Two Perspectives on the Object of Knowledge

 

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

 

 

 

Reason proceeds by one path in its empirical perspective, and by yet another path in its transcendental perspective [Kt1:591].

 

1. Kant-s Six -Object-Terms-

 

      Kant-s use of the word -object- (Objekt or Gegenstand) is a potential source of much confusion and ambiguity. Sometimes he uses it in a broad sense, either nontechnically to refer to an ordinary -thing- encountered in im­mediate experience, or technically to refer to anything which stands in some potential, actual or necessary relation to the knowing subject. At other times he uses it in a narrower sense to refer to an object in general as it is viewed at one of several stages in the knowing process. Consequently, its meaning is not always evident when Kant uses it without a qualifying adjective [cf. B20: 76 and G12:778]. The first step to coping with this situation is to rec­ognize that he explains the role of the object in his theory of knowledge (i.e., in systemt) primarily by implementing six technical -object-terms- (as I shall call them). A clear understanding of these special terms and of their perspec­ti­val interrelationships will provide an interpretive framework for understand­ing Kant-s use of the word -object- when it appears on its own.

 

      Throughout Kt1 Kant makes frequent use of three object-terms: -thing in itself-, -transcendental object- and -appearance-. Because he does not describe their relationships univocally, his inter­preters and critics have made numerous proposals as to how these terms should be treated. Oftentimes they are de­fined in conjunction with one or more of three other, less used object-terms (viz., -phenomenon-, -negative noumenon- and -positive noumenon-), which Kant formally intro­duces towards the end of the Analytic.[1] These six terms, to which I will limit my attention in this chapter, compose one of the most ob­scure, yet most fundamental, conceptual networks in Kant-s entire System. Of course, the Copernican Perspective, upon which Critical philosophy is based, emphasizes the way expe­rience is constructed a priori by the subject. But by establishing here a framework for understanding Kant-s conception of the object, a great deal of complexity can be avoided in Part Three, so that we will be fully prepared to concentrate there on the various conditions imposed on experience by the subject in each of Kant-s three Critical systems.

 

      Most interpreters take two or more of Kant-s six object-terms to be syn­onymous. Certainly the most commonly equated terms are -appearance- with -phenomenon- and -thing in itself- with -noumenon-; but other syno­nymies have also been suggested.[2] Among those who admit the possibility of dis­tin­guishing between one or another of these pairs, many would nevertheless agree with Weldon that the difference -is not of any great importance- [W16: 107]. Such tendencies reflect a widespread neglect of what should be re­garded as an important fact when interpreting Kant-s usage: that he does not make any significant use of the second set of object-terms until his elabora­tion of the main tenets of systemt (using only the first set) is nearly complete [see note VI.1]. In light of the considerable effort Kant put into constructing his System according to an architectonic plan, in relation both to the particu­lar terms in which it is expressed and to its general outline [see Kt1:xxxvii-xxxviii and III.3-4], it seems likely that such a sudden change of terminology could serve as a -clue- of some sort to help us understand his theory. The in­troduction of a new set of object-terms in the middle of Kt1 would be redun­dant unless their meanings were designed to be distinguished from those of the original set.

 

      Although some commentators do distinguish between all or most of Kant-s object-terms [see Ap. VI], I have been unable to find any who try to account for the gap (which is rarely even acknowledged to exist) be­tween his introduction of the two sets.[3] This neglect, though unfortunate, is only a minor problem, however, since the task of determining what Kant means by each term is fundamental, and is not necessarily dependent on an understand­ing of why he introduces them in the order he does. Indeed, the main purpose of this chapter will be to determine the extent to which each term can be given a distinctive meaning without misrepresenting Kant-s in­tentions; the explanation of the late introduction of the second set of terms will be signifi­cant only insofar as it aids in this task.

 

      The conceptual key which can, as I have argued in Chapters II-V, unlock many of the complexities, ambiguities and apparent inconsis­ten­cies in Kant-s System is the -principle of perspective-. By recognizing its thoroughgoing in­fluence, especially as applied to the fundamental distinction between the tran­scendental and empirical perspectives in systemt (to which the object-terms have their primary application), it should be possible to render his the­ory of the object of knowledge at least intelligible, if not to establish its va­lidity. As explained in IV.3, adopting an empirical perspective in one-s search for knowledge involves examining particular experiences in order to determine what -is true- (synthetic a posteriori) about them, without necessarily distin­guishing between the subject and object of knowledge. But adopting a tran­scendental perspective involves carefully distinguishing the subject from the object and examining experience in general in order to determine what -must be true- (synthetic a priori) about it-i.e., in order to determine the conditions of knowledge which make experience (i.e., the -empirical knowledge-) possi­ble [Kt1:28-9]. Since Kant-s theory is couched in these -radically epistemo­logical- terms [A10:44], his discussion of -different objects- should be inter­preted as referring not so much to ontological distinctions [cf. P14:74-5] as to -different perspectives- on one object, encountered in ordinary (immediate) ex­perience. Thus, as Allison puts it, -the general distinction between the tran­scendental and the empirical...is not intended as a distinction between two kinds of being, but between two perspectives or manners in which we can consider one and the same thing- [A6:194; s.a. B20:29].

 

      Throughout Kt1 Kant frequently discusses the implications of the tran­scendental and the empirical perspectives together in the same passage. This gives the impression that all such passages are equally concerned with estab­lishing the elements applicable to both sides of this perspectival distinction. In one sense this is quite true. For it is possible to pinpoint transitions from one perspective to the other in specific passages, such as Bird does in B20:14 with regard to Kt1:A121. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter VII, Kant does introduce both em­pirical and transcendental elements at virtually every step in systemt. Nevertheless, as we saw in III.4, each of Kant-s systems is divided into four -stages-, each of which is defined by a specific perspective [see Figure IV.2], and the shifts between these stages can be correlated quite closely with four of the major divisions of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [Kt1:33-732].

 

      Kant starts by focussing in the Aesthetic on the transcendental perspec­tive. For, although he asserts that objects are both -ideal- when viewed from the transcendental perspective and -real- when viewed from the empirical perspective, the primary goal of his exposition is to elaborate the basis and implications of the former claim. Thus, as Bird hints in B20:47-51, the Aesthe­tic more or less assumes the empirical reality of space, time and ob­jects, but argues for their transcendental ideality. The first shift occurs in the transition from the Aesthetic to the Analytic of Concepts. In the latter sec­tion Kant takes a step back from the perspectives concerned with transcenden­tal ideality and empirical reality and adopts a logical perspective, from which ob­jects are viewed as relating not to sensibi­lity-not to time and space-but to the understanding and its concepts. Thus in this section the transcendental and em­pirical perspectives are more or less of equal im­portance, both being sub­ordi­nate to the main goal of estab­lishing the status of the categories as -pure con­cepts of understanding-.

 

      In turning from the Analytic of Concepts to the Analytic of Princi­ples, Kant is modulating from the logical to the empirical perspective. This is ev­i­denced first by the reintroduction of time in the Schematism chapter and then by the reintroduction of space in the chapter on the Principles (especially in the second edition, where it includes the revised Refutation of Idealism). The Analytic of Principles focuses primarily on the empirical perspective in the sense that its primary target is the description of the synthetic a priori princi­ples which determine objects in the ordinary physical world to be empirical objects (a task quite different from that of the Aesthetic, which seeks to estab­lish the synthetic a priori -form of appearances-). The reader of Kt1 who fails to realize that Kant intends the -objects- dealt with in the Refutation of Ideal­ism and throughout the Analytic of Principles to be regarded as empirical objects [cf. E3:107n] is bound to misunderstand the significance of Kant-s arguments in these sections.

 

      Finally, having completed both the empirical and the transcendental sides of systemt, Kant modulates in the Dialectic from the empirical to the hypo­thetical perspective, where he considers the illusions resulting from the specu­lative attempt to adopt a quasi-logical perspective, which is actually a confla­tion of the transcendental and empirical perspec­tives. Both the dogmatic acceptance and the skeptical rejection of numerous speculative knowledge-claims are shown to result from an improper confusion of these two key perspec­tives. The alternative is to view such notions as God, freedom and im­mortal­ity as practical ideas which serve the end of unifying knowledge, rather than as legitimate transcendental and/or empirical objects of knowledge. Thus systemt ends by giving equal weight once again to the transcendental and em­piri­cal perspectives, for both are subordinated to the hypothetical perspective, in preparation for adopting the practical standpoint in systemp.

 

      One way of assessing the plausibility of this overview as an ac­count of the perspectival organization of Kt1 is to compare the relative frequency with which Kant uses the terms -transcendental-, -logical-, -empirical-, -hypotheti­cal- and -practical- in the Aesthetic, Analytic of Concepts, Analytic of Princi­ples and Dialectic of Kt1. Table VI.1 uses Pq10 to make just such a compari­son. The results, predictably, are not altogether conclusive, because of the above-mentioned fact that Kant often develops the transcendental and em­piri­cal im­plications of his theories side by side. Moreover, the five key words are not al­ways used in their strict, perspectival senses, so the most we can expect out of such a statistical analysis is a rough idea of Kant-s tendencies. Neverthe­less, the ten­dencies revealed by the table confirm that the correlations I have made are at least possible, and in some cases even probable.

