PART TWO
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS
OF KANT'S SYSTEM
by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. [Kt1:xxx]
Knowledge and Experience
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins
with experience.... But ... it does not follow that it all arises out of
experience. [Kt1:1]
1. The
Fundamental Epistemological Distinction
Kant's
Critical philosophy is notorious for its terminological ambiguity and apparent
inconsistency. The interpretive confusion that often results is at least a
contributing factor to the conclusion of many commentators, such as Strawson, that
large chunks of Kant's System (e.g., his 'transcendental idealism') are
'unintelligible' and 'incoherent'.[1] Yet I believe,
with Kant [Kt1: Axxi], that if his works are approached with 'the patience and
impartiality of a judge' (and perhaps
even with 'the benevolent assistance of a fellow-worker'),
rather than with a set of analytical tools with which to dissect his every
sentence, then almost all of his theories can be understood in surprisingly
simple and consistent terms. Accordingly, I shall make a further step in this
chapter towards the substantiation of this supposition by interpreting and
interrelating some of the fundamental epistemological distinctions which serve
to structure all three Critiques.
The primary
epistemological distinction, underlying directly or indirectly all others in
Kant's System, is that between 'knowledge' (Erkenntnis)
and 'experience' (Erfahrung).
Unfortunately, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) its ubiquity in Kant's
writings, it tends to remain an obscure and uncriticized presupposition for
both Kant and his many interpreters and critics. The main reason for this
neglect seems to be that he invokes a variety of distinctions which define
knowledge and experience more precisely, with the result that these more common
terms naturally appear to be less technical and in no need of special
treatment. The purpose of this chapter will be to explicate the
knowledge-experience distinction implicit in Kant's System by integrating it
with the most important of these more obviously technical distinctions: first
with his pure-empirical and subject-object distinctions, secondly with his
a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic distinctions, and
thirdly with his distinctions between the empirical, transcendental, logical,
and hypothetical perspectives.
The wide
range of connotations the terms 'knowledge' and 'experience' have in ordinary
language might induce an interpreter to regard any secondary distinctions with suspicion.
One might insist that they must inevitably share the indistinct nature of the
primary distinction from which they are derived, notwithstanding any
intelligibility they seem to have on their own. Such a proposal, however, is
unsound; for, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, Kant's own explanations of
these distinctions can be interpreted in a relatively clear and plausible
fashion. Moreover, even though he does not say much about the terms 'knowledge'
and 'experience' as such, he does say enough to provide a basis for a
sufficiently coherent interpretation.
In ordinary
use, 'experience' can refer generally to the concrete, immediate (i.e.,
uninterpreted) encounter between a subject[2] and an object.
This 'immediate experience' provides the raw material upon which more abstract
functions such as 'determinant judgment' and 'reflective judgment' operate [see
e.g., Kt7:385-6; s.a. IV.3], for in such experience the subject has neither
determined the given object to be an object of knowledge nor reflected upon its epistemological status. Kant uses
the word 'immediate' to define 'experience' four times in Kt1, most notably in
the Refutation of Idealism, the main purpose of which is to prove that 'outer
experience is really immediate ...'[3] But in many
other passages he uses 'immediate(ly)' to qualify more specific words such as
'sensation' or 'perception'. In Kt1:A371, for instance, 'immediate' describes
both the 'self-consciousness' of 'inner sense' and the 'perception' of 'outer
sense'. Moreover, Kant frequently uses the phrase 'possible experience' to
refer to this immediate starting point for all knowledge; as such, it denotes
'not only the totality of the objects of experience but also Erfarhen itself as spiritual act'
[V4:96; see VII.2.A]. Thus as we shall see, this ordinary, indeterminate and
nonreflective sense of 'experience' crops up on numerous occasions throughout
Kant's Critical works.
Certainly the
most important example of Kant's use of this sense of 'experience' is when he
begins the Introduction to Kt1 with the proclamation: 'There can be no doubt
that all our knowledge begins with experience' [1]. That is, all knowledge must
be related to someone's immediate experience in order for it to qualify as
actual knowledge [cf. 629]. Kant stresses the philosophical significance of
this type of experience in Kt18:347(82) when he says an 'impression of the
senses precedes all the judgments of reason, and carries with it immediate
evidence, far excelling all other persuasion.' Yet the priority of immediate
experience does not preclude the possibility that certain aspects of our
knowledge might be derived from some other source. For several sentences later
in Kt1:1 he adds that, although 'all our knowledge begins with experience, it
does not follow that it all arises out of experience.'
In explaining
how some knowledge is grounded in a source other than immediate experience,
Kant does indeed develop another, less conventional, meaning for 'experience'.[4] He describes
this more determinate type of experience as a concrete 'synthesis of
perceptions' [Kt1:792,161] in which various 'objects of possible experience'
[73] are made actual objects of knowledge through the cooperation of the
subject's two main powers of cognitive judgment: intuitive sensibility (which
produces sensation) and conceptual understanding (which produces thought).[5] This process,
known also as 'determinant judgment', implies a differentiation between two
kinds of knowledge: the validity of 'empirical' knowledge is determinable only
by appealing at some point to sensible experience [Kt1:2-3; cf. 34], while that
of 'pure' knowledge is determinable without reference to sensibility, to the
extent that 'there is nothing that belongs to sensation' in it.[6] Kant claims
empirical knowledge is tied so closely to experience that the two can, for us,
be equated: 'Empirical knowledge is experience.'[7] In this new
sense (developed fully only in the second edition of Kt1), experience is no
longer the immediate chronological starting point of all knowledge, but one of
several 'species of knowledge' [xvii,196; cf. 314]. Unlike empirical knowledge,
pure knowledge is related only indirectly to experience: it arises out of the
subject's abstract reflection on the general nature of experience [316-9], and
is pure in virtue of its primary dependence on the subject rather than the
object of knowledge.[8] But in order to
engage in such reflection, we must be consciously aware of our experience, not
in its immediate state, but as empirical
knowledge; for experience in itself
is 'the ultimate unconditional given,
within which all reflection arises' [G1:348-9].
So far,
Kant's use of the words 'knowledge' and 'experience' seems to be relatively
clear. The latter refers either to the original encounter between subject and
object (i.e., 'immediate experience') which yields actual knowledge through
determinant judgment, or to the 'empirical knowledge' which is so produced; and
the former refers either to this same empirical knowledge, or to the knowledge
which can be inferred from experience by reflecting in other, more abstract
ways. But this account of his primary distinction will be of use to the
interpreter only if it provides an adequate context for interpreting Kant's
secondary distinctions. In IV.2, therefore, I will introduce the four classes
of knowledge which arise out of two of his secondary distinctions, after which
I will examine in IV.3 the type of reflective perspective which produces each
class of knowledge. Finally, in IV.4 I will integrate the various results of
this inquiry into a single picture, delineating the essential perspectival
pattern which determines the epistemological form of each of Kant's Critical
systems.
2. Two Secondary
Epistemological Distinctions
The
knowledge-experience distinction is rarely discussed as such by either Kant or
his commentators because, as mentioned above, experience (even though it has
chronological priority in its immediate form) is defined in terms of knowledge.
Despite the negligible attention it has been given, this distinction will turn
out to form the context in which all Kant's other epistemological distinctions
are set. But before this can be fully demonstrated, a good deal more will have
to be said about the 'knowledge' side of the distinction. In this section, therefore,
I will specify how four basic types of knowledge arise out of the two most
prevalent of Kant's secondary epistemological distinctions, between the a
priori and the a posteriori and between the analytic and the synthetic, both of
which are concerned not only with knowledge, but with the various ways
reflective knowledge and immediate experience are related.
On the
surface, the bifurcation of knowledge into a priori and a posteriori types
seems to be readily comprehensible. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived
directly from-or the truth of which is contingent upon-the meeting of subject
and object in immediate experience. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is
'given' or 'innate' knowledge which is derived from a source-or the truth of
which is-'absolutely independent of all experience' [Kt1:2-3]; hence it is both
necessary[9] and universal
[3-4]. But upon closer investigation, two problems arise: first, How does this
distinction differ from that between pure and empirical knowledge? and secondly,
If 'all our knowledge begins with
experience', then what sense is there in saying a priori knowledge is somehow 'independent of all experience'? I will address these problems in
the following two paragraphs.
Although Kant
ordinarily uses the terms 'pure' and 'a priori', as well as the terms
'empirical' (i.e., impure) and 'a
posteriori', interchangeably, they should not be regarded as mere synonyms [as
in P14:4n], for he does occasionally make a technical distinction between them.
The pure-impure distinction discriminates between knowledge which does (impure)
and does not (pure) depend directly on some particular sensation, whereas the a priori-a posteriori distinction
discriminates between knowledge which is grounded in the subject's experience of some particular object (a
posteriori) and that which the subject brings to experience, which must
therefore be grounded primarily in the subject itself (a priori). Presumably,
knowledge can be a priori even if it involves sensation in some way [Kt1:3,28-9];
or it can be a posteriori without having anything to do with sensation. These
possibilities cannot be rejected merely by virtue of the meanings of the words
involved. Hence, although examples of pure a posteriori and impure a priori
knowledge might be hard to come by, the distinct classes must be acknowledged
as logically possible. Nevertheless, they are of minimal importance, since the
two pairs are almost always treated coextensively: impure a posteriori
knowledge is knowledge derived from a subject's experience of an object (a
posteriori) and requiring sensation (impure), while pure a priori knowledge is
knowledge brought to experience by the subject (a priori) and requiring no
sensation (pure) [x,4-5,124-5].
The status of
a priori knowledge in relation to experience should become more evident when I
relate the distinctions of this section to the four fundamental reflective
perspectives in IV.3. But for now several remarks can be added to dispel some
of the ambiguity shrouding the meaning of the word 'knowledge' in the phrase 'a
priori knowledge'.[10] Knowledge which
arises a posteriori seems not to be troublesome because it is by definition
based on experience. A priori knowledge, by contrast, 'which I must presuppose
as being in me prior to objects being given to me' [Kt1:xvii; s.a. xviii,xxiii,
A128-9], and which is therefore objectively valid 'antecedently to all
experience' [198], is rather more ambiguously called 'knowledge'. This
ambiguity can be cleared up by recalling the distinction made in IV.1 between
immediate experience (which can lead to 'empirical knowledge') and reflective
knowledge (which is known only if
experienced, but which might be traceable to some other source). When this is
stressed, both a posteriori and a priori knowledge can be regarded as
abstractions from immediate experience-though, as will become evident in IV.3,
they abstract in different directions. 'A priori' does not denote knowledge
which is actually known apart from
experience; rather, it refers to knowledge whose validity does not depend on a subject's encounter with particular
objects in experience. (Thus, for example, although we cannot actually know, in the a posteriori sense, space
and time as wholes, we can claim to have a
priori 'knowledge' of these wholes whenever we have a posteriori knowledge
of anything.) Kant could have made his meaning less confusing either by not
calling the determinate form of experience 'empirical knowledge', or by not
using the word 'knowledge' for that which arises out of our reflection on
experience. (For instance, he could have referred only to the a priori 'source'
or 'conditions' of our actual knowledge.) Using 'knowledge' for both empirical
knowledge and its conditions gives rise to uncertainty on the part of the
reader as to which sense of the word he intends when he uses it without a
qualifier (as in Kt1:26, where he seems to fluctuate between both meanings).
