The Principle of Perspective

 

 

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

 

 

... pure reason ... is a quite separate self-subsistent unity, in which ... no principle can safely be taken from one perspective without [taking it] at the same time from the overall perspective it is examined to have from the entire pure rational Perspective ... [Kt1:xxiii]

 

1. Kant's Perspectival Revolution

 

  In the first edition Preface to his first Critique, Kant declares that he will supply 'the key' which can solve every 'metaphysical problem ... to which [pure reason] itself gives birth' [Kt1:Axiii]. Similarly, in the second edition Preface, he claims to 'furnish an excellent touchstone of what we are adopting as our new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them' [xviiie.a.]. This 'new point of view' [xviii-xix] defines Kant's 'transcendental' turn, which is universally recognized as the fundamental presupposition of his Critical philosophy. He describes it as a 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy [xv-xxii], an epithet we will discuss further in III.1. The main tenet of this 'new method', or new Perspective, for philosophical inquiry is that the nature of the object of any rational activity is now assumed to be determined, at least in part, by the nature of the subject (i.e., by the human knower [see note IV.2]). The validity of this key assumption rests not so much on a set of arguments (though Kant does support it with some arguments), as on the overall coherence of the System to which his new Perspective gives rise. Although its full implications will therefore emerge only gradually as we interpret his Critical philosophy, we can nevertheless begin in this chapter by examining the general perspectival implications of the System's key assumption.

 

  In the first Critique Kant names the System built on his new method of thought 'transcendental philosophy' [Kt1:25]. The problem with this label is that it is too general: transcendental philosophy covers not only the topics dealt with in the three Critiques, but also the elaborate metaphysical systems to which Kant believes they give rise. Moreover, Kant also uses the term 'transcendental' in several more specific ways, as we shall see in III.4 and IV.2. In order to avoid equivocation, he later gives the 'transcendental idealism' developed in Kt1 the new title 'critical idealism' [Kt2:375], thus suggesting that the aspect of transcendental philosophy expounded in the three Critiques should be regarded as composing 'Critical philosophy'-the label preferred by most commentators. A 'critical' approach is one which accepts the new, 'transcendental perspective' as its touchstone, but is limited to the task of forming an 'estimate of what may be expected from our faculties' [Kt1:766], particularly as regards 'the sources of synthetic a priori knowledge' [249]. (The meaning of the latter phrase will be brought out in IV.2-3.) Kant then develops the explicitly metaphysical aspects of transcendental philosophy in several post-Critical treatises [s.e. Kt3 and Kt6; cf. III.4].

 

  In spite of the widespread recognition of the importance of the transcendental perspective as the touchstone of Kant's Critical philosophy, the full significance of the 'perspectival' approach (which it entails) is rarely appreciated. To counteract this neglect, I will argue that the general transcendental assumption which guides the Critical method implies most fundamentally a thoroughgoing 'perspectival revolution' in philosophy [Kt1:x-xvi]. For the Transcendental Perspective in general includes within it several levels of subordinate perspectives, which are equally important in guiding the development of the various systems and subsystems which compose Kant's System. Thus, what I shall call the 'principle of perspective' (i.e., the universal rule that the truth is always relative to some perspective) can be seen functioning throughout the System: transcendental philosophy begins by giving the knowing subject the determining power formerly given to the object on general matters, such as questions regarding the nature and form of knowledge; so any change in the conditions adopted by the subject as the System develops will have a profound effect on the way the subject characterizes the object. Kant's primary interest, of course, lies in discovering the general forms which the subject necessarily adopts in interpreting experience, and which therefore cannot simply be changed at will. But in the course of describing the nature and operation of these synthetic a priori forms of experience, he does find it necessary at times to alter his conception of how the subject and object are related. Each change of this sort can be regarded as a change of perspective.

 

  Before we examine the extent to which the principle of perspective is imbedded in Kant's writings, we must take a step back and ask just what is meant by the word 'perspective' as it is being used here. My use of this term is rooted in its ordinary use, as we shall see; but it is also influenced by the analogical relation between formal logic and certain simple geometrical figures, which we have discussed in I.3 [s.a. III.3 and Pq16]. In the construction of geometrical figures, as in ordinary language, a 'perspective' on an object refers primarily to the angle at which a subject views it, together with any distortions which may be imposed upon it by the manner in which it is being viewed. Thus, if I wish to represent a circular object as viewed from a point outside its circumference and on a different plane, I will draw an ellipse. Such distortions arise whenever we try to draw a higher-dimensional figure on a two-dimensional surface. For example, a common method of distorting a three-dimensional figure so as to depict its depth is to draw any border lines which are hidden from view as broken lines [see e.g., Figure II.2]. A drawing which in this way imposes the limitations of a lower dimension onto a higher-dimensional figure is referred to technically as a 'perspective drawing'.[1] Obviously, the perspective of such drawings changes whenever we change the angle from which we are viewing the object.

