Politics and Immortality in Perspective
by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
What is Right?
This question may be said to be about as embarrassing to the Jurist as the well-known question,'What is Truth'is to the Logician.[Kt6:229(44)]
1. Metaphysics and the Foundations of Politics
That Kant had a keen interest in politics is a well-established fact: not only did he devote half of his Metaphysics of Morals [Kt6] to the task of setting down some basic principles of political 'right', but his biographers reveal that politics was among his favorite topics of conversation with the guests at his regular luncheons [see e.g., W5:40]. What is less commonly acknowledged is the close connection he saw between politics and history;[1] nor have commentators been quick to point out that, when politics and history are taken together, they point us towards the idea of human destiny, as represented by the third of Kant's trio of basic metaphysical ideas, immortality. Yet, as Paulsen rightly points out, '[t]he problem of immortality...constitutes the ultimate goal in Kant's critical philosophy' [P4:252; but cf. note X.2].
Compared to the ideas of God and freedom, Kant wrote very little about the idea of immortality as such. Even in his early writings, such as Kt43 and Kt18, where he is somewhat freer to speculate than in his later writings, Kant makes only vague suggestions as to what immortality might entail. In Kt43, for example, he develops an elaborate theory of the structure of the cosmos, which includes the suggestion that different life-forms exist on other planets and that, because of their ever-decreasing density of matter, 'the excellence of thinking natures' will 'become more excellent and perfect in proportion to the distance of their habitats from the sun' [359(189)]. After speculating as to how some of the more advanced life-forms might differ from human intelligence, his brief Conclusion raises some unanswered questions concerning human destiny:
Shall the immortal soul during the whole infinity of her future duration, which the grave itself does not interrupt but merely transforms, remain tied forever to this point of space, to our earth? Shall she never share in a closer contemplation of the other wonders of creation? Who knows, is it not her destiny that she should once know at a closer range those faraway globes of the world-edifice...? Perhaps there are further globes of the planetary system in the process of evolving, so that after the completed course of time, which is prescribed to our sojourn here, there may be new habitats ready for us in other heavens. [366-7(195-6); cf. Kt60:23n]
In Kt18 Kant develops a more elaborate theory of the immortal soul. Without going into the details of that theory here, it will suffice merely to recall that, since Kt18 set the stage for Kant's entire System, it should come as no surprise that the System ends by returning in Kt9 to one of the central themes of that book [see X.4].
Although there is no evidence that Kant ever renounced his interest in the plausibility of such speculations, his Critical writings do offer an explanation for his cautious way of expressing his opinions. In Kt1 he introduces immortality as the ultimate characteristic of the 'soul', arising out of the combination of all the other concepts in the traditional pseudo-science of 'transcendental psychology' [403]. But he then proceeds to demonstrate why such speculations regarding the soul can never produce knowledge, concluding that 'we must renounce the hope of comprehending, from the merely theoretical knowledge of ourselves, the necessary continuance of our existence' [426]. As we saw in VIII.3.B, Kant reintroduces immortality in Kt4, but devotes only a few short pages [122-4] to defending the practical necessity of postulating this idea. Although he reaffirms on several occasions in Kt7 both the theoretical unknowability of the soul's immortality and the practical necessity of believing in the reality of this idea [see e.g., 460-1], he never provides any explanation as to how it is to come about. Apparently, the Critical philosophy requires us to believe we will survive our death in some way, without shedding any light on how this will come about.
In any case, immortality is the only one of the three ideas of reason which contains within itself an historical element: it suggests that human beings must look beyond the temporal boundary of their own life for the source of life's purpose and meaning. One of the reasons Kant had little to say about the details of how immortality comes about may be that his primary interest was in explaining how the idea of immortality could be in some sense realized through a proper conception of the ultimate purpose of human history. In other words, the idea of immortality served for Kant not as an excuse to look forward to 'pie in the sky when you die', but as a reason to work in the present for the future betterment of humanity, even if the benefits of our actions are not realized until after our death. And one of the most important ways in which a person can work towards this goal is through politics. Unless Kant's views on politics are firmly placed within the context of his vision of the rational plan of human history, they are therefore bound to be misunderstood. For, although pure practical reason, with its vision of the highest good, is based on the ahistorical idea of freedom inherited from pure theoretical reason, it gives rise to the thoroughly historical idea of immortality.