Fortunately, once the choices are explicated, the context usually makes his
intention sufficiently clear.
Kant also has
a more general use for the a priori-a posteriori distinction which should be
mentioned briefly at this point. Sometimes he equates all philosophical or
'metaphysical' knowledge with the a priori and all ordinary or 'physical' knowledge
with the a posteriori [e.g., Kt7:174,475]. Thus he says 'knowledge through
reason and a priori knowledge are the same thing' [Kt4:12; s.a. Kt7:167-8].
This is the sense England has in mind when he says a priori truths 'enable us
to understand the "why" of a thing or event', while a posteriori
truths 'enable us to know its existence as a fact' [E3:45]. Wolff rightly
criticizes Kant's tendency to identify 'the formal (space, time, categories)
with the a priori and the material
(sensation, empirical concepts) with the a
posteriori';[11] but he goes too
far when he adds that this causes Kant to 'be irresistibly drawn to assimilate
all knowledge to a priori knowledge.' For Kant's general usage of these terms
is never more than a tendency: as we
shall see, he is ordinarily very careful to limit the a priori to certain
specific sorts of philosophical knowledge, and to allow a definite place for
the a posteriori (or material) in his System. Moreover, the dual meaning of 'a
priori' (as a specific kind of philosophical knowledge or as all philosophical knowledge) is related
to the distinction between Kant's broad and narrow uses of the term
'transcendental' [see e.g., Kt1:80-1], which, as we saw in II.4 and III.4, is
quite legitimate once the broad use is understood in connection with the
overall Perspective of his Critical philosophy.[12] Nevertheless,
since an equivocal use of technical terms is likely to lead to
misunderstanding, it should be avoided wherever possible. Accordingly, I shall
henceforth treat 'a priori' (and 'transcendental', whenever it is not
capitalized) in the narrow sense, and attempt to differentiate more precisely
the various sorts of knowledge with which Kant is concerned.
The other
important secondary distinction Kant makes between types of (reflective)
knowledge is that between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments.[13] Unfortunately,
he describes this contrast in a wide variety of ways, which are difficult if
not impossible to integrate into a single, consistent picture. Garver, for
instance, finds no less than 'twelve theories of analyticity contained in or
suggested by Kant's discussion' [G3:245; s.a. V1:1.253f]! Moreover, perhaps as
a result of such variety, the nature and validity of this distinction has been
a matter of considerable debate in recent years. Although it is not necessary
for our purposes to embark on a thoroughgoing study of this topic, examining a
selection of the most significant comments of both Kant and his critics will
help differentiate Kant's version of the distinction from some of the unkantian
versions which have recently been suggested.
Probably the
best known of Kant's descriptions of these terms is that in an analytic
judgment the predicate is already 'contained in' the subject, while in a
synthetic judgment the predicate 'lies outside' the subject [Kt1:10; cf.
Kt22:232; see e.g., H4:lii]. A more illuminating, yet less frequently cited
description of this distinction is Kant's claim that judgments are analytic
only if their truth is 'based entirely on the principle of [non]contradiction',[14] while judgments
are synthetic only 'under the condition that an intuition underlies the concept
of their subject'.[15] As Allison says:
'Synthetic judgments assert [real] relations [of concepts to objects], while
analytic judgments merely assert logical relations between concepts' [A7:54].
With these descriptions in mind, we can use Kant's own pictorial representation
of 'particular judgments' in Kt10:103(108-9) (according to which the subject is
depicted as a square and the predicate as a circle), to show how (e.g.) 'Yellow
is a color' and 'This table is yellow' are propositions representing analytic
and synthetic judgments, respectively:
(a) 'Yellow is a color.' (b) 'This table is yellow.'
Figure IV.1: Analytic and Synthetic Judgments
Beck
translates Kant's distinction into less metaphorical terms: if '"X is
A" implies logically "X is B", the judgment is analytic', but if
B is 'related to A by virtue of the fact that both are predicates of the same
X', then it is synthetic.[16] Synthetic
judgments, then, are informative: they extend our knowledge by providing
information about the subject which is not necessarily implied by the meanings
of the words (e.g., this table would still be a table whatever its color).
Analytic judgments, on the other hand, are, strictly speaking, not informative:[17] the predicate
does not extend our knowledge, but provides only what can be inferred from the
subject by means of the laws of logic.[18] Although this
description of Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction is given predominantly in
terms of simple, subject-predicate propositions, it is unfair to charge Kant
with limiting his logic to such propositions [as in F6:88]. On the contrary,
says Wolff, 'nothing could be further from the truth' [W21:188]. The great
variety of applications Kant offers for his analytic-synthetic distinction
[s.e. H4:xxii-cxv] is evidence enough of his awareness of the potential
complexities of propositional logic. More complex judgments, as Allison
explains, are viewed by Kant 'as logical compounds of [these simple]
categorical judgments' [A11:25]. Subject-predicate examples, therefore, provide
a manageable way of grasping the general characteristics of the analytic-synthetic
distinction.
Kant leaves
no doubt as to how all this applies to empirical knowledge: 'Judgments of
experience, as such, are one and all synthetic' [Kt1:11]. Only when we attempt
to interpret such determinate judgments by reflecting upon them does some
knowledge come to be regarded as analytic. The bulk of the discussion of the
analytic-synthetic distinction by recent philosophers has suffered needlessly
by neglecting the implications of this salient qualification. The result has
been a running debate over whether the terms refer to a difference of kind or merely to one of degree.[19] The position
Kant would adopt on this point becomes evident once his admittedly subtle
distinction between immediate experience and reflective knowledge is sharpened
(as I am attempting to do in this chapter): both views would be accorded a
measure of validity. Kant himself uses the analytic-synthetic distinction
primarily as a tool for organizing various forms of reflective knowledge
according to their logical status. Thus, his distinction is clearly one between
different kinds of knowledge. But, in
order to locate the sources of both analytic and synthetic knowledge in
immediate experience, this rigid distinction of kind would have to be
reinterpreted in terms of varying degrees.
The point of Kant's assertion that all judgments of experience are synthetic is
simply to emphasize that the term 'analytic' will apply only to certain forms
of reflective knowledge, and never to nonreflective experience. It in no way
disallows the legitimate formulation of a less restrictive analytic-synthetic
distinction, such as those discussed in Appendix IV, in which the terms are not
so mutually exclusive.
The main
question raised by Kant's introduction of the distinction between analytic and
synthetic kinds of reflective knowledge is: How does he intend to integrate it
with his distinction between a priori and a posteriori kinds of reflective
knowledge? Some philosophers tend to equate the two distinctions (as well as
that between 'pure' and 'empirical'); but such an oversimplified approach is
not only inadequate [B19:227f], but obviously unkantian [see K2:11.38(Z1:141)].
If, then, the two distinctions are not equivalent, four possible classes of
reflective knowledge arise out of their combination: knowledge by reflection
might be classified as 'analytic a posteriori', 'analytic a priori', 'synthetic
a priori' or 'synthetic a posteriori'. I shall conclude this section by
examining briefly what each of these four classes would entail.
To begin
with, the impossibility of analytic a posteriori knowledge is generally
considered to be 'quite evident' [P5:182-3]: indeed, it is a nonsensical
contradiction in terms for those who equate 'analytic' and 'a priori' [see Ap.
IV]. Even though Kant argues against those who identify analyticity and
apriority [e.g., in Kt1:1-10], he joins them in dismissing this class of
knowledge with only a brief explanation: 'it would be absurd to found an
analytic judgment on experience. Since, in forming the judgment, I must not go
outside my concept, there is no need to appeal to the testimony of experience
in its support' [Kt1:11; cf. Kt2:268 and Kt4:12]. There are, however, a few
theorists who do regard the analytic a posteriori as providing the best
description of certain types of knowledge.[20] Notwithstanding
Kant's lack of concern for this class of knowledge, I shall argue in IV.3 that
certain aspects of his philosophy can best be understood by reinterpreting them
in terms of the analytic a posteriori. At this point, though, it will suffice
to say that we should expect such knowledge, if it is possible, to have its
validity grounded in some way in experience (a posteriori), and yet also to
proceed by making inferences solely on the (analytic) basis of an application
of the laws of logic to the concepts or propositions involved.
The second
class of reflective knowledge, the analytic a priori, is rather more clearly
delineated by Kant. It includes any judgment which, given some previously
understood meaning for the terms involved, can be reduced to a logical
tautology. This definition of analytic knowledge is what Kant has in mind when
he makes such statements as: 'if the judgment is analytic ... its truth can
always be adequately known in accordance with the principle of
[non]contradiction' [Kt1:190; cf. Kt2:267]. The truth value of such knowledge
is both independent of experience (a priori) and determinable solely by the
application of logical laws to the concepts involved (analytic).
The third class
of reflective knowledge, the synthetic a priori, is by far the most important
for Kant, at least within his Critical philosophy [see note III.26]. Indeed, he
says in Kt1:19 that 'the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the
question: How are a priori synthetic
judgments possible?'[21] It is a problem because it is not immediately
evident how a judgment could be a priori without being analytic [see Ap. IV].
Such knowledge would be valid independently of any particular experience (a
priori) [Kt1:171-2], yet it would also supply new information about the
concepts involved (synthetic)-information not deducible by means of formal
logic [cf. S15:10 and K9:22-7]. This class of knowledge is of utmost importance
to the philosopher because the propositions composing it would be necessarily
true without being in any sense trivial: just as the analytic laws of logic
determine the general form of what a person can think coherently, so also these synthetic a priori judgments would
determine the general form of what a person can experience coherently (i.e., of how a person can convert immediate
experience into empirical knowledge). They would therefore provide a solid
foundation upon which not only empirical knowledge, but also a philosophical system of knowledge, could rest.
Finally,
synthetic a posteriori knowledge is the least troublesome (but also, for Kant,
the least philosophically interesting) of the four classes of knowledge. All
the knowledge arising out of such empirical factors as scientific experimentation,
psychological introspection, the citing of examples, and appeals to 'common
sense', falls into this class. Consequently, the word 'knowledge' is usually
intended in this sense when it is uttered in ordinary language. Such knowledge
consists, quite simply, in judgments which have their validity grounded in
various facts of experience (a posteriori), and in which intuitive content is
supplied to the concepts involved-content which is not logically implied by the
conventional meanings of the words used (synthetic).
3. The Four
Reflective Perspectives
The foregoing
discussion of Kant's two secondary distinctions between types of knowledge and
of the four classes to which they give rise has relied heavily on the supposition
that these divisions are intended by Kant as classifications only of knowledge
by reflection, and not of immediate
experience. In this section I propose to support and enlarge upon this claim by
discussing the four methods of reflection, or perspectives, which Kant says can be adopted in considering various
objects of knowledge. As suggested in II.4, these will include the empirical,
transcendental, logical and hypothetical perspectives, respectively. But first
it will be helpful to make some general comments about Kant's use of the word
'reflection'.