 

      The following conclusions (in order of probability) can be drawn from the table. (1) The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements undoubtedly em­phasizes the transcendental-empirical distinction more than the logical-hypotheti­cal (or -practical) distinction: the former pair of terms is used over seven (or six) times more frequently than the latter. (2) If -hypothetical- and -practi­cal- are to be specially associated with the perspective assumed in any one part of the Doctrine of Elements, it must be with the Dialectic; for all but seven of the 63 occurrences of these two words come in this section-by far the highest percentage of occurrences on the entire table. (3) The -logical- cannot be associated with the Aesthetic, but is used significantly in the other three sections. Of these, it seems to be associated most close­ly with the Analyt­ic of Concepts, where it is used half again as many times per page as in the two subsequent sections. Moreover, it has a higher percentage of use in the Analyt­ic of Concepts than any of the other terms in that column. (4) Be­cause of the ubiquity of -transcenden­tal- and -empirical- (each occurring an aver­age of more than once per page), they are the terms most difficult to 

   Table VI.1: Frequency of Perspectival Labels in the

Transcendental Doctrine of Elements (TDE) of Kt1a

NOTES:

aThe boxes with thick borders indicate the set of figures which should be most significant for each column and row, in order for Kant-s usage of these key terms to support my overview. (Page numbers refer to Kemp Smith-s translation of Kt1.)

bThe average numbers per page provide an accurate means of assessing the relative importance of a given word in different sections (as listed in the rows), because the dif­ferences in the number of pages in each section are in this way taken into ac­count. However, these figures are not as useful for comparing figures in a column, because the five terms differ widely in their total numbers of occurrences.

cThe percentages provide an accurate means of assessing the relative importance of all five words in a given section (as listed in the columns), because the differ­ences in the overall usage of each word are in this way taken into account. However, these figures are not as useful for comparing figures in a row, because the four sections differ widely in the number of pages they occupy.


asso­ciate with any one sec­tion in particular. The most sig­nificant difference between their fre­quencies of use comes in the Analytic of Principles, where -empirical- is used nearly half again as often as -transcendental-. The per­cent­age of the former is also higher, though the per­centage of -logical- in this sec­tion sur­passes both-a reflection of the close connection between the two parts of the Analytic [cf. note VII.8]. (5) Finally, the frequency of -transcen­dental- and -empirical- in the Aesthetic is almost identical. But be­cause the former is in general used by Kant slightly less frequently than the latter, its percentage of total usage ends up being slightly higher (5.1% as compared with 4.7%). Thus Table VI.1 supports all four of the proposed cor­relations between per­spectives and sections of text-though admittedly with varying degrees of probability.

 

      In Chapter VII I shall examine in detail the extent to which the theories elaborated in Kt1 support this interpretation of the perspectival modulations in systemt. If it is accurate, then it would seem reasonable for Kant to intro­duce a new set of object-terms at some point in the Analytic of Principles. This would help the reader to know whether the -object- referred to at any given point is meant to be viewed transcendentally or empirically. As it turns out, this is precisely what he does: -thing in itself-, -transcendental ob­ject- and -appearance-, I propose, refer to various ways of considering the ob­ject from the transcendental perspective, while -phenomenon-, -negative nou­men­on- and -positive noumenon- refer to parallel ways of considering the object from the empirical perspective. The latter set is introduced at the end of the Ana­lytic of Principles, once the synthetic a priori rules governing the empiri­cal perspective have been fully established. Moreover, the Appendix [Kt1: 316-49] added after the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena emphasizes the perspectival nature of his theory as it is worked out to that point [cf. note VI.3]. What more appropriate place could there be for these sections than just before the Dialectic, where Kant always assumes the two perspectives are fully compatible?

 

      This perspectival interpretation of the progression of Kant-s argument in Kt1 seems far more plausible, and accords to him a great deal more integrity as a philosopher, than the alternative interpreta­tions which tend to depict him as unknowingly propounding contradictory and incompatible theories in the Aesthetic, the Analytic and the Dialectic. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall therefore adopt it as a tentatively valid hypothesis. In accordance with its description of the general movement of Kant-s thought from the transcen­dental to the empirical, I will examine the terms applicable to the former perspective in VI.2, and those applicable to the latter in VI.3.

 

2. Kant-s Transcendental Object-Terms

 

      Kant-s transcendental perspective in systemt is concerned not with partic­u­­lar objects but with -objects in general-. When an empirical act of knowing is viewed from the transcendental perspective, it is there­fore described in terms not of specific facts, but of a knowing subject -repre­senting- to itself an unknown thing in the form of a -representa­tion-. This unknown thing, Kant ar­gues, cannot be represented as it is in itself, because its ori­ginal representa­tion must stand in some rela­tion to the person perceiv­ing it; that is, a thing in general, regarded from the transcendental perspective, must become an ob­ject of experience in order for it to be known by a subject.[4] The original rep­resentation of an unknown thing, which in this form is nothing but a com­pletely indeterminate -something in general=x- [e.g., Kt1:A104], is called -the transcendental object- [e.g., 236,A109]. Bird observes that -the un­known- as a descrip­tion of the transcendental object -is not a reference to any mys­te­rious realm of intelligible objects- [B20:79]; rather it re­fers to the general epistemo­logical requirement of -having experience-. Thus it presents -a philosophical task to solve- [79]: viz., how does the unknown -x- (an object of possible ex­perience) come to have the status of a real object of empirical knowledge? The steps from the former to the latter point, and the rules governing them, will be examined in full in VII.2-3. For now it is enough to point out that to view a subject-s experience of a real empirical object from the transcenden­tal perspec­tive is to -posit- the object as existing -in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it- [Kt1:667t.b.]-i.e., to view it as a transcen­den­tal ob­ject which is believed to be in some way based on the unknowable -thing in itself-. The latter is Kant-s term for an object as considered in its original, unrepresented, and so -transcendent-, form: -The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in it­self, is not known, and cannot be known, through [any] representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it.-[5]

 

      The problem which inevitably arises for the interpreter of Kant is that, if the thing in itself is unknown and unknowable, it would seem to be difficult, if not impossible, to defend Kant-s use of it as the transcendent starting point for systemt. One reaction to this diffi­culty is to conclude that -Kant was sim­ply mistaken- [W3:3], and that the thing in itself is knowable after all; but, as I demonstrate in Appendix V, this approach is radically untenable, both in itself and as an interpretation of Kant. Another reaction is to drop the thing in itself altogether, regarding it as superfluous [see e.g., S17:38-42]. However, this phenomenalist approach, though a coherent alternative, does not solve the problem, but merely ignores it or denies its existence [see Ap. VI]. As an alternative to these approaches, I have argued in Chapter V that faith is an adequate justification for our initial assumption of the thing in itself; but in order fully to understand its function (and hence, its legitimacy), it is still necessary to present a clear and coherent interpretation of the System to which it gives rise. We can now begin this task by demonstrating that Kant-s theory of the object of knowledge is self-consistent, even when it comes to his assumption of the thing in itself.

 

      Much of the unwillingness of Kant-s interpreters to accept his starting point results from a common misunderstanding about what the unknowability of the thing in itself entails. When Kant denies the knowability of the thing in itself, he is not denying empirical knowl­edge, for the thing in itself does not directly -affect- the senses: the af­fection of a subject-s sensibility by an object occurs only in immediate experience.[6] (Hence empirical knowledge of the thing in itself would be a contradiction in terms.) In fact, from an empir­i­cal perspective the objects of everyday experience (of which we certainly do have knowledge) can be regarded (nontechnically) as things in themselves [see VI.3]. But in its technical sense, the concept of the thing in itself is implied by a limitation which arises once a person reflects on affection from a tran­scendental perspective. This limita­tion is that transcendental knowledge of the conditions and sources of empirical knowledge is not possible unless one re­gards the object as an object of experience. Accordingly, it is the possibility of gaining transcendental knowledge of the thing in itself which Kant denies. Empirical knowledge is based on our experience of real objects, but transcen­dental knowledge is based on our reflection on the transcen­dental object (which is itself empiri­cally unknowable [Kt1:641-2]).[7] Considered in its transcendent state, however, as a thing in itself, even its existence is open to legitimate doubt. (This, I believe, is Kant-s concession to the skeptic [see V.3].) But once it is accepted as a valid assumption, its unknowa­bility is self-evident and unproblematic [see A9:319-20]. For the unknowability of the thing in itself simply means nothing can be known about empirical ob­jects if they are considered apart from all relation to the forms by which a knowing subject experiences them.

 

      Unfortunately, Kant-s doctrine of the transcendental object is no less ob­scure than his doctrine of the thing in itself. The former is certainly closely related to the latter-indeed, so closely that the two are sometimes wrongly in­terpreted as merely synonymous terms. Ewing, for example, follows Vaihinger and Kemp Smith in claiming that -it is hardly possible to doubt that the transcendental object is identified with the thing-in-itself- [E5:101; cf. W2:107]. Nevertheless, others interpret it as related more closely to the de­terminate forms of the object-s represen­tation in experience [see Ap. VI]. For example, Paton suggests (with some uncertainty [P2:2.449]) that the tran­scen­dental object should be identified with the concepts produced by the unity of apperception [443f]. But Paton-s dubious interpretation of Kt1:A250 ig­nores the fact that Kant says the transcendental object is the -correlate of the unity of apperception- [e.a.], and that it -cannot be separated from the sensible data- [A250]. Kant-s point, then, is that the transcendental object does for the object what the unity of apperception does for the subject: each provides in its own way the basis for the unity of experience.