 

  In ordinary language, as in geometry, a perspective is primarily a 'way of considering an object'-i.e., a 'method of perceiving' its form and the details of its composition. A person's perception of an object may be described in different, but equally valid ways, if it is viewed from different angles, or perspectives. Some of these differences are due to the nature of the object itself: an ordinary table looks quite different when viewed from the top as when viewed from the side. Other differences may arise from the nature of the subject: if I am wearing someone else's spectacles, my perspective on the table might be distorted, no matter which angle I view it from. Still other differences arise out of the relation between the subject and the object: a table top which looks square when viewed from a vantage-point directly above its center will look like a trapezoid if viewed from a point above the center of one of the sides, or like a line if viewed from a point on the same plane but off the table's surface, or indeed, like a point if viewed from a great distance. All these factors-the nature of the object, that of the subject and that of their relationship-work together to determine a 'perspective' in this ordinary sense of the word. To abstract from all possible perspectival limitations in such cases leaves us with nothing but a concept. Thus, we can think 'table' without experiencing a real table, and hence without adopting any physical perspective on it, but we cannot experience a real table without adopting some spatio-temporal perspective on the object of our perception.

 

  The word 'perspective' also has another common meaning, according to which it refers to the conceptual limitations which are imposed on a given situation. Thus we might say: 'Ronald Reagan was a good actor, but from a political perspective (i.e., as President of the United States), he left a lot to be desired.' Here we are concerned not with what might be called 'perceptual perspectives', but with 'conceptual perspectives'-i.e., with various ways of thinking about an object, or methods of reflecting on its form and the details of its composition. Once again, different perspectives can arise from differences either in the object, the subject, or the relation between the two. But in this case, to abstract from all possible perspectival limitations would leave us speechless, with nothing but the possibility of perceiving an unknown 'x'. (Compare the fundamental role of the 'thing in itself' as the unknowable starting point of Kant's System, as discussed in VI.2, VII.2 and Appendix V.)

 

  This second sense of 'perspective', which is directly analogous to the word's primary meaning, is closely related to my use of 'perspective' as a technical term in interpreting Kant's Critical philosophy. For the various words and phrases which can be regarded as 'perspectival equivalents'[2] all describe a conceptual perspective of one sort or another. When Kant talks, for example, about the 'empirical employment of the understanding', he is clearly referring to a certain way of considering objects, a method of reflecting upon them, which can be described as 'empirical'. Consequently, the same notion can be expressed in modern English by referring to the 'empirical perspective'. Although Kant's perspectival terms are often used in connection with the various 'faculties' of the subject, such as 'understanding' or 'sensibility', the latter are never regarded as the names for types of perspectives as such; rather the faculties are names for that in the subject which has the power to adopt a perspective.[3] (Thus, for example, the phrase 'the perspective of the understanding' would always mean 'the understanding's perspective', not 'the understanding perspective'.)

 

  My use of 'perspective' as a technical term will refer to the systematic context into which an object (e.g., a philosophical question) is placed by virtue of the method of reflection assumed by the subject. In this sense a 'perspective' is similar to what logicians call a 'universe of discourse': i.e., 'a given context, or range of significance' [S14:56], or more generally, 'the field within which all objects of our discourse are found' [B23:3.4]. But the perspective itself is not identical with the subject-matter of a given inquiry, for it determines the general character of the latter. Rather, it refers to the rules and methods adopted by the subject in the attempt to relate subject and object in a synthetic unity. It is for this reason that the principle of perspective is especially crucial for metaphysical inquiries: 'Metaphysical propositions are perspectives. They determine the point of view from which all human experience or all our science and anticipations can be coordinated' [C10:63].

 

  Perspectives, defined in this general way, can take on many different forms, since there is no limit to the number of ways a 'systematic context' can be defined. Indeed, when the principle of perspective is accepted as a first principle of philosophical inquiry, some type of perspectives can be found operating in the thought of virtually all philosophers. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find, as we turn now to an examination of Kant's use of perspectival thinking [II.2], that he too employs perspectival terms in a variety of ways, only some of which can be regarded as technical (i.e., as referring to perspectives which serve to constitute his philosophical System). In II.3 we will examine Kant's text in detail to see just how prevalent is his use of perspectival equivalents. This chapter will then conclude in II.4 with a suggestion as to how the various types of perspectives which constitute his System can be related together in a coherent System of Perspectives. The details of these relationships will be filled in and defended throughout the remainder of this book.

 

2. Kant's Use of the Principle of Perspective

 

  In the past few decades more and more scholars have begun to recognize the problem-solving potential of interpreting Kant's System in terms of distinctions between various perspectives. The interpretations of Allison [A5-A13], Bird [B20], Pippin [P8] and Prauss [P12,P13] are especially noteworthy in this respect, although none of these interpreters use 'perspective' consistently as a technical term.[4] The problem to which the notion is most commonly applied (sometimes exclusively [as in P8]) is that of the relation between the 'appearance' and the 'thing in itself' [see Ap. VI, note 1], which I shall discuss in detail in VI.2. The most purposefully developed use of the term I have found is that of Genova, who uses 'perspective' technically to denote 'logically distinct functions, relations, and functional parallelisms' [G5: 137]. His only explicit application of the principle to Kant's text, however, is when he draws a general distinction between the 'vertical perspective' and the 'horizontal per­spective' in each of the three Critiques.[5]

 

  By far the most significant use of the term 'perspective' is made by those who connect it directly with Kant's Copernican revolution, which, according to Capaldi, is intended to 'lead to a change in perspective' [C3:235; cf. Kt1: xviii-xix, q.a.]. For instance, this is implied, though left undeveloped, by Yovel's reference to the 'Copernican perspective' [Y2:977]. Kant's Copernican revolution just is the assumption: 'Everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers' [Kt1:670] can only be understood properly from some perspec­tive. Consequently, the 'critique' of these powers is concerned primarily with determining the 'right employment' of the various perspectives the human mind can adopt [670]. Only those interpreters who fail to grasp this essential aspect of the Critical method can construe Kant's use of words such as 'knowledge' and 'experience' to be positivistic [see e.g., J3:670-3; cf. IV.1].

