Faith as Kant's Key

to Justifying the Transcendental Perspective

 

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

 

 

 

A purely rational belief is ... the signpost or compass by which the specu­la­tive thinker can orient himself in his rational excursions in the field of super­sensuous objects. But to the man of ordinary but (morally) sound reason, it can show the way for both the theore­ti­cal and the practical standpoint, in a manner entirely suitable to the end to which he is destined. This rational belief must also be made the basis of every other be­lief—indeed of every revela­tion. [Kt20:142]

 

1. Faith and Kant's Transcendental Turn

 

      Kant is sometimes reproved for not having devoted more attention to the question of how Transcendental philosophy itself is possible [e.g., W9:249-55]. To compensate for this neglect, Kantian philosophers tend to focus on one or more of three ways of justifying his Transcenden­tal Perspective[1] (and particularly his infamous presupposition of the 'thing in itself'[2]). Interpreters have stressed the role it plays: first, in the overall System to which it gives rise; second, in Kant's special theory of transcendental ideal­ism; or third, in relation to his transcendental arguments. Part Three of this book will provide a version of the first type of justification; a version of the second type will be given in VI.2; and Appendix V considers the possibility of the third type. However appealing Kant's theories may or may not turn out to be once an in­terpretation of his System brings out their consistency and coherence (and perhaps even their validity), we must concede that such an approach on its own could not provide an entirely conclusive justification for Kant's 'transcendental turn'. In this chapter, therefore, I will touch upon each of these methods, but only in order to demonstrate their secondary importance to Kant's own justification for assuming an unknowable reality as his epis­temo­logical starting point. Though almost always neglected by interpreters, this fourth method, I will argue, is his ultimate and indispensable key to jus­tify­ing the Transcendental Perspective, so it accounts for his failure to justify it explicitly in other ways.

 

      In Kt2:371 Kant suggests it is occasionally necessary for the philosopher to adopt 'a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, sufficient to our wants, and perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself.' Although this would appear at first sight to be precarious ground on which to build an epis­temological foundation for a philosophical system [cf. S17:241], Kant seems to treat it not only as sufficient, but as the necessary support for both his theoretical and his practical standpoints [see e.g., Kt20:142q.a.]. Establishing such an approach as philosophically valid will not only provide an initial jus­tification of his starting point, but will also play an important role in Pq20, where I will explore the theological implications of his System [s.a. Ch. X]. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, will be to demonstrate that Kant does in fact appeal to faith as the justifying key to his Transcendental Perspective, and to defend its legitimacy in this role.

 

      Before discussing the implications of this rather unconventional claim, we must understand what Kant means by the word Glaube (translated as either 'faith' or 'belief'). Schrader may be right in saying 'the term faith is not used in any conventional sense' by Kant [S4:183]; but this does not justify his charge that it therefore 'serves to confuse the function of the critical method as applied to moral experience' [183]. For if we make an effort to understand Kant's own special use of the word and apply it consistently, then it can serve instead to clarify the implications of his entire Critical philosophy.

 

      Most commentators limit the application of all Kant's comments on faith to his moral philosophy, ignoring or denying their application to his epistemology [e.g., W16:109]. For instance, his claim to 'deny knowledge [Wissen], in order to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx] is often taken out of its wider context and regarded solely as an allusion to the way the denials of the Dialectic in Kt1 make room for the faith of practical reason in Kt4. Kemp Smith's translation perpetrates this misconception by dividing Kant's one long paragraph at Kt1:xxiv-xxxi into five paragraphs. Kant's immediate point in making this assertion is indeed to stress the need for faith in one's practical employment of the ideas of 'God, freedom, and immortality'; but it is rarely acknowledged that his general argument in this passage assumes that the same 'attitude of reason' must also hold true in systemt for the thing in it­self.[3] Just as he regards the faith of practical reason as the legitimate re­sponse to our lack of knowledge concerning God, freedom, and immortality, so also he regards the faith of theoretical reason as the legitimate response to our lack of knowledge concerning the thing in itself. The two cases are di­rectly parallel; in fact, Kant's overall purpose in the paragraph in which the statement occurs is to demonstrate their similarity, and in so doing to estab­lish the requirement of faith in the thing in itself for both epistemological and moral reflection.

 

      Admittedly, the great majority of Kant's references to faith do concern its role in his practical, rather than in his theoretical, system; and in a few cases he even seems to deny the validity of applying it to the latter [see e.g., Kt7: 472,475]. The least ambiguous of these apparent denials comes in Kt10:69n (76-7n): 'The belief of reason ... can never be directed to theoretical cognition, for there the objectively inadequate holding-to-be-true is mere opin­ion. It [i.e., faith] is merely a presupposition of reason from a subjective, though abso­lutely necessary practical standpoint.' However, this and all such state­ments are not intended to deny the need for rational faith in the thing in itself; for such faith, though indeed theoretical, is not intended as a 'theoretical cogni­tion' of an 'object' [s.e. Kt23:396-7n(173-4n)]. Only when we aim at reach­ing empirical knowledge (i.e., only within the limits of systemt) does an appeal to faith lead to 'mere opinion'. By contrast, the thing in itself is pre­cisely that sort of subjective 'presupposition of reason' which Kant is here de­scribing as being supported on the pillar of rational faith.[4] Once this is fully under­stood, it becomes unreasonable to regard the thing in itself as a 'wild card', slyly included in Kant's epistemology solely 'for the purpose of his ethics' [W9:159-60; s.a. 166; M6:144]; for, even though he does not always state his position explicitly, Kant uses faith in this rational presupposition to form the very ground in which his System of Perspectives is planted.

