PART THREE

 

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ELEMENTS

OF KANT'S SYSTEM

 

 

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

 

 

Reason's nature is such that it can never conceive anything except in­sofar as the latter is determined under given con­ditions. Conse­quent­ly, inasmuch as it can neither rest with the conditioned nor make the un­conditioned comprehensi­ble, nothing remains for it, when thirst for knowledge in­vites it to grasp the absolute totality of all conditions, but to turn back from objects to itself in order to investigate and determine the ultimate boundary of the capacity given it, instead of in­vestigating and determining the ultimate boundary of things. [Kt3:564-5]

Kant's System of Theoretical Perspectives

 

 

When one has thought according to a method and then expressed this method and distinctly stated the transition from one proposition to the next, then one has treated a cognition systematically. [Kt10:148(149)]

 

1. The Four Stages of Representation in General

 

      The task set before us here in Part Three is to fill the formal structure of Kant's architectonic, as outlined in III.3-4, with the content provided in the part of each Critique called the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.[1] This will require us to put forward a more detailed interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy, beginning in this chapter with his system of theoretical perspec­tives (as de­veloped mainly in Kt1). One of the risks of modulating from for­mal to transcen­dental logic in this way will be that of oversimplification-i.e., of making distinct what Kant (perhaps purposefully) left obscure, or vice versa. Conse­quently, I shall not pretend to have discovered texts in Kant's writings which match perfectly with each of the twelve formal components in Figure III.6, nor to have accounted adequately for all of his multitude of appar­ently techni­cal terms. Instead, I shall pick out those arguments which seem to constitute the essential elements of his system (and which must therefore, in the case of Kt1, be common to both editions [see note I.21]), in hopes of deter­mining the extent to which each can be correlated with one of the components given in Figure III.6. (The goal of such a procedure is to develop a schematic outline of systemt which can be used as a map to guide us through Kant's text, and which can therefore simplify the task of those who wish to reformulate Kant's arguments in contemporary terms [see I.1].) Such correlations are not always as straightforward as we might wish, so in some cases they must be advanced tentatively, as the best choice presented in the text. Nevertheless, I believe the correspondence between the elements Kant put forward and the twelvefold pattern described in III.3 is sufficiently close to establish my claim that he was working towards such an ideal pat­tern, but was unable to elabo­rate its structure precisely enough in his own mind to pass it on unambigu­ously to his reader [see Kt1:862-3].

 

      As suggested in III.4, the form of my interpretation of systemt will be as follows. Its four major 'stages' are concerned with the ana­lysis of the nature of sensibility [VII.2.A], understanding [VII.2.B], judgment [VII.3.A] and reason [VII.3.B]. Each stage has three 'steps', arranged in a synthetic pat­tern. Thus, I will interpret Kant's presentation of the 'conditions of knowing' in systemt as containing a total of twelve steps. Each step is itself estab­lished as necessary by means of a threefold (synthetic) argument. The various 'ele­ments' which operate in each step of Kant's overall argument (and which, taken together, constitute the 'Doctrine of Elements') can therefore be regarded as constituting a ninefold pattern in each stage. The formal structure of such 'second-level synthetic integration' is discussed in Pq18:4.1, but does not need to be described here. Instead, a very general, but also very important, ex­am­ple will be used to demonstrate the threefold structure of each step in Kant's presentation. Once this is done, we will discuss the general character of each of the four stages in systemt and their structural relationship. These two introductory tasks will prepare us for a detailed study of each stage.

 

      As we saw in VI.2, Kant's whole theory of the synthetic progression of the elements of knowledge is based on the assumption that the knowing sub­ject must 'represent' to itself an unknown thing in the form of a 'represen­tation'. The power to perform this function is attributed to the 'faculty' of representation. Two ambiguities concerning this claim, which could give rise to much confusion and hamper our understanding of almost every step in systemt, are discussed in Appendix VII.A.