 

      If it can be identified neither with the thing in itself nor with any of the determinate forms of an object-s representation, then the transcendental object must be regarded as a preconceptual, nonsubjective (but none the less tran­scendental) element in systemt. Kant implies this in a reference to reason-s pursuit of an unconditioned object, which can also be applied to the relation between the thing in itself and the transcendental object:

 

reason relentlessly seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself com­pelled to assume it [cf. the thing in itself], though it has no means by which to make it comprehensible and is happy enough if it can only discover the concept [viz., the idea; cf. the concept of the transcendental object] which is consistent with this presup­position.... [Even though] we do not indeed com­prehend [it,]...yet we do comprehend its incomprehensibility...[8]

 

Along these lines Buchdahl argues in B27:77 that the transcendental object -is not the sort of thing which as such has or lacks a constitu­tion but is always the aspect of the object still awaiting acquisition of such a constitution via a process of realization [i.e., via intuition and conception].-

 

      Findlay also puts forward a plausible account of these object-terms when he says Kant

 

mainly uses the term -Transcendental Object- when he conceives of such ob­jects...as being what we have to conceive as being the underlying, unknown ground of appearance and experience; while the term -Thing-in-itself- is mainly employed when he conceives of them as existing independently of whatever we may conceive or believe. [F3:3; cf. Kt1:A190-1]

 

Similarly, Allison says Kant-s purpose in introducing the transcendental object is to show that the thing in itself -for us can be nothing more than a mere something=x- [A10:60n]. Indeed, only when the thing in itself is regarded as a transcendental object (i.e., as an element of systemt, given in im­mediate expe­rience) does its -existence- take on a literal meaning for us [cf. Kt26:(68)]. Yet in spite of these clear distinc­tions, both Findlay and Allison tend to use the terms indiscriminately [e.g., F3:16-24; A10:69; s.a. Ap. VI].

 

      A metaphor which can help us avoid such inconsistency is to picture the mediating function of the transcendental object as a doorway between the thing in itself and the subject: although it is directly related to both, it can­not be wholly identified with either. As such, it refers to an object, consid­ered transcendentally, as it would be just at the point of being apprehended by a subject (hence, not to the thing in itself), but without taking into account the subject-s determining influence. Only this object is -given-, though not as a determinate object of -experience- [Kt1:522-3,642]. Thus Kant equates -an ob­ject in general- (i.e., a transcendental object) with -an object as it may be given in intuition- [411ne.a.]- an option denied to the thing in itself. Since the transcendental object bridges the gap between the indetermin­able thing in itself and the determinate forms of a represented object, it is not surprising that Kant regards it as similar at times to the thing in itself and at other times to the determinate object.[9]

 

      Once we have a clear understanding of Kant-s initial assumption that the thing in itself can be represented to a knowing subject only as a transcenden­tal object, it becomes easier to understand his elaborate theory of how the transcendental object comes to be represented in a determinate form through intuition and conception. Most of the details of this theory will not concern us until Chapter VII; but Kant does make use of yet another object-term, which we must examine if our analysis of his transcendental perspective on the object is to be complete. That term is -appearance-.

 

      In Kant-s primary transcendental sense appearances are objects intuited in time and/or space by a subject [Kt1:A384]. Since -the transcendental object of our...sensible intuition gives [such] intuition- [585], the resulting appear­ances must in some way -conform to- the former [522-3]: indeed, -the tran­scendental object [lies] at the basis of appearances- [641; s.a. A104-10], which in turn reflect -the way in which our senses are affected by this un­known something- [Kt2:314-5; s.a. B20:78]. Inasmuch as the -transcendental appear­ance- (as I shall call it) is -grounded- in an unknown something which exists independently of the subject [Kt2:314,354; cf. B20:4-5,76], the tran­scendental object (and so also the thing in itself) can be regarded as -the cause of appear­ance-.[10]

 

      Notwithstanding their transcendental relationship with the thing in itself, such appearances -constitute an object which is merely within us- transcen­den­tally [Kt1:A129]: from the transcendental perspective these transcendental appearances -do not exist in themselves but only relatively to the subject- [164] as -possible perceptions- [246; cf. A250,A375n,527]. Kant defines an appearance as an -undetermined object of an empirical intuition- [34], and ex­plains that we -have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance-.[11] The result is that the one aspect of an object viewed from the transcendental per­spective which we do encounter in experience-viz.,the transcendental ap­pear­­ance-is -ideal- rather than -real-(hence the name -transcendental ideal­ism-[12]).

 

      Kant employs the term -appearance- in several other ways as well, which I will expound briefly in hopes of dispelling any tendency to regard them as incompatible. Applying the principle of perspective to his use of this term will reveal that its meaning is not -incoherent- or -absurd-, nor is it -non­sense- arising out of a -verbal gymnastic-, as some commentators have sug­gested [S8:43; P14:75-6; H8:19; s.a. E3:103], but is merely a reflection of the complexities in­herent in a rigorous investigation of the epistemo­logi­cal un­derpinnings of human experience. The word-s primary sense, as por­trayed above, is as a tran­scendental term employed in the context of the tran­scenden­tal perspec­tive. Another equally straightforward sense is as an empiri­cal term employed in the context of an empirical perspective. Kant clearly dis­tin­guishes in Kt1:69-71 between an ordinary empirical appearance and his special transcendental type: the former is a partial or even illusory perception, whereas the latter is that aspect of a real empirical object which, being -inseparable from the [act of] representation of the [empirical] object, is not to be met with in the object [=thing] in itself, but always in its [perspectival] relation to the subject- [70n; cf. B20:51,192]. Likewise, in Kt69:269 he dis­tin­guishes between a thing-s -physical appearance- (Apparenz) and appearances as -Phenomena- [see VI.3]. But Kant uses the term -appearance- in the former, empirical sense only on rare occasions [e.g., Kt1:428].

 

      The trap into which the interpreter must be careful not to fall is to think these two senses of -appearance- provide an exhaustive account of Kant-s usage. On the contrary, two other, more subtle senses are discernible. First, an empirical appearance can be regarded from a tran­scendental perspective. The appearance would then be nugatory, since illusions play no part in con­stitut­ing empirical knowledge (as transcen­dental appearances do). Consequently, Kant mentions this possibility only in order to pass it off as insignificant, or to warn against adopt­ing an incorrect epistemology.[13] But the second subtle use plays a cru­cial role in systemt: a transcendental appear­ance can be regarded from an empirical perspective. In this case appear­ances are the things and ob­jects which make up the natural world of our everyday experience.[14] Only when this transcendental term is viewed from the empir­ical perspec­tive, then, is Grabau correct in suggesting that -for Kant appear­ance in experience is the mode in which we grasp reality- [G12:771]; for when it is viewed from the transcendental perspective it implies our inability to grasp reality. Likewise, only from the empirical perspective is it proper to say -the domain beyond the sphere of appearances is not full of things in themselves, but is empty- [775; cf. Kt1:310; Kt2:361; see V.2]; for the tran­scendental appearance, viewed from the empirical perspective, is a -real- rather than an -ideal- constituent of knowledge (hence the equally valid name, -empirical realism-[15]).

 

      Neglecting the difference between the two perspectives from which a transcendental appearance can be viewed will almost always render an in­ter­preter-s account of Kant-s theory inadequate. Barker, for instance, sees the two ways Kant has of talking about appearances, but, ignoring their perspectival relationship, regards them as -by definition mutually exclusive- [B2:281]. He accuses Kant of unknowingly contradicting him­self [289], inasmuch as he -decisively embraced neither the [empirical] theory of appearing nor the [transcendental] theory of appearance, but oscillated between them without recognizing any need for making a choice- [283]. But when the principle of perspective is taken into consideration, we can see that no -choice- has to be made, since both theories have their own valid sphere of application. This in­terpretive key enables us to reconcile such claims of Kant-s as that appear­ances are -in us- (i.e., transcendentally) even though they exist as objects of perception -outside us- (i.e., empirically) [cf. Kt1:59 and A373].

 

      Kant-s varied use of such an important term inevitably gives rise to some confusion. The foregoing account of the four ways in which -appearance- can be used is an attempt to dispel some of this confusion. It may be helpful at this point, therefore, to summarize the results:[16]

 

(1)  A transcendental appearance viewed from the transcendental perspec­tive is a representation in the knowing subject which, though unde­termined, is ready to be assimilated into a perceptual experience. This is an appear­ance in Kant-s primary technical sense.

(2)  An empirical appearance viewed from the empirical perspective is an or­dinary perceptual illusion. Kant uses the word in this nontech­nical sense only occasionally.

(3)  To view empirical appearances from the transcendental perspective would be to attempt to include perceptual illusions in an explanation of the possibility of experience. Kant explicitly warns against this use of the word.

(4)  A transcendental appearance viewed from the empirical perspective is a real object of empirical knowledge. This is an appearance in Kant-s sec­ondary technical sense.

 

Fortunately, Kant helps to reduce the chances of confusion by introduc­ing, at the end of his discussion of the conditions and rules governing the empirical perspective, a new object-term denoting an appearance in the fourth sense. This new term, -phenomenon-, is the first member of the empirical set of object-terms to be examined in VI.3; but before turning to this task, I will attempt to clear up some possible misconceptions re­garding the thing in itself and its relation to the other transcendental object-terms.

 

      Many interpreters who ignore the perspectival relationship between Kant-s object-terms interpret them as referring to things which are somehow actually different objects [e.g., K3:217-8; P14:75-6; S17:90-1]. Such an in­terpretation finds support in Kant-s occasionally careless use of the word -object- [see VI.1]. For he sometimes calls the thing in itself an -object- [e.g., Kt1:70n] even though-inasmuch as it is -in itself- before it is repre­sented to a subject-it is strictly speaking no more than a possible object (i.e., a thing which might become an object through representation [cf. G12:778]). But in­terpreting the thing in itself as an object which transcends the object given in experience, yet stands in some sort of -causal- relationship to it, creates the insurmountable problem of explaining what this means without assuming a transcendent employment of the categories, which would contradict Kant-s own Critical principles [see VII.2.B and B20:75-6].