 

  Despite the large number of interpreters who refer in passing to Kant's 'perspectives', no one has yet put forward a thoroughgoing interpretation of his System which takes this insight into account. Allison, who I believe succeeds in many ways in demonstrating 'that Kant's position is far more coherent than is commonly supposed' [A10:76], has come closest to doing so in recent years; nevertheless, because his perspectival interpretations have usually focused on various aspects of Kant's theoretical system (e.g., his 'transcendental idealism' [see note VI.12]), it is lacking in several crucial respects.[6] By contrast, my goal is to apply the principle of perspective to Kant's entire System more consistently and thoroughly than it has been applied in the past.

 

  The main reason for the widespread lack of emphasis on perspectives by Kant-scholars up until now is, no doubt, that the German word, die Perspektiv, never appears in Kant's writings (although 'Perspectivische' oc­curs once and some related Latin words occur 29 times in K2, mostly in vols. 1-2 [K11:694]). However, this is because in Kant's day that word would ordinarily have been used only in physical contexts, such as when referring to the angle of one's vision of a sensible object. The way I am using the word 'perspective' is a comparatively recent development. Although this may sufficiently explain why the concept of perspective as a technical principle has been neglected for so long by most interpreters, it is not a sufficient reason for continuing to ignore this key concept. Accordingly, I will henceforth substitute the word 'perspective' for the words used by Kant's translator whenever I quote a passage which employs some perspectival equivalent. This will make it possible to provide clear textual evidence without interrupting the text with bracketed alternative translations, and without continually referring back to this chapter, where the form of and rationale for such translations is to be explained. (Note that I will not adopt this policy in respect to the terminology used by writers other than Kant, whose wording I will quote exactly as it appears.) The new translations are not always more literal (though this can be argued in some cases [see II.3]), but they are always intended to reveal Kant's meaning more clearly.[7] This procedure should create no confusion: since Kemp Smith and other translators rarely use 'perspective',[8] the reader may assume the translation is altered whenever I use 'perspective' in a quote from Kant.

 

  Although Kant himself never explicitly states the principle of perspec­ive as such, he alludes to it on many occasions and, more importantly, utilizes it con­sistently throughout his lectures and writings. England alludes to Kant's dependence on this principle when he reports in E3:73n that 'his habit was to "turn everything upside down" with utter indif­ference to his own arguments or those of others, and to regard [philoso­phical problems] from all possible points of view.' Likewise, Jachmann [q.i. W5:37] reveals that Kant lectured as if he were conducting 'an experiment before his audience', during which he would discuss a conception from various angles until it was 'completely elucidated from every point of view.... But the hearer who ... took the first explanation for the correct and exhaustive statement ... carried away half-truths.' Kant himself describes his way of thinking in a similar fashion in a 1772 letter to Herz [K2:10.127(Z1:73)], where he says his mind 'is kept in readiness to view the subject matter from other perspectives all the time and to widen its horizon from a microscopic observation to a universal outlook in order that it may adopt all conceivable positions and that views from one may verify those from another.'

 

  Kant's reliance on the principle of perspective is clearly evident whenever he makes comments about how philosophers should go about the process of judging the views of other philosophers. Before we declare someone else's argument to be fallacious when they propose a conclusion different from our own, he insists we should 'inquire whether we do not assume a different standpoint' [Kt5:450]. In Kt15:67-8(223) he explains that by adopting such a procedure, agreement can often be reached between opposing parties:

 

Were the judgments of undissembled reason in persons thinking differently proved with the sincerity of an incorruptible counsel, who ... puts himself in the place of those who assign these [opposing] reasons, in order to be as sensible of them as possible ...; there would be much less disagreement in the opinions of philosophers, and an unfeigned equity in adopting the cause of the opposite ... would soon unite the scrutators in one way.

 

In a 1771 letter to Herz Kant describes the way in which he himself tries to follow such a policy in dealing with his own opponents:

 

I do not approach reasonable objections with the intentions of merely refuting them; I always weave them into my own train of thought and concede them the right of overturning my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my own judgements impartially from the perspective of others, some third view may emerge which is better than my former one.[9]

 

Such passages indicate that for Kant the same question can often be answered in different, sometimes equally valid, ways, depending on the perspective assumed.

 

  Kant's tendency to consider a matter from various perspectives characterizes virtually all his writing, though as a rule, the later the work, the greater and more explicit is the use he makes of this principle. In one of his earliest essays he introduces a perspectival distinction between 'physical' or 'absolute necessity' and 'moral' or 'hypothetical necessity' [Kt11:400(230-1)], which foreshadows the distinction between the theoretical and practical standpoints in his Critical philosophy. In attempting to solve the problem of freedom versus determinism, he points out that the crucial factor to consider is 'whence a thing is necessary' [400(230-1)]-i.e., in the context of which perspective it is determined to be necessary. In both cases the certainty provided by a thing's necessary status is 'by [its] own reasons', which is the early Kant's rather Leibnizian way of saying that 'certainty' means something different for each different perspective in which it arises. However, when he points out the need for a change of perspective, he ends up assuming what his later (Transcendental) concept of perspective seems to preclude, that human beings can know God's perspective [414-5(250-1); s.a. W10:10; but cf. X.2].