 

      An examination of representation makes a good introduction to Kant's way of arguing not only because it reveals these typical ambiguities, but also because he uses the term in connection with almost every step in his theory [cf. Kt1:94,376-7]. Representation itself 'cannot be explained at all', since it 'would have to be explained again through another representation': human knowledge 'always presupposes representation' [Kt10:34(38)]. 'All representa­tions', he insists, 'can themselves become objects of other representations' [Kt1:A108]. So his entire discussion of the conditions of knowing can be re­garded as an account of the faculty of representation applying a series of con­ditions (+) to the object which is to be conditioned (-), so that the latter is represented in a more and more determinate form of representation (x), until all such steps eventually lead to the fully determined knowledge of the repre­sented object. The format chosen to summarize this most general function of knowing can therefore be adopted as the pattern for summarizing the steps in each of Kant's systems.[2] The synthetic structure of this basic argument can be depicted straightforwardly by using the following schema:

 

 

 

 

      Kant defines an 'organism' in Kt7:376 as 'an organized natural product in which every part is reciprocally both end and means.' Taking this comment, together with his subsequent claim that the interrelation­ships between the parts of an organism are 'founded upon ... the causality of an architectonic un­derstanding' [388-9], to apply not only to physi­cal organisms, but to rational systems as well (as he suggests in Kt1:xxii,xxxvii-xxxviii), can help us to understand the formal relationship between each of his twelve successive threefold arguments (or steps). Following the format given above, the first part of each step will specify the material given, i.e., the conditioned element (-), which is carried over from the conclusion of the previous step; the second part will specify the formal function, i.e., the condition (+), which is sup­plied by the subjective faculty involved;[3] and the third part will spe­cify the synthetic unity (x) of these, thus yielding a new level in the determina­tion of the ob­ject. The 'end' of each argument (i.e., the third part) is then presented to the 'means' (i.e., the second part) of the next step: that is, the object at this new level of determination serves as the material for the next step; and the process continues until the object is finally represented as fully determined. Such re­ciprocal development is what Kant means by 'the causality of an ar­chitectonic understanding'. Kant alludes to this synthetic pattern when he notes that a transcenden­tal argument is required whenever 'an a priori determi­nation is syn­the­tically added to the concept of a thing' [Kt1:286]. But even though the Critical philosopher is concerned primarily with the transcendental aspects of the elements defined by each argument, Kant often discusses their empirical aspects as well. I shall mention this empirical side of many of the arguments discussed, but concentrate mainly on their transcendental character (using 'transcendental' here in the broad sense in which all the conditions of know­ing, regardless of the stage in which they arise, are transcendental [see II.4, III.4 and IV.2].

 

      Two methodological clarifications must be made before we discuss the structural relationship between the four stages of systemt. The first is simply that its twelve progressive steps must be taken to determine only the transcendental-logical order of the elements which constitute experience, and not the empirical-temporal order in which they are experienced.[4] But the second is rather more complex: ignoring the fact that Kant is interested more in the formal conditions of knowing[5] than in actual experienced knowledge could lead an interpreter to confuse the synthetic method, which analyzes how em­pirical knowledge is possible [see Ap. IV and Kt2:276n], with actual 'syn­thetic a priori knowledge' as such. Inasmuch as we can discover the twelve condi­tions of knowing only through transcendental reflection on the way in which empirical knowledge arises, Kant's synthetic method in Kt1 can be thought of as an analysis of the elements of such knowledge, organized according to the (architectonic) form of their logical synthetic progression [see F1:114-6]. Once it is taken as given that we know something, any investi­ga­tion of that knowledge will be analytic; but such an investigation can be pre­sented in a synthetic form by theoretically putting all empirical knowledge in abeyance and asking what syntheses logically gave rise to the possibility for analysis.[6] Thus, although the series of arguments which constitutes the syn­thetic method will reveal at some point the content of some synthetic a priori knowledge, it will also reveal other types of knowledge [see Figure IV.2]; for the series itself is intended to trace all the conditions which, when regarded as syntheses from the Transcendental Perspec­tive, explain the possi­bil­ity of the empirical knowledge being analyzed.

