PART FOUR
THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF KANT'S SYSTEM
by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of reason, which soars far above the teachings of experience, and in which reason is meant to be its own pupil. Metaphysics ... though it is older than all other sciences, ... has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science. [Kt1:xiv]
Religion and God in Perspective
But to accomplish this end [i.e., to 'clear up' misconceptions in demonstrating God's existence] we must venture into the unfathomable depths of metaphysic. A dark ocean, unbounded by coasts and without beacons, where one must proceed like the mariner in a sea not yet navigated, who, as soon as he makes land, examines whether some unobserved currents have not, notwithstanding all the circumspection which the art of navigation may enjoin, disturbed his course. [Kt15:65-6(220)]
1. The Metaphysical Perspective in Kant's System
One of the gravest errors in interpreting Kant's philosophy is to regard the three Critiques as composing the entirety of his System. For as we have seen in III.4, Kant intends them to serve as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly grounded metaphysics' [Kt1:xxxvi], on the basis of which reason can 'follow the secure path of a science, instead of, as hitherto, groping at random, without circumspection or self-criticism' [xxx-xxxi]. Kant never wavered in his conviction that a proper philosophical account of the richness of human experience must venture beyond mere critique into the 'dark ocean' of metaphysics itself. The Critical philosophy supplies us with a 'map of the land' of reason's capabilities [295], thus insuring that the real value of the traditional philosophical concepts of truth, beauty and virtue will not be lost in empty transcendent speculations, but will be preserved through a constant recognition of their grounding in human experience-viz., in our cognitions, feelings and desires (i.e., choices [see note VIII.1]). Once the elements of the Critical philosophy have been fully elaborated [as in Part Three], the philosopher's duty is far from being completely fulfilled. For the crucial task of metaphysics still remains.
Kant distinguishes between metaphysics and critique as early as Kt1:Axx-xxi: metaphysics makes an 'inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, systematically arranged'; but first, critique must discover the 'sources and conditions' of such possessions. As we saw in IV.3, although Kant assumed that metaphysics and critique both give rise to the special class of synthetic a priori propositions, there are good reasons to deny that status to metaphysical propositions. Indeed, the very fact that metaphysics is an (analytic) inventory of what reason already possesses (a posteriori) suggests that, in sharp contrast to the truly synthetic a priori status of critique, metaphysics as such has an analytic a posteriori status. We have seen that one of the primary achievements of Kant's Critical philosophy was to transform metaphysics from a speculative pseudo-science into a hypothetical system of
Figure X.1: Kant's System of Perspectives
NOTE: This model comprehensively illustrates 'the idea of the whole' which Kant said we must master if we are to avoid misunderstanding his particular arguments [Kt1:xliv (quoted at the beginning of Chapter I)]. It is constructed by attaching a three-revolution spiral, like the one used in Figure IX.2 to represent Kant's Critical philosophy, to each pole of the cross in Figure III.8. The result is a more continuous, and hence more suggestive, model of Kant's entire System of Perspectives than that given in Figure III.9. In each quadrant of this model the outer revolution represents the theoretical standpoint, the middle revolution represents the judicial standpoint, and the inner revolution represents the practical standpoint. The model shown on the dust cover of this book is, of course, identical to the model shown here, except that the former is not labelled as thoroughly as the latter. The logical structure of this type of 'spiral cross' is discussed in more detail in Pq18:7.3.
rational beliefs.[1] Unfortunately, Kant did not fully recognize the implications of this change for the epistemological classification of metaphysics.