 

  Nearly all Kant's works follow this early essay in its concern for understanding concepts and questions 'in a right sense' [Kt11:402(233)] before attempting to reach any firm conclusions. In most cases Kant intentionally sets himself the task of arbitrating philosophical quarrels-a task closely related to the task he eventually names 'critique' [see e.g., P4:128-9,214]. In Kt11, for example, he aims to resolve a 'dispute between Crucius and the Wolffians' by introducing two mediating principles between 'the principles of [non]Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason' [W5:116]. Similarly, in Kt20 he tries to settle a dispute between Mendelssohn and Jacobi [Z1:21]. And in Kt63 'Kant attempted to combine ... the Eden theory and the Savage theory of the condition of primitive man ...' [B29:103n].

 

  In arbitrating such ongoing disputes Kant typically discovers, in truly Critical fashion, that 'both sides have erred', so that the solution must be found in adopting 'a middle ground' [Kt8:20(16)]. The error, in fact, is usually not inherent in either of the positions defended, but is caused by the tendency of each proponent to assume absolute validity for only one side, thus neglecting the principle of perspective; for when the latter principle is adopted, we find that in most philosophical quarrels '[b]oth propositions are correct' [Kt24:409], though only when viewed from a limited perspective. Thus Kant asserts in Kt21:152(174) 'that wherever philosophical controversies have been carried on for a long time, they never depended fundamentally on a verbal quibble but always on a genuine opposition concerning perspectives.' Along the same lines he says in Kt40:32(R1:6): 'If men of good intelligence and character maintain entirely opposite positions, the logic of probabilities leads one to look for a middle proposition which could put each party in the right to a certain extent.' 'All that is needed' in order 'to determine the point where the correct elements from both sides meet' in most philosophical de­bates (e.g., the debate between 'the Leibnizians and the Cartesians' in Kt40) is 'some absence of party fanaticism. With a well-balanced mind the dilemma [can be] solved at once' [Kt40:181(R1:8); s.a. 30(R1:6)]. By contrast, the tendency of some scholars in other fields to treat philosophy as 'dispensable' is condemned by Kant as a 'cyclopean erudition that lacks one eye' [Kt10: 45(50)].

 

  Even in his essays on 'natural philosophy', Kant makes frequent use of the principle of perspective in one form or another. His first perspectival distinction (between mathematics and physical science) comes in Kt41, his very first essay: 'body as mathematically conceived is a thing quite distinct from body as it exists in nature; and statements can be true of the former which cannot be extended to the latter.'[10] Kant begins Kt42 by warning that the term 'old' must not be understood absolutely, as a reference 'to the number of years it has lasted', but can only be understood properly from the perspective of 'the number of years it is expected to last' [195(11)]. He then goes on to point out the differences in our conception of 'growing old' when we regard this issue from the perspectives of dogs, humans, trees and the earth. In Kt43 Kant tries to show in detail how, as Wallace puts it [W5:108], 'a mechanical theory of the origin of the world is at once scientifically correct and in har­mony with religion.' In Kt44 he attempts 'to reconcile Euler's wave-theory [of light and heat] with Newton's particle theory' [B14:45]. In Kt52:377 Kant distinguishes between three levels of physical space (absolute space, regions and positions) in a way that bears considerable resemblance to the three levels of perspectives which, as we shall see in II.4, determine the basic perspectival structure of his Critical philosophy.[11] And in Kt55:321-2(88) he an­nounces his intent to resolve a conflict between 'theory' and 'experience' regarding the moon's influence on the temperature of the air. He argues that 'there is no contradiction' between the 'thesis' ('The moon has no influence') and the 'antithesis' ('She has an influence') as long as we view them from different perspectives: the former as referring to a 'direct' influence and the latter to an 'indirect' influence [323(90)].

 

  The principle of perspective is just as evident in Kant's early (more philosophical) secondary writings, such as Kt12, in which Kant hopes to rec­oncile 'transcendental philosophy with geometry' [475-6]. Likewise, in Kt17 Kant recognizes that the philosopher's method 'completely changes the perspective' from that of the geometer [289]. For the philosopher should attempt to understand 'not only objects, but their relations to man's reason'; in this way he can determine 'the boundary stones'-i.e., he can define the per­spec­tives-'which in future never allow investigation to wander beyond its proper district.'[12] Kant's discussion of the proofs for the existence of God in Kt15 is filled with examples of words and phrases which are equivalent to my use of 'perspective'. In particular he frequently contrasts in this work the 'real' and the 'logical' perspectives [see e.g., Kt15:72-4(230-4)]. And the key role played by perspectives in Kant's discussion of mystical and metaphysical visions in Kt18 is discussed at length in Pq12 [s.a. Ch. X].

 

  The implications of this principle are not fully developed, however, until they are elaborated in the Critical philosophy itself [see II.4]. Since the remainder of this book will focus mainly on examining just how the principle of perspective operates in the major works in which Kant develops his three Critical systems, there is no need to discuss the matter at this point. It will suffice merely to point out that Kant very intentionally designed his Critical philosophy in such a way that it would give rise to a 'perspectival shift' (i.e., a fundamental 'change of thinking') in philosophy [see e.g., K2:10.252(Z1: 95); Kt1:xv-xix]. Moreover, as is well-known, the riddle which provided at least part of the impetus for Kant's decision to begin constructing a philosophical System was the need to explain the source of the self-contradictions (later called 'antinomies') into which reason naturally falls in the course of speculation. Thus, in a 1781 letter to Bernoulli he explains that, before the writing of Kt1 'this putative science [i.e., metaphysics] lacked a touchstone with which to distinguish truth from deception, since different but equally persuasive metaphysical propositions lead inescapably to contradictory conclusions' [K2:10.259(Z1:97); s.a. Kt1:Avii-viii]. As we saw in II.1, the Transcendental Perspective is the 'touchstone' to which Kant is explicitly referring; yet this claim also applies implicitly to the principle of perspective in general, since it is only because the former is a perspective that it can act as a touchstone for resolving philosophical conflicts.