 

      The first and second stages of systemt deal with the faculties of sensibil­ity and understanding. Kant describes the functions of these 'two sources of representation' [Kt1:327] in the Transcendental Aesthe­tic[7] and in the (Tran­scendental) Analytic of Concepts,[8] respectively. He defines sensibility as 'the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects' [Kt1:33; cf. 75 and Kt6:211n]. In other words, 'the senses' are 'the first foundation of all judgments' [Kt18:361(102)], so that the aim of the first stage is to discover how the material for knowl­edge (i.e., sen­sation) arises through the function of intuition. Special atten­tion is paid to the role of 'representations which are not empirical' [Kt1:A99]; thus the fac­ul­ty of sensibility adopts the transcendental perspective in sys­temt.[9] However, Kant defines understanding in a number of different ways. Indeed, he assigns to 'understanding' almost as wide a variety of possible meanings as he does to 'representation'. So it is important to determine which of his meanings ap­plies to the second stage of systemt and how the understanding in this sense is related to sensibility.

 

      'Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge' [Kt1: 137]. As such, it is 'the mind's power of producing representa­tions from it­self, the spontaneity of knowledge' [75]. Kant analyzes this general mean­ing in Kt66:138(19):

 

understanding (in the most general sense of the term) ... must include: 1) the power of apprehending given [representations] to produce intuition ..., 2) the power of abstracting what is common to several of these to produce a con­cept ..., and 3) the power of reflecting to produce knowledge of the object.

 

As we shall see, this threefold division of the general powers of the under­standing directly corresponds to the first three stages of systemt (i.e., to intu­itive sensibility, conceptual understanding and determin­ate judgment, respec­tively). But Kant later distinguishes this general type of understanding from sensibility by calling the former 'the higher cognitive power' and the latter 'the lower'. He then specifies that, as 'the higher cognitive power', the fac­ulty of understanding 'consists in understanding, judgment, and reason' [196-7 (68-9); s.a. Kt7i:201 and Kt39:476(182)]. And these three terms refer di­rectly to the second, third and fourth stages of knowing (i.e., to conceptual under­stand­ing, determinate judgment and inferential reason, respectively). In its most general sense, therefore, the understanding is equally well describable 'as a spontaneity of knowledge ..., as a power of thought, as a faculty of con­cepts, or again of judgments', as a 'faculty of rules' and as 'the lawgiver of nature' [Kt1:A126]; indeed, it is involved in some sense in every stage of knowing, so that, as Beck says in a note to Kt4:9, it is itself 'the faculty of empirical knowledge'.

 

      The terms sensibility, judgment, and reason all refer in their own right to stages in systemt, so the sense of 'understanding' we shall adopt-that is, as referring to the second stage-will be its narrow sense, according to which it refers to one aspect of the higher cognitive power in general. Kant uses the word in this sense when he says 'the understanding ... thinks only, and does not intuit' [Kt1:139]. But within this specific usage, the word 'understanding' is occasionally utilized even more specifically as a description of any one of the three functions which combine to make up the second stage [e.g., 134n]. Fully aware of its multifarious meaning, Kant observes that 'the proper task of a transcendental philosophy' is the 'dissection of the faculty of the under­standing itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts a priori' [90-1]. Rather than discussing every variation at this point, let us now examine the relationship between understanding and sensibility.

 

      As the second stage of knowing, understanding is always closely related to sensibility. In fact, Kant himself speculates that these 'two stems of hu­man knowledge' may 'spring from a common, but to us unknown, root' [Kt1:29]. Whereas sensibility provides the transcen­dental material for empiri­cal knowledge, understanding in the second stage provides 'the logical form of all judgments' by forming self-conscious thoughts which correspond to sensa­tions [Kt1:140e.a.; s.a. 143]. Understanding in this context is therefore al­ways conceptual understanding. Like sensibility, understanding is an abstract func­tion, in the sense that it is concerned not with concrete objects of real ex­peri­ence, but with one aspect of our knowledge of such objects in isolation from the other. The faculty of sensibility considers intuition in abstraction from the corresponding power, which I shall call 'conception' [see note VII.28], and is always 'passive, consisting in receptivity'; the faculty of un­derstand­ing, by contrast, considers conception in abstraction from intuition and is 'active and manifests power' [Kt66:140(21)]. This relation of passive to active, or matter to form, suggests the former can be correlated with - and the latter with + [see III.4].