 

      Fortunately, the perspectival interpretation of Kant-s System re­veals a more coherent picture. The various stages in the determination of an object of knowledge all result from the taking up of some perspec­tive by the sub­ject; the thing in itself, however, is independent of any perspective, because it is not actually viewed by the subject at all [S8:42]. Kant has this in mind when he speaks of the thing in itself and its representational determinations as two equally legitimate ways of referring -to the very same thing- [Kt2:344; s.a. Kt1:xxvii and G12:771n]. In relation to the -appearance-, -the thing in itself...is not itself a strange [absonderlicher] object, but only a special [besondere] perspective (respectus) for constituting [the thing in] itself as an object- [Kt9: 22.44; cf. A3:653; B27:97; H11:37-9]. In this sense we can say that -the thing in itself is...given in its appearance- [G2:471]. The latter is -a thing considered in a certain relation, in virtue of which it falls under a certain description-, and the former is -the same thing, considered in abstraction from this relation, and therefore as not falling under this description- [A10:54]. Those who ignore or overlook Kant-s principle of perspective, and continue to refer to the thing in itself as an object, often end up using the term in a way closer to Kant-s use of -phenomenon-, in which case (as we shall see in VI.3) the object under consideration is knowable in principle.

 

      When the thing in itself is interpreted from the transcendental perspective as referring to an empirical object insofar as it is not an object of any sub­ject-s knowledge, it becomes a more reasonable (indeed almost a trivial) notion to maintain; for, whatever else might be required for the possibility of empirical knowledge, we obviously cannot know a thing empirically without encountering it as a represented object. -To state that we know only appear­ances and not things in themselves is-, as Schrader rightly asserts, -to state an obvious tautology, namely that objects are known only as they are known- [S4:173]. Moreover, if the thing in itself were interpreted in this way and yet rejected, it would be impossible to give any plausible account of the source of -the empirical differences in shapes and sizes- of the objects of everyday expe­rience [P2:1.139; cf. E5:191-2]. Only what is common to all representations is, for Kant, supplied a priori by the subject in the act of representing. So the thing in itself must be posited and assumed to determine in some sense the raw material for any possible object of knowledge.[17] In other words, a thing other than us must be represented to us in a perceivable form, otherwise we could never become conscious of it; and this, Kant assures us, -would practi­cally amount to the admission of [its] non-existence- [Kt1:A117n].

 

      In accordance with this interpretation, Kant-s claim that things repre­sented in the form of transcendental appearances or of the tran­scendental object also exist apart from the subject in the unrepresented form of the thing in it­self can be understood (and hence accepted) as an argument against Berkeleyian idealism. Berkeley-s view-sometimes attributed to Kant, usually by those who reject the thing in itself [e.g., S17:242,246]-is that the existence of a thing is due only to the nature of the knowing subject (possibly with some help from God). But Kant-s view is that a subject-s knowledge of a thing, and so also the representations which constitute that knowledge, exist only in the subject. Whereas for Kant the existence of a real object is ultimately derived from the thing in itself which exists independently of any subject, for Berkeley objects have no nature at all -in themselves- [Kt1:69-71; cf. V.3]. Berkeley-s error results from his failure to see the difference between regarding an object from an empirical perspective and regarding it as a thing in itself. Kant-s modulation to the empirical perspective in the Analytic of Principles is intended at least in part to point up this important difference; hence it is to his often neglected empirical object-terms that we shall now direct our atten­tion.

 

3. Kant-s Empirical Object-Terms

 

      Why does Kant wait until the last chapter of the Analytic of Kt1 to in­troduce his empirical set of object-terms? As suggested in VI.1, he has a very specific reason: empirical terms for his primary transcen­dental distinctions are now required because the same object which he began by viewing from the transcendental perspective is now being viewed from the empirical perspec­tive. The empirical status of the object under consideration in the Analytic of Principles, and so also the function of this section in systemt, could perhaps have been conveyed more clearly by introducing these new terms at the be­ginning of this section, rather than postponing their introduction until after the principles governing the empirical perspective had been fully elaborated. However, as we shall see in VII.3.A, the position of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena does have a basis in the architectonic structure of systemt.

 

      Kant hints rather early on that, whereas an appearance (i.e., a transcenden­tal appearance regarded from the transcendental perspective) is -an empirical in­tuition...which becomes experience- (i.e., becomes empirical knowledge) through -the concept of understanding arising from it- [Kt66:142(22)], a -phe­nomenon- is an appearance which is already -in agreement with the cate­gory- [Kt1:186]. In his secondary writings he uses -phenomenon- in much the same sense: it refers to -an object of experience- [Kt23:401n(179n)] or -...of the senses- [391n(165n)], the detailed knowledge of which -can be confirmed by experience- [Kt55:318(83); s.a. Kt53:76(156)]. Although in these works he prefers this term to the term -appearance- [see e.g., Kt46:435(101),440(109), 453-5(130-3); Kt55:318(83); Kt57:234(45)], he does explain the differ­ence be­tween them in Kt19:394: -in phenomena that which precedes the logi­cal use of the intellect is called appearance, and the reflective cognition which arises when several appearances are compared by the intellect is called experi­ence.... [Thus] the objects of experience are called phenom­ena...- Kant-s first proper definition of -phenomena- in Kt1 agrees with his usage elsewhere: phenomena are -appearances, so far as they [i.e., the appear­ances] are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories- [A248-9].

 

      An appearance, then, is the undetermined or -nondescript- form of what is destined to be regarded as an empirical object, while a pheno­menon is such an object -into which appearances may be discriminated by means of the under­standing- [B20:56-8,53; cf. Kt1:34]. When the two terms are interpreted as names for -the same things, only viewed in different ways- [B20:54], it be­comes evident that phenomena are always transcendental appearances viewed from an empirical perspective (i.e., -categorised appearances- [55]), but that appearances viewed from the transcendental perspective are not phenomena be­cause they are regarded as if they are not yet categorized (and thus, not yet known empirical­ly). Therefore, just as the transcendental object is trans­formed into an appearance only when the transcendental forms of intuition are added to it, so also the appearance is transformed into a phenomenon only when it has been synthesized with concepts in such a way as to become a real, determinate object of empirical knowledge.

 

      This interpretation reveals that Kant does not intend -phenomenon- to be -pejorative- merely because he contrasts it with -noume­non-, nor to -imply that the reality we elaborate in judgment is somehow defec­tive-.[18] On the con­trary, of all Kant-s object-terms, it is the only one which refers straight­for­wardly to -objects- proper [Kt1:137]-i.e., to the objects of everyday expe­ri­ence with which science is concerned, which are -immediately perceived- in sensation [A371]. But it does so in such a way as to remind the reader that if an empirical phenomenon were to be viewed from a transcendental perspec­tive, then it would have to be re­garded (but not -condemned- [F3:20]) as an appearance. Accord­ingly, it would be doubly misleading to claim with Weldon that the thing in itself (as such) is -the necessarily unattainable goal of empirical investi­gation- [W16:140e.a.]; for Kant maintains not only that the goal of empirical inves­tigation is always and only the phenomenon, but also that this goal is adequately attainable [see B20:24]. Although -the com­plete de­termination of an individual [object] is an infinite task- [W25:41e.a.; cf. Kt7:418], Kant allows that for empirical purposes -the cognition of [phe­nomena] is most veridical.-[19] Furthermore, although we could say with Ewing that phenomena -should be treated in science as if they were things-in-themselves relatively to us as empirical beings-,[20] this empirical use of the term must be clearly distinguished from its technical use, according to which phenomena viewed from the transcendental perspective must be regarded mere­ly as appearances. In other words, -empirically con­strued, an object "in itself" just denotes the correlate (Phänomena) of empirical judgments- [P7:375; cf. A10:67]. Of course, this is the case only because the objects we think of em­pirically as independent­ly exist­ing -things- are the same entities as those which must be called -ap­pearances of a thing in itself- from the transcen­den­tal perspective.[21]

 

      If the phenomenon is the final goal of empirical investigation, then why does Kant also introduce the -noumenon- at this point [Kt1:306]? His ex­pressed reason is not to stress the importance of the change from the transcen­dental to the empirical perspective, which these terms signify; this he does in the Appendix to the Analytic [316f]. Rather, he introduces the -noumenon- in order to emphasize that the transcenden­tal elements in his account of the synthetic a priori construction of empirical knowledge can be applied only to ob­jects of possible experi­ence. To elucidate this limitation, he needs a specifi­cally empirical object-term not only for the transcendental appearance, but also for the object in its unknowable state. The former need is clearly fulfilled by the word -phenomenon-; but it is not so clear in what sense the word -noumenon- can be an empirical equivalent of either the transcendental object or the (transcendent) thing in itself.

 

      As we saw in VI.2, the thing in itself is the reality which is knowable as represented to us in the form of a transcendental appear­ance, but which is by definition unknowable in its unrepresented form. Once the unknown thing is considered to be a transcendental object standing in some relation to a tran­scendental subject, it can be deter­mined through intuition to be a transcenden­tal appearance, and through conception and synthesis to be an empirical object [see VII.2-3]. With this progression in mind, it seems natural to infer in em­pirical reflec­tion that the empirical object, which we can now call a phe­nomenon, must be related -to something, the immediate re­presentation of which...must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensi­bility- [Kt1:A252e.a.]; hence it must be re­lated to -an object determinable through mere concepts [341], or to -an object of a nonsen­sible intuition- [A249]. In other words, -something which is not in itself an appearance must correspond to [the phenomenon]. For appear­ance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode of representation- [A251].