Kant
distinguishes 'reflection' (Reflexion)
from 'comparison' and 'abstraction' by defining it as the act of 'going back
over [Überlegung] different
representations' in order to determine 'how they can be comprehended in one
consciousness' [Kt10:94(100)]. These three 'acts of the understanding' are
similar inasmuch as they are all 'logical acts ... by which concepts are
generated as to their form' [94(100)]. But elsewhere he puts special emphasis on
reflection as the only act by means of which truly philosophical concepts can be generated, for 'reflective judgement'
is 'our critical faculty' [Kt7:408;
s.a. 395; Kt7i:211; V2:446,451n]. The description 'going back over ...' implies
that the representations which give rise to various philosophical perspectives
have already been 'gone over' once. This indeed is precisely what Kant intends
to get across by his distinction between 'determinant [bestimmende] judgement' and 'reflective [reflectirende] judgement' [Kt7:385-6]. 'Determinant judgment',
interprets van de Pitte, 'is constitutive of the world of factual experience
and is thus objectively valid. Reflective judgment, on the other hand, is
merely an interpretive technique which we employ in order to bring organic
entities and systematic unities within our powers of comprehension. It thus
carries only a subjective validity.'[22] This distinction
is closely related to that between immediate experience and reflective
knowledge: determinant judgment converts immediate experience into empirical
knowledge by subsuming a particular intuition under a universal concept, and
reflective judgment converts empirical knowledge into more abstract forms of
reflective knowledge by positing the universal which serves as the guiding
principle for a given set of particulars [Kt7:179-80]. With this distinction
clearly in mind, we can now examine the nature of the four fundamental
perspectives which operate throughout Kant's System.
In the first two Critiques Kant does not use the word
'reflection' as a technical term for the activity of viewing objects from an
empirical perspective. Instead, he uses phrases such as 'the empirical
employment of understanding' or 'the empirical employment of reason' [see
II.3.C] whenever he wishes to describe some aspect of the empirical perspective
as it operates in one of these systems. (Many of the empirical elements
introduced in these systems are presented merely as by-products of other
perspectives [e.g., Kt1: 152; Kt5:390]; but the constitutive role of the
empirical perspective in systemt will be discussed in VI.3
and VII.3.A, and that of systemp, in VIII.3.A.) However,
Kant sometimes mentions in passing the role of reflection in the empirical
perspective, as when he describes an 'empirical deduction' as one which 'shows
the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through
reflection upon experience' [Kt1:117; s.a. 503].
In the third Critique, by contrast, Kant's use of the
phrase 'reflective judgment' is, as Evans argues, equivalent to his former use
of the phrase 'empirical employment of pure reason' [E4:483; s.a. G6:457], thus
implying that the perspective which determines Kant's standpoint for examining such judgment in systemj is the
empirical. As we saw in II.4, each of Kant's three systems adopts one
perspective in this way as the standpoint to guide the operation of all four
perspectives in that system. Although my main focus in this section will be on
their role as perspectives in systemt, I will also
refer at several points to the way in which each forms the basis for a discrete
standpoint. This will prove to be especially important in our discussion of
Kant's hypothetical perspective. (In Part Three we will discuss various ways in
which the four perspectives change when they are applied from standpoints other
than the theoretical.)
A person who
adopts an empirical perspective reflects upon particular objects of experience
without attempting to 'go beyond' their nature as given in immediate
experience. In empirical reflection as such there is no need to discriminate
between the respective roles of the knowing subject and the known object,
because the two are fused in experience. This continuity between immediate
experience and knowledge resulting from empirical reflection is, no doubt, what
leads Kant to make the (potentially misleading) claim that 'empirical knowledge
is experience' [see IV.1]. Strictly speaking, 'empirical knowledge' should
denote only that synthetic a posteriori knowledge which arises out of empirical
reflection on the objects of one's
experience.[23] Thus, empirical
knowledge of 'cause', for instance, refers neither to the actual (i.e.,
immediate) experience of some particular cause, nor to the ability to determine
its subjective or objective ground; rather it consists in the ability to answer
the question 'What is the cause of X?' by thinking and reasoning
straightforwardly about the objects
of one's experience.
Ordinarily,
we do not distinguish between our experience and our reflection on experience,
since any type of reflection must itself be part of our immediate experience in
order to bring forth knowledge which is actually known [see IV.2]. Thus, in
everyday life all reflective perspectives tend to be mixed indiscriminately.[24] (This is the situation,
incidentally, which gives rise to the need for a Transcendental Perspective as
the foundation for a philosophical System, within which our various
perspectives can be distinguished in an orderly fashion.) All types of
reflective experience attempt to give elegance to their vulgar counterpart,
nonreflective experience. In the case of empirical reflection, the transition
from vulgarity to elegance tends to be gradual, because of the affinity between
immediate experience and empirical knowledge-i.e., because of the need to
appeal to our sensible experience whenever we try to establish synthetic a
posteriori knowledge. But in each of the other three types of reflection, to
which we shall now turn our attention, the qualitative transition tends to be
rather more abrupt.
Of all the
perspectives in Kant's System, the transcendental perspective plays the most
important role [Kt1:25-6; cf. P2:1.226-30 and E5:29]. Indeed, the a priori-a
posteriori distinction itself first arises in this context. Unfortunately, the
fundamental significance of the 'transcendental reflection' with which this new
perspective is concerned could be easily overlooked by the reader, because Kant
waits until an Appendix in the middle of Kt1 to discuss its importance in
detail.[25] The reason he
waits until this point is that, before he can show how transcendental
reflection reveals the errors in any non-Critical philosophy [see note IV.25],
he first has to specify the doctrines which can be established by adopting this
transcendental alternative. But this gives the misleading impression that
transcendental reflection is more a convenient tool for the comparison of
various treatments of specific philosophical issues than (as we have seen in
II.4, III.4 and IV.2) the essential methodological tool defining the overall
Perspective for all three Critical systems!
Kant does,
however, give one of his clearest accounts of what the transcendental
perspective entails as early as Kt1:25 [cf. 185,196-7]: 'I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is
occupied not so much with objects as with our Perspective on knowledge of
objects in so far as this Perspective on knowledge is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts
might be entitled transcendental philosophy.' Kant elsewhere says his task as a
transcendental philosopher is to 'enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests,
and which remain as its underlying ground when everything empirical is
abstracted from appearances [i.e., from the objects of experience].'[26] A transcendental
perspective, then, presupposes the subject-object distinction: it attempts to
determine what there is in the subject a priori which makes possible our
knowledge of the objects we experience. Because these conditions must be added by the subject to the objects
given in intuition to produce such
empirical knowledge, they are (both logically and methodologically) synthetic
as well as being a priori. That the knowledge arising out of this radically
epistemological perspective concerns only a set of synthetic a priori forms
embedded in the subject is spelled
out explicitly by Kant when he says 'the word "transcendental" ...
never means a reference of our knowledge to things, but only to the cognitive
faculty' [Kt2:293; s.a. Kt1:74-5].
When Kant
finally gets around to describing what transcendental reflection is, he says it is the act of determining
'in which faculty of knowledge [given representations] belong together subjectively-in the sensibility or in
the understanding' [Kt1:317]; in so doing one determines whether or not each
representation is pure. Accordingly, such reflection is the necessary first
step in adopting a transcendental perspective; for it would be impossible to
abstract everything empirical from experience without first differentiating
between what is pure and what is impure (i.e., empirical) [80-1]. But in a
broader sense [see II.4 and IV.2], all the steps involved in determining the
synthetic a priori forms of empirical knowledge can be regarded as arising out of
transcendental reflection. Thus, transcendental knowledge of 'cause', for
instance, refers neither to the actual experience of some particular cause, nor
to the ability to determine such a cause through empirical reflection; rather,
it consists in the ability to answer the question 'What is the status of
causality in the general relation of a subject to an object?' by reflecting
transcendentally on the synthetic a priori conditions for the possibility of
experience.
Two remaining
points should be made concerning the transcendental perspective to help guard
against possible misunderstanding. First, some common uses of 'transcendental',
according to which the word refers to a special kind of consciousness, or to
'the grasping of things as they are in themselves' [M12:163], or even to 'God's
point of view' [C9:84], might lead to the mistake of confusing the
transcendental perspective with the 'ivory tower' perspective of typical
non-Critical metaphysicians, who assume they can ascend reflectively to such
heights as to attain a perfectly objective view of transcendent reality. Kant, having devoted the bulk of the
Dialectic in Kt1 to the task of disclosing the error inevitably bred by this
'logic of illusion' [349], explicitly rejects this interpretation in Kt2:373n:
'High towers ... are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos of experience
...' Indeed, such error is precisely what he believes he can avoid by
emphasizing the differences in the various perspectives which can be adopted legitimately
in the quest for knowledge. By referring to the synthetic a priori as
'knowledge', he is not claiming to possess a special type of knowledge which is
actually known independently of the
limitations of experience; rather, like all knowledge, it can be known only
when a person experiences a certain kind of reflection.[27] Kant supports
this point when, in response to a misunderstanding of his use of the word
'transcendental', he says it 'does not signify something passing beyond all experience
but something that indeed precedes it a
priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience
possible' [Kt2:373n]. When properly understood, adopting the transcendental
perspective can be seen not only to be legitimate, but to be the 'duty' of the
philosopher.[28] Far from being a
kind of 'ivory tower' perspective, it determines the epistemological foundations on which our knowledge and
experience is built [Kt1:195], and in so doing, reveals that all human
knowledge is inextricably tied to certain limits it cannot transcend.
The second
point is that Kant does not limit synthetic a priori knowledge to the
philosopher. On the contrary, as suggested in IV.2, there is a sense in which
anyone who has any empirical
knowledge must also (unconsciously) possess transcendental 'knowledge'. For
instance, Kant says that 'in all theoretical sciences of reason synthetic a
priori judgments are contained as principles' [Kt1:14]. Viewing such
principles from a transcendental perspective is important (philosophically)
because it is only through transcendental reflection that their status can be shown to be synthetic a priori [cf.
81,316-7,749-50]. The extent to which mathematicians, for example, know their principles to be synthetic a
priori is the extent to which they have reflected transcendentally on their
status. But the word 'know' here refers only in a loose sense to
'transcendental knowledge', insofar as the latter can refer to the (empirical)
knowledge that a given proposition is
synthetic a priori.
Distinguishing
between the empirical and transcendental perspectives is recognized by many
recent commentators as being essential to an adequate understanding of Kant's
Critical philosophy [see II.2]. Unfortunately, these commentators usually
emphasize this distinction so much that another, equally important perspectival
distinction tends to be ignored [see e.g., B20: 36-51,140-8; A6:194]. Although
it is true that most of the problems Kant attacks in Kt1 are, as Allison says,
solved 'by means of the perspectival conception of the relation between the
transcendental and the empirical' [A6:203; but see Kt1:189-91], the distinction
between the logical and the hypothetical perspectives is, as I shall
demonstrate in the remainder of this section, just as vital to the success of
Kant's System. The importance of the latter distinction is often recognized
only as it applies to the standpoints
in Kant's System, since the logical and hypothetical perspectives give rise,
respectively, to the theoretical and
the practical standpoints [see II.4].