 

  In Kant's later secondary writings, his dependence on the principle of perspective continues to be evident. On a rather pragmatic note, Kant asks in Kt28 who has the right to claim ownership of a published book. After distinguishing between a copy of the book ('opus') and the use to which a publisher puts it ('opera') [84(234)], Kant explains that this question has one answer (viz., 'the author') if we regard 'the book as a writing, or a speech', but another answer (viz., 'the proprietor of the copy') if we regard it 'as the mute instrument merely of the delivery of the speech' [86n(238n)]. So the disputing parties 'may both say of it with equal right: it is my book! but in a different sense'-i.e., each from a different perspective. In Kt30 Kant addresses the more philosophical issue of the conflict between theory and practise by 'divid[ing] up this essay in terms of three perspectives' adopted by those who criticize theories: 'The three attitudes are those of the private individual or man of affairs, the statesman, and the man of the world or cosmopolitan', which give rise to a potential conflict between theory and practise in the corresponding areas of 'morality', 'political right' and 'international right' [277-8(63)]. After comparing each of these perspectives with that adopted by the 'academic', he concludes 'that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice' [313(92)].

 

  These later secondary writings also use perspectival equivalents more frequently than the earlier writings, often taking on quite significant roles. A good example is Kant's use of 'view' in Kt64:256n(193n) and Kt23:389(161) [s.a. 394(168)]. Examples of the many other relevant uses of perspectival equivalents can be found in the following passages: Kt60:17,21,30; Kt61:45, 47,49,63; Kt63:113; Kt31:332,339; Kt32:362,368,374; and Kt65:83. In Kt10, published a few years before Kant's death, perspectival equivalents occur on virtually every page: he talks about the categories enabling us to view knowledge from different 'angles' [38(43)], and he repeatedly employs the concepts of 'horizon' [40-4(44-9)] and 'sphere'.[13] Finally, Kant's depen­dence on the principle of perspective leads him to use perspecti­val equivalents in the very titles of two of his latest works: Kt60, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective [Absicht], and Kt66, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective [Hinsicht]'!

 

  These many examples provide ample evidence of Kant's belief in the importance of distinguishing clearly between the various perspectives available before trying to reach a definite answer to any philosophical question. But unfortunately, because he never explicitly acknowledges the dependence of his philosophical System on this principle, Kant has never been given full credit for the great emphasis he does put on it-an emphasis which determines to a significant extent the course of the Critical method itself.

 

3. Textual Evidence: Perspectival Equivalents in Kt1

 

  A careful investigation of the text of Kant's three Critiques would provide  the best proof of the great extent to which he uses terms which have perspec­tival connotations. In four subsections to this section I will provide the first step of such a thoroughgoing investigation by picking out the perspectival equivalents Kant uses in Kt1, and by comparing Kemp Smith's translation with the (sometimes paraphrased) perspectival translation. I will confine my attention to the first Critique, not because it is any more or less rich in perspectival equivalents than the other two, but because it is the only one for which adequate lexical tools are available in both English and German. Using Martin's Sachindex [M4] in conjunction with an Index of Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's first Critique [Pq10] makes it possible to carry out an exhaustive analysis and comparison of the text and its translation. The references of the relevant perspectival equivalents will be summarized in tabular form near the end of each of the first three subsections. Within each subsection the numbers in curved brackets will refer to the number of occurrences of the immediately preceding word(s), as determined by their entries in M4 or Pq10. (Plurals and other variations of words are included in all word counts, unless a derivative form is specified.) Because Pq10 lists the words occurring in both the A and B editions of Kt1, whereas M4 includes only those occurring in B, and because Kemp Smith often uses the same English term to translate a variety of German terms used by Kant, the English and the German totals for similar terms will not add up to the same number.

 

  Kant's use of perspectival equivalents in Kt1 can be conveniently divided into four types according to their English translations: on at least 47 occasions Kemp Smith translates Kant's perspectival intentions by using an 'exact' equivalent, such as 'standpoint' or 'point of view'; on at least 164 occasions he uses a 'categorial' equivalent, such as 'connection', 'relation' or 'modes of ...'; on at least 256 occasions he uses an 'instrumental' equivalent, such as 'use' or 'employment'; and on almost innumerable other occasions he uses an 'incidental' equivalent, such as 'aspect', 'in respect of' or 'in view of'. These classifications can be regarded as arbitrary groupings of Kant's usage, used here merely to simplify our examination of Kant's and Kemp Smith's often ambiguous and/or inconsistent use of terms. The terms which can be regarded as falling into each of these groups will be examined, respectively, in the following four subsections.