As Paulsen and many others have demonstrated, Kant's metaphysical beliefs 'remained essentially the same through all the other changes of his thought' [P4:76; s.a. 238-9]. The Critical philosophy did not convince Kant to revise his most basic beliefs in any significant way; instead, it provided him with the philosophical tools he needed to confirm their validity. The rather intimidating model of Kant's entire System of Perspectives given in Figure X.1 is intended on the one hand to summarize our foregoing investigations into his Critical philosophy (which can now be fully recognized as a thoroughgoing critique of experience), and on the other hand, to point us forward to the quite distinct realm of metaphysics. The model illustrates how the Metaphysical Perspective in Kant's System corresponds directly to the Transcendental Perspective: whereas the latter revolves around the four questions defining the basic 'interests of reason' [Kt1:833; see X.2], the former revolves around the basic metaphysical ideas of God, freedom and immortality. As we have seen, these ideas also play important roles in all three Critiques; but they do not define the standpoint of each Critique, as do the basic questions.
Figure X.2 shows how the Metaphysical Perspective on the ideas requires an analysis of the basic principles which determine the nature of three corresponding human disciplines: as we shall see here in Part Four, religion, science and politics (including political history) arise as a direct result of the tension between, on the one hand, the ideas of God, freedom and immortality, and on the other hand, the opposing ideas of humanity, nature (or the 'world') and the soul (or life in the world).[2] Kant normally lists the former trio of ideas
Figure X.2: The Origin of Religion, Science and Politics in the Basic Metaphysical Tensions
in the order given here, because he regarded this as their proper metaphysical order. His actual treatment of them in the Critiques follows various other orders because the order is there determined by the Transcendental rather than the Metaphysical Perspective. Hence, here in Part Four I will explain in an abbreviated form how a recognition of the perspectival character of Kant's System reveals the depth of his concern for the human fields of religion, science and politics. As we shall see, the traditional interpretations of the 'Kantian' view of these disciplines will need some fairly radical revision, if the principle of perspective is to be taken as a reliable touchstone for interpreting Kant's intentions.
2. Critical Theology and the Existence of God
Let us begin, then, with religion and the idea of God on which it is based. As mentioned at the end of IX.4, there is an important, yet rarely acknowledged sense in which Kant's entire System of Perspectives is theocentric. For the three ideas of reason, around which Kant believed metaphysics revolves, all have a direct or indirect theological orientation: 'freedom' and 'immortality' are the objective and subjective extremes which are synthesized in the idea of 'God' [see e.g., Kt1:391-2]. The Critical philosophy on its own, of course, is anthropocentric: the three questions which form the basis of each Critique ('What can I know?', 'What ought I to do?' and 'What may I hope?) are all contained in a fourth question, 'What is man?' [K2:11.414(Z1: 205); see note III.24]. Rather than being contradictory, however, the anthropological orientation of critique and the theological orientation of metaphysics ought to be viewed as complementary. Only when taken together as two corresponding Perspectives can they provide the dual focus necessary for constructing a balanced philosophical System.
Kant's criticism in Kt1 of the traditional proofs for the existence of God is often regarded as evidence enough of his negative attitude towards all theology. He demonstrates clearly and persuasively a number of flaws in the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological (or teleological) arguments which render them virtually obsolete. Although his counter-arguments differ significantly in their details, his general criticism of each focuses on essentially the same point: in each case the proponent of such arguments uncritically mixes two perspectives which should be kept distinct. The ontological argument, for instance, can be regarded as establishing certain knowledge of God's existence only by someone who believes a purely logical treatment of concepts (e.g., 'God', 'perfection', 'necessity' and 'existence') can eventually establish a conclusion concerning the real world. But Kant rejects such an assumption on the grounds that knowledge of the real existence of an object can be gained only by synthesizing a concept with an intuition. Since God is not an object like other objects in the world, he cannot be intuited by human beings. That is, we cannot perceive God in all His glory-and even if we could, we could never form a concept out of what we were intuiting. Therefore, the reality of God's existence cannot become an item of theoretical knowledge, no matter what type of proof is constructed. And because they attempt to establish just such knowledge-viz., that God exists as a real object (albeit the most perfect one)-all theoretical arguments are bound to fail.