 

      To regard a phenomenon as released from the subjective conditions of ap­pearance which particularized it (viz., from -our mode of intuition- [Kt1:307]) -i.e., to regard a particular object of knowledge as if it could be an object with­out being represented-is to form the concept of what Kant calls a nou­menon. This -entirely indeterminate concept of an intelligible entity- [307] accompanies a phenomenon [A251] whenever an object is judged empir­ically to have -objective reality-;[22] for this judgment consists precisely in de­ter­mining that the phenomenon has such an independent (and thereby in itself unknowable and indeterminate) na­ture. -The understanding, when it entitles an object from an [empirical] perspective mere phenomenon, at the same time forms, apart from that perspective, a representation of an object in itself--i.e., a noumenon [Kt1:306; s.a. B20:74]. Hence-much as in the case of -phenomenon- and -appearance--a noumenon is always a thing (i.e., an ob­ject) in itself, but a thing in itself is not a noumenon unless its representation is considered to be particularized as an object in a subject-s phenomenal expe­ri­ence. In both cases the new terms are brought in as empirical equivalents for the original, transcendental terms. This explains why Kant never uses -noumenon- until the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles, and then oc­casionally equates it with -thing in itself- in subsequent sections: in these sec­tions Kant is exposing the mistake of viewing the thing in itself as an ob­ject -or vice versa-so he naturally treats -thing in itself- as synonymous with -noumenon-.

 

      Kant is careful to warn, however, that the concept of -noumenon- a­rises out of an -ambiguity- which -may occasion serious misapprehen­sion- [Kt1: 306; cf. B20:71-3]. For although -even the wisest of men- has a ten­dency to speculate on this basis [Kt1:397], it is a mistake to conclude that the noume­nal aspect of objectively real phenomenal objects opens up to us -a world which is thought as it were in the spirit (or perhaps intuited), and which would therefore be for the understanding a far nobler...object of con­templa­tion- [Kt1:A250]. Such a conclusion would require us to view the nou­menon in a literal way as -an intelligible object- [311e.a.] or an -object of pure thought- [393e.a.]; but when viewed from mankind-s limited, empirical per­spec­tive, -noumenon- is -not the concept of an object, but is a problem unavoid­­ably bound up with the limitation of our sensibility- [344]. As phe­nomenal be­ings, we can acquire empi­ri­cal knowledge only by means of sen­sible intu­ition: -our kind of intui­tion does not extend to all things, but only toobjectsofoursenses,...consequentlyitsobjectivevalidityislimited-[342-3]; yet we can infer from this that -a place therefore remains open for some other kind of [non-human] intuition, and so for things as its objects- [343].

 

      Our ignorance of that -space- in which we could experience the nou­menon as an empirical object raises yet another problem. Such ignorance is re­quired by systemt, because from the transcendental perspective a thing can be an ob­ject of knowledge only if it is represented intuitive­ly to our senses as an ap­pearance, and not directly to the understanding as a thing in itself [Kt1: 307]. Yet something like noumenal knowledge seems to be necessary in order for us to judge an empirical object to be independent from the empirical subject, and thus to be an objectively real phenomenon. Rather than eliminat­ing this difficulty by retracting one of his claims, Kant uses our natural but unattain­able desire to know the phenomenon as a noumenon to uncover a number of long-standing philo­sophical illusions in the Dialectic. But before doing so, he refines his terminology by proposing one further distinction, in order to clarify how it is possible to know the objective reality of phenome­nal objects in spite of our necessary ignorance of their noumenal nature.

 

      The meaning of the general distinction between phenomenon and nou­menon, as well as the particular sense in which -noumenon- is intended to be regarded solely as an empirical object-term, remains in somewhat of a muddle [cf. W9:159-67] unless we take into account Kant-s distinc­tion be­tween the negative and positive aspects of the noumenon-a dis­tinction which, as I shall demonstrate, is closely related to, though not synonymous with, his distinction between the thing in itself and the transcendental ob­ject.[23] In its negative sense, the noumenon is -a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition-; and in its positive sense, it is -an object of a non-sensible intuition- [Kt1:307].

 

      The positive noumenon would supply direct, quasi-perceptual knowl­edge of the thing in itself without requiring the knower to represent it in terms of time, space and the categories [Kt22:208; s.a. F3:3-4 and S8:43]. Although the possibility of such knowledge for other types of beings -must not be ab­solutely denied- [Kt1:344], Kant insists it is of no use so far as our empiri­cal knowledge is concerned: -What things-in-themselves may be I do not know, nor do I need to know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance- [332-3]. The assumption that our knowledge of empirical ob­jects is a knowledge of things in themselves, and thus of positive noumena, is what Kant believes gives rise to illusions such as those he tries to dispel in the Dialectic, where he argues that the closest metaphysics can come to such knowledge is to put faith in an -idea of practical reason- as a guide to the uni­fication of empirical knowledge [385,498; cf. IV.3, V.4 and VII.3.B]. It is important, therefore, not to equate the thing in itself with the positive noumenon: the former is the unknowable basis of transcendental appearances, while the latter is (for us) an unrealizable concept denot­ing an immediate empirical knowledge of the thing in itself. Al-Azm describes this difference suc­cinctly when he says: -The noumenon is a strictly epistemological con­cept; the thing-in-itself is an ontological concept- [A4:520].

 

      Although his moral philosophy puts certain qualifications on his theory of knowledge [see e.g., Kt4:48 and VIII.1], Kant-s position in Kt1 is that, be­cause our intuition is necessarily sensible, -a "noumenon" must be understood as being such only in a negative sense- [Kt1:309]; it -is not indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything- [A252]. The posi­tive noumenon is epistemologically useless: -our understanding...cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and...it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something- [312]. Never­theless, the negative noumenon serves an important purpose as a limit­ing concept:

 

[It] is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being ex­tend­ed to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validi­ty of sensible knowl­edge... [For] the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us empty [i.e., from the empirical perspective; but cf. V.2]... The concept of noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept... [Yet] it is no arbi­trary inven­tion; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility... [310-1]

 

To apply the concept of -noumenon- negatively, therefore, is merely to recog­nize that a phenomenon has a -non-phenomenal- aspect-i.e., that it is not a mere phenomenon (an empirical appearance)-and that, as Bird warns in B20: 75, this aspect -must not be supposed to refer to any object.- As such, the negative noumenon in systemt -is not only admis­sible, but as setting limits to sensibility is likewise indispensable- [Kt1:311].

 

      The negative noumenon corresponds to the transcendental object in much the same way as the positive noumenon corre­sponds to the thing in itself, and the phenomenon to the transcendental appearance.[24] Just as the transcenden­tal object is -the thought of an object in general- [B20:80] as it is originally represented pre-conceptually from a transcenden­tal perspective in its undeter­mined but deter­minable state [Kt1:A250,A253], so also the negative noume­non is the final representation of that same object, which, though pre­viously determined, is now regarded con­ceptually from an empirical perspec­tive as indeterminate once again. The latter is -the concept of the "con­cretiza­tion"...of the transcendental object-; it is the transcendental object -construed empiri­cal­ly, or "in terms of" actual empirical knowl­edge- [P7:377; s.a. B27:77]. We can therefore call the transcendental object the first possible rep­resenta­tion of an undetermined object as it -comes in- to systemt (the thing in itself not being a representation at all), and the negative noumenon its last possible representation as it -goes out- of that system.

 

      Kant-s solution to the problem of how to determine a thing-s objec­tive reality-i.e., its independence from the knowing subject-has both a subjec­tive and an objective side. The former will be discussed in VII.3.A, in terms of the role of -conceptual rules, and agreement in the application of concepts- in con­ferring objectivity [B20:80]. But Kant-s view of what it is in the object which enables it to be regarded as objectively real is now evident: a thing has objective reality if it can be viewed from the transcendental perspective as rooted in the transcendental object and from the empirical perspective as lim­ited by a corresponding negative noumenon. Kant explicitly says the function of the transcendental object is to -confer upon all our empirical con­cepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality- [Kt1:A109; see B20: 78]. Similarly, he implies that a negative noumenon must correspond to a phenomenon if the experienced object is to be regarded from the empirical perspective as independent of all subjects [Kt1:306-7].

 

      The need for the negative noumenon to accompany the phenomenon in order for the object to be regarded as objectively real is parallel to the need for a concept to accompany an intuition in order for a judgment to be regarded as objectively valid [see note VI.22]. This is because -phenomenon- alludes primarily to the intuited aspect of a known object (though, as an object of em­pirical knowledge, it must also have been conceptual­ized), whereas -negative noumenon- alludes primarily to its conceptualized aspect (though, being em­pirical, it is related to intui­tion via the phenomenon). The negative noumenon is that aspect of an object which is experienced as nonsensible, so it refers to our -experi­ence- of its concept. Likewise the phenomenon is that aspect which is apprehended by our senses; without an awareness of its noumenal aspect, we could not distinguish a phenomenon from an empirical appearance (i.e., from an illusion). Therefore, the negative noumenon, like the transcendental object, functions as an element in systemt by conferring on the empirical object an actual (independent) form.