 

      Kant describes faith as 'the moral attitude of reason in its assurance of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge' [Kt7:471; s.a. 469]. He is most interested in such 'realities which transcend experience' [L3:44] when they have their primary positive function in systemp, and therefore inspire such a 'moral attitude'; nevertheless, he admits that 'even in purely theoretical judgments there is an analogon of practical judgments, to the mental enter­taining of which the term "belief" is appropriate' [Kt1:853]. Moreover, Kant says even a belief in a transcendent reality such as God depends not just on practical faith, but also on 'pure rational faith, because pure reason alone (in its theoretical as well as practical standpoint) is the source from which it springs' [Kt4:126].

 

      In both practical and theoretical contexts, faith's 'assurance' can result from either ordinary 'contingent belief' or special 'necessary belief'. The lat­ter, strictly transcendental kind of belief, can apply only to situations in which 'I know with certainty [ich gewiss weiss] that no one can have knowl­edge [kennen könne] of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end.'[5] Such transcendental faith does not entitle us to 'speculative knowledge' [Wissen] concerning the conditions in question [Kt2:371]; instead, it means the conditions are regarded as sufficient 'only subjectively' [Kt1:850]. For 'rational belief ... is a subjectively sufficient assent associated with the con­sciousness that it is an objectively insufficient assent; therefore ... [it] can never be con­verted by all the natural data of reason into knowledge, because the ground of assent in this case is merely subjective' [Kt20:140-1]. Accord­ing­ly, 'the expression of belief is, from the objective standpoint, an expres­sion of modesty'—i.e., of an awareness of our ignorance—yet it is 'at the same time, from the subjective standpoint, an expression of the firmness of our confi­dence' [Kt1:855; s.a. 498-9; Kt2:278]. In spite of our ignorance, there­fore, the 'conviction' which results 'is often firmer than any knowing. In knowing one still listens to counter-reasons, but not in belief, because this turns not on objec­tive grounds but on the moral interest of the subject' [Kt10:72(80)].

        Ewing aptly observes that 'faith does not mean for Kant belief on author­ity or belief without ground, but believing what we have adequate grounds for believing but cannot absolutely prove' [E5:9]. Along these lines, Kant notes: 'Belief is no special source of cognition. It is a kind of holding-to-be-true with consciousness of its incompleteness' [Kt10:67n(75n)]. As such, faith always involves the formation of something like a hypothesis.[6] Kant defines the latter as: 'The holding-to-be-true of a presupposition as a ground' [84 (92)]. In working with a hypothesis 'we conclude from the truth of the con­se­quence to the truth of the ground'; and although 'hypo­theses always re­main hypothe­ses, that is, presuppositions whose complete certainty we can never attain', nevertheless 'the more conse­quen­ces can be derived from a hy­pothesis, the more probable it is' [85(92-3)]. Kant says metaphysics itself does 'not permit of hypotheses' [86(93)]. But this does not prevent him from adopting faith in the thing in itself as the starting point of the Critical phi­losophy; on the contrary, as we shall see, this metacritical hypothesis enables him to avoid depending on such hypothe­ses at crucial points within his three Critical systems [see Kt20:141-2]. Moreover, the systematic conse­quences of presup­posing the thing in itself [see Part Three] lend a measure of 'objective valid­ity' [see note VI.22] to this hypothesis, which initially is sup­ported only by the subjective validity of faith. Thus theoretical as well as practical faith 'lies at the foundation of the critical philosophy' [W25:20], and is, in fact, 'the outlook, the Weltanschauung of the critical philosophy itself' [W24:249].

 

      In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to defend this interpretation of the role of faith in Kant's philosophy by relating it to three specific issues. First, I will elaborate on what it means to say the thing in itself must be accepted on faith [V.2]. I will then contrast this approach with that which regards transcendental arguments as the only valid method of justifying this as­sumption [V.3]. And finally, assuming my interpretation is correct, I will consider the relationship between theoretical faith in the thing in itself and moral faith in the ideas of practical reason [V.4]. (In Appendix V I will ex­am­ine the legitimacy of the claim made by some Kant-scholars that the thing in itself could in fact be viewed as knowable without destroying Kant's basic program.) If I am successful, I will have demonstrated not that Kant be­lieved he had established his System as undoubtedly 'true', but rather that he knew the truth of Transcendental philosophy can be fully recognized only by those who choose to fol­low his initial leap of faith.

 

2. Filling the Transcendent 'Space'

 

      In discussing the concept of 'noumenon'—a term related to, but not to be equated with, 'thing in itself' [see VI.3]—Kant says:

 

The relation of sensibility to an object and what the transcenden­tal ground of this unity [i.e., what the thing in itself] may be, are matters undoubtedly so deeply concealed that we ... can never be justified in treating sensibility as being a suitable instrument of investigation for discovering anything save al­ways still other appearances—eager as we yet are to explore their non-sensi­ble cause. [Kt1:334]

 

He concludes on this basis that the only legitimate function of this 'empty' concept is negative: 'to mark the limits of our sensible knowledge and to leave open a space which we can fill neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding' [345; cf. A10:46].