Nevertheless, the resulting view of Kant as a typical Enlightenment 'deist', out to destroy the possibility of all theology, is deeply flawed. For there is ample evidence that Kant viewed himself as a theist-i.e., one who believes not just in 'a God', but 'in a living God' [Kt1:661]. His reason for denying the possibility of theoretical knowledge of God's existence is to keep human beings in their proper place, as believers, not as knowers. For 'in order to believe in God', he insists, 'it is not necessary to know for certain that God exists' [Kt35:(81)]. Indeed, the 'sophisticated' assumption that we can gain theoretical knowledge of God's existence implies 'attributing omniscience to yourself' [Kt7:480; Kt35:(86-7)]; far from promoting the religious cause, Kant argues, it detracts from a truly religious way of thinking and acting. For the authentic basis for a religious life (and so also for belief in a living God) is not theoretical, but practical. The traditional arguments do 'have a certain cogency', then; but only as a way of supporting a religious point of view, once 'the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken as granted' [Kt1:615]. If we assume God exists, we can use theoretical reason to determine how God's nature is to be conceived (as Kant does in Kt26), even though it leaves us powerless to confirm or disconfirm the fact of God's existence as such.
The theistic character of Kant's Critical theology can be appreciated only if we take into consideration three ways in which the Critical philosophy itself paves the way for an affirmative approach to theology. Pq15 describes these in detail, so at this point a brief summary will suffice. First, in Kt1 Kant proposes a theory of God as a regulative 'idea of reason', which can help us to see our otherwise disconnected experiences as part of a larger whole. Some scholars have interpreted this to mean that God is really nothing but a fictitious, man-made invention, comparable to the imaginary numbers mathematicians use even though they know they are not real [see notes V.9,10]. Yet this totally misrepresents Kant's true intention, which is to express the view that God's existence, when considered from the theoretical standpoint, is bound to be 'postulated problematically' [Kt1:709] as what might nowadays be called an 'explanatory hypothesis'. Because theoretical reason is also powerless to disprove God's existence, the arguments in Kt1 serve to establish our right to use the concept of God from this hypothetical perspective. But rather than limiting theology to the hypothetical perspective, Kant sees it as a preparation for using the idea of God from other, nontheoretical standpoints.
The second affirmative aspect of Kant's Critical theology is his attempt to justify the idea of God from the practical standpoint in Kt4. As we saw in VIII.3.B, he there argues that, if moral agents are to think consistently about the implications of their moral actions, they must admit either that there is a God who will eventually reward the person who acts morally for the right motive, or else that morality itself is an essentially irrational form of activity. Whereas the hypothetical perspective in systemt establishes the logical possibility of using the idea of God, the corresponding perspective in systemp establishes the reality of God for moral reasoning. The practical standpoint therefore provides the proper basis for religion; yet it does so without presuming to know God's existence as a theoretically demonstrable fact.
Finally, in Kt7 Kant devotes a lengthy Appendix to the task of drawing together the various theological implications of his Critical philosophy. In this process, as we saw in IX.3.B, he develops the third affirmative aspect of his Critical theology. The physico-theological argument, used from the judicial standpoint as a tool for enlivening our sense of the mystery of human experience (rather than as a speculative tool for theoretical argumentation), is now rehabilitated as a legitimate means of supporting a person's belief in God. Indeed, the balanced, Critical approach to theology secures this mystery against the illusions of both dogmatic theology (which tries to replace the mystery with knowledge) and skeptical theology (which tries to replace the mystery with meaningless ignorance). Properly grounded in a 'moral theology', our experiences of beauty and purpose in nature can now replace such speculative pretensions as the best confirmation of the necessity of believing in God.