For instance, Wolff has this distinction between standpoints in mind when he
rightly says that for Kant reason is 'the faculty both of logic and of ethical
judgment' [W21:204]. As usual, Kant is partly to blame for this interpretive
problem, since he often mixes the terms which properly refer to perspectives
with those which properly refer to standpoints, as when he says in Kt10: 72(80)
that 'all our conviction is either logical
or practical.'
Immediately
after introducing 'transcendental reflection' as a technical term, Kant
contrasts it with 'logical reflection'.[29] He says at this
point only that the latter 'is a mere act of comparison' which takes 'no
account whatsoever of the faculty of knowledge to which the given
representations belong' [Kt1:318]. That is, from a logical perspective, there
is no need to determine whether the objects of reflection 'are noumena for the
understanding, or are phenomena for sensibility' [325], because all that
matters is their compatibility with the laws of logic [189-91]. The logical
perspective is the 'merely formal' employment of reason which 'abstracts from
all content of knowledge' [355]. Logical reflection is like all types of
reflection, however, in being ultimately dependent on the 'possibility of
experience' [195; s.a. Kt15:81(244)]. It is similar to empirical reflection in
that it operates without distinguishing between the subject and object of
experience; and it is similar to transcendental reflection in that it seeks to
establish a priori truths; but it is different from both in that it 'has
nothing to do with the origin of knowledge, but only considers representations
... according to the laws which the understanding employs when ... it relates
them to one another' [Kt1:80]. This means the aim of logical reflection is
always analytic: it is concerned only with determining whether or not the
representations in a given proposition are related in a form which can be
reduced to a tautology [see Z2:169-70]. The tools used in such reflection are
those enumerated by what Kant calls 'pure general logic' [Kt1:78], and the goal
towards which it works is the systematic delineation of the analytic a priori
knowledge which is applicable to specific sciences [76].
Just as the a
priori-a posteriori distinction makes sense only if one engages in
transcendental reflection, the analytic-synthetic distinction makes sense only
if one engages in logical reflection (yet, once made, both distinctions relate
to the classes of knowledge which arise in all four reflective perspectives);
for as Schulze accurately declares, the latter 'division is itself derived
immediately from the principle of [non]contradiction' [S7:174; cf. P8: 98-9].
Kant is careful to point out that a proper understanding of the implications of
this distinction requires transcendental
reflection as well, since general logic is unconcerned with the synthetic a
priori [Kt1:824; Kt22:242-5]. But this in no way detracts from the need to
stress the logical character of its
analytic side in order to bring out the difference between it and the empirical
versions of the distinction [see Ap. IV]. For Kant, the status of a proposition
can be determined to be analytic only
through logical reflection [see O1:336]; therefore, a proposition considered
(by means of transcendental
reflection) to depend on some synthetic element, such as intuition, may or may
not be logically analytic.[30] Consider, for
example, the question 'How do you know all bachelors are unmarried?' We cannot
show our knowledge to be logically analytic by appealing to experience and
answering 'Well, all the bachelors I've ever known, now that I think about it, have been unmarried, therefore
...' ( la Quine), or even by answering 'Being a bachelor is always connected
by linguistic convention with being unmarried, therefore ...' ( la Bird);[31] the only way to
show such knowledge to be logically analytic would be to answer 'If (given a
previously agreed upon use of terms) we map that proposition onto the laws of
logic, it eventually reduces to a tautology, therefore ...' ( la Kant).
Logically analytic truths might be employed in the context of an empirical
version of the analytic-synthetic distinction ( la Bennett [see Ap. IV]), but
no one could know they are analytic
without engaging in logical reflection.
The fourth
and final type of reflection is that which aims to produce 'practical
knowledge'[32] when a subject
adopts the hypothetical perspective.
The best way to back up my proposal that hypothetical/practical reflection[33] should be
regarded as the correlate of logical reflection in a way comparable to the
transcendental-empirical correlation would be to show from Kant's own words
that it yields the one class of knowledge which has so far gone unmentioned in
this section, the analytic a posteriori. At first sight, this alternative seems
to be precluded by his hasty rejection of the possibility of such a class of
knowledge [Kt1:11] and by his unfortunately broad understanding of a priori
knowledge, according to which it refers not only to the knowledge yielded by
transcendental or logical reflection, but to that which is necessary in any non-physical sense [see e.g., 661;
cf. IV.2]. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, although he
intends his practical standpoint (based as it is on the hypothetical
perspective) to replace the traditional form of metaphysical reflection, he
never makes it entirely clear just how the status of the knowledge yielded by
the former differs from that yielded by the latter. I will therefore examine
first Kant's view of the status of traditional metaphysical reflection,
secondly, how this differs from his own hypothetical perspective, and thirdly,
how the latter gives rise to the practical standpoint. Only then will we be
prepared to make an adequate assessment of the extent to which the analytic a
posteriori class of knowledge might find a place in Kant's System.
As early as
the Introduction to Kt1 Kant states unambiguously that 'metaphysics ... ought
to contain a priori synthetic
knowledge. For its business is ... to extend our a priori knowledge' [Kt1:18; cf. Kt2:273-4]. He later adds that the
metaphysician cannot obtain this goal 'by mere [or 'naked' (bloss)] reflection', but only by
clothing it with 'inference' [Kt1:366]. Inference is required because 'the
[metaphysical] concepts of reason ... are concerned with something to which all
experience is subordinated, but which is never itself an object of
experience'-namely, 'the unconditioned' [367]. In itself, the unconditioned is,
as Allison points out, 'an analytic principle, depicting what is contained in
our concept of a thing in general.'[34] Because it is a
pure concept 'transcending the possibility of experience', Kant calls it an
'idea' [377,382-3]. But the metaphysician who attempts to use such ideas synthetically
to make inferences without first engaging in transcendental reflection is
likely to assume that synthetic a priori judgments can apply directly to the
unconditioned, as if it were an intuitable object of ordinary experience
[325-6,410,662-3]. The 'misinterpretation' of the 'concepts of reflection'
[336], which characterizes this 'speculative perspective' [669], inevitably
leads to the sort of ambiguity and illusion which Kant attempts to dispel in
the Dialectic [354-5]. In each case the fallacy arising out of speculative
reflection has the same essential character: metaphysical reflection which has
not been limited by a prior use of transcendental reflection will be patterned
solely along the lines of a pseudo-transcendental mixture of empirical and
logical reflection; that is, it will attempt to produce synthetic a priori
knowledge by conflating the logical perspective and its a priori aspect with
the empirical perspective and its synthetic aspect.
Within the
confines of systemt, Kant does not offer a clear alternative to
speculation as a means of establishing positive
metaphysical conclusions. Instead, he argues throughout the Dialectic, but
especially in the final Appendix [Kt1:670-732], that as long as we limit our
attention to the theoretical
standpoint (i.e., by assuming the primacy of the logical perspective), the only
proper way of dealing with metaphysical questions regarding the three
'transcendental ideas' [383-4]-viz., 'God', 'freedom', and 'immortality'-is to
adopt the hypothetical perspective. As he explains in Kt1:675: 'Reason's hypothetical perspective is regulative
only', rather than constitutive. This means the hypotheses we form about such
ideas can never be proven to be true,
but can only be viewed 'as if' they are true [e.g., 698-701]. Because each idea
is 'a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given
in sense-experience' [383], Kant stresses that in systemt 'it remains a problem to which there is no solution'
[384; s.a. 809]. Although he never assigns a particular epistemological status
to the hypothetical use of ideas, as he does for speculative knowledge, he does
allude to the affinity (and opposition) between the logical and hypothetical
perspectives: he warns that this 'problem' is to discover something like 'a logical principle', rather than 'a transcendental principle', of ultimate
unity: 'Reason's hypothetical perspective has ... as its aim the systematic
unity of the knowledge of understanding' [675-6]. This differs from the logical
perspective as such because for the hypothetical perspective such unity is 'set as a task' for reason, whereas for
the logical perspective it is 'already given' [526-7].
In the
Doctrine of Method of Kt1 Kant devotes an entire section [797-810] to the issue
of the nature and function of the hypothetical perspective in systemt, as well as its
relation to the logical and transcendental perspectives. He gives two
conditions under which an opinion can serve as an hypothesis [798]: (1) 'the possibility of the object' to which it
refers 'must ... be ... completely certain'; and (2) the 'opinion ... must be
brought into connection with what is actually given ... Then, and only then,
can the supposition be entitled an hypothesis.'
After warning against the danger of inventing hypotheses about new types of
entities which somehow do not conform to the synthetic a priori conditions for
the possibility of experience (viz., space, time and the categories [see
VII.2]), he then explains that the proper role of hypotheses in systemt is only to aid
'the understanding in the field of experience' by providing 'regulative
principles' of systematic unity [798-800]. This means it is 'permissible to think' of the ideas as real entities,
but not 'to assume' that they could
ever be presented as such in experience. The latter would require a
'transcendenal hypothesis', which 'would really be no explanation' [800], and
which 'can never be permissible from reason's speculative perspective' [801],
whereas the former requires only the quasi-logical recognition that the ideas
are at least permissible as
'heuristic fictions'.[35]
Instead of
labelling such hypotheses with a specific epistemological status, he says they
provide not even 'the least knowledge', since 'we are not actually asserting'
anything in forming an hypothesis [Kt1:808]. If we neglect this fact by
misusing an hypothesis in a dogmatic fashion (i.e., by assuming the idea is
'necessary, not only subjectively and logically, as method, but objectively
also' [676]), the result is that it 'relieves us from further investigation,
and our enquiry is brought to an end [but] not through insight' [801-2].
Nevertheless, Kant goes on to argue that these same hypotheses can and ought to be used 'in a polemical
fashion' in order to nullify 'the sophistical arguments by which our opponent
professes to invalidate' the reality of the ideas [804]. 'Hypotheses are
therefore, in [systemt], permissible only as weapons of war, and only for
the purpose of defending a right, not in order to establish it' by 'proof'
[805]. By using hypotheses in this 'merely negative' fashion [809] to show the
skeptic that he 'has too little understanding ... to allow of his flattering
himself that he has the advantage in respect of speculative insight' [805], 'we
are ... proceeding in entire conformity with reason' [808]. Indeed, 'for our
complete equipment we require ...
the hypotheses of pure reason' [806e.a.]. The reason, Kant explains, is that
this hypothetical perspective serves to protect,
from within the theoretical
standpoint, the 'interest of reason' which the speculative perspective is
powerless to defend by means of proofs [see e.g., 676 and 803]. It must perform
this task because, although the hypothetical perspective in systemt can be employed only
negatively, 'reason has, in respect of its practical
standpoint, the right to postulate what in the field of mere speculation it
can have no kind of right to assume' [804].