2. The Highest Good as the Focal Point for Immortality
We have already seen in Chapter X how Kant develops the metaphysical implications of the idea of God, and how, in spite of popular opinion to the contrary, that idea is more closely connected to the third (judicial) system in Kant's System than to the first (theoretical) or second (practical) systems. We can now see more clearly why immortality is the idea most closely associated with the latter. Kant's practical system ends with the hypothetical postulation of 'the highest good' [see Figure VIII.2] as the perfect combination of virtue and proportional happiness. Given Kant's insistence on the primacy of practical reason, this ideal should be regarded as touching the very heart of Kant's entire Critical philosophy (as suggested by the spiral in Figure IX.2]. But the problem, as Kant is careful to point out, is that the highest good does not actually exist in the world as we know it today. Rather, it exists only in potential, as an idea of what is 'not yet'. Nevertheless, for this very reason human beings have the duty to act in such a way as to bring this ideal closer and closer to the point of realization. Because human beings have, so far, all died before seeing the full realization of this ideal, the postulate of immortality is necessary to provide hope that we can nevertheless participate in this future reality in some way.
The problem preventing the highest good from being realized in the present stems from the tension between nature and freedom, out of which, as we saw in XI.1, science itself arises. As long as we allow science, or anything else rooted in our theoretical standpoint, to tantalize us with the pleasure of following our inclinations, the rule of universal freedom, out of which the highest good (and so also the ideal political system) springs forth, cannot come to pass. But as we shall see, Kant's vision of humanity is one in which all human beings will gradually come to realize the futility of following their inclinations, and work together instead for the realization of the highest good.
As long as we have not yet realized the highest good on earth, some externally legislated political system will be necessary. This political system will be 'right', Kant argues, only if it maximizes the freedoms of individuals, thus allowing them to follow the internally legislated moral law as much as possible. Accordingly, just as the categorical imperative defines what is morally good, the following principle, Kant claims, defines what is politically right [Kt6:230(45)]: 'Every Action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can co-exist along with the Freedom of the Will of each and all in action, according to a universal Law.' All Kant's (sometimes outmoded) suggestions as to how this principle gives rise to a system of political rights are intended to be taken not as eternally binding legal truths, but as imperfect measures whose purpose is to bring humanity at a particular point in time closer to a realization of its final goal.
3. Critical Politics and Human History
Kant emphasizes the importance of understanding and believing in an ideal politics of freedom as early as Kt1:373-4. So it is no accident that a large proportion of the minor essays he wrote after 1781 were devoted to topics relating to the political history of the human race. This reflects his recognition that, in spite of his lack of emphasis on it in his main Critical writings, this issue actually plays a constitutive role in his System. A brief glance at these essays is sufficient to reveal that Kant's interest in political history was an intentional application of his Transcendental Perspective to this final (i.e., ultimate) problem. The essays rarely give an account or interpretation of any specific historical events. Instead, as their very titles suggest, they pose questions about the necessary form of human history, such as: What was the 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History'? [Kt63], 'What is Enlightenment?' [Kt38], '...Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?' [Kt65] and What is 'The End of All Things'? [Kt31]. Kant's goal, in other words, was to discover an 'Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective' [Kt60] which could bring 'Perpetual Peace' [Kt32] to humanity through a full realization of the highest good.