3. Critical Religion and the Universality of Christianity
Religion, for Kant, arises not as a kind of second-rate version of morality, as is so often assumed, but as the only possible solution to a problem which arises out of our moral nature. Although the moral law provides us with the highest principle of human development, we human being are all unable to follow that principle consistently throughout our entire life. This fact jeopardizes the entire moral enterprise: for if no one can follow the moral law perfectly, then how can the highest good ever become a reality? Any morally sensitive person therefore must look beyond morality to a new standpoint, from which the problems of human weakness can be solved. According to Kant, religion is the best representative of this new standpoint. We are therefore bound to misunderstand Kant's arguments in Kt8 if we read it as a mere continuation of the practical standpoint; for it actually adopts the judicial standpoint (the standpoint of Kt7) as its basis [see III.4]. Moreover, as I shall argue in Pq20, Kt8 sets out the elements of religion in a much more systematic form than anything that appears in Kt7, which raises the question as to whether or not Kant might have even had in mind Kt8 replacing Kt7 as the fundamental bridge between the theoretical and practical standpoints.
Kant's religious system conforms almost perfectly to the architectonic pattern set out in III.3: the transcendental elements defining what makes religion possible are defended in the four 'Books' into which Kt8 is divided, each of which describes one of the system's four stages. In the first Book [19f(15f)] Kant argues that 'radical evil' necessarily limits human morality in a way that requires us to adopt a new, religious standpoint; as such, evil corresponds to sensibility and freedom, each of which establishes the transcendental perspective in its respective system. The second Book [57f(50f)] then presents a new kind of logical perspective, arguing that every true religion must provide some conception of how a 'change of heart' is possible. Whereas the 'conflict' between good and evil depicted in the first two Books remains on a formal and individual level, Kant argues in the third Book [93f(85f)] that 'victory' over evil can take place only when the religious individual bands together with other religious individuals to form a 'church'-which can then act as a means of working towards the realization of the 'kingdom (or realm) of ends', first introduced in systemp [see VIII.3 and XII.4]. This empirical perspective then leads Kant to conclude Kt8 by outlining in Book Four [151f(139f)] the hypothetical perspective on religion, according to which true religious 'service' can be distinguished from 'pseudo-service'. In each of these four stages, as we shall see in Pq20, a three-step argument can be found; but there is no need for our present purposes to go into such detail.
What is more important is to note that Kant tests his system of Critical religion in Kt8 by examining one example of an historical religion to see how well it fits his rational mold. For the purpose of this 'experiment' [Kt8: 12(11)] he chooses Christianity. In each Book of Kt8 he therefore devotes considerable attention to the task of examining the extent to which traditional Christian beliefs and practises correspond to the pure moral core of all true religion. The consensus of scholarship over the past two centuries has been that Kant's reason for referring so often to Christianity was to demonstrate that all of its key assertions must be either reduced to nothing but moral meanings, or else discarded as worthless superstition. By contrast, as I have argued in Pq17 (and will develop even further in Pq20), Kant's true intent is almost exactly the opposite: to raise morality to the status of religion, so that even the nonmoral elements in real historical religions can be given their proper place. Indeed, the conclusion of Kant's experiment is that Christianity can justifiably be regarded as the first, and still the best, historical manifestation of what he calls the 'universal religion of mankind' [Kt8:155f(143f)].
4. Critical Mysticism and the End of Philosophy
Kant's interest in the idea of God and its relation to religion does not remain merely on the abstract level of philosophical theorizing, for he was himself 'a profoundly religious man' [R1:vii]. Evidence for Kant's religious disposition can be gathered not only from the insights of his biographers, but also from many of his own comments, scattered throughout his writings. Since I have examined this evidence in detail in Pq13, there is no need to review it at this point. I should mention, however, that the original impetus for Kant's construction of a philosophical System can be traced back to the influence of the Swedish mystic, Swedenborgan influence which Kant scholars, following Kant himself, are usually reluctant to acknowledge.