In order
fully to understand the nature of Kant's hypothetical perspective, therefore,
we must examine how he uses it in the form of the practical standpoint to propose a more positive alternative to the traditional type of metaphysical
reflection. The speculative assumption that logic and its theoretical
standpoint provide the foundation for metaphysical reflection must, he
maintains, give way to the new assumption that practical reflection provides the only secure foundation for
metaphysics. Just as the logical perspective guides the search in systemt for the elements
of pure theoretical reason whose
application is necessary for the possibility of natural experience, so also the hypothetical perspective guides the
search in systemp for the elements of pure practical reason whose application is necessary for the possibility
of moral experience.[36] The former
elements compose the Critical foundation for a 'metaphysics of nature' and
define Kant's theoretical standpoint, while the latter compose the Critical
foundation for a 'metaphysics of morals' and define Kant's practical standpoint
[Kt5:388; see III.4].
Although Kant
is unclear about the epistemological status of hypothetical reflection, he
does describe the status of practical reflection in a way which highlights his
claim that it can replace the illusory synthetic a priori knowledge of
speculative reflection. In Kt1:xxi he seems to take it for granted that
practical reflection ought, like transcendental reflection, to yield synthetic
a priori knowledge, but he explains that such 'practical knowledge' is a priori
'only from a practical standpoint' [s.a. 364,691], which leaves open the
question of what its status would be when viewed from the theoretical standpoint. Clearly, Kant has to regard the elements in
systemp, like all elements in his System, as synthetic a priori in the sense
that they are governed by the overall Transcendental Perspective [see II.4].
Yet he does not put nearly as much emphasis on demonstrating this status in
systemp as he does in regards to the elements in systemt. His failure to
explain how the synthetic a priori status of practical reflection relates to
the synthetic a priori status of transcendental (or speculative) reflection
runs the risk of obscuring several major differences between these
perspectives, which have to be ignored or underemphasized if one is to continue
thinking of them as yielding the same class of knowledge. Yet such differences
do exists, for why else would Kant have added 'though only from a practical
standpoint' in Kt1:xxi?
What would it
mean to view 'practical knowledge' from a theoretical
standpoint? Since Kant views the practical as reason's proper standpoint and the hypothetical as reason's proper perspective in systemt, he would no
doubt begin to answer this question by saying the hypothetical perspective is viewing practical knowledge from the
theoretical standpoint. And in Kt1:691 [s.a. 697-8] Kant himself lists three
differences between hypothetical
principles and ordinary transcendental principles: (1) 'A transcendental
deduction cannot ... be effected' in respect to practical ideas; (2) rather
than constituting empirical knowledge, they serve merely 'for the guidance of
the empirical perspective'; and (3) their 'validity' is 'objective', but
'indeterminate' rather than determinate. Such important differences should have
been enough to convince Kant of the need to classify the legitimate use of the
hypothetical perspective (i.e., any theoretical view of practical knowledge)
with a special status of its own. Instead, as we have seen, he neglects this
issue, probably because he knew the hypothetical perspective as such
does not produce knowledge. Another reason for this neglect could be that the
hypothetical perspective is designed explicitly to point beyond itself to the
practical standpoint. For as Kant explains in Kt4:5, the 'problem' of the
'hypothetical' use of ideas in systemt 'now [in systemp] becomes an
assertion' which can fully satisfy the 'need' of reason out of which the ideas
arise-i.e., the hypothetical perspective itself attains in systemp the status of synthetic
a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, the converse of this is that the practical
principles in systemp can be
viewed from the theoretical standpoint, and that they ought therefore to have
some special status when viewed in that way. Surprisingly, here in Kt1:691 Kant
actually suggests that, despite the differences, hypothetical principles 'seem
to be transcendental', since they consist of 'synthetic a priori propositions'.
Whenever Kant
regards the products of hypothetical and practical reflection as 'synthetic'
and 'a priori', he must be allowing these terms to take on significantly new
meanings. Indeed, 'a priori' is no longer being used to define a necessary and
universal subjective condition for the possibility of experience; it is now
being used to define an idea, which
is a 'concept of reason' inferred by the subject from experience [Kt1:367-8],
which plays no part in making that experience (i.e., empirical knowledge)
possible, and whose application to immediate experience is neither necessary
nor universal.[37] As Kant himself
says: 'No actual experience has ever been completely adequate to [the idea],
yet to it every actual experience belongs' [367], for it is 'so constructed as
necessarily to contain the concept of what is absolutely primordial' [802]. The
claim that all experience is contained in
this concept of reason implies not that such an idea is a priori (since
the idea is certainly not given before
experience) but that it is analytic
[cf. A8:237-8]. This seems especially evident when Kant tells us that synthetic
knowledge through reason is 'completely impossible', since 'understanding alone
is capable of true synthetic a priori
items of knowledge' [Kt1:824], and that 'the criterion of the possibility of
synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong'
[630e.a.]. If the idea cannot produce synthetic knowledge, then it surely ought
to be regarded as analytic.
The term 'synthetic'
must likewise refer no longer to knowledge whose truth is verified by appealing
to some factual, intuitive content [cf. A7:72-3], but to knowledge whose truth
is dependent on its compatibility with various theoretical 'hypotheses'
[Kt1:797-810] or practical 'laws' [Kt5:388]. Kant explains that 'in the
practical standpoint, our sole concern is with the carrying out of rules' [Kt1:384-5e.a.]-a concern for the
instantiation of practical ideas in
experience which would seem to be more a
posteriori than synthetic. This seems especially evident when we consider
it together with his claim that 'the indispensable condition of reason's entire
practical standpoint' is that 'the idea of practical reason can always be given
actually in concreto, although only
in part' [384-5]. If the idea cannot be given as an individual whole, which is
a characteristic of all intuitions [see VII.2.A] and thus a criterion of
syntheticity, then its in concreto
character must surely refer to some non-synthetic type of a posteriori
givenness.
If I am right
in pointing out these shifts in meaning, then, whenever Kant says something
like 'X is synthetic a priori, though only from a practical standpoint', we can
interpret this as meaning 'X is analytic a posteriori'. For the changes he
makes to his ordinary sense of 'a priori' when he applies it to the practical
standpoint actually convert it into his strict sense of 'analytic', and those
he makes to his ordinary sense of 'synthetic' convert it into his strict sense
of 'a posteriori'. Why does Kant neglect these discrepancies in his usage? The
explanation I would offer is that, since his ultimate goal is to defend rather
than to destroy many of the traditional doctrines of metaphysics
[Kt1:xxiv-xxxi; see X.1], he might have thought (in keeping with his
rationalist background) that to give a different status to practical knowledge
would set it too far apart from that of traditional metaphysical knowledge; so
instead, he inadvertently altered the meanings of his terms and (supposedly) preserved
the same status.
Now this
terminological change may seem drastic, yet I do not believe it entails any
substantial revision of the various theories Kant puts forward in the Dialectic
of Kt1 or in his moral philosophy, especially since, as we have seen, he
himself makes contradictory claims about the status of hypothetical and
practical reflection. On the contrary, referring to the knowledge arising out
of hypothetical and practical reflection as 'analytic a posteriori' clarifies
its status by abiding more strictly than Kant himself does to the meanings he
originally assigns his terms. I explore in Appendix IV the nature of this type
of knowledge in a bit more detail by relating it to the views of several other
philosophers. At this point, however, let us examine more closely the
implications of this change for Kant's System.
Just as Kant
discusses the close correlation between the hypothetical and logical
perspectives in Kt1:676, he compares the practical standpoint to logic in
Kt35:(2-3): 'like logic, practical philosophy does not concern itself with a
particular sort of cases of practical activity but deals with the practice of
free actions in general without reference to any case whatsoever.' Both logical
and practical reflection depend on certain laws,
either 'of the understanding' or 'of the will'. Just as the highest principle
of logical reflection is revealed in systemt to be the law of
noncontradiction [Kt1:189; cf. III.3], so also the highest principle of
practical reflection is revealed in systemp to be the law of
'duty' [Kt5:397; Kt4:32] or 'the categorical imperative' [Kt5:420; Kt4:21]. In
both cases the law is analytic in relation to other laws in its system because it
can be used to test the validity of such subordinate laws, yet it cannot itself
be verified by appealing to a higher law [see note IV.18]. The difference is
that, whereas logical laws are necessary a priori for all thinking and are
thereby equally applicable in principle to all experience, even in systemt, practical laws
apply to what ought to be the case, a
posteriori, in 'matters of conduct' [Kt1:575], and 'allow for conditions under
which what should happen often does not' [Kt5:388]. Thus, for example, we call
someone 'good' by judging the extent to which their behavior, considered a
posteriori, coincides analytically with the idea of 'perfect goodness'-that is,
the extent to which their behavior is, as it were, 'contained in' that idea of
perfection. Likewise, in systemt the unconditioned ideas of
reason must be presupposed to refer to the analytic totality of some empirical
synthesis [Kt1:701; Kt4:132,134; see VII.3.B], so our knowledge of them can be
described most adequately as the analytic a posteriori counterpart of the
analytic a priori knowledge gained through logical reflection.
Interpreting
both the hypothetical perspective of systemt and the
practical standpoint of systemp in terms of analytic a
posteriori knowledge does not imply that the 'ought' of practical reflection is
determined by the empirical 'actions and conditions of the human volition'-a
view Kant explicitly denies [Kt5:390; cf. Kt1:575-6]. Rather, I am arguing that
when, for example, Kant says our awareness of an '"ought" expresses a
possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept'
[575], the part he thinks makes such knowledge synthetic (i.e., its appeal to a
'possible action') actually makes it a posteriori, and the part he thinks makes
it a priori (i.e., the fact that its 'ground' is a concept such as 'God' or
'goodness', rather than an appearance of God or of something good) actually
makes it analytic. How else could a standpoint be 'practical' except by
stipulating an analytical connection between an abstract concept and an
a posteriori experience which ought to be subsumed under it?
If Kant's
practical standpoint is to be regarded as yielding knowledge which is analytic
and a posteriori, then what sense can be made of his assertion, quoted in IV.2,
that 'it would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience'?
Admittedly, this statement indicates that Kant saw no use for the label 'analytic a posteriori' as
describing a class of knowledge. Such an attitude results from his tendency to
limit the use of 'analytic' to the knowledge arising out of the logical
perspective, and that of 'a posteriori' to the knowledge arising out of the
empirical perspective. Had he considered the possibility of describing the
knowledge produced by hypothetical and practical reflection as analytic a
posteriori, he could have reworded his rather extreme condemnation in such a
way as to bring out his two essential points more clearly: first, that it would be absurd to found any logically analytic knowledge on
experience (because it is a priori); and second, that the need to found practically analytic knowledge on
experience makes it impossible ever to reach the 'absolute certainty' which is
possible in some other types of reflection, so that in a sense it is absurd to regard it as 'knowledge'.
Is not this latter assertion just what Kant is alluding to when he says he
intends 'to deny knowledge, in order
to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx]?
Indeed it is. And when this is recognized, the audacious claim that practical
reflection is concerned with the analytic a posteriori becomes rather more
tame.