 

      Kant does not explain at this point whether (and if so, how) this 'space' can be regarded by us as filled in any way. But he leaves no doubt about his position when he states that even in systemt 'the supersensible was not mere fancy and ... its concepts were not empty' [Kt4:6]. Furthermore, he says in K2:12.222(Z1:247): 'The sphere of non-sensible objects is ... not quite empty, though from the standpoint of theoretical knowledge such objects must be viewed as transcendent.' Since, as I will argue in VI.3, 'noumenon' is for the empirical perspective what the 'non-sensible cause' of appearances [Kt1:334] is for the transcendental perspective, Kant must regard this space as being 'filled' in some sense by the thing in itself. For us the thing in itself is unknowable by definition [see Ap. V], so it would not fill the space be­yond our sensibility with an actual noumenal object, or with any other knowledge of 'the relation of sensibility to an object' [334]; it would merely provide us with a label for the belief that there is a supersensible 'ground' of the world as we know it. The only problem this raises is, of course, how to justify such a belief.

 

      Allison defends a view of the thing in itself in A10:49 which might seem to render the above interpretation superfluous:

 

Properly construed, this problem is not, as is generally believed, that of somehow justifying the assumption of the existence of unknowable entities. Rather, it is to show the possibility and the significance of ... considering thing [sic; i.e., empirical objects] as they are in themselves, which means as they are apart from the conditions under which we can know anything about them.

 

On the whole, Allison's interpretation is a good one; for Kant is indeed pri­marily concerned with investigating the various perspectives from which 'things' (i.e., objects) can be considered. Consequently, a good deal of what he says about the thing in itself can be interpreted as referring to how the concept of 'things apart from our knowledge of them' can be analyzed. But this, surely, is not what Kant has in mind when he talks about the thing in itself as the 'cause' of appearances [as in Kt1:334]. On the contrary, he is regarding the thing in it­self as that which fills the transcendent space which is for us unknowable. To regard it in this way is to hypostatize its concept, so that its existence (in some transcendent, but analogously categorial sense of the word) must be pre­supposed [cf. 855]. And any talk which even alludes to such hypostatization of unknowable concepts does require some justification.

 

      Kant maintains that 'the modest language of a rational belief [vernünftigen Glaubens]' enables us to 'assume ... the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life' [Kt2:278e.a.]. The assumption which guides 'the will', or 'practical reason' [Kt4:15], concerns the existence of what for theoretical rea­son are merely 'ideas' (especially God, freedom and immortality). Likewise, the assumption which guides 'the understanding', or theoretical reason, con­cerns the existence of what would otherwise be a mere concept (viz., the thing in itself). Kant's treatment of practical reason and theoretical reason is in many respects parallel, not only because he regards the form of both as arising out of their mutual dependence on architectonic logic [see III.3-4], but also because their justification is essentially the same: even if sensibility cannot intuit as an appearance something which under­stand­ing can think as a concept, its employment in a philosophical system is not forbidden as long as reason (theoretical or practical) can present itself with sufficient evidence to assume its existence on faith. Without such evidence, Kant's faith would not be 'rational belief'.

 

      To adopt faith in the thing in itself is not so much to posit it as a separate 'entity', as to accept that the objects which fill the world of our experi­ence have some real nature 'in themselves': it is to believe they are not mere appearances, for there is something about them which, in principle, transcends our knowledge. Findlay is largely correct, therefore, to say Kant

 

plainly does not regard [this assumption] as involving any diffi­cult, prob­lematic step: it is rather ... a primordial certainty which stands in no need of justification, even if its lack of empirical content means that it can never be ranked as knowledge.... [Thus] we cannot but conceive of, and believe in, such non-apparent objects or aspects of objects, even though we can have no knowledge of them. [F3:2]

 

But he errs in saying the thing in itself 'stands in no need of justification'; for Kant does not regard it merely as an unsupported 'extra' which can be accepted or rejected, and which is peripheral to the main purposes of Critical philoso­phy [cf. S17:38-42]. On the contrary, his entire System is an attempt to pro­vide good reasons for assuming that the objects of our experience are ap­pear­ances which are grounded in the unknowable thing in itself. Yet faith is still required as the ultimate justification of his presupposition because, as we shall see in V.3, it is impossible ever to prove the objective validity of the existence of the thing in itself. But before examining why this is so, I will touch upon one of Kant's most important reasons for having faith in the thing in itself.

 

      If philosophers adopt faith in the thing in itself at the outset of their transcendental inquiries, then they will find it is not necessary to appeal to faith to justify their empirical inquiries. Kant states this rather obscurely in Kt1:xxxixn:

 

it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of our knowledge, even of our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.

 

This passage might at first sight appear to contradict the claim that faith is Kant's key to justifying his assumption of the thing in itself [cf. S18:117]. It would do so if 'things outside us' referred to the thing in itself as regarded from the transcendental perspective [see e.g., S13:3.35]. But this could not be Kant's intention, since he goes on to give a brief summary [Kt1:xxxixn-xlin] of the proof he supplies in the Refuta­tion of Idealism section of the Analytic of Principles, where the third (empirical) stage of systemt is being elaborated. His empirical idealist opponent doubts the real existence of empirical objects —i.e., objects of experience, or, phenomena [see VI.3]. So the 'things out­side us' in this context must be phenomena. Moreover, Kant would never claim to have provided a proof for the existence of the thing in itself, since he consistently regards it as unknowable [see Ap. V].