 

      The third and fourth stages of systemt deal with the faculties of judgment and reason, and are presented in the Analytic of Principles and in the Di­alectic, respectively. Kant defines judgment as 'the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it' [Kt1:93]: it is the empirical realization of the understanding in its concrete relation to sensi­bil­i­ty. Thus, the role of the third stage in clarifying how judgments are pos­sible can be depicted as a simple synthetic integration, as shown in Figure VII.1. 'The judgment indicates what use is to be made of the understand­ing.'[10] For, as Kant says in Kt7:407: 'understanding must wait for the subsump­­tion of        

Understanding (+)

 

 

Figure VII.1:

The 'Lower' Cognitive Powers as a 1LSR

 

the empirical intuition ... under the conception, to furnish the determination [of an empirical object] for the faculty of judgment.'

 

      Kant defines reason in a deceptively similar way, as 'the faculty of infer­ring, i.e., judging mediately' [Kt1:386; s.a. Kt14:59(93)]. Rational inference, or 'syllogism',[11] refers to the subjective function whereby certain universal conditions are determined to apply to an object of judgment which cannot be discovered through judgment alone [Kt1:360-1]. 'Concepts of understanding', he explains, 'first provide the material for making inferences' [366-7]; judg­ment, which now 'mediates between the other two faculties' [Kt7i:202], serves as the form (+) under which such conceptual material (-) is subsumed in order to be synthesized in an inference (x) [Kt1:360-1]. Thus, for Kant 'a syllogism shows in its conclusion something more than the activity of the understanding and judgment required by the premises, viz., a further particular activity belonging to reason' [K2:345(Z1:112)]. The synthetic relation be­tween these three higher stages is depicted in Figure VII.2. Kant summa­rizes the synthetic relation between these three faculties in Kt39:472(171): 'Under-

 

 

Figure VII.2:

The 'Higher' Cognitive Powers as a 1LSR

 

standing is the knowledge of the universal. Judgment is the ap­plication of the universal to the particular. Reason is the faculty of perceiv­ing the union of the universal with the particular.'

 

      Because the role of sensibility drops out in this fourth stage [Kt1:363; cf. R11:65], inferential reason, as we shall see, often tends to be employed spec­ulatively. This occurs when the understanding adopts sensibility's transcen­dental perspective, rather than the logical or empirical perspectives which properly belong to it; as Kant puts it in Kt1:345, 'employing the understand­ing transcendentally' is 'contrary to its vocation'. But in their proper employ­ment, the objects ultimately determined through inference 'serve only for the completion of reason's empirical perspective' [Kt1:593; cf. 714]-i.e., only to complete our systematic understanding of the nature of empirical objects. As we shall see in VIII.3.B and Appendix IX, the fourth stage in each of Kant's systems functions in this same way, revealing the ultimate ful­fill­ment or purpose of what might already seem to be complete at the end of stage three.

 

      The most comprehensive way of mapping the stages of systemt, how­ev­er, is not to isolate sets of three which form simple syntheses, but rather to include the relations between all four, in the form of a 2LAR.[12] By doing so, the four stages in systemt can be correlated on a one-to-one basis with the four perspectives mapped onto Figure IV.2. Each of these perspectives has as its task the defense of one type of synthetic a priori (and in this broader sense, transcenden­tal) condition for knowing, as shown in the following table:

 

Table VII.1: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemt

 

Each of the conditions of knowing (i.e., 'transcendental forms') listed above serves as the formal element in its respective stage, so in each case it will ap­pear as the second step in that stage [see III.4 and Kt19:389-92]. The focal point in each stage, therefore, will be the task of determining rationally 'how an empty form ac­quires the content which fills it', rather than merely observ­ing empirically (as in a non-Copernican philoso­phy, such as Aristotle's) 'how a given content acquires its form' [G10:92n]. When that content fills the form, the empirical goal of the stage is reached, just as in the example of representa­tion, given above. This means each stage will start with a kind of transcenden­tal 'object' (or matter), proceed from there to a transcendental 'subject' (or form), and conclude with an empirical synthe­sis of the preceding two elements.