 

  A. Exact Equivalents

 

  The two English expressions 'point of view' (28) and 'standpoint' (17) can be regarded as exact equivalents of the term 'perspective'. Kemp Smith uses these two expressions to translate ten different German words. The three most common of these are: Gesichtspunkt (14), translated nine times as 'point of view' and four times as 'standpoint'; Standpunkt (9), twice as 'point of view' and six times as 'standpoint'; and Absicht (117), five times as 'point of view' and once as 'standpoint'. In the second edition Preface Kemp Smith translates Denkart (6) as 'point of view' four times, when it is used to refer to the 'new' or 'changed' Denkart of the Copernican revolution, and twice as 'intellectual' when it is used to refer to an 'intellectual revolution'. (In the latter case it would have been more accurate for him to have used a phrase such as 'revolution in perspective' or 'perspectival revolution'. Hence we can include these two occurrences in our list of exact perspectival equivalents.) Three occurrences of Seite (in conjunction with betrachtet) and one occurrence each of Beziehung, Grunde and Stellung are also translated in one of these two ways, though ordinarily translated differently. The remaining eight occurrences are paraphrased versions of texts which have no equivalent for the        
 

 

Table II.1: Exact Equivalents (47)

 

 

*Implied grammatically in the German text.

 

 

Note: The numbers in this table and those that follow refer to the page and line numbers of each perspectival equivalent in Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's first Critique. Some line numbers may be off by one or two because of minor changes in the different printings of Kemp Smith's translation.

English expression in question. By supplying these extra words, Kemp Smith expli­cates what is implied by the context, viz., Kant's dependence on the principle of perspective.


   With the possible exception of Denkart, there is no evidence of a consistent pattern in either Kant's or Kemp Smith's usage. But this terminological asymmetry is relatively insignificant here, since both the original and the translation use these words interchangeably in most of the 47 occurrences mentioned above. Both use these and other perspectival equivalents rather haphazardly to refer to a diversity of specific perspectives, as well as to perspectives, or perspectival distinctions, in general. Since a new translation of these equivalents requires simply substituting 'perspective' for 'point of view' or 'standpoint', it is unnecessary to specify any examples. In the remaining sections, however, examples will be used to help clarify equivalents which are more cryptic, though in many cases, more illuminating.

 

  B. Categorial Equivalents

 

  Several terms which would ordinarily be used to refer to one of Kant's 'dynamical' categories-i.e., to the category of relation or that of modality [see III.3]-are actually perspectival equivalents in certain contexts. The English reader naturally tends to assume that terms such as 'connection' and 'relation' refer in some way to the third of Kant's 'categories of the understanding', and phrases such as 'mode of knowledge' and 'mode of thought' to the fourth. But in both cases Kemp Smith has obscured Kant's meaning by using the same English word to translate a number of German words which have different connotations. In this section, therefore, we shall uncover some of the most obscure, yet most profound, perspectival equivalents in Kt1.

 

  Most of Kemp Smith's 190 uses of the technical word 'connection' are accurate translations of standard terms such as Verbindung (66), Verknüpfen (48), Verknüpfung (76) and Zusammenhang (59). But on a number of occa­sions, especially when using the phrases 'in connection with' (14) or 'in this connection' (7), he is actually paraphrasing the original text, which does not contain any of these standard terms. It is unfortunate here, as elsewhere, that he should use an otherwise technical term in nontechnical contexts, when he could just as easily have used some other paraphrased expression. As is the case with other incidental phrases, such as 'in respect of', 'in view of', etc. [see II.3.D], in most of these paraphrastic occurrences of 'connection' the term does not refer to any of the perspectives which are constitutive of Kant's System. That is, although in many instances such phrases could be rendered 'from this perspective', to do so would be just as arbitrary as is Kemp Smith's use of 'connection'. There are, however, at least ten occurrences of 'connection' in which the context suggests that Kant does intend to refer to a specific perspective within his System. Of these, there are three instances of Absicht [Kt1:538,723,736], one of Ansehung [712], one of Betrachtung [662] and one of Rücksicht [806] (all of which are also mentioned in II.3.D below) which can be translated loosely as 'perspective'. There are also two instances in which 'perspective' can translate Beziehung [108,588] (a term discussed later in this subsection) and one in which Kemp Smith paraphrases the German [xixn]. The remaining occurrence, the only one which contains one of Kant's standard words for 'connection', is worth mentioning as an example of how such phrases can be more appropriately translated. In Kt1:491 Kemp Smith translates 'in Verbindung mit demselben' as 'in connection therewith' -a rendering which leaves the reader guessing as to what kind of 'connection' Kant has in mind. By contrast, translating this phrase as a perspectival equivalent clarifies Kant's meaning: 'As befits a transcendental philosophy, [the 'dry formulas' of reason] have been divested of all empirical features, although only from this [i.e., the empirical] perspective can their full splendour be displayed.'