 

      Far from contradicting my interpretation, Kant's statement confirms it by implying that philosophers can avoid the 'scandal' of having to take refuge in faith to justify the existence of phenomena (i.e., 'things outside us' from the empirical perspective) [as in H21:1.3.7] only by having faith in the thing in itself (i.e., in the reality of 'things outside us' from the transcendental per­spec­tive). In other words, philosophers will be unable to prove the objective reality of empirical objects unless they presuppose that these objects are phenomena which, when regarded transcendentally, are appearances of the unknowable thing in itself. If they do muster up enough faith to make such a presupposition, the way is open for a completely adequate solution to this long-standing philosophical problem. The solution is that outer objects are unknowable from the transcendental perspective, yet from the empirical perspective 'inner experience itself [the real existence of which the empirical idealist does not doubt] depends upon something permanent which is not in me, and consequently can be only something outside me' [Kt1:xln-xlin]—namely, phenomena. Not only can phenomena be proved to exist, they can also be re­garded as (in principle) completely knowable by the scientist [see VI.3]. But philosophers who cannot bring themselves to take the initial step of faith in an unknowable thing in itself will inevitably confuse the transcendental and empirical perspectives, and, taking the objects of experience to be things in themselves, will be unable to prove their existence.

 

      Kant would surely be disappointed to find that his solution to this 'scandal' has not prevented it from continuing to spread—indeed, to thrive—in some philosophical circles to this day. A good example is Quine's declara­tion that 'in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind' [Q1:41]. He bases this on the rather more plausible supposition that '[t]he totality of our so-called knowl­edge and beliefs ... is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges' [39; cf. IV.4]. But the 'man-made' nature of all knowledge does not preclude the philo­so­pher from discerning different kinds of knowl­edge or belief; it does not require him to reduce all knowledge to mere 'cultural posits', as Quine suggests [41]. Quine is unable to make any strict distinct­ion be­tween knowledge of 'physical objects' and belief in the 'gods' for the same reason which led Berkeley to his empirical idealism: both philoso­phers con­fuse the transcendental with the empirical perspective and conse­quently fail to distinguish between faith in the thing in itself and faith in matters of empiri­cal interest.

 

      The reason philosophers such as Berkeley and Quine refuse to take advan­tage of Kant's transcen­den­tal faith is obviously that they assume a fundamen­tally different approach. But why some philosophers, on the other hand, shun the need for faith in the thing in itself even though they do accept the bulk of Kant's System is not quite so evident. Probably the most common example of the latter is found among those Kantians who attempt to pick up where Kant left off in his use of 'transcendental arguments' (i.e., proofs by reference to the possibility of experience [cf. note IV.26]). To the alternative offered by such philosophers, therefore, we shall now turn our attention.

 

3. Transcendental Arguments or a Concession to the Skeptic?

 

      Kant himself never uses transcendental arguments on behalf of the thing in itself; instead, he limits their use to determining what must be presupposed to be true about the phenomenal world in order for our experience of it to be possible [e.g., Kt1:38,A402]. Paton thus has good reasons for suggesting that the validity of presupposing the thing in it­­self 'is not considered by Kant to be in need of proof', and that such a proof would have seemed 'ludicrous' to him [P2:1.70; s.a. M8:56; I1:756]. But this is not entirely fair, since Kant does occasionally supply rather brief arguments for his presupposition, such as that if experi­ence has bounds, then 'that which binds it must lie quite without it' [Kt2:360]. Such comments do provide a possible basis for at­tempting on Kantian grounds to construct a transcendental argument for the necessary existence of the thing in itself.

 

      Chipman constructs such an argument by paying close attention to Kant's own statements. He gathers together a number of fragmented bits of reasoning and forms them into a single, surprisingly complete, transcendental argument:

 

(a) The objects of experience exist only as spatio-temporal appearances,

(b) Insofar as we judge that there are appearances, we must be prepared to judge that there are things appearing,

(c) To speak of a thing appearing is, by implication, to make use of the con­cept of a thing-other-than-as-it-appears,

Ergo,

(d) Objective experience requires us to postulate things-other-than-as-they-appear, or things in themselves. [C8:491]

 

Although Chipman thinks Kant's theory of the thing in itself is 'consistent', he admits that even this reconstructed argument remains 'inconclusive' [489]: 'Kant has not succeeded in establishing that we must postulate things in themselves as a necessary condition for the possibility of objective experi­ence, but ... their possibility must nevertheless be countenanced' [498].

 

      Walker attempts to compensate for the inconclusive nature of such recon­structed forms of Kant's position by straying rather further from Kant's own methods. He maintains that, once we recognize that 'Kant was simply mis­taken' to think the thing in itself must be completely unknow­able, the way will be open to construct transcendental arguments which can establish some highly significant conclusions about its nature [W3:3]. But, as I will argue in Appendix V, his position is radically incoherent both in itself and as a ba­sis for interpreting Kant. For if his transcendental arguments prove anything, they yield conclusions only about the phenomenal world—conclusions which Kant himself has already established.

