conditions, is enjoined or set as a task, and that
in this regress there can be no lack of given conditions. 
These considerations make it clear that the major premiss
of the cosmological inference takes the conditioned in the
transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor pre-
miss takes it in the empirical sense of a concept