 

  The 'categorial' term Kemp Smith uses most frequently in contexts which deal with perspectives is 'relation' (447), a word which ordinarily refers straightforwardly to the category of relation or to its application in specific cases. Once again he translates several German terms with this one English term. Kant's use of Relation (18) always refers unambiguously to relation in the categorial sense (e.g., 'die Kategorien der Relation' [Kt1:288]). In such instances Kemp Smith's use of 'relation' is obviously correct. But an exami­nation of Kant's use of the two terms most often translated as 'relation'-viz., Verhältnis (194) and Beziehung (134)-reveals an unfortunate equivocation in Kemp Smith's usage. The former is almost always used, like Relation [e.g., 486], in some categorial sense, usually as a reference to a relation between two or more items of the same or similar type.[14] Kemp Smith's translation of Verhältnis as 'interrelations' on two occasions [318,341] is therefore quite appropriate. The latter, by contrast, almost always implies a more abstract, 'perspectival relation', such as that between 'the understanding' and 'objects in general' in Kt1:A115-a relation in which one side is clearly in control of, or establishes a perspective for viewing, the other side. Of course, exceptions can be found to this general rule [see e.g., 302]. Indeed, Beziehung and Ver­hältnis are occasionally used in such close conjunction that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between them.[15] Nevertheless, the distinction is an important one, for I have found only two occurrences of Verhältnis which can be paraphrased with a perspectival equivalent,[16] yet Beziehung can be so translated in 51 of its occurrences without obscuring-indeed, often clarifying-Kant's meaning [see Table II.2]. Moreover, in most of the other passages in which Kemp Smith uses 'relation' for Beziehung, adding the adjective 'perspectival' would clarify Kant's meaning by distinguishing it from strict categorial interrelation. (Such passages are not included in Table II.2, however, since the reference to perspectives is only indirect.)

 

  A few sample translations will help clarify the important difference between Beziehung and Verhältnis. Beziehung often occurs in phrases which bridge one sentence or clause with another. Thus, in contexts such as Kt1:524, where Kant says 'Nur in anderweitiger Beziehung', Kemp Smith's translation ('Only in another sort of relation') leaves the reader wondering 'Relation? Relation of what to what? But the translation, 'Only from another perspective', unambiguously conveys the perspectival emphasis of this passage. Or again, when Kant says 'einmal in anderweitiger, vielleicht praktischer Beziehung' [668], he is not intending to say anything whatsoever with respect to the category of relation; hence 'in some other, perhaps practical, perspective' brings out Kant's meaning far more clearly than Kemp Smith's paraphrase, 'in some other relation, perhaps on practical grounds'. Occasionally, when Kant specifies more clearly what is in relation to what, Kemp Smith's translation as '... in relation to ...' is rather less ambiguous. But in most cases, and especially when two ways of considering a single object are being discussed, '... from the perspective of ...' or '... the perspective of ... on ...' can do the same job without having to employ a standard categorial term so ambiguously. Accordingly, Kt1:136 would be translated: 'The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition, from the perspective of sensibility, is ... The supreme principle of the same possibility, from the perspective of understanding, is ...'

 

  Although it cannot usually be paraphrased in terms of a perspectival equivalent, Verhältnis is quite frequently used by Kant in conjunction with some perspectival term, or even to explicate what the principle of perspective itself entails. The most significant example occurs in Kt1:316-7, where Kant defines 'reflection' as 'the consciousness of the Verhältnißes of given representations to our different sources of knowledge'. He then goes on to explain that it is this relation that gives rise to, or determines, which perspective is under consideration at any given time: 'only by way of such consciousness [i.e., only by discerning the differences between our perspectives] can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another [i.e., their role in a System of Perspectives] be rightly determined.' Elsewhere he lists three types of Verhält­nißes: '(1) the relation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the appearance; (3) the relation to all things in general' [391]. These three types of 'relation of representations' correspond to three of the four perspectives which, as we shall see in II.4, constitute part of the basic framework of Kant's System of Perspectives: the hypothetical, the empirical and the transcendental perspectives, respectively [cf. IV.3]. The remaining per­spective, the logical, is, by contrast, concerned with a 'mere comparison [bloße Comparation]' of representations which do not necessarily stand in any real relation to each other [318]. (Note also the speculative perspective, which is concerned with the consideration of an object 'in itself, and therefore apart from any perspective [Beziehung] of the outer senses' [A358-9]). These passages are typical of many others in which Kant uses Verhältnis to describe the perspectival character of his System.

 

  In addition to Relation, Verhältnis and Beziehung, Kemp Smith translates several nonstandard words as 'relation', words which can sometimes be regarded as direct equivalents of 'perspective'. I have found two relevant occurrences of Absicht, one each of Beziehungsweise (2), relativ (11) and Verknüp­fung, and five in which Kemp Smith uses the word in a paraphrase [see Table II.2]. The most common nonstandard word translated as 'relation' is Ansehung (not listed in M4), which can be regarded as a perspectival equiv­alent in thirteen of its occurrences. As one would expect, the perspectival equivalents which are based on such nontechnical words are often used to refer to very specific perspectives which do not, as such, play a dominant role in Kant's System of Perspectives. A good example is when Kant says: 'The practical idea ..., from the perspective [Ansehung] of our actual activities is indispensably necessary' [Kt1:385]. The words 'actual activities' are not in this context intended to describe a perspective constituting part of Kant's Sys­tem (though they may, in fact, refer indirectly to some such perspective). Taking into consideration these additional occurrences brings the total number of perspectival equivalents which Kemp Smith translates as 'relation' up to 76.

 

  Moving now to the terms which seem at first to be associated with the category of modality, we find that most references to the 'mode of' something describe specific elements which arise within a given perspective. Thus Kant frequently describes time and space in terms of our 'mode of intuition [Art der Anschauung]' [e.g., Kt1:52] or of our 'mode of representation [Vorstellungs­art]' [e.g., 54]. Such phrases could be roughly paraphrased as '... the elements characteristic of a(n) ... perspective'; but, unlike the other trans­lations suggested so far, to do so would not only stray too far from the original meaning of the words used, but would also involve replacing a relatively simple phrase with a rather cumbersome one. Therefore it will suffice in most cases merely to keep in mind that Kant's modal language often provides significant, though indirect, descriptions of his various perspectives. There are, however, several exceptions.