Kant's whole
point in the Dialectic of Kt1 is to demonstrate how the limitations revealed by
transcendental reflection prevent the metaphysician from attaining knowledge through speculative
reflection. In place of the latter he proposes the need for a reasoned faith in the (analytical) ideas as
subjectively necessary presuppositions of the hypothetical perspective in
systemt.[38] An idea on its
own always remains a 'problematic concept' [Kt1: 445n]. So we must believe it
to be true even though it lies 'out beyond' the limits of the empirical
perspective [825]. To do so is to view it 'as if' it were analytically
applicable to all experience [698-703]. Likewise, viewing myself in systemp as if I am a free agent (i.e., believing I am such) is the only way I
can coherently explain my actions as being 'moral' [see e.g., Kt5:459,462-3].
Kant says such practical presuppositions, whether in systemt or systemp, do not 'extend'
my knowledge in any way, for 'no synthetic proposition is made possible by
conceding their reality.'[39] But neither does
the 'as if' commit me to believe in a mere 'philosophical fiction' [see note
IV.35]. On the contrary, it connotes that, although the transcendental limits
of my experience in systemt make it impossible for me to have empirical knowledge that I am free, the
practical limits of my action in systemp provide very
good reasons for adopting a rational
belief that I am free: namely, that from the hypothetical perspective I
must assume my (a posteriori) experience of morality is contained analytically
within the notion of freedom [cf. Kt1:702-3 and Kt4:132,134]. Accordingly, the
most accurate statement of Kant's position is that, whereas speculative
reflection attempts to establish the synthetic a priori status of metaphysical
knowledge-claims, hypothetical/practical reflection admits that the
epistemological status of such claims cannot (and need not) be anything other
than analytic a posteriori belief.
4. A Summary and
Model of Kant's Reflective Method
In the second
edition Preface to the first Critique
Kant stresses that his book 'is a treatise on the method' through which 'the
procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics' can be revolutionized,
'and not a system of science itself.'[40] If we interpret
this claim literally-and I am convinced we should-it means Kant's main goal is
not (as is commonly supposed) to establish a particular set of transcendental
'principles'. This is undoubtedly one of his most interesting and influential
secondary aims; but, as Vleeschauwer observes, Kant always tends to approach
the subject with which he is concerned 'with the clearly avowed intention of
showing how ... everything depends on method' [V4:19; cf. W5:97]; so his main
purpose must be to delineate the patterns
of thinking which the philosopher must adopt in order to construct a coherent
philosophical system. We examined the form of such patterns in detail in III.3.
Our findings in the foregoing section have now revealed one of Kant's most
important methodological applications of the fourfold (2LAR) pattern,
according to which it defines the relationship between four methods of inquiry,
or reflective perspectives, by means of which we can attain knowledge. In fact,
one's ability to understand the significance of the particular arguments or
theories in Kant's System of Perspectives is likely to be directly proportional
to one's grasp of the implications of this fundamental pattern.
In this
chapter I have attempted to uncover this key epistemological pattern by
investigating Kant's various ways of distinguishing between 'knowledge' and
'experience'. The results can be summarized as follows. 'Immediate experience'
refers to an indeterminate, nonreflective encounter of subject and object in
the ordinary world. 'Knowledge' refers to the results aimed at when a person
chooses to assume one of four 'perspectives' on that experience by engaging in
one of four corresponding types of 'reflection'. To adopt an empirical perspective is to reflect on
what 'is true' about one's experience without taking note of the distinction
between the subject and object of knowledge; its goal is to reach synthetic a
posteriori knowledge. To adopt a transcendental
perspective involves distinguishing clearly between the subject and object in
order to reflect on the subjective conditions which 'must be true' in order for
it to be possible for a subject to experience an object; its goal is to reach
synthetic a priori knowledge. To adopt a logical
perspective involves abstracting completely from the subject-object distinction
in order to reflect on what 'must be true' because the logical laws of thought
require it to be so; its goal is to reach analytic a priori knowledge. To adopt
a speculative perspective involves
distinguishing between the subject and object, but ignoring the role of the
subject, in a fallacious attempt to reach synthetic a priori knowledge of the
thing in itself, even though such knowledge extends beyond the limits set by transcendental
reflection. The hypothetical
perspective replaces the speculative perspective by distinguishing properly
between the subject and object as in transcendental reflection, and then
reflecting on what we can reasonably treat 'as if true' about both transcendent
reality and experience in light of the requirements of systematic unity in
systemt [see VII.3.B]; Kant vaguely suggests its goal is to reach the
synthetic a priori, but I have argued that he really means its goal is to reach
analytic a posteriori belief.[41]
Figure IV.2:
Kant's Four Reflective Perspectives on Experience
The most
effective way of demonstrating the integrative coherence of this pattern is to plot
all these terms and their intricate relationships onto a single, schematic
'map' of Kant's perspectival methodology, as shown in Figure IV.2. The center
of this map is occupied by immediate experience, since each of the four
perspectives either stems from it or constitutes its ground. Following the
model of the cross [see I.3 and III.3], we then plot on the horizontal axis
stretching out from experience in both directions the two perspectives which
yield synthetic knowledge: to the right lies a priori knowledge and to left
a posteriori knowledge. And on the vertical axis, as it were, cutting into
the synthetic axis at the point where it meets experience, we plot the two
perspectives which yield analytic knowledge: above experience is the a posteriori
belief in a reality which transcends experience, and below it is the abstract a
priori knowledge of logic. The manner in which each perspective is connected to
experience by a particular sort of reflection can now be represented adequately
by making each axis into an arrow. Thus, in the case of transcendental and
practical reflection, the arrow points towards
experience, since each of these is an attempt to determine the ultimate
principles which act as its ground in one way or another;[42] and in the case
of empirical and logical reflection the arrow continues in the direction of its
counterpart, so that it points out from experience, since in both cases the
flow of thought presupposes experience as a basis (either for empirical
reasoning or for logical abstraction).[43]
Interpreting
Kant's System in accordance with this map enables us more readily to detect the
short-sightedness of many interpreters, such as Hintikka, who accuses Kant of
arguing that 'we as it were look at the world always from the same perspective'
[H17:94], or Allison, who tends to underestimate the importance of the other
perspectives, as when he claims 'transcendental reflection ... can be taken
as equivalent to the critical method itself.'[44] By the same
token, it enables us to grasp the appropriateness of other, potentially
confusing ways of interpreting various aspects of Kant's System, such as
Paton's description of the first half of Kt1 as a 'metaphysic of experience'
[P2]. Although systemt is not technically part of Kant's metaphysics, Figure
IV.2 suggests an analogy revealing a sense in which Paton's epithet is
appropriate. Just as metaphysical reflection operates at the opposite pole of
the same axis as logic, transcendental reflection determines the 'metaphysic'
at the opposite pole of the axis of our ordinary empirical reflection on
experience.[45]
The
correspondence between this fourfold division and that between Kant's four
faculties [see II.4 and Figure III.10] is fairly obvious, and its importance
will become even more evident in Part Three. When the four stages in each of
Kant's systems are viewed in terms of the four perspectives from which
experience can be interpreted, it becomes clear that they are not gradually
improving 'versions' of the same basic argument, repeated in ever new and
updated forms, as are the 'stages' in Wolff's interpretation [W21:111]. Rather,
they form a progressive development, a set of cumulative conclusions linking
the variety of (often seemingly contradictory) steps leading to knowledge,
which combine to constitute a single, unified system.[46]
Although our
discussion of Kant's reflective perspectives in IV.3 concentrated mostly on
their functions in systemt, we saw in II.4 that each of these can also be used
as a standpoint from which to view
all the perspectives in a given system. Along these lines, our map of Kant's
essential perspectival method can also make it easier to explain how the three Critiques fit into the overall plan of
his System of Perspectives. Using the Transcendental as a kind of umbrella
Perspective for all the other perspectives, Kant begins his Critical philosophy
by using the logical perspective as the basis for the theoretical standpoint in
systemt. He then proceeds to the opposite pole in Figure IV.2, and uses the
hypothetical perspective as the basis for the practical standpoint in systemp. Finally, he
completes the circuit by using the empirical perspective as the basis for the
judicial standpoint in systemj. Since 'judgment' for Kant
is primarily an empirical activity [see E4:480; G6:457], a 'critique of judgment' is bound to be
significantly different from the other two types of critique, whose standpoints it attempts to unite in a common, third
standpoint.[47] This difference
is appropriately represented in Figure IV.2 by placing judgment's empirical
perspective on an altogether different axis
than the perspectives of the first two Critiques.
Moreover, placing it on the pole opposite
to the transcendental perspective suggests the paradoxical nature of the
task set for the third Critique: its
standpoint is in a sense opposed to, and yet the fulfillment of, the root
Perspective of the entire Critical philosophy.
The general
picture of Kant's fundamental epistemological perspectives presented in Figure
IV.2 is, of course, only one of the preliminary steps towards a coherent
interpretation of his System. Fully substantiating my claim that Kant's
philosophy is profoundly coherent [see IV.1] will necessitate applying this
framework to innumerable problems and ambiguities which arise both in his
writings and in those of his interpreters and critics. It will therefore be
most suitable to proceed from here to an interpretation of the 'thorny'
topic of the transcendental object
(which includes notions such as the 'thing in itself', 'appearance', etc. [see
Ch. VI]) and from there to the transcendental subject (i.e., the role of
intuition, conception, etc. [see Part Three]). We will then be prepared to use
this interpretation as a guide to making an accurate assessment of the
metaphysical implications of Kant's System [see Part Four]. By constantly
keeping in mind the perspectival framework offered in this chapter, our
analysis of the elements of this System will perhaps enable it, as Kant hoped,
to 'secure for itself the necessary elegance of statement' [Kt1:xliv].
[1] S17:38-42. Kuehn lists 21 remarks of this type to show how those in 'what may broadly be called the "Strawsonian tradition" of the study of Kant' have (unjustifiably) 'raised to a highly refined art the ascription to Kant of [such ineptitudes]' [K15:512].
[2] Kant always intends the word 'subject' (as well as 'mind') to be taken 'in a comprehensive sense, as inclusive of all who belong to the human race' [Kt7:401; s.a. C10:186-7]. But its specific function in each context depends on the perspective being adopted.
[3] Kt1:276-7; s.a. 275,276,864. Of the 48 occurrences of 'immediate' in Kt1 [see Pq10:179], most of the others concern either the 'immediate representation' [Kt1: 41,94(2),A252] of an object in 'immediate intuition' [48,195,273] or sensation [579]-i.e., the 'immediate relation' of one representation to another [33,93,180, 327,363,671,690]-or the experience of 'immediate consciousness' [276,276n, A372; s.a. A354-5,A371], or their combination in an 'immediate perception' [272,273,A368,A371,A377,718]. (Even more examples of each could be cited if the 67 occurrences of 'immediately' were also included in this listing.) Such immediacy is implied by Kant's use of 'experience' in various passages in his early writings, as when he says that the 'reason of knowing' something (the 'ratio quod') is always given in 'experience' [Kt11:392(220)] or that in metaphysics 'concepts derived from experience ... must always be the foundation of all our judgments' [Kt18:367-8(113)]. Kant also uses 'immediate experience' from time to time in his later writings [e.g., Kt7i:240].