 

4. A Summary and Three Models of Kant-s Six Object-Terms

 

      The foregoing interpretation of Kant-s six object-terms consists mainly of the claims that the terms -positive noumenon-, -negative nou­menon- and -phenomenon- are the empirical correlates of the transcenden­tal terms -thing in itself-, -transcendental object- and -appearance-, respectively, and that the per­spectival distinctions between them are as vital to the proper interpretation of systemt as are the similarities. In reconstructing Kant-s theory of objective reality we have seen that in systemt the judgment that a thing is an objec­tively real constituent of empirical knowledge is described in systemt as the judgment that a phenomenon has a negatively noumenal aspect. (This empir­i­cal judgment is also described transcendentally in terms of a transcendental appearance which is determined to be a phenomenon by virtue of the fact that it is related transcendentally to-i.e., it is a representation of-the thing in itself through the mediation of the transcendental object.) In making this judg­ment we require no knowledge of what the object is in itself; it is only neces­sary to know (or indeed, to believe [see V.1-2]) that a given phenome­nal object has the noumenal mark of indepen­dence. The possibility and ne­cessity of regarding the phenomenon in this limited manner is precisely what Kant wishes to defend by introduc­ing the concept of a negative noumenon; for its purpose is to guarantee the objective reality of a phenomenal object by estab­lishing its connec­tion with the transcendental object, but without requir­ing any knowledge (transcendental or empirical) of the object as it is in itself.

 

      Although Kant-s presentation of his empirical set of object-terms serves (among its other func­tions) as -a summary statement- of his theory of knowl­edge [Kt1:295], it will be necessary to examine more closely the subjective side of systemt before elabo­rating in any greater detail just what it means to judge a phenomenon to be objectively real. This difficult task will be under­taken in Chapter VII. But before our present considerations come to an end, it will be helpful to schematize the basic progression in the foregoing interpre­tation of Kant-s the­ory of the object in the form of two reciprocal models. This should make it easier to understand and cope with the occasional incon­sistencies and ambigui­ties which really do occur in Kant-s discussion of the object of knowledge. (In Appendix VI I will then give some examples of how the foregoing inter­pretation can resolve some apparent problems, which are in fact due not to Kant himself but to the failure of his interpreters to grasp the principle of perspective.)

 

      First, if the transcendental perspective is regarded as the starting point (as is the case for someone whose primary concern, like Kant-s, is with determin­ing the transcendental roots of knowledge), then the model will begin with the thing in itself and progress through the phenomenon to the positive nou­menon. Conceived in this way (as I have done in this chapter), the pro­gres­sion follows a -synthetic- (or -progressive-) method [Kt2:276n], and can be depicted as follows:

 

 

Figure VI.1:

Kant-s Six Object-Terms, Progressing Synthetically

 

Neither 1A nor 1B can ever be known by the human understanding (hence the gaps in the first and last arrows). 1A is presupposed to be the transcendent root of all real objects of experience. 1B is the unattain­able -space- occupied by -intelligible objects-, objects which can be thought but cannot be intuited; the space can be filled only through faith in an idea of reason [see V.2,4]. The concepts of 2A and 2B both refer to the object in its transition between an unknowable and a known form.[25] 2A is the unknown -x- of a possible expe­rience, awaiting to be transformed into 3A through intuition. 2B is the inde­pendent aspect of an actual experience; it is the -limit- which remains when all intuitive determinations are abstracted from 3B. And finally, 3A and 3B are two names for the object as experienced. Viewed from the transcenden­tal perspective the object (3A) is -in us- and ideal. Viewed from the empirical per­spective the object (3B) is -outside us- and real.

 

      The obvious limitation of the synthetic approach is well expressed by Bossart: -Every attempt to begin from the side of the transcendent falls short of philosophical knowledge since we must first believe in the existence of the transcendent if we are to recognize its appearance- [B24:302]. If we wish to engage in transcendental reflection despite this limitation, two options remain open to us. The first is to ask whether and to what extent faith is a sufficient justification for transcendental reflection. This option has been discussed in Chapter V. The second is to start from the empirical perspective, in which case the schematic progression would begin with the phenomenon, and pro­ceed on the one hand to the noumenon and on the other to the object-terms which function within the transcendental perspective.

 

      Conceived with emphasis on the empirical, Kant-s theoretical progres­sion follows the analytic (or -regressive-) method [Kt2:276n], and can be depicted as follows:

 

 

Figure VI.2:

Kant-s Six Object-Terms, Progressing Analytically

 

      In this case, 1A is the object as experienced, and as such is in principle com­pletely knowable. It can be converted into 2A or 1B by abstracting from it the forms of intuition or conception, respectively. 1B can then be converted into 2B by abstracting from it the forms of intuition, and 2B likewise into 3B by abstracting the very notion of objectivity. Finally, 3A results from ab­stracting conceptualization from 2A, but remains empty because of our lack of an -intellectual intuition- [see e.g., Kt1:307].

 

      We need not decide here as to the relative value of these two versions of Kant-s progression, for this would depend to a large extent on the perspectival bias of any particular philosopher.[26] (Moreover, when all four perspectives are taken into consideration in VII.4, a more com­plete model of systemt will be constructed.) Kant seems to oscillate somewhat confusingly between both versions, though he feels most at home with the first. My own opinion is that, once the two versions are clearly distinguished and their relationship to the transcendental and empirical perspectives on knowledge is taken into ac­count (thus minimiz­ing the danger of confusion), they are equally legitimate.

 

      One possible way of combining these two perspectives into a single model without favoring either perspective would be to map both sets of object-terms onto intersecting triangles, with the mediating term (or -limiting concept-) in each case occupying the synthetic (x) position. Picturing the transcendental perspective as a triangle pointing upwards and the empirical perspective as a triangle pointing downwards gives rise to the following -six­fold compound relation-, or -6CR- (i.e., half of a 12CR):

 

 

Figure VI.3: Kant-s Six Object-Terms as a 6CR

 

This model has several advantages over the models favoring either the empiri­cal or transcendental perspectives, though I will not dwell on these here. Instead I will merely point out that in this model each term is placed directly opposite its perspectival counterpart.

 

      Rather than arguing for the superiority of one of the above three models, I shall now conclude Part Two by addressing a topic I have virtu­ally ignored so far: namely, how my interpretation is af­fected by Kant-s ac­tual inconsis­tencies. I have side-stepped this issue until now, not because I am unaware of the difficulties it presents, but because I believe the only way to understand a deep and profound thinker such as Kant is to devote one-s pri­mary attention to the extensive consistency of the overall picture he portrays. I would be the first to admit that there are passages in his works which re­main ambiguous and/or contradictory even when read with a clear understand­ing of the episte­mo­logical underpinnings presented here in Part Two, and that even some of his clearer statements could be taken to contradict my interpreta­tion. This is particularly true with respect to my interpretation in VI.3 of Kant-s special set of empirical object-terms. For if we disregard the chapter he devotes to the task of explaining their meaning [Kt1:294-315]-which I maintain should by no means be done-then there is little evidence left to support the foregoing interpretation of their function. Such an interpretation would have been con­firmed if Kant had made a special effort to use his empirical object-terms fre­quently and carefully in the remainder of Kt1; but he did not. On the con­trary, he employs them in comparatively few instances, and occasionally in such a way that they seem to be virtually synonymous with their transcendental counter­parts.[27]

 

      Two points can be raised in explaining this inconsistency. First, because the transcendental perspective is the foundation upon which the empirical per­spective is built [cf. Figures II.1, III.8 and IV.2], Kant always tends to favor his transcendental terminology, even in empirical contexts. As a result, in Kt1 he freely uses his transcendental terms as synonyms for his empirical terms when referring to an object viewed from the empirical perspective (especially -appearance- for -phenomenon-), but rarely if ever uses his empiri­cal terms as synonyms for his transcendental terms when referring to an object viewed from the transcendental perspective. In Kt2, by contrast, Kant starts with the empirical perspective and modulates to the tran­scendental per­spective (as in Figure VI.2); consequently, he more regular­ly uses the terms -phenomenon- and -noumenon-. An equally important point is simply that Kant was obvi­ously not fully aware of the potential clarity which can be achieved through a consistent use of empirical object-terms in passages which assume the empir­ical per­spective and transcendental object-terms in passages which assume the transcendental perspective. (Kant appar­ently regarded systemt as clear enough without giving the reader what he would have viewed as a concession [cf. Kt1:Axvii-xix]!) Whether or not these points adequately ex­plain the passages which are or seem to be inconsistent with my interpreta­tion, I believe the epistemological framework established in this chapter pro­vides with sufficient clarity a plausible account of some of the fundamental aspects of our knowledge of objects.[28]

 

      However one chooses to explain Kant-s apparent terminological in­consis­tency, it must be regarded as truly unfortunate that he did not always express his theories in a clear and consistent form, particularly if the (hopefully more straightforward) interpretation given above is accurate; for if he had done so he would have saved countless hours of fruitless toil by subsequent interpreters, and escaped innumerable unwarranted claims to have refuted his posi­tion.[29] The fact that he did not do so, but contradicts at one point or another virtually every interpretation ever given of his technical terms, indicates not the falsity of any particular inter­pretation,[30] but only that Kant himself was struggling to form (rather than to interpret) his theories as he wrote. Thus, he can be ex­cused for his obscurity as long as we remember with Paton that he -is open­ing up a world of altogether new ideas; that Kant is undertaking the most dif­ficult task ever undertaken on behalf of metaphysics; and that the human mind does not, in an enterprise of this kind, detect at first sight the shortest path towards its goal- [P2:1.47; cf. Kt1:vii]. My perspectival inter­pretation of the epistemologi­cal underpin­nings of Kant-s System here in Part Two has been intended not so much to detect a shorter path from his starting point to his goal, as to clear away some of the rubble which tends to trip us up, and some of the over­grown -thorns- [xliii] which impede our ability to see his vision, on -the secure path- [xiv] which he himself exposed. By using the conclu­sions established in Parts One and Two as a basis for examining in Part Three the architectonic content of the System, my further aim will be to -aid in making this footpath [Fußsteig] into a highway [Heereßtraße]- [884alt.].