 

  While there is admittedly no reason to paraphrase Kant's modal language when its literal meaning fits the context, a change is justified whenever it both flows more smoothly with the context and helps to convey Kant's meaning more accurately. I have found this to be the case only once each in regard to Kant's use of the terms Art (276) [Kt1:768] and Modis (13) [304]. Six other exceptions are paraphrased translations, where no direct equivalent of 'mode' is specified in the German: the phrases 'mode of reflecting upon' [375], 'in all its possible modes' [676], 'mode of employing reason' [740], 'mode in which reason handles' [743], 'mode of their presentation' [772] and 'mode of procedure' [884] can all be translated more appropriately using 'perspective'. (Three similar occurrences of 'mode(s) of employment' [675, 740,751] are included in II.3.C.)

 

  All other perspectival equivalents in this class fall into two groups: 'mode of knowledge' and 'mode of thought'. In a footnote on page 42 of his translation, Kemp Smith explains that he uses the phrase 'modes of knowledge' to translate the term Erkenntniße (12) because 'the term "knowledge" cannot be used in the plural'. His way of avoiding this difficulty is inadequate, however, for two reasons: first, such a translation risks equivocation, because Kant already has a technical word for 'mode' (Art); and second, it risks unintelligibility whenever the context deals with knowledge in general, rather than with its specific contents. To avoid these risks Erkenntniße can be translated more accurately as 'items of knowledge' in the latter type of context, and as 'epistemological perspectives' in the former. Most contexts in which 'items of knowledge' occurs can then be regarded as conveying, at least indirectly, some perspectival nuance, since all such 'items' can be known only from some perspective. Unfortunately, the context is ambiguous in many of the 50 occurrences of Erkenntniße and its derivatives [see e.g., Kt1: 6]; nevertheless, in 30 of these it seems legitimate to use the paraphrased, perspectival translation [see Table II.2]. Doing so produces helpful trans­la­tions such as in Kt1:870: 'It is of utmost importance to isolate the various epistemological perspectives according as they differ in kind and in origin, and to secure that they be not confounded owing to the fact that usually, in our employment of them, they are combined.'

 

  Several other expressions can be translated in a similar fashion. Kemp Smith translates 'eine Erkenntniß' as 'a mode of knowledge' [Kt1:33] and as 'knowledge' [865], yet in both cases the context actually suggests something more like 'an epistemological perspective' (i.e., a perspective out of which our knowledge of objects arises). The same holds true for his use of 'mode of thought' as a translation for Erkenntnißart (9) on three occasions [25(twice), 808], along with the passages in which he translates this term in various others ways [see Table II.2]. The most important example of Erkenntnißart as a perspectival equivalent is in Kt1:25, where Kant defines 'transcendental' as 'knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our epistemological perspective on objects in so far as this perspective is to be possible a priori.' In at least five instances Kemp Smith trans­lates Verstandeserkennt­niße (20) and Vernunfterkenntniße (26) in modal terms when their meaning is brought out more clearly by translating them as perspectival equivalents. At one point the latter is translated cumbersomely as 'modes of knowledge obtainable by reason' [109], whereas it could be more simply stated as 'reason's epistemological perspectives'. An equally good example with regard to the former is when Kant's 'alle möglichen Verstandeser­kenntniße (darunter die empirischen)' [676], rendered loosely by Kemp Smith as 'knowledge of the understanding in all its possible modes (including empirical knowledge)', is translated more directly as 'all the understanding's possible epistemological perspectives (including the empirical)'.

 

  In the second group of modal expressions, the phrases 'mode of thought' and 'mode of thinking' translate the terms Denkungsart (14) and Art zu denken (4), respectively, five times each. Nine of these ten uses can be translated as direct perspectival equivalents. In Kt1:704, for example, Kemp Smith's 'a distinction bearing on the procedure of thought' can be replaced simply by 'a perspectival distinction' as an accurate translation of 'ein Unterschied der Denkungsart'. Elsewhere, Denkungsart is contrasted twice with Sinnesart:

 

[Reason's] empirical character (the sensible perspective [der Sinnesart]) is completely and necessarily determined in the intel­ligible character (the con­ceptual perspective [der Denkungsart]) .... [Appearances] yield an immediate knowledge only of the sensible perspective. The action, in so far as it can be ascribed to the conceptual perspective as its cause, does not follow therefrom in accordance with empirical laws ... [579]

 

But Kemp Smith also translates Denkungsart once as 'manner of thinking' [493], 'procedure of thought' [704] and 'way of thought' [776], twice merely as 'thought' [xviii,776], and four times as 'way of thinking' [xxxvii,326,683, 785]. In each of these passages, as well as the three other times Kemp Smith      

 

Table II.2: Categorial Equivalents (164)

*Implied grammatically in the German text.

uses 'way of thinking' [53,A399,615], the relevant phrase can readily be taken as a perspectival equivalent. This group (including Sinnesart) therefore yields 23 further equivalents. When added to the number of relevant occurrences of 'connection' (10), 'relation' (76), 'mode' (8) and 'mode of knowledge' (47), discussed above, this brings the total number of categorial equivalents to 164.

 

Table II.2: Categorial Equivalents (cont.)


  C. Instrumental Equivalents