Michalson accurately explains in M11:140 that 'the aim of all [Kant's] speculations on history...is to give an account of the course and destiny of the life of rational beings who can genuinely "know" only about the world of appearances.' These speculations (or hypotheses, as I believe Kant would want us to call them) 'are not so much predictions as they are "rational hopes"' about the ultimate purpose of history itself [152]; as such, they are regulative, rather than constitutive [150]. In other words, they are intended to be taken as hypothetical explanations of a plan (a 'politic', we might call it) for human history as a whole-a plan which develops as a direct result of the tension between the soul's life in this world and the metaphysical idea of immortality. As Kant explains: 'Even if we are too blind to see the secret mechanism of its workings, this Idea [of Nature's 'plan or purpose' in human history] may still serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a system...what would otherwise be a planless conglomeration of human actions' [Kt60:29]. Although Kant himself never presents us with a fully elaborated system of human history, his various essays on political history do provide enough clues to allow for a fairly accurate reconstruction [see XII.4]. This reconstruction of Kant's metaphysical system of history will be fully presented in Pq22.
At this point it will suffice merely to point out that Kant explains his conception of this rational plan in sufficient detail to offer some concrete suggestions as to how a proper recognition of 'the unsocial sociability of men' [Kt60:20] can provide a solution to 'the greatest problem for the human race' [22]-viz., 'the achievement of a universal civic society which administers law among men.' One of the most important requirements is that a body of international law must be set up with 'the ultimate end' of establishing 'perpetual peace' [Kt6:350(224)]. This will require, among other things, that 'standing armies...shall in time be totally abolished' [Kt32:345], since 'war itself...will be regarded as a most dubious undertaking' [Kt60:28]. When adopting the standpoint of real politicians, who 'must proceed on empirical principles' [Kt32:343], Kant admits that such hopes must be regarded as 'impossible', or at least 'impracticable' [Kt6:350(224)]; nevertheless, he acknowledges that from another standpoint, there are indeed grounds for hope that such a universal community 'will come into being as the womb wherein all the original capacities of the human race can develop' [Kt60:28]. Given the theocentric emphasis on all three metaphysical ideas [see X.2-4], it should therefore come as no surprise to find, alongside these specific, concrete guidelines, that Kant's plan includes at the same time 'a philosophical eschatology' which 'carries a strong endorsement of the Christian world view' [M11:139].
There is no need for our present purposes to enter into a more detailed interpretation of Kant's essays on political history, nor of his other works on related themes, such as Kt6. Instead, we can conclude this overview of the metaphysical implications of Kant's System of Perspectives by using some clues provided in Book Three of Kt8 to summarize what we could call his 'vision' [see e.g., M11:157] of human destiny. For he there presents us with a picture of the relationship between the visible manifestations of religion and the true, moral religion-a picture which I believe is, in the end, virtually identical to his view of the relationship between the visible manifestations of politics and the truly rational (i.e., just) political system.
4. The Theocratic End of All Politics
Kant begins section VII of the first Division of Book Three of Kt8 by describing 'The Gradual Transition of Ecclesiastical Faith to the Exclusive Sovereignty of Pure Religious Faith' as 'the Coming of the Kingdom of God' [Kt8:115(105)]. He argues that, although historical faiths can never be more than a 'vehicle' for 'pure religion' [115(106)], they are nevertheless necessary for the proper development of the pure moral core of religion: 'some historical ecclesiastical faith...must be utilized' [109(100)e.a.], even though no single empirical model can be taken as absolute. The imperfect practises and partial beliefs of real empirical religions are therefore legitimate insofar as they bring their members a foretaste of the Kingdom of God on earth. That Kant is actually defending something like a theocracy[2] is suggested by passages such as the following:
...in the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that God may be all in all.' [121(112); quoting I Cor. 15:28]
In the preface to Kt8 Kant compares the relationship between pure religion and the present manifestations of historical religion to a pair of concentric circles [12(11)]. Any historical faith which is truly religious (i.e., moral) will have elements of the rational religion at its 'core', though the latter might be relatively small in comparison to the outer circle of extra (i.e., nonmoral) ecclesiastical elements. But as human history progresses, the rational core increases in size relative to the outer historical 'shell'. In the 'end', to which Kant refers in the passage quoted above, these two circles will be not only concentric, but coextensive: historical religion will manifest in its entirety the pure religion of reason. Being the most rational picture of human destiny, this is the hope in which all rational beings should believe.