 

  [1] Kant defines these termsinthethirdchapteroftheAnalyticofPrinciples [s.e.   Kt1:A248-9,306-7]. He never uses -noumenon- or its derivatives in previous sec­tions of Kt1, but he does use -phenomenon- or one of its derivatives in eight earlier passages [viz., Kt1:Axi,155,186,A166,209,227,250,251], all but two of which occur in the first two chap­ters of the Analytic of Principles. The placement of these terms in the text will play a significant role in my interpretation of their meaning.

 

  [2] See Ap. VI.In each case interpreters equate such terms because Kant him­self treats them synonymously at various points. Unfortunately, Kant-s reason for some­times equating yet elsewhere differentiating every object-term in the two sets with almost every other has never to my knowledge been adequately explained. Most commentators who try to explain it at all simply opt for the easy alterna­tive, which is to say Kant frequently expressed himself in -inconsistent- ways, appar­ent­ly forget­ting his -official- meaning [e.g., A4:520]. As I shall explain below, my goal in this chapter will be to apply the principle of perspective to this puzzle, in such a way as to provide a more complete explanation of his apparently contradictory use of these terms.

 

            Equating -phenomenon- and -noumenon- with their counterparts is attractive prima facie not only because Kant himself sometimes uses each pair interchange­ably [e.g. Kt1:423n], but because -phenomenon- and -noumenon- are translitera­tions of Greek words meaning -a thing which appears- and -a thing perceived by the intellect-, re­spectively [L4:1912,1180-1]. Although Kant was the first to draw such a sharp distinc­tion between them, Plato and Aristotle did make roughly the same dis­tinction between -fanetai- (-the visible world-) and -noumena- (-the intellectual world-) [e.g., P9:508c1,509d7-8; A14:1073b36-7,1074b16].

 

  [3]PippinreportsPrauss-awarenessofsomesuchproblem[inP12]whenhesays-the    chapters on Phenomena and Noumena, and the Amphibolies [are] both oddly out of place in the architectonic- [P7:377]; unfortu­nately, the only explanation of­fered for their position is that it is -a superior example- of Kant-s failure to -think through- the implications of his own -analysis- and -methodology-. I will attempt to show, on the contrary, that Kant has a good reason to put them where they are.

 

  [4] The activityof representationanditsformsrelateprimarilytothesubjective side of systemt [see Ch. VII]; they are relevant here only indirectly, insofar as they serve to define the object.

 

  [5] Kt1:45;s.a.V.2andAp.V.C-D.Assuch,thethinginitselfcouldbe called the -transcendent object- [cf. G11:198], although this would be using the word -object- in a way which, as we shall see in VI.3, Kant regards as illegitimate (though he himself occasionally slips into such usage). Viewed as the nature of an object before it becomes an object, the thing in itself is, as Deleuze affirms, the -starting point for the [first] Critique- [D2:6].

 

  [6]Thefamous-doubleaffection-theorypopularizedbyAdickesappearstocontra­dict   this claim by interpreting Kant as proposing a set of -transcendental acts- over against ordinary -empirical acts- [W21:169-70]. But to conceive of the former in any literal sense would be absurd, since the word -acts- loses its meaning if it refers to something which (somehow) -takes place- outside of the spatio-temporal framework of experience. The only way to make sense out of it would be to say, with Findlay, that Kant uses such terms -analogically, and in respect of a par­al­lelism of logical structure which transcends knowledge- [F3:12]. And in such a case it still would not be accurate to say the thing in itself -affects- the senses in any empirically meaningful way. I will discuss this topic further in Appendix VI and Appendix VIII.

 

 [7]Findlay-s failure to distinguish clearly between transcendental and empirical knowledge gets him into somewhat of a muddle on this matter. He states that for Kant -what we regard as a necessary condition of a certain sort of knowledge is not itself capable of being known-, because -we can never be said to know what we only conceive emptily and without fulfilling intuition. We cannot therefore be said to know that there is a Transcendental Subject or that there are Transcendental Objects, though both are necessary to the existence of empirical knowledge- [F3:7]. Although it is true that for Kant empirical knowledge requires intuition and so the object and subject as they are in themselves-i.e., as transcendent (which Findlay wrongly calls -transcendental- [see Ap. VI])-are not empirically know­able, Findlay ignores the fact that truly transcendental knowledge is something we possess whether or not we know it empirically [see IV.2]. That is why, as we shall see in VII.2-3, the thing in itself and the -self- in itself are not elements in systemt in the way space, time and the categories are. These latter, as truly -necessary condi­tions-, are known through pure intuition: systemt is in fact the attempt to bring this tran­scendental knowledge into the realm of our empirical awareness (e.g., by means of transcendental arguments), on the assumption that only the thing in itself must remain entirely unknowable.

 

  [8]Kt5:463. Kant often refers to the concept of the transcendental object, and dis­cusses this notion primarily outside the Aesthetic, where it would seem to belong. In such cases it refers not to the transcenden­tal object as such, which, as Buchdahl argues against Bird in B27:64f, has its primary function in relation to sensibility, but rather to the general assumption that some aesthetic element is assumed as given throughout systemt. This matter is discussed more fully in Appendix VII.B.

 

  [9] Birdusesasimilar-bridge-metaphorinaB20:73:-Suchnotionsasthatofa"thing     in general" [i.e., a transcendental object] form the bridge across which philoso­phers may carry admitted truths of a con­ceptual kind, until they become to­tally un­related to any possible experience.- From a rather different tradition, Lao Tzu uses a -seed- metaphor to serve a parallel function: -The concept of the seed takes up a position between the world of ideas and the corporeal-material world- [W19:22]. The notion of the -Dao-, which Wilhelm here associ­ates with the Platonic notion of -the world of ideas-, also bears a resemblance to Kant-s notion of the thing in itself [see 70,72]. Although a direct influence from the Chinese tra­dition is un­likely, it is interesting to note that, according to Collins in C11:90, Kant gave -summer lectures on Oriental religions...throughout his teaching ca­reer.- Perhaps there is more truth than is often recognized in Nietzsche-s reference to Kant as -the Chinaman of Koenigsberg- [N3:210]!

 

[10]Kt1:344; cf. Kt2:287. Gotterbarn points out in G11:202 that the tran­scenden­tal object -is that which allows us to represent [appear­ances] to ourselves as refer­ring to objects.- He infers from this that the transcendental object -is not the cause of appearances-, but only their -ground-. The transcendental object would then be the refer­ential ground of appearances while the thing in itself would be their tran­scen­dent cause. Although Gotterbarn is right to distinguish the thing in itself from the transcendental object, I believe it would be more in line with Kant-s (rather am­biguous) usage to say these two object-terms both refer to different aspects of the cause (or ground) of appearances.

 

            The justification for employing this notion of a transcendent cause was dis­cussed in V.2. Appendix VIII will consider some of the problems associated with its use. It will suffice here to say Kant prefers such -fundamental relations- to be -taken from experience alone- [Kt18:369(117)]; those who persist in using them in a transcendent (albeit metaphorical or -non-literal- [B20:117]) sense must rec­ognize that -philosophy has no business any more- [Kt18:369(117); cf. B20:76].

 

[11]Kt1:xxvi. The role of intuition in the formation of appearances, and the reason  such intuition is qualified by Kant as -sensible- and -empirical- will be made clear in VII.2.A.

 

[12]-Transcendental idealism-refers primarily to Kant-s doctrine of sensibility[S17: 112]; yet inasmuch as it determines the path followed throughout Kt1 [see e.g., K9:118; S17:21], it is sometimes used as a title for the entirety of systemt. Kant defines his idealism as -the doctrine that appear­ances are to be regarded as being...repre­sentations only, not things in themselves- [Kt1:A369], so that apart from the subject-s knowledge (or -ideas-) they -are nothing- [A370; cf. 518-9; s.a. B20: 46-7 and P2:1.144]. This follows from his Copernican assumption that the sub­ject imposes on the object certain transcendental forms [see III.1], while its mate­rial is derived mysteriously from the thing in itself [660-1; cf. E3:119; G11:197]. Paton explains that the mind -is the source only of what is common to [all objects of experi­ence]-, not of the -empirical differences- between such ob­jects [P2: 1.557n; s.a. K2:11.380-1(Z1:198)]. Thus, the transcendental appear­ance, which is the only source for our knowledge of such differences, must be re­garded as a mere mental construction out of these formal elements only when we view it from the transcendental perspective.

 

[13]Kt1:69-71,278-9,349-50,A376; s.a. B20:15-6. Philosophers at least as far back  as Plato had often suggested that the philosopher-s task is to see through the illu­sions of appearances to their underlying truth. Kant argues in Kt3:555, by con­trast, that in metaphysics -the question is not of the transformation of illusion [Schein] into truth, but of appearance [Ersheinung] into experience.- Meerbote discusses Kant-s view of the non-epistemic character of -sensory illusions- in M9:197.