 

      Philosophers who attempt to construct a transcendental argument for the validity of presupposing the thing in itself apparently fail to see the reason why 'the formal character of transcendental arguments does not interest [Kant]' [K1:421]; as a result, like 'the critic who dis­sects a transcendental ar­gument [i.e., one which Kant does give] with merely formal instruments', they 'may miss the heart of the matter' [423]. It is indeed unfortunate that Kant himself does not present his argument as clearly as Chipman has shown to be possi­ble. But it is not surprising that even in its clearest form it is not undeniably conclu­sive. For Kant never intends his comments to provide any­thing but good reasons for assuming the thing in itself as the starting point for the transcendental perspective in systemt.

 

      When Kant says, for instance, that the presupposition of the thing in it­self is 'not only admissible, but unavoidable' [Kt2:314-5], he is implying not that a transcendental argument could ever prove it to be necessary, but that it is unavoidable for anyone who wants to ask tran­scen­den­tal questions (i.e., questions about the subject and/or object of experience, which assume the transcendental perspective). To ask such questions without presupposing the thing in itself (as in some versions of phenomenalism) is 'to be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears' [Kt1:xxvi-xxvii]. For, as George rightly says, 'if Kant's theory of objectivity is correct, it is not for us men to say that there are objects of representation but no things in themselves' [G8:194]. It may be that representations are some­how generated out of nothing; but if we wish to construct a coherent theory of the phenomenal world on the basis of the transcendental per­spec­tive, then it is more reasonable to presuppose that they are rooted in the thing in itself. Therefore, the 'heart of the matter', which is likely to be missed by those who wish to prove the validity of Kant's pre­supposition, is that doubt in its validity can in the end be counter­ed only by faith.

 

      This interpretation of Kant's intentions reveals a fundamental point at which he agrees with the skeptic: both Kant and Hume maintain that there is a sense in which objects are unknowable, so that even the philosopher cannot claim to have objectively valid knowledge of them. For Kant this is true only so long as objects are regarded as things in themselves; but this should not be taken as an attempt at entirely refuting the skeptic. For his response to being 'awakened' by Hume was not, as Russell suggests, to conjure up 'a soporific which enabled him to sleep again' [R13:731]. Rather, having real­ized that the skeptic's doubts can never be entirely satisfied merely by means of logical proof and disproof, he formulated the doctrine of the unknowable thing in itself as his concession to the skeptic [see e.g., Kt2:20 and Kt4:53].

 

      Transcendental arguments are designed to convince the skeptic that expe­rience is possible only if the object is regarded as an appearance conforming to certain synthetic a priori forms of knowledge, sup­plied by the subject (namely: space, time and the categories). When the role of these arguments is taken into consideration, it becomes evident that Kant's position is not, as Schaper suggests [S3:237], that we must view the world 'as if' these forms of knowledge apply to objects, even though we know that in reality they do not, or that objects of experience 'can be taken "as real" for all empirical pur­poses'; on the contrary, it is that these forms must really apply to empirical objects and that such objects must be empirically real in order for experience itself to be possible. If the arguments are successful, skeptics are still allowed (indeed, encouraged) to regard the thing in itself as unknowable, but they must now also admit that empirical knowledge of objects is possible so long as it is regarded as representational; for such knowledge is not a direct appre­hension of the thing in itself. However, skeptics are not forced to admit that the rep­resentations of experience are grounded in the thing in itself—a view more likely to be rejected by Berkeley than by Hume [see VI.2]. Kant does not con­struct a transcendental argument on the latter point because he knows the skeptics' acceptance of it depends in the end on their willingness to adopt some amount of faith.[7]

 

      This conclusion enables us to accept Hartmann's suggestion that all sys­tems of transcendental philosophy 'can be explained only from within, not from without' [H3:249], yet without jeopardizing the success of Kant's attack on Hume's skepticism. Kant is here attempting not so much to force skeptics (or any other 'outsiders') to relinquish their position, as to integrate the valid insight acknowledged by the skeptic (that reality in itself is not know­able) with the valid insight acknowl­edged by the dogmatist (that reality as we know it is necessarily characterized by certain unchanging forms), and in so doing to provide the impartial reader with a coherent alternative to both ex­tremes.

 

      Kant's success, though by no means complete, can be measured by the fact that philosophers who refuse to adopt faith these days are generally not so skeptical (or perhaps, not so forthright) as to admit to drown­ing their despair in food, backgammon and merriment, as Hume did [H21:1.4.7]; instead they adopt one of several agnostic positions, from which they either ask transcen­dental questions without committing them­selves to belief in the thing in it­self (as in phenomenalism), or else simply ignore transcendental questions al­together (as in pragmatism). Kant would have little to say to the latter group: perhaps only that their pragmatism itself only makes sense within the broader context of Critical philoso­phy. But to the former group he would question the authen­ticity of their supposedly 'transcendental' questions by pointing out the inco­herence of adopting a 'phenomenal' view of the world without assuming something transcendent which necessarily limits our knowledge. Unfortunate­ly, it is unlikely that either group would be anxious to listen.

 

4. Theoretical Faith and Practical Faith

 

      Now that I have clarified the role of faith as Kant's key to justifying the transcendental starting point of his System, I shall touch upon its role as the hypothetical goal of systemt. It is important for us to consider the latter not because it is essential to the justi­fication of his transcendental turn [cf. note V.6], but because such practical faith is often regarded as the only way in which Kant refers to faith [see e.g., W24:13-25]. We must therefore conclude our discussion by examining how practical faith in the ideas of reason differs from theoretical faith in the presupposition of the thing in itself.