[4] Humphrey refers to Kt1:1-3 and several other texts [A1-2,116-7 and Kt69:274-5] as evidence of Kant's distinction between experience in 'the ordinary sense', as 'an isolated act of perception', and experience in Kant's technical sense, as coextensive with 'theoretical knowledge': the former, he says, concerns 'the questio facti of experience' while the latter concerns 'the questio juris about experience' [H22:26-7]. Walsh distinguishes in a less rigorous way between such 'immediate' experience and the more 'developed' sense of experience, noting that this distinction is reflected in Kant by the difference between 'Empfindung' (feeling or sensation) and 'Wahrnehmung' (perception) [W7:221-2].
[5] Kt1:74; s.a. Kt5:455. The precise meaning Kant gives these terms in his analysis of the stages through which experience passes will be discussed in VII.1-2. Some of these stages would themselves be called 'experience' in ordinary language (e.g., conscious activity which is not focused on a given object, or the perception of an object which does not enter fully into conscious thought). But Kant would regard such 'experience' as 'merely subjective', and would give it some other name, such as 'imagination' or 'apprehension' [see e.g., Kt1:A115-28].
[6] Kt1:34-5; cf. 74. That Kant replaces his initial explanation of this distinction with a clearer version in the second edition of Kt1 reveals his increasing awareness of the importance of specifying technical meanings for his primary distinction between knowledge and experience. However, he could have avoided using the word 'empirical' for both his pure-empirical and his empirical-transcendental distinctions [see IV.3] simply by replacing it in the former case with 'non-pure' [cf. C14:246-7] or 'mixed' (as in Kt14 [see e.g., 50(83); cf. Kt1:A11]). Alternatively, it might have been even better for him to have identified pure knowledge with knowledge by reflection-i.e., with knowledge which arises out of thinking about experience, whether or not it requires the intuition of an object in an actual experience. The pure-empirical distinction would then have been one between nonreflective experience (empirical) and knowledge by reflection (pure), much like the one I shall develop in this chapter. Although any type of reflection would be regarded as yielding pure knowledge, different 'levels' of purity would have to be discerned (e.g., transcendental, empirical, etc.). However, Kant does not use his terms in this manner.
[7] Kt1:165-6; s.a. 147,218; Kt7i:203n. In K2:11.302(Z1:184) Kant describes the way he proceeds in his lectures: 'I begin by defining "experience" in terms of empirical knowledge.' As he puts it in Kt69:274 [s.a. 276]: 'Cognition [Das Erkenntniß] of the objects of the senses as such ... is experience.'
[8] Kt1:5-6; cf. Kt7:179. As we shall see in IV.3, some reflective knowledge is not strictly pure or empirical, but an 'admixture' of both [Kt1:3].
[9] A posteriori knowledge can also be called 'necessary', but only when the necessity is derived to some extent from our experience of the laws of nature. For example, it happens to be a necessary truth that human beings cannot survive prolonged exposure to temperatures above, say, 100°C; but this fact has only a posteriori necessity because its truth is discoverable only by reflecting on the structure of the natural world, and not on the laws of thought.
[10] Nakashima calls attention to this ambiguity [N1:98-9], regarding it as a reason for denying the validity of Kant's overall Transcendental Perspective. Pippin, by contrast, recognizes the importance of actually clarifying Kant's meaning. After stating 'it is not so clear just what this kind of formal knowledge is' [P8:20], he presents an exhaustive account of Kant's theory of form which helps clarify this ambiguity [see e.g., 91,94-5]. He explains at one point that 'A priori does not mean "not derived from experience" but "known without appeal to experience"' [102; s.a. P4:203-4]. Pq8 and Pq9 give a detailed account of the meaning of the phrase 'a priori knowledge'. In Pq8:9-14 I pay special attention to the ambiguity under consideration here.
Werkmeister tries to clarify the nature of a priori knowledge by noting that Kant always 'uses a priori adverbially, not adjectivally' [see e.g., W17:213]. Indeed, he warns against the common practice of using the phrase 'synthetic a priori knowledge' in interpreting Kant [e.g., 66-7,215-6], claiming this 'is perhaps the worst possible misunderstanding of Kant' [66]. Unfortunately, he not only fails to give any clear explanation of the meaning of the term 'a priori', but he also never actually explains what is so bad about this common way of translating Kant's phrase into smooth English. Provided we keep in mind that 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' refer to how we know things, not to any intrinsic qualities, an adjectival translation would not seem to cause any serious problem. For although Kant's normal usage is undoubtedly adverbial, it is rather presumptuous to say it is always such, without citing extensive textual evidence. Moreover, Werkmeister himself uses 'a priori' as an adjective on at least one occasion, where he refers to '... the synthetic and a priori elements ...' [69]! Yet this need cause no confusion, as long as we remember to associate both 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' with adverbial meaning and both 'analytic' and 'synthetic' with adjectival meaning.
[11] W21:304. Paton goes so far as to equate Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori with his formal-material distinction [P3:61].
[12] Cf. Figures II.1 and III.9. The fact that Figure III.9 depicts each Critique as filling the position of the transcendental perspective in relation to the other works in its system [cf. Figure IV.2] should clarify the reason for the broad use of words such as 'transcendental' and 'a priori', mentioned here. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to discern which use Kant has in mind in specific contexts. To make matters worse, the term 'pure' is, as mentioned above, often used in roughly the same way as the broad senses of 'a priori' and 'transcendental', though their meanings are technically distinct.
[13] Although these terms are 'as old as Euclid' [P2:1.130n]-indeed, older [H9:I.136-42]-and although Kant's usage was largely influenced by his predecessors [H4: lv-lxxvii], his peculiar formulation of this distinction is certainly original, as Allison convincingly argues in A11 [s.a. K2:11.38(Z1:141)]. Before Kant, the distinction referred not so much to the epistemological status of judgments, as to reciprocal methods of argumentation [see Ap. IV and Pq18:I.3]. In H18 Hintikka examines in detail the roots of 'the method of analysis and synthesis' in ancient Greek geometry.
It should also be noted that, according to Kant, 'knowledge' always reveals itself in the form of 'judgments', not just 'propositions'. When he speaks, for example, of 'analytic judgments', he must be taken to mean roughly the same thing as when he speaks of 'analytic knowledge' [cf. Kt1:10 and 191]. Thus, although Wolff is, at least in general, grammatically correct to point out that '"analytic" and "synthetic" are adjectives which modify the noun "judgment," while "a priori" and "a posteriori" are adverbs which modify the verb "know" and its cognates' [W21:113n; see note IV.10], the two sets of terms nevertheless have the same field of applicaion. The empirical connotations of the word 'judgment' [see K9: 18 and II.4] should not, as we shall see in Appendix IV, mislead us into limiting the analytic-synthetic distinction to an empirical interpretation.
[14] Kt69:32. Kant appears to contradict this claim when he says 'the law of [non]contradiction ... is absolutely incapable of grounding any but identical judgments' [K2:11.36(Z1:139)]. He clarifies the relation between analytic and identical judgments in Kt69:322: 'analytic judgments are not identical because they require division and in such division serve to clarify their concept, whereas, by contrast, in identical judgments ... absolutely nothing is explained.' Humphrey explains that this means analytic judgments, though reducible to identity, may be able to clarify concepts [H22:22; s.a. Kt10:111(117)].
[15] Kt22:241; s.a. Kt1:749; Kt10:111(118); A7:60,164; A11:36-7. Kant refers to this as 'the principle of synthetic judgments' [e.g., Kt22:241 and K2:11.38(Z1: 141)], thus highlighting its direct correlation with the principle of noncontradiction for analytic judgments. On the nature of an 'intuition', see VII.2.A.
[16] B5:5,10; cf. Kt1:A8. Kant gives his own formulae in Kt10:111(117-8): 'To every x to which appertains the concept of [the subject] (a+b) appertains also [the predicate] (b)-is an example of an analytic proposition. To every x to which appertains the concept of [the subject] (a+b) appertains also [the predicate] (c)-is an example of a synthetic proposition.' Allison explains that the latter connection between 'the predicate (c)' and 'the subject concept (a+b) ... is grounded in ... the reference of both to the identical object (x)', whereas for an analytic judgment, the predicate simply reiterates something already 'contained' in the subject concept without requiring any 'extra-conceptual claim' about 'the "reality" of the predicate' [A11:36-7].
[17] This holds, of course, only as long as the meanings of the words involved are already understood [see H1:108-9 and S20:266-7,231]. For someone who does not know what 'yellow' means, the proposition 'Yellow is a color' would be informative; but, as I have argued in Pq9:273-9, it would not then be analytic in the usual a priori sense for that person. This will become more clear when we discuss the possibility of analytic a posteriori knowledge [see IV.3 and Ap. IV]. But in either case, Garver is right when he says 'the clarification achieved through analytic propositions consists in presenting immediate inference possibilities pertaining to some word which expresses the concept that is being clarified' [G3:266; s.a. K9:19; H4:xxxix-xl; P4:136-7].
The inevitable existence of human ignorance renders inadequate those contemporary accounts of analytic knowledge in which it is equated with 'deducible from definition' [B5:19; see e.g., W1:31]. For as Beck aptly insists, Kant regards definition as 'a sufficient, but ... not a necessary, condition for analytic judgments' because it 'requires a completeness and precision that is often an unattainable ideal; yet its absence does not jeopardize the analytic judgments already made' [B6:34]. Therefore, 'a judgment logically implied by a definition is analytic, [yet] analytical judgments are not necessarily or even usually known or justified from definitions' [36; cf. Kt10:140-5(141-6) and H4:xxii-liv].
[18] Although it is in virtue of the laws of formal logic that the informative content of analytic judgments is reducible to nothing [Kt1:190; cf. B5:19], it should be stressed that the analytic-synthetic distinction in general 'is not one of formal logic, for formal logic abstracts from the meaning of all terms' [10-1]. This is the point Zweig is making when he urges it is wrong to think Kant says 'analytic judgments are deducible from the principle [of noncontradiction] alone': for Kant regards this principle 'as a rule to be used in testing a judgment and not as a premise from which other propositions are to be deduced' [Z2:167]. However, too much emphasis on the 'transcendental, non-logical nature of the analytic-synthetic distinction' [as in A7:59; s.a. 46-75] can be misleading, since, as I shall argue in IV.3, logical reflection is also a necessary requirement for the determination of analyticity in its Kantian sense. The distinction itself arises out of the relation between the transcendental and the logical perspectives, so it cannot accurately be described in terms of one or the other on its own.
[19] The debate was first formulated in these terms by Quine, who argued that in the analytic-synthetic distinction the entire 'difference is only one of degree' [Q1:43]. Subsequent arguments for and against this position have been too numerous to review here, though a sampling of these developments is presented in Appendix IV.