 

     One way of mapping these stages onto the cross is to regard them as aris­ing out of two 1LARs: between the axes, representing the re­ceptive (-) facul­ties of intuitive sensibility and determinate judgment and the sponta­neous (+) fac­ulties of conceptual understanding and inferential reason; and be­tween the end points of each axis, representing the abstract (-) faculties of sensibility and understanding and the concrete (+) faculties of judgment and reason. This gives us the model shown in Figure VII.3.

 

     We can now see that the synthetic relation mapped in Figure VII.1 at­tended only to the first term in the two-term components describing sensibil­ity and understanding. Likewise, Figure VII.2 made use only of the second term in the corresponding two-term components specified in Figure VII.3. More­over, the close affinity, as well as the marked distinction, Kant saw be­tween the Analytic of Concepts (conceptual understanding) and the Analytic of Principles (determinate judgment) [see note VII.8] is reflected by the fact that these two stages are represented in Figure VII.3 by the two secondary, or mixed components, while stages one and four are represented by the two pri­-

 

Figure VII.3: The Four Stages in Systemt

 

ma­ry, or pure components. (Kant's important distinction between the 'logi­cal' and 'real' employments of the understanding refers to the con­tradic­tory, i.e., +- vs. -+, relation between these two stages.)

 

      Keeping in mind this description of the formal relations between the four main stages of systemt will help us to steer a straight course through the rough waters of Kant's terminology. In VII.2 we will examine the six steps which constitute the first two stages of this system, the stages dealing with intuition and conception in abstraction from each other; and in VII.3 we will examine the third and fourth stages, which deal with our concrete judg­ment and reasoning concerning real objects of empirical knowledge. Once this arduous task is completed, we will be in a position in VII.4 to look back over our exposition in order to determine the extent to which the interpretive tools given in Parts One and Two have enabled us to discern order in the ac­tual content of systemt.

 

2. The Abstract Conditions of Knowing (-)

  A. Intuitive Sensibility (--)

 

      Kant's exceedingly broad understanding of terms such as 'represen­tation' and 'understanding' makes it necessary for him to introduce other terms to de­scribe both the objective and the subjective elements which operate at each particular step of systemt. Since we have already considered at length in Part Two several of the most important of these more specific terms, I will as­sume with only brief reminders that their meanings are already sufficiently understood. Two such terms come up in the first step of Kant's twelvefold progression.

 

      We saw in VI.2 that 'thing in itself' is a label for that aspect of an object of knowledge which transcends our modes of representation, and is therefore unknowable [s.a. Ap. V]. Since it does not have the status of a formal condi­tion of knowledge [see notes VI.12,17], it cannot be correlated with any of the components listed in Table III.5 (though we can label it with a neutral component, 0). When considered as determined only to the extent of being represented by a subject through an 'original' act of representation, the thing in itself can be called the 'transcendental object'.[13] This first representation of reality in the form of an undetermined object is entirely negative with re­spect to our knowledge, so it is appropriate that this material (-) step in the sensibility (--) stage is correlated with the purely negative component, ---.[14]

 

      Although he uses phrases such as 'original representation' and 'immedi­ate representation' only occasionally [e.g., Kt1:40,41], Kant seems to regard this condition as a necessary starting point. For he frequently uses 'original' in close proximity to 'representa­tion', usually when referring to the original (i.e., non-empirical [Kt1:72]) representations of space [40] and time [48], in contrast to the 'origi­nal apperception' in which the second stage cul­minates [see e.g., A107]. He also speaks in Kt1:A99-100 of the 'original re­ceptivity' through which the representations of sensibility become possible. Here 'origi­nal' indicates the bare fact that a thing must first of all be repre­sented as an object in order for us to know it empirically [33; s.a. W6:297]. Indeed, in­tu­i­tion itself is 'possible only if the subject's faculty of representa­tion is af­fected by that object' [Kt1:72], yet this 'transcendental object re­mains un­known to us' except, as we shall see, through the mediation of the 'forms of our sen­sible intuition' [63]. Moreover, in Kt10:64(71) he calls rep­resentation 'the first degree of cognition', thus suggesting its role as the first step in systemt. Using the method suggested in VII.1, we can now summarize step one as:

 

 

 

      The next step maintains that the transcendental object must be re­pre­sent­ed as an 'appearance' through the process Kant calls 'intuition'. Once again, the meaning of the third term of this argument was fully ex­plained in VI.2, where we referred to it, when viewed from the transcen­dental perspective of systemt (i.e., sensibility), as a 'transcendental appearance'; but the role of intuition as the 'form of appearances' [Kt1:223; s.a. 323-4] has yet to be explained. This process of intuition is neither an imaginative activity nor a ca­pacity for 'mystical insight' [R7:240-5], but the function whereby the undetermined object is inter­preted by the subject as a mass of unorganized representations called the 'manifold [Mannigfaltige]' (i.e., 'multiplicity' or 'vari­ety'). Once the original given, the transcendental object, is intuited [Kt1: A394], so that it has the formal (+) limits of sensibility (--) imposed upon it, it becomes a manifold of appearances (--+) and can serve as 'the data for a pos­si­ble experience' [A119,298]. 'Possible experience' is Kant's way of referring to immediate experience [see IV.1] as viewed from the theoretical standpoint. But another formal limit, as we shall see, must be imposed by the understand­ing in the second stage [A119] before the contents of this pos­sible experience can become 'data for a possible knowledge' [296]. Kant holds these formal limits to be 'concepts which are of two quite different kinds ..., namely, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate­gories as con­cepts of understanding' [118]. The former, as given here in stage one, are the source of our immediate 'awareness of individual entities', while the latter, to be given in stage two, are the source of our awareness of their general nature, as mediated through thinking.[15]

 

      The manifold of appearances is sensible only when it appears in the con­text of space and/or time-i.e., only when these intuitive 'forms of sensibil­ity' [Kt1:522] are applied to it. (Since this is 'the only kind of intuition we pos­sess' [302], Kant calls a (transcendental) appearance 'the undetermined ob­ject of an empirical [or 'sensible'] intuition' [34].) Kant says: 'The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with representations, the relation of which to one another is a pure intui­tion of space and time' [522]. Thus time and space, the two pure forms of all human intuition, 'come before appearances and before all data of experience, and are indeed what make the latter at all possible.'[16]

 

      Kant proposes two ways in which this sensible intuition can be mani­fested in the human subject: through 'inner sense' (i.e., the soul) and through 'outer sense' (i.e., the body).[17] He proposes:

 

Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility [Kt1:42].

 

Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state [49].

 

Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever [50].

 

This means all objects which appear to the inner sense-i.e., 'the sum of all representations' [220]-are intuited in the context of time, while both time and space are required for an object to appear to outer sense.[18] 'Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are what make a priori synthetic propositions possible' [55-6].

 

      Because the pure intuitions of time and space are not forms 'inher­ing in things in themselves as their intrinsic property' [Kt1:45], but exist 'only in us',[19] they cannot claim 'absolute reality'.[20] As Kant explains, 'these a pri­ori sources of knowledge, being merely conditions of our sensibility, just by this very fact determine their own limits, namely, that they apply to objects only in so far as objects are viewed as appearances, and do not present things as they are in themselves' [56; cf. A9:320]. This limiting function explains why such spatio-temporal intuition is the core element in the transcendental perspective of systemt. Pure spatio-temporal intuition fulfills the transcenden­tal function of enabling the representations of the first step, which could otherwise be regarded only in terms of the transcendental object, to be repre­sented as a manifold of appearances here in the second step. That is:

 

 

 