 

      An idea of reason is a concept which serves to unify our interpre­tation of experience by providing a rational explanation of what the unconditioned ground of some kind of experience might be [Kt1:383-6]. Speculative meta­physicians make the mistake of believing they can reason their way to knowledge of such unconditioned objects. But Kant denies this possibility, insisting that, because an idea is a mere concept, with no corresponding intu­ition, it can never constitute knowledge of the unconditioned. Instead, it can be employed effectively only by those who are willing and able to adopt a kind of hypothetical faith in the practical value of its use [499-500].

 

      Kant says practical faith 'refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence in that furthering of the activities of my reason which confirms me in the idea, and which yet does so without my be­ing in a position to give a speculative account of it.'[8] Another, better known description of what is involved in adopting such faith is that it entails view­ing certain objects of experience 'as if they had their ground' in the object rep­resented by an idea [709], even though the reality of this object is not objec­tively knowable. In suggesting this interpretation, Kant is intimating that we should regard the idea not merely as a 'philosophical fiction',[9] but as our best approxima­tion (or hypothesis) of what the unconditioned object really would be, if we were able to gain knowledge of it. Because its speculative employ­ment can never be legitimate, such hypothetical faith in the idea is required in order to justify its practical employment.

 

      How, then, are the ideas of reason and the faith they require related to the thing in itself and the faith it requires? Some of the claims Kant makes in discussing the ideas can be applied directly to the thing in itself as well. He says, for example, that through the ideas 'we really know only that we know nothing [about transcendent reality]' [Kt1:498]; and the same can be said of the thing in itself [cf. 45]. Moreover, Kant's references to the thing in itself in his discussion of the ideas often imply that the two notions are inextrica­bly related [e.g., 593-4; Kt2:353-4]. But the closeness of their relationship should not lead us to agree with those interpreters who propose that the thing in itself should actually be included as an idea of reason.[10] To do so would be to ignore the difference between Kant's transcendental and hypothetical per­spectives [see IV.3]. For when the thing in itself is mentioned in the context of a hypothetical perspective (such as Kant adopts whenever he discusses the ideas), it always refers to what the thing in itself would be if it were an un­con­di­tioned object of knowledge; and as we will see in VI.3, this is pre­cise­ly what he means by the (technically more accurate) term 'positive noumenon'. The ideas are concepts of what might be true about the thing in itself as posi­tive noumenon, based on what we actually encounter in experience; but they are regulative, rather than constitutive, of experi­ence. By contrast, the thing in itself as such is a transcendental presupposition referring to that which is ultimately constitutive of (at least) the matter of experience, but which is not considered in experi­ence to be either regulative or constitutive. When this dis­tinction is taken into consideration, it becomes obvious that Kant's refer­ence to the thing in itself as such from the transcendental perspective is quite dis­tinct from his connection of the thing in itself as noumenon with the ideas from the hypothetical perspective.

 

     The fact that Kant positions the thing in itself and the positive noumenon at opposite ends of the spectrum of knowledge indicates that the sort of faith employed in each case is at least in some respects different. In its transcendental use it is directed towards a single, necessary, theoretical pre­supposition: the whole realm of transcenden­tal reflection is closed to the philosopher who is unwilling to adopt faith at this point. In its hypothetical use, on the other hand, it is directed towards a variety of practical presupposi­tions, the denial of which may or may not affect the coherence of the overall System. But apart from the difference in the object to which it is directed and in its relation to that object (as determined by its position in the unfold­ing of systemt [see VII.2-3]), the kind of faith required at these two points is really the same. It is the reasoned decision to treat as true a presup­position which cannot be verified objectively, but which is suggested by the objectively known facts to be the best (or perhaps, the only) choice available which will enhance the unity of the systematic context (i.e., of the perspective) to which it belongs. When Kant adopts rational faith in the thing in itself, it generates a systematic movement of thought through the whole spectrum of human knowledge, which comes full circle to rest where it began, with faith in the unknown, considered now as the tool of practical reason.

 

      Numerous implications follow from this understanding of the role of faith, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and philosophical theol­ogy. The most obvious example, however, concerns those philosophers whose ultimate goal is to reach a certainty which is in no sense depend­ent upon faith. Philosophers of all sorts can readily be found who tend towards this attitude: Heidegger can serve as a typical case. He de­scribes philosophy as a science of 'thinking' which excludes all faith, relegating the latter to the­ol­ogy [H10:10,27,205-6]. But if I am correct in my interpretation of Kant's justification for the type of reflection which Heidegger himself practised, and if Kant is correct in putting it forward, then philosophers who push aside faith in this way are in danger of either letting their overconfidence in the powers of unaided human reason lead them to make unwarranted speculations (e.g., about 'Being'[11]), or letting their lack of confidence prevent them from making any significant affirmations at all [see Kt20:145-7]. For there would then be an important sense in which faith is not only relevant, but vital to the task of the philosopher (as well as that of the theolo­gian). As Bradley puts it, 'philosophy demands, and in the end rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove it' [B25:15].