 

[14] Kemp Smith-s repeated insertion of-[field of]-before the word-appearance-some­times obscures Kant-s meaning by making his reference to an individual tran­scendental appearance, viewed from the empirical perspective, look like a refer­ence to appearance in general, viewed from the transcendental perspective. But Weldon clearly distinguishes between these two senses of the word -appearance-, as referring either to -physical bodies in space- or to -data of empirical sensibil­ity- [W16:149] and suggests using Kant-s rather cumbersome phrase -appearance of the ap­pearance- [see Kt9:22.339,363-5] to distinguish the former from the latter.

 

[15] -The transcendental idealist-,Kant insists,-is an empirical realist,and [there­fore] allows matter, as appearance, a reality which is immediately perceived- [Kt1: A371; s.a. A375; B20:43-7]. Although transcendental idealism maintains that space and time are -absolutely independent of things in themselves-, -at the same time- it guarantees -their complete reality in respect to the objects of the senses- [Kt69:268]. The transcendental character of knowledge is not under con­sideration in experience, so the question of the existence of the thing in itself does not even arise [Kt1:45].

 

[16] These four uses of -appearance- constitute the following 2LAR:

 

 

 

[17] See VII.2.A. Kant suggests in Kt22:215 that -the objects as things in them­selves give the matter to empirical intuition..., but they are not the matter of these intu­itions.- The matter as such is the tran­scendental appearance [Kt1:207].

 

[18]W9:165. Walsh mentions this interpretation of the word -appearance- again in W8:193,205-6, but argues against it: -there is nothing in [Kant-s theory of phe­nomena and noumena] which demands that we agree that one is better than the other- [207].

 

[19] Kt19:397.The -necessarily unattainable- task, according to Kant, is not to gain knowledge of any one phenomenon, but to know the totality of all phenom­ena. -Our right to aim at an explana­tion of all [i.e., the totality of] natural prod­ucts on simply mechanical lines is in itself quite unrestricted-, though it will never be completed [Kt7:417]. In K2:11.37(Z1:140) he states that -to recognize the real essence of matter...far exceeds the capacity of human powers.- But this is only because such knowledge would require either knowledge of the transcendent ground of matter, or knowledge of the totality of material things (or both); it in no way prevents us from having adequate empirical knowledge of particular objects.

 

[20] E5:179;s.a. Kt2:353 and B20:42.As Kant himself says:-In the language of ex­peri­ence, the objects of the senses are regarded as things in themselves- [Kt69: 269]. Kant may be speaking from this empirical perspective (rather than simply contradicting his later views) when he writes in 1763 that -things them­selves...constitute the raw materials of nature- [Kt15:308; s.a. 232-3].

 

[21] These two perspectives on the object are,for Kant,mutually inter­dependent.For on the one hand he says the empirical object (the pheno­menon) is -the one species of knowledge which is capable of imparting reality to any nonempirical synthe­sis- [Kt1:196e.a.]-i.e., to the object as viewed from the transcendental per­spec­tive. Yet on the other hand he says that, although -transcendental truth- exists in vir­tue of its -relation to possible experience-, it -precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible- [185]. There is no contradiction here, as long as we remember he is talking about empirical reality in the former quote and transcendental ideality in the latter [see notes VI.12,15].

 

[22] -Objective reality-and-objective validity-are two phrases which Kant never de­fines with sufficient clarity. In K2:11.496(Z1:216) he does suggest a helpful way of understanding the latter. He stresses that -feeling...in itself cannot be commu­nicated- (because it is only subjectively valid), whereas anything which is -valid for everyone- through relation to -an object- will be -communicable-. This is con­sistent with Allison-s claim that for Kant -every judgment, simply qua judg­ment, is "objectively valid"-, since this term is meant to distinguish -a judgment from a mere associa­tion of ideas, which only possesses "subjective validity"- [A11:23]. Buchdahl notes that Kant establishes the -real possibility- of judgments by prov­ing their -objective validity- [B28:131n; see Kt1:xxviii,122].

 

            The problem arises in trying to isolate a distinct meaning for -objective real­ity-. For Kant often discusses this phrase in terms deceptively similar to those he uses for -objective validity-. For example, he equates it with -meaning and truth- in Kt3:478, with -practicability- in Kt32:356, and with proving the -real possi­bil­ity- of a concept-s referent in Kt69:325. Meerbote attempts to solve this prob­lem by stressing that -objective validity- does not mean -true-; rather it denotes that the conclusions of transcendental arguments es­tablish -the justified belief...that we possess, i.e. know, (some) true judgments which cannot be disputed- [M8: 56]. He then opines -that Kant identifies "objective reality" with "truth"--i.e., with corre­spondence to a real object [57]. Although this is probably the most adequate way of translating these two phrases into contemporary philosophical terms, I have warned against the danger of equating -justified belief- with Kant-s concept of -knowledge- in Appendix V.C. Moreover, Kant strays from the usage Meerbote de­scribes on several occasions, as, for example, when he equates -objec­tive real­ity- with -transcendental validity- in Kt22:190.

 

[23] Kant makes this further distinction in both editions of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena; but in the first edition it is between -noume­non- and -transcendental object- rather than between -positive noumenon- and -negative noumenon-. His reasons for making this change have been a matter of some de­bate. Kemp Smith uses his -patchwork- theory to infer that -the doctrine of the transcendental object is...a pre-Critical or semi-Critical survival-, ultimately re­jected by the mature Kant [K3:204-5; s.a. P4:177-8]. And Vleeschauwer claims that an inherent ambi­guity, wherein -the transcendental object oscillates ceaselessly between the thing in itself and apperception-, led Kant to suppress it in the second edition [V4:109]. Yet we have seen that this -oscillation- is not an ambiguity, but part of the essen­tial task fulfilled by the transcendental object: the task of bringing the thing in it­self to the subject. Moreover, such views do not explain why Kant did not omit all references to the transcendental object if, in fact, he had decided it was a useless or incoherent concept by 1787.

 

            In light of the overview of the organization of Kt1 given in VI.1, we can offer an alternative explanation which preserves the proper func­tion for the transcen­dental object: between 1781 and 1787 Kant must have noticed he had inappro­pri­ately carried one of his transcendental terms over into his discus­sion of the em­pir­ical perspective; so he omitted the refer­ences to the transcendental object and clarified the empirical character of the dis­tinction, by distinguishing between two aspects of the nou­me­non. (Buchdahl hints at this solution in B27:78.) Since this -terminological shift- [A10:59] would in this case represent a definite im­prove­ment in the consistency of his explanation of the two perspec­tives, I will adopt the second edition version both here and in VII.3.

 

[24]Kt1:344-5,A358. This perspectival correspondence between each transcen­dental object-term and its empirical counterpart explains why Kant so often treats as equivalent terms which he elsewhere differen­tiates, thus misleading many in­terpreters [see Ap. VI]. Kant-s usage is legitimate since, for example, a phenome­non is a transcendental appearance, only viewed from an empirical per­spec­tive; the object is not different, but only the perspective of the subject. (Thus, as we saw in VI.2 with the thing in itself and the appearance, and earlier in this sec­tion with the appear­ance and the phenomenon, it is also legitimate to say the phe­nome­non and the noumenon are -merely different aspects of one and the same thing- [O4:160-1; s.a. W13:107].) Kant could have made his position easier to follow not by omitting such -careless- iden­tifications, as is sometimes sug­gested [e.g., A4:520], but by stressing how the principle of perspective affects his use of object-terms.

 

[25] 2A and 2B are for the object what Strawson says apperception is for the sub­ject:   they are -the tangential point of contact between the field of noumena and the world of appearances- [S17:173].

 

[26]The phenomenalists- rejection of the noumenal [see Ap. VI], for in­stance, is di­rectly related to their preference for the empirical analysis of the phe­nomenon (which does not require the presupposition of the thing in itself) and to their consequent exclusion of any reflection on the object in terms of transcenden­tal syn­thesis (which does).

 

[27] Seee.g.,Kt1:423.In contrast to the hundreds of occurrences of each of Kant-s transcendental object-terms in Kt1, -phenomenon- and its derivatives are used only 41 times, and -noumenon- and its derivatives only 54 times [Pq10:250,280].

 

[28] Itmightbecontestedthat Kant himself did not purposefully empha­size the prin­ciple of perspective as much as I have done, or that he was not himself as clear as I have portrayed him to be on the interrelation­ships between his six object-terms. No one, of course, will ever know precisely what Kant would think of all the vari­ous interpretations which have been given to his philosophy. So my response to this objection would be that even if some aspects of my interpretation are not deemed to be acceptable as a straightforward explanation of what Kant intended to say-which I believe they all are-their value can be preserved by regarding them as revisionary aspects of the interpretation [see note I.23]. That is, even if Kant himself seems at times not to be aware of some of the distinctions I have been making, I would maintain that he was in fact working towards them as he wrote: had he been able to reconstruct systemt in a clearer and more precise manner after having completed his Critical works, something like my interpretation would have been made more evident.

 

[29] Kant may have been overly optimistic to believe the danger in leav­ing the task of clarification to others -is not that of being refuted, but of not being under­stood- [Kt1:xliii; s.a. Kt2:261]. Yet ironically, if he had not done so, he would probably not have come to be regarded as quite such a great philosopher, since his writings would have been less likely to hold the reader spellbound as they have managed to do in their present form for two centuries.

 

[30] It is unlikely that any interpretation of such a diverse thinker as Kant will ever gain universal acceptance; so the value of the interpre­tive presuppo­sitions with which his philosophy is approached [see Part One] in the end cannot be wholly justified by logical arguments, but only by measuring the extent to which they are able to render Kant-s System as a unified and self-consistent whole [see Part Three].

 

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