In the 1760's Kant read at great length the writings of Swedenborg, and evidently spent a considerable amount of time reflecting on the author's claims to have experienced numerous spiritual visions. Kant responded by writing Kt18, in which he compares the nature and possibility of such visions to the nature and possibility of metaphysical speculations. This book, which is written in a rather sarcastic tone that later embarrassed Kant, is usually interpreted as marking a skeptical turn in Kant's development. However, as I have demonstrated in Pq12, this is an altogether inadequate way of classifying this very important work. For in Kt18 Kant planted the seeds which were eventually to grow into his System of Perspective. Many of the important doctrines of his Critical philosophy are foreshadowed in this book (and, using rather different language, in Swedenborg's own books). Kt18 first formulates the basic problem of the Critical philosophy and maps out, by way of analogy, the means of solving the problem. Recognizing the importance of Kt18 therefore sets Kant's entire System of Perspectives in its proper context: the task of establishing the claims of metaphysics is there compared directly to the task of establishing the claims of mystical experience.
In light of this basic comparison, we can first come to recognize that Kant's System is not just a philosophical exercise, but an attempt to map out a way of life, which I believe is best called 'Critical mysticism'. Critical mysticism refers to the 'middle way' forged by Kant's System of Perspectives between two extreme forms of 'fanaticism' concerning the possibility of experiencing a supernatural reality: 'religious superstition' believes we can 'recognize a supersensible object in experience' [Kt8:174-5(162-3)], while irreligious skepticism 'denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation' [154(143)]. Much as his interpreters have tried to place him on the side of the latter and make him out to be a deist, Kant's actual position on the issue of experiencing God begins with a reverent confession of ignorance: 'for these matters no man can determine through reason' [155(143)]; yet 'the inscrutable wisdom through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in [respect to] what it has granted' [Kt4:148]. Moreover, Kant recognizes on numerous occasions two kinds of experience which, though unable to qualify as empirical knowledge of an object called 'God', can justifiably be regarded as symbols of divine action in the world: 'the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me' [Kt4:161] represent for Kant two basic realities beyond which reason cannot pass and which can therefore be regarded hypothetically as symbols of 'the hand of God' in nature and 'the voice of God' in one's heart [see e.g., Kt64:269(205)].
This twofold basis of Critical mysticism in the most immediate human experiences comes to the forefront in Kt9, the final book in the overall plan of Kant's System [see Figure III.9], which reaches to the heart of what Cassirer aptly calls 'the critical philosophy's new theoretical perspective on the world and on life' [C5:38]. Since Kant was unable before he died to organize the notes which now constitute Kt9, and since his method of writing was to weigh opposing points of view carefully before settling in upon the most appropriate Critical (i.e., mediating [see II.2]) position, it is now extraordinarily difficult-if not impossible-to know for sure just what Kant himself was aiming to get across in that final work. However, one thing which he repeats often enough to render it virtually certain to be one of the main points he wished to make is that mankind itself (or the idea of 'man in the world') is the unifying link between God and the world-these being the two otherwise mutually exclusive hypothetical principles.[3] The highest point of Kant's System is reached, as he writes in Kt9:21.39(W17:195) [s.a. Kt9:21.41], when we are able to conceive of 'God above me, the World outside me, the human spirit within me-combined in one all-inclusive system of transcendental philosophy.' If Kt9 is interpreted with this basic conception in mind, then its main role in the overall System, as argued in III.4, would be to build a metaphysical bridge between the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Nature in the form of a Metaphysics of Religious Experience-i.e., a Critical Mysticism.
The mystical thrust of Kant's System of Perspectives suggests an interesting paradox. Referring to the way of life which best suits the Critical philosophy as 'mysticism' makes it look much closer to fanaticism than Kant or most Kantians would like to contemplate. Kant warns, for example, that fanaticism ultimately leads to 'the moral death of reason' [Kt8:175(163)], and so also to the end of all philosophy. Such comments are usually taken to imply that Kant held an attitude of uncompromising repugnance for the mystical way of life. While there is no doubt that he was utterly opposed to unCritical forms of mysticism, the double meaning of such comments must not be ignored. For even though they do indeed warn against an improper dependence on religious or mystical experience, they suggest at the same time that such experiences may have a legitimate role, when viewed from the proper perspective. Reason, according to Kant, is itself an 'organ' [Kt1:xxxvi], and we must face the fact that organisms die. The important thing is not to prolong life beyond its natural end, but to insure that life's purpose is fulfilled. This seems to be at least part of the meaning of the common epitaph, 'rest in peace', which expresses the sentiments we have towards someone who dies a timely death, after a life full of meaning and purpose. With this phrase the survivors express their hope in an immortal life in which the peace unobtainable in this life can be enjoyed. As we shall see in Chapter XII, it is just this kind of 'perpetual peace' which forms the ultimate metaphysical goal of Kant's entire System. Once this is taken into consideration, we can see religion in its proper perspective, as an expression of the idea of God which enables us to interpret our deepest and most immediate experiences in such a way as to compensate for the imperfections of our moral character. As the empirical realization of religion, the mystical life, though it transcends the bounds of rational philosophy as such, can therefore serve as the natural conclusion of a healthy philosophy, and so also as the final goal of reason itself.