 

      Another example of how this perspectival view of the role of faith is ap­plicable to theological issues is the potential it has for resolv­ing the age-old controversy over the question of the rela­tion­ship between faith and reason. With all his 'enlightened' emphasis on the superiority of reason, Kant saw that transcendental reflection must be preceded by faith if it is to be con­sis­tently and coherently employed. Yet at the same time, he saw that reason pre­cedes faith when it is viewed from the empirical perspective. Theologians, I suggest, could apply this perspectival understanding of faith to their own interests by arguing that religious faith likewise precedes reason transcenden­tally (e.g., when considering the necessary conditions for salvation), even though reason precedes faith in empirical matters (e.g., when considering the significance of some specific religious activity). Of course, such an attempt to integrate the two alternatives into a single consis­tent solution would have to be dis­cussed in greater detail than is possible here before any firm conclu­sions could be established [but see Pq20].

 

      Other examples could be provided, but are peripheral to our purpose in this chapter, which has been to clarify the nature of Kant's emphasis on faith. Although Kant's Transcendental Perspective can, as we have seen, be partially justified in other ways as well, our conclusion has been that faith is Kant's key to its ultimate justification. Thus we can say with Weldon that Kant is 'entitled to his view that the nature [indeed, the very 'existence'] of things in themselves inevitably remains for us a matter of belief, not of scientific metaphysical knowledge' [W16:11]. Only when we follow Kant in replacing our natural tendency towards dogmatism or skepticism with a rational faith in the legitimacy of the transcendental presupposition will we be in a position to understand, and so also to judge the validity of, his Critical philosophy. Just as practical faith in the ideas can 'bring unity into the body of our de­tailed [i.e., empirical] knowledge' [Kt1:675], so also we may find that such theoretical faith can bring unity into our understanding of the nature of human knowledge in general. For in both cases, as Kant says in Kt43:222(82), 'faith ... provides ... a clear light to enlighten philosophy itself.'

 


  [1] On the general nature of the Transcendental Perspective, its epistemological status, and the role it plays in Kant's System, see II.4, III.1 and IV.3.

 

  [2] Some commentators have criticized Kant for referring to both a 'thing in itself'    (singular) and 'things in themselves' (plural) [e.g., S13:3.37]: since the terms are supposed to denote an unknowable reality, how can we know whether there are many or just one? Ewing's reply to such a criticism is that this problem is 'rather a defect of European languages than a philosophical inconsistency' [E5:191]. Although this may be true to an extent, I would add that this concept has to be expressed in a singular or plural form because the reality to which it refers is, for us, an abstraction from empirically knowable objects, which are represented in singu­lar or plural terms. (In support of this Allison cites Prauss' claim [in P12:20; s.a. P13:222-39] that Kant intends the phrase 'thing in itself' (Ding an sich) to be an abbreviated form of the more accurate phrase 'thing considered as it is in itself' (Ding an sich selbst betrachtet) [A9:317n]; thus 'thing' and 'things' both refer—Allison says directly, but I will suggest indirectly [see VI.2]—to the object or objects of ordinary experience [cf. G12:771].) Accordingly, Kant's usage reflects not so much a 'defect', as a potenti­ally (but not necessarily) misleading ambiguity in the meaning of his terms. In order to minimize confusion, I will limit my­self wherever possible to the singular form. (This seems particularly appropriate since Kant uses the closely related term 'transcendental object' in the singular ev­ery­where in Kt1 except one passage [A394], where he slips into the plural three times.) The phrase 'thing in itself' will therefore be short for something like 'the thing (reality) which is indepen­d­ent of me (transcendent) and which may or may not be composed of "things"'.

 

  [3] Vleeschauwer mentions that in Kt1 'Kant had expressed his faith in the exis­tence of the transcendent in the theoretical necessity of its participation in the Critical synthesis as a limiting concept' [V4:191]; but he does not develop the implica­tions of this fact. Barker also admits 'it is implausible to suppose that [Kant] him­self regarded his moral philosophy as providing the main basis for say­ing there are things-in-themselves' [B2:285]. But instead of offering an alterna­tive justifi­cation, Barker argues that the thing in itself is a groundless assump­tion, resulting from Kant's acceptance of two contradictory theories of perception [283,289]. In VI.2 I will attempt to demonstrate how the principle of perspective provides for the compatibility of these two theories.

 

  [4] Paulsen supports this position by arguing that the thing in itself, 'that crux inter­pretum ... is not the central principle of [Kant's] system; it is a self-evident pre­supposi­tion' [P4:153]. As such, faith in the thing in itself is quite similar to what Peano called a 'primi­tive concept', inasmuch as 'it is assumed and affords a basis for demonstra­tion although it is not itself demonstrated' [S14:175]. According to Stebbing, the whole of science is based upon faith in such 'unprovable' fundamen­tals [402].

 

  [5] Kt1:852; s.a. Kt10:65-70(72-8). Kant's technical word for empirical or objec­tive 'knowledge' is Erkenntnis (sometimes translated as 'cogni­tion'). Wissen, by con­trast, is a more inclusive term, used to refer to cases in which 'the holding of a thing to be true [Fürwahrhal­ten] is sufficient [for a given person] both subjec­tively and objective­ly' [Kt1:850]. Kant's use of the verbal forms of both words in the same sentence at this point is therefore a potential source of confusion for the English reader, since the two are not distinguished by Kemp Smith. Wissen is a more general term, which includes both Glaube and Erkenntnis as mutually exclu­sive types.