      This second condition not only determines the intuitive form of sensibil­ity, but also enables the matter provided by the transcendental object to be revealed in the appearances; for as Kant says, 'appearances contain in addition to intuition the matter for some object in general [i.e., for the transcendental ob­ject]' [Kt1:207]. The third condition of sensibility (--), therefore, must be to actualize these formal (+) and material (-) conditions in a synthetic unity (x); that is, the appear­ances, or sensible intuitions must actually be sensed, thus representing the manifold of appearances as a discrete sensation.[21] This pro­cess can be summarized as:

 

 

      Kant does not devote much attention to this third step in his argu­ment, perhaps because its conclusion is so obvious.[22] It is important to point out, however, that the sensations in this third step, as viewed here from the tran­scen­dental perspective, are not sensations as we actually experience them, but refer only to the level of determination of the object produced by the faculty of sensation in abstraction from the understanding. (Kant does sometimes view sensibility empirically, in an active sense-as, for example, when he says 'inner sense presents to me ...' [Kt1:321]. But when viewed transcen­den­tally, sen­sibility is the purely passive capacity for receiving objects, some of which will eventually help constitute knowledge.) This third step completes the sen­sibility stage of systemt and establishes sensation as 'the material of sen­sible knowledge'.[23] Of course, those sensations which are never concep­tualized in such a way as to produce possible knowledge will never be­com­e conscious [C1:1.352-5]. Inasmuch as unconscious sen­sations are not episte­mologically interesting, Kant ignores them and concen­trates instead on those destined to help make up empirical knowledge [Kt1:A111].

 

  B. Conceptual Understanding (+-)

 

      As mentioned in VII.1, the aim of the understanding in the second stage is to provide the abstract conceptual form for the abstract matter presented to it by sensibility. This does not mean 'All intuitional process is concep­tually controlled' [E3:89e.a.], but that in order to produce empirical knowl­edge, such material processes must submit to the formal 'control' of conceptual pro­cesses. In Kt1:A94 Kant lists three 'conditions for the possibility of expe­ri­ence', which must hold true in order for thoughts to arise out of a manifold of appearances : '(1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of the manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception' [s.a. 104,A115]. He then re­minds us that the Aesthetic (i.e., the first stage) culminates in the first of these condi­tions, sensation [A94-5]. The second stage, as expounded in the Analytic of Concepts, now assumes the logical perspective (+-), which cul­minates in the formation of self-conscious thought; therefore, the other two conditions listed in Kt1:A94 should function as two of the steps in this sec­ond stage.

 

      Kant's account of the fourth step of systemt is somewhat muddled by his use of several terms in very similar ways with no clear explanation of their relationship. In particular, the terms 'imagination', 'perception' and 'appre­hension' are easily confused, because they all take part in the function of synthesis, which Kant regards as the 'first application' of the understanding to sensibility [Kt1:152], and which he defines as 'the act of putting different rep­resentations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge.... Synthesis of a manifold ... is what first gives rise to knowl­edge' [103]. 'The understanding does not', according to Kant, 'find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense.'[24] This 'synthetic influence of the understanding upon inner sense' is what Kant ordinarily refers to as 'the transcendental act of imagina­tion' [154]. In itself, apart from the illumination provided by the fifth and sixth condi­tions as they 'bring this synthesis to concepts', the imagination is 'a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowl­edge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious' [103]; it sim­ply 'connects the manifold of sensible intuition' [164] in such a way as to form an inner image of the sensations involved.[25]

 

      This application of imagination to sensations results in a con­scious 'as­sociation of representations',[26] which Kant calls perception [Kt1:160,164]. Perception is the act in which appearances are 'combined with con­scious­ness' [A119-20] to produce 'objects of perception' [207]; it 'contains sensation' as its 'matter' [208-9]. Accordingly, a percep­tion can be described as a 'represen­tation accompanied by sensation' [147], as long as it is a 'sensation of which we are conscious' [272]. In short: 'Perception is ... a con­sciousness in which sensation is to be found' [207; cf. Kt22:217]. Since this conscious­ness, which forms sensations into perceptions, arises only through the syn­thesis of imagination, 'perception' can be thought of as a general de­scription of the whole process (i.e., the four steps) leading up to and includ­ing this synthesis. Kant suggests this when he describes the entire second stage as that in which 'our faculty of knowledge ... advan­ces from particular perceptions to universal concepts' [Kt1:118; cf. Kt7i:203n]. As the material (-) step in the second stage (+-), percep­tions can therefore be correlated with the +-- component in Figure III.6 [s.a. Table III.5].