What Kant refers to as the Kingdom of God in Kt8 is closely related (if not identical) to what he normally refers to elsewhere as a 'realm of ends' [see e.g., Kt5:433-40]. As he explains in Kt5:433, the term 'realm' refers to 'the systematic union of different rational beings [i.e., souls] through common laws.' A realm of ends, therefore, is a picture of all human souls working together for the common good, through their mutual obedience to the moral law [cf. 462-3]. Although it is 'only an ideal', it is 'a very fruitful concept' [433], for it can drive us towards a more complete realization of the highest good, just as the analogous ideal of a 'realm of nature' can drive us towards a more complete scientific understanding of the world [438]. The guiding principle informing this moral ideal is the necessity of viewing humanity as an end in itself, which, as we saw in VIII.2.B, first surfaces in Kant's System as the second formulation of the categorical imperative [429]. From this principle Kant derives not only his doctrine of humanity as the final end of creation [see e.g., Kt7:435 and IX.3.A], but also his elaborate system [in Kt6] of what is right for us as real human beings.[3] The kingdom of ends is simply the term appropriate to the practical standpoint for the ideal which, from the religious standpoint, is properly called the Kingdom of God.
When the ideal goal of realizing the 'universal religion of reason' [e.g., Kt8:122(113)] is finally fulfilled, religion and politics will actually merge, though both will at that point be thoroughly transformed: they will both be legislated entirely from within, through the agency of the moral law (regarded as the voice of God) speaking to each individual, and uniting all human beings in a whole which no human political system could ever sustain. That Kant had such a merger in mind can be seen at various points in Kt8, not the least of which is in his use of the paradoxical term 'ethical commonwealth' as a description of the true church. Thus it should come as no surprise when he ends the first Division of Book Three with a clear allusion to the political implications of what he earlier called 'the Coming of the Kingdom of God':
Such, therefore, is the activity of the good principle, unnoted by human eyes but ever continuing-erecting for itself in the human race, regarded as a commonwealth under laws of virtue, a power and a kingdom which sustains the victory over evil and, under its own dominion, assures the world of eternal peace. [Kt8:124(114)]
Of course, Kant is often quite reluctant to discuss his vision of the ultimate destiny of the human race, not only because of its thoroughly hypothetical nature (as befits all good metaphysics), but also because of the great danger of mistaking such a vision for a real set of policies intended for immediate historical implementation. Kant is well aware of the tension between the ideals of reason and the realities of history. This is why he devotes most of his attention in Part I of Kt6 to the construction of a political philosophy which is capable of being applied in the here and now. In order to use such principles in the most appropriate way, however, we must view them as interim measures, valid only during the long transitional period which we call human history. Hence, as he says in Kt6:319(175), the common maxim 'All Authority is from God' should not be interpreted to 'express the historical foundation of the Civil Constitution, but an ideal Principle of the Practical Reason.' Critical politics does not deny the validity of such theocratic ways of viewing the world, but rather insists that we view them from their proper perspective, as ideals towards the realization of which our imperfect political systems ought to work.
With this in mind, we can now adapt Kant's own model of concentric circles to summarize his vision of the rational plan of human history. The human race, like all human individuals, began in a state of innocence, but was corrupted by the radical evil which infected the first moral act. When such individuals joined in groups, conflicts of various sorts inevitably arose. Their attempt to make agreements which could resolve such conflicts was at first legislated only externally, through both political and (nonmoral) religious forms of coercion. As a result, the internal 'seed' of moral religion remained dormant within humanity [see Figure XII.1(a)]. External legislation is the proper domain of politics; internal legislation is the proper domain of true (moral) religion. But at this early stage in human history, neither religious nor political agreements bore much resemblance to the idea of freedom which lies at their base. 'Progress' in human history happens whenever individuals learn to utilize more of the internal power of freedom, so that both the religious and political 'vehicles' of goodness can conform more closely to their pure rational core.