 

       Wiebe makes a distinction in W18:524 between 'doctrinal' and 'moral' faith, which is virtually the same as the distinction I am making here between theoreti­cal and practical faith. As he explains, quite rightly, in W18:522-3: 'Faith, ... in the Kantian view of things, is not outside the realm of reason, but is rather one aspect of reason, as is knowledge.' Unfortunately, Wiebe does not explain how Kant's notion of theoretical faith serves as the foundation for the Transcendental Perspective.

 

 [6] The hypothetical character of faith will be discussed further in V.4 [s.a. IV.3]. Kant alludes to the close link between the hypothetical perspec­tive and the practi­cal standpoint [see IV.4 and Ap. II] in Kt69:297: 'faith ... is ... an assumption or pre­suppo­si­tion (hypothesis), which is neces­sary only because an objective prac­tical rule of conduct that is necessary sup­ports it. Such faith is assent to a theoreti­cal propo­sition, e.g., there is a God, through practical reason.' He then clarifies that an 'opinion' can become a 'belief' if, on its ba­sis, a person 'must decide what to do' [298], because belief always 'has in itself a moral worth, for it includes a free com­mitment.' In this sense, Kant's presupposition of the thing in itself could be regard­ed technically as an opinion until we discover in sys­temp that it demands moral commitment as well as recognition of theoretical igno­rance. However, in light of Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason [see VIII.1], it would be better to think of practical reason as itself providing the ini­tial basis for theoreti­cal faith.

 

  [7] A transcendental argument for the existence of the thing in itself would be anal­o­gous to an ontological argument for the existence of God [cf. X.2]. Kant rejects both for much the same reason (viz., '... to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx; s.a. 642-8]). This similarity reveals the inadequacy of Cameron's attempt in C2 to force Kant into a dilemma on this subject, whereby it would be necessary for him either to accept the possibility of an ontological argument or to reject his own theory of the transcendental object (which Cameron wrongly regards as 'exten­tion­ally equivalent' to the thing in itself [C2:355n; but cf. VI.2]). Cameron's error is to assume with lit­tle or no evidence (a misreferenced quote on the empirical certainty of one's own existence [supposedly from Kt1:356]) that Kant is committed to the view that the transcendental object 'exists' in the same sense that empirical objects exist.

 

  [8] Kt1:855. Although Kant often uses the term 'speculative' in a way which ap­pears  to be synonymous to his use of 'theoretical', there is technically an impor­tant dif­ference between these two terms. Theore­ti­cal knowledge is any legitimate knowl­edge which arises out of the syn­thesis of concepts and intuitions, as described in systemt. Speculation, by contrast, is the illegitimate attempt to gain knowledge without se­curing an intuitive content for the concepts (or ideas) being employed.

 

  [9] S3:233. In K2:11.278n(Z1:180n) Kant says: 'When ... I seek the uncondi­tioned and the highest ground of the totality of the series [of condi­tioned appearances], it is as if I were looking for .' Although she does not refer to this text, Schaper uses the same comparison in her attempt to prove in S3 that Kant intends his ideas of reason to be no­thing but useful 'fictions'. However, Kant applies the analogy of 'im­possible roots' only to the 'cosmological ideas' (i.e., the Antinomies), not to all ideas of reason [K2:11.278(Z1:180)], and it seems likely that the 'some­thing similar' to which he refers is simply the fact that in both cases the process in question implies a self-contradiction. In other respects the analogy would not hold. For mathematicians know they are working with a fictitious hy­pothesis, to the extent that they label it an 'imaginary number'. Philosophers, on the other hand, do not know the extent to which the ideas they employ accurately represent the unconditioned; but they may have reasons for believing they do, other­wise they could not be regarded as valid hypotheses. Kant says in Kt1:397 that, even in their 'pseudo-rational' (i.e., speculative) use, the ideas 'are not ficti­tious, and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of reason.' Only if the object represented by an idea is hypostatized as a real object of empirical knowledge would Kant regard it as 'a mere fiction' [608].

 

[10] E.g., S3:238. Schaper strays even further from Kant by combining this approach with the interpretation of ideas as 'useful fictions' [see note V.9], so that the philosopher would be required to know the thing in itself does not exist, yet to make use of it anyway. This stands in sharp contrast to Kant's more modest ap­proach of adopting rational faith in the validity of presupposing its reality from the transcendental perspective [cf. I1:756]. Schaper's belief that things in them­selves 'have to remain fictions' in order to 'make sense' [S3:236] results from her tendency to regard the thing in itself as an empirical, rather than a transcendental, presupposition [see VI.2-3].

 

[11] Van de Pitte fails to distinguish Kant's transcendental and empirical perspec­tives     when he says: 'For Kant, Being is—and remains—transcendent, and thus is not a presupposition of his transcendental account' [V3:1027]. From the empiri­cal per­spective, Being is not transcendent, but immanent: it consists of every­thing that 'exists' in the ordinary world. From the Transcendental Perspective, on the other hand, Being is indeed transcendent, and so does not actually enter into the realm of the transcendental. But for this very reason it is necessary to presup­pose its real­ity as the foundation of the Transcen­dental Perspective. For Kant's en­tire System is based 'on the assumption of a fundamental reality, subject to a rule of necessary existence, without which nothing could possibly happen and even nature would not be possible' [I1:757; cf. Kt1:280].

 

 

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