[20] Hartman and Schwarz describe the 'analytic a posteriori' in terms of 'empirically analytic' qualities which 'are part of the experience of the thing', yet are 'merely perceived but not yet conceived' [H4:l-li]. And Cameron suggests the proposition 'I have experience' as a possible candidate for this status [C2:352-3; s.a. M7:34-42]. I argue towards the end of Appendix IV, and more thoroughly in Pq9, that what recent philosophers such as Kitcher and Kripke have called the 'contingent a priori' is more accurately regarded as another example of the analytic a posteriori.
[21] Scruton's paraphrase of this question ('How can I come to know the world through pure reflection, without recourse to experience?' [S8:19]) is misleading for two reasons: first, because (as we shall see in IV.3) all forms of reflection are related in one way or another to immediate experience; and second, because synthetic a priori knowledge is concerned not with the world as such, but with the forms imposed on it by the knowing subject. Prichard's paraphrase is more appropriate: 'How is it possible that the mind is able, in virtue of its own powers, to make universal and necessary judgments which anticipate its experience of objects?' [P14:33; s.a. 19; cf. A7:2; E3:83; G10:152; P4:135].
[22] V2:445. Calling reflective judgment subjective is not intended to degrade it, but only to distinguish its 'inner' character from the 'outer' character of ordinary experience. However, van de Pitte misleadingly argues that determinant judgment depends on reflective judgment [450]. A theory of determinant judgment is indeed a product of reflective judgment; but this does not require a person to be aware of even the possibility of reflection before employing determinant judgment [see below]. As Wallace puts it: 'The reflective judgment ... looks at the relation between the mental representation of the object [via determinant judgment] and the general constitution of the human mind' [W5:192].
[23] That is, empirical reflection focuses on what Kant calls 'phenomena' [Kt1:A248-9,306; see VI.3]. Kant clarifies the meaning of 'empirical knowledge' in K2: 11.302(Z1:184) by saying a representation is empirical if 'the object is given in a sensuous representation (which ... includes sensation and ... consciousness ...)' and it is knowledge if the perceived object 'is thought' by means of a 'conception'. Calling this synthesis of intuition and conception 'experience' highlights the fact that, as we shall see in VII.2.A, intuition on its own cannot generate a properly empirical perspective.
[24] Webb neglects Kant's sincere respect for the viewpoint of the common man [see XII.1] when he claims in W13:211 that an 'experience in which the whole of our personality is involved' is for Kant 'somehow inferior in validity to the results of abstraction.' On the contrary, such an experience represents a different, but equally valid perspective, even though some perspectives are more appropriate for the philosopher to adopt while asking certain types of questions. Thus for example, Kant's contrast between 'the empirical' (or 'historical') and 'the rational' (i.e., 'the whole higher faculty of knowledge') in Kt1:863-4 is not intended to diminish the validity of the former, but simply to define a difference between two Perspectives: 'Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis; rational knowledge is cognitio ex principiis.' The former is knowledge either 'through immediate experience' or 'through instruction', while the latter is knowledge either 'from concepts ['philosophical'] or from construction of concepts [mathematical]' [864-5].
[25] Kt1:316-49. Stressing the significance of transcendental reflection, Allison goes so far as to say it 'can be taken as equivalent to the critical method itself. Consequently, ... the errors of all non-critical philosophies are traceable to a failure to engage in transcendental reflection' [A10:45]. He neglects to point out, however, that this common failure is itself a direct consequence of failing to draw the distinction between the transcendental and empirical perspectives in general-a distinction which he does emphasize in A6. Kant himself stresses the importance of this distinction in the very title of the Appendix, which states that 'The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection' arises 'from the Confusion of the Empirical with the Transcendental Perspective' [Kt1:316; s.a. 345-6]. The disastrous consequences of failing to take into account the perspectival nature of this distinction are evident in many interpretations [s.e. P14].
[26] Kt1:A96. Propositions are transcendental if, as Ewing puts it, they can be 'proved by showing that if they were not true of objects, these objects could not be experienced by us' [E5:26]. The nature and function of Kant's special type of 'transcendental arguments' will be discussed in V.3 and in Appendix V.
[27] See IV.2. Such reflective experience contains certain aspects which can be traced back to a nonempirical source. In itself-i.e., before the philosopher actually comes to know it in transcendental reflection-the knowledge revealed in this 'tracing back' is not really 'knowledge' at all, but the necessary condition for the possibility of both reflective and determinant judgment, which every knowing subject naturally follows unconsciously. Kant's reference to such conditions as 'knowledge' has given rise to various misunderstandings of what he means-misunderstandings which usually lead to a premature rejection of his views [see e.g., my criticism of Walker in Appendix V.3 and of Kitcher in Pq8:9-14].
[28] See Kt1:319. Unfortunately, aside from explaining what he means by 'transcendental', and arguing for the validity of various synthetic a priori knowledge-claims, Kant never gives a detailed explanation of how it is possible for human beings to attain such knowledge. This has made it easier for some philosophers to reject its legitimacy; but Walsh defends its possibility admirably, in my opinion, in W9:249-59.
[29] Kt1:318-9. The neglect of the crucial difference between these two perspectives is one of the central contentions of Kant's polemic with Eberhard [see e.g., Kt22:193-4].
[30] See e.g., Kt22:221,244-5; A7:164; S7:171. Along these lines, Neeman suggests in N2:8-9 'that the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions rests for Kant on two different kinds of real acts of cognition. For the logical nature of the object is supposed to be discovered analytically and its real nature synthetically.'
[31] See Ap. IV. Because logical reflection is ultimately rooted in experience [Kt1: 195], it is, of course, dependent on linguistic conventions [see note IV.17]. But any analysis of these conventions as such is empirical, and has no part in determining a proposition's logical status as analytic or synthetic. Accordingly, Weitz's assertion that analyticity applies only to 'a statement which [merely] expresses part of the everyday usage of the term[s]' [W15:492] should be regarded as a variant of Quine's empirical perspective on the distinction [see note IV.19].
[32] Kt1:xxi; s.a. x,xxvin and Kt8:181(169). In Kt1:661 Kant defines 'practical knowledge as the representation of what ought to be.'
[33] Kant rarely uses the term 'reflection' in close connection with the terms 'hypothetical' or 'practical' [but see Kt39:476(182)]. Nevertheless, these are legitimate names for this type of philosophical reflection, because he does connect the closely related Metaphysical Perspective with reflection [e.g., Kt1:366-7], and he frequently uses phrases which are equivalent to 'hypothetical perspective' [e.g., 675] and 'practical standpoint' [e.g., xxi,384]. (My reasons for treating 'hypothetical' and 'practical' as more or less synonymous terms are given in II.4 and Appendix II; see also V.4.)
[34] A8:238; cf. Kt1:599-601. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Kant does not clearly recognize the implications of this fact.
[35] Kt1:799. Kant's reason for occasionally calling the ideas
'fictions' is not because he thinks they really are entirely fictitious [see notes V.9,10], but simply to guard
against the dogmatic mistake of assuming 'their independent authority or
absolute validity', which would run the risk
of 'drown[ing] reason in fictions and delusions' [810]. Kant's point is that
the reality of the ideas is
demonstrated not in systemt, but in systemp [see Kt4:5].
[36] See note IV.37. As we shall see in VIII.2-3, one of the main tasks of the practical standpoint is to discover the implications of the 'categorical imperative'. Thus, what is 'hypothetical' for theoretical reason becomes 'categorical' for practical reason. But this should not obscure the fact that the fundamental perspective which guides systemp is the same one which in systemt is called hypothetical. This simply means the difference between hypothetical and categorical is, for Kant, a difference of standpoint.
[37] Kt1:830; Kt5:388. Although it could be said that the knowledge yielded by practical reflection in systemp makes moral experience possible, it would be more accurate to say it makes moral experience coherent, or rational, by providing its justification, and that it consists in principles which ought to be applied universally to experience.
[38] The role of hypotheses in the formation of faith will be discussed further in V.1 [s.e. note V.6], and the relation between faith and these ideas will be discussed in V.4.
[39] Kt4:134. Statements such as this by Kant reveal the inadequacy of labeling the product of practical reflection 'synthetic a priori'. The difference between 'knowledge' and 'belief' will be discussed more fully in V.1 and Appendix V.3.
[41] And the same goal is aimed at in systemp, wherein the hypothetical perspective gives rise to the practical standpoint, which provides a more positive alternative to the speculative perspective by reflecting on what 'ought to be true' in light of the universal experience of duty [see VIII.3.A; s.a. Kt1:700-1].
[42] That it is appropriate to locate logic below experience with the arrow of reflection pointing down towards it is intimated by Kant when he says logic always comes 'last of all' in the actual formulation (as opposed to the logical structure [cf. III.2-4]) of any science [Kt1:76].
[43] That it is appropriate for synthetic a priori knowledge to 'point to' experience in this way is suggested by a metaphor of Kant's, according to which 'pure a priori concepts ... must be in a position to show a certificate of birth other than that of descent from experiences' [Kt1:119e.a]. In Kt18:358(98) he uses another metaphor which also alludes to this pattern: 'knowledge has two ends of which you can take hold, the one a priori, the other a posteriori.'
[44] A10:45. Of course, in its broadest sense 'transcendental' does refer to the Perspective of Kant's entire Critical philosophy [see II.4]; yet, as we saw in II.2, the Critical method should be associated not so much with any particular perspective as with Kant's natural tendency to think perspectivally, especially since he was thinking Critically long before he hit upon the insight which led to his new Transcendental Perspective [s.a. Pq12]. In fairness to Allison, however, it should be noted that Kant himself often seems to underestimate the philosophical significance of empirical reflection. (By contrast, most philosophers would now agree that the only way they could fulfill Kant's hope [Kt1:viif] of making philosophy (excluding logic) into a 'science' (at least, the way this term is used today) would be to adopt some type of Empirical Perspective-such as, perhaps, some version of verificationism or linguistic analysis.) Nevertheless, even though Kant stresses the importance of one perspective more than the others, they are all equally essential to a coherent understanding of his overall method.
Incidentally, Kant's emphasis on the transcendental led him, much to the dismay of Husserl and numerous others, to be satisfied with a fairly uncritical view of logic 'as self-sufficiently grounded in its apriority' [S12:49]. Kant would not deny the legitimacy of investigating the foundations of and the justification for logical reflection as such (rather than as speculation), but this task is secondary to the properly Transcendental tasks Kant undertakes in his three Critiques.
[45] See Kt1:682-3. Ordinary metaphysics regards logic as applicable directly to experience, and therefore uses it to make 'empirical-like' inferences about transcendent reality. This can be plotted onto our map of Kant's methodology by reversing both vertical arrows in Figure IV.2 (as in Figure III.8). Kant's discovery was to recognize that such applications must be preceded by Transcendental Criticism if they are to be properly made.
[46] As mentioned in III.3, this way of organizing Kant's System follows the same pattern as his division of categories [cf. Figures III.4 and IV.2].
[47] Kt1:194-5. Accordingly, as long as it involves judgments which synthesize the theoretical and practical standpoints, any class of experiences-not just the aesthetic and teleological-could be chosen for this task.
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