[1] This status is reflected by its position on Figure III.8 [cf. Figure IV.2]. In W17:141 Werkmeister rightly points out that for Kant metaphysics is an attempt not to deduce specific moral rules (or natural laws) from their a priori (Critical) principles, but rather to lay bare the transition between the Critical principles and experience itself. This difference can also be expressed by saying that, whereas transcendental deduction is a synthetic a priori task, metaphysical transition is an analytic a posteriori task. If the perspectival difference between these tasks is not taken into consideration, they can easily appear to be in conflict with each other. This leads Paulsen, after noting the tension between Kant's epistemology and metaphysics, to regard the latter, upheld so firmly by Kant throughout his life, as nothing more than 'a private opinion of Kant's, with which he did not care to dispense' [P4:247]. But too sharp a division between Kant's 'official' (Critical) position and his 'private' (metaphysical) beliefs [see e.g., Ap. VI, note 4] is entirely unjustified. For the very purpose of the former is to raise the latter beyond the level of mere opinion; as Paulsen himself acknowledges in the next breath: 'Kant's metaphysics...undertakes to give philosophy the dignity of a science'.
[2] Paulsen recognizes Kant's emphasis on the need to see these three ideas in their proper order [P4:212], even to the extent that he sees immmortality (quite rightly, as we shall see in Chapter XII) as 'the ultimate goal in Kant's critical philosophy' [252]. Nevertheless, Paulsen passes off such architectonic considerations as unworthy of any serious consideration [212]: 'That this is all the idle play of a capricious scholastic subtlety, needs no elaboration.' By contrast, I believe such matters deserve to be treated with the utmost care.
My interpretations here in Part Four will be presented in summary form, without any attempt to justify them in detail; this is because I plan to develop and fully defend the ideas outlined in each chapter in a series of three projected monographs. (I ask the reader to keep this in mind throughout Part Four, and so to reserve judgment until the full arguments appear-or at least until the relevant articles listed below have been consulted.) Most of the material for the first monograph [Pq20], as summarized in Chapter X, has already been written; much of it has been published in the form of various articles [Pq12, Pq13, Pq15 and Pq17], though some new material remains to be written before an overall revision will bring it to the point of completion. Only one potential chapter of the second [Pq21] has been written; it has been published as Pq14 [but s.a. Pq7 and note XI.2]. Work on the third and final monograph in the series [Pq22] is still in the very early stages. Although I hope to publish each of these independently in the first instance, I would eventually want-if this plan is ever completed-to publish them all together with the preent book, under the general title Kant's System of Perspective. The four volumes would then have the following titles: (1) Critical Philosophy; (2) Critical Religion; (3) Critical Science; and (4) Critical Politics.
[3] See e.g., Kt9:21.31 and W17:194-5. Kant witnesses on numerous occasions in Kt9 to his own mystical experience of God. For instance, he repeatedly refers to God as a 'Person', even though this practise was by no means common in his day [W13:181-4,197-201]. As Ward puts it, Kant's 'God is a Personality, not external to man as a separate substance, but within man' [W10:166; cf. Kt9:22.118]. Indeed, He is 'closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands or feet' [q.i. W13:200].