In Kt8 Kant portrays the rise of Christianity as the first historical faith to reflect accurately the pure rational core of all true religion. As such, the authentic forms of Christianity (i.e., the ones which encourage individuals to make use of their freedom to be self-legislating) have marked, during the past two millennia, the first major step towards the realization of pure moral religion in human history [see Figure XII.1(b)]. But nonmoral political systems (like the false attempts of various 'ecclesiastical faiths' to legislate externally) have continued to dominate human societies during this period, so that the core of moral religion has been unable to progress much further.In his minor
Figure XII.1: The Four Stages of Human History
essays Kant therefore predicts that we can enter the next stage in human history only through the formation of a worldwide federation of states, an historical political structure which would accurately reflect the pure rational core of all right politics [see Figure XII.1(c)], just as Christianity provides an historical representation of universal religion. Some would say that in the twentieth century we have seen a partial fulfillment of this prediction, in the form of the United Nations, though this federation is still far from realizing the goal of establishing a universal, internally legislated political system.
The ultimate end of this entire process will come about when there is no longer any distinction between the empirical manifestations of religious and political systems and the pure moral reason to which they conform [seeFigure XII.1(d)]. When these are fully identified, the external forms of religion and politics as we now know them will no longer be necessary; instead, politics will finally be seen in its proper perspective, as the expression of God's rule guiding the actions of all human beings, thus creating a society of lasting peace and true justice. At that point, the idea of immortality will no longer refer merely to a hope for everlasting life in another world-as it properly does at our present stage of human history, in which we can only hope to 'rest in peace' after we die. It will then refer also to the realization of another way of life in the present world: a life in which the autonomous domains of religion, science and politics cooperate for a single purpose, being guided by the rational ideas of God, freedom and immortality, fully regulative in the lives of every human person.
[1] Several books have been written in recent years pointing out the importance of Kant's views on history [s.e. D3, M11, R3 and Y3]; but their neglect of the principle of perspective in interpreting Kant's System gives rise to various unfortunate misunderstandings. I hope to dispel some of these in Pq22.
[2] The term 'theocracy' is intended here to be taken in its proper sense, as referring to a political system based on the internally legislated 'rule of God' in human hearts. In Pq19 I have argued in detail that theocracy is properly regarded as the most basic form of Christian political philosophy. Unfortunately, the word 'theocracy' is nearly always misused as a reference to a political system characterized by the 'rule of the church'. Yet this is the very opposite of true theocracy, and ought rather to be called 'ecclesiocracy', as I suggest in Chapter Four of Pq19, or 'clericalism', as Kant suggests in Book Four of Kt8. Kant himself often uses explicitly theocratic language, as when he describes God as a person 'possessing law-giving power over all rational beings' [Kt9:22.35(W17:193)].
[3] Because of his emphasis on the importance of respect for humanity, Kant is often cited as one of the fathers of our modern concern for human rights. Although there is obviously some justification for this view, I shall argue in Pq22, where the arguments of this chapter will be worked out in full, that Kant's conception of the 'right' departs in some important respects from today's emphasis on defending one's own 'human rights' at all costs. For Kant, it is not the individual person as such who, as 'the end of creation', has a set of inalienable rights deserving of the highest respect, but only humanity as a whole [see e.g., Kt8:60(54) and Kt60:18]. Therefore, rather than presupposing a naive 'equality' upon which the rights of all individuals are based-a view often imputed to Kant [see e.g., P11:483-6]-Kant seeks to determine what is politically 'right' in various situations by examining how and to what extent individuals participate in the cosmos of rational beings known as 'humanity'.