 

      An accurate summary of the complexities of this fourth condition would have to take into account Kant's variety of expression [see Ap. VII.E], which would be too cumbersome for our purposes. Instead, we need only express the essential function of this 'first principle of the human under­standing' [Kt1: 139; s.a. 152] in stage two:

 

 

No matter which terms we use to describe it, this fourth step serves, by means of a transcendental synthesis, to 'bring the manifold of intuition on the one side into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other' [Kt1:A124; s.a.164].

 

      Apperception, however, does not follow synthesis immediately in sys­temt (i.e., it does not function as the form to be imposed upon the percep­tions rep­resented in the material step); rather this function is fulfilled by the 'pure con­cepts of the understanding' (i.e., the 'categories') [see e.g., Kt1:A119], while apperception, as we shall see, acts as the synthetic condi­tion of stage two.[27] For 'our understanding ... can produce a priori unity of appercep­tion solely by means of the categories' [145e.a.]; indeed, such 'transcendental unity ... is thought in the categories' [151]. The categories, as 'the conditions of the nec­essary unity of apperception', and not apperception itself, can be re­garded therefore as doing for stage two what 'the formal condi­tions of space and time' do for stage one [A110e.a.; s.a. A111,136]. Whereas 'the categories contain, from the perspective of the understanding, the grounds of the possi­bility of all experience in general' [167], space and time contain the grounds for the same possibility, from the perspective of sensibili­ty. Since Kant believes 'All synthesis ... is subject to the categories' [161], he de­scribes the lat­ter as categories of synthesis, to which the object as given in step four, that is 'perception, must completely conform' [162], and which as such prepare the way for the unity of apperception in step six. 'Consequently, all possible perceptions ... must be subject to the categories' [164-5].

 

      Whereas the second condition of the first stage gave rise to objects of intuition (i.e., appearances), that of the second stage gives rise to objects of thought or conception (i.e., concepts). Kant defines thought rather loosely as 'knowledge by means of concepts' [Kt1:94], but more precisely as 'the act which relates given intuition to an object' [304]. In Kt1:A124 he explains that 'concepts ... are brought into play through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception', thus implying that they arise out of the applica­tion of categories to conscious perceptions here in step five. The connection between the concepts produced by this activity of 'categorial conception'[28] and the categories through which this task is achieved is frequently made ex­plicit, as when Kant refers to the categories as 'forms of thought' [e.g., 150, 289,305] (as opposed to space and time as 'forms of intui­tion'[29]), or as 'the pure form of the conceptual perspective on objects in general' [305]. As such, categories are 'concepts of objects in general' [K2:11.301(Z1:183); s.a. Kt1: 158], which suggests a correla­tion between the intuitive determination of the transcendental object in stage one and its conceptual manifestation in stage two [see Ap. VII.B]. Since the categories function as 'the law of the syn­thetic unity of all appearances' [A128], a concept produced by such conception 'is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule.'[30]

 

      Kant often stresses the necessary, reciprocal relationship between intu­ition and conception: 'Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition, through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, concept[ion], through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition' [Kt1:125; see also Kt69:325; K2: 11.302(Z1:184)]. Just as intuitions are intelligible only when related to con­cepts, so also concepts are objectively valid only if they are related to in­tu­i­tions via perception [Kt1:272]. Even though in experience these two are al­ways combined, Kant believes that, by theoretically abstracting from the par­ticular content of all perceptions and examining their general content [A245], he can compile a complete list of all the a priori categories of pure under­stand­ing.[31] Moreover, as we saw in III.3, there is a sense in which the twelve categories correspond directly to the twelve steps in systemt-a corre­spon­dence which Kant himself begins to elaborate in Kt1:742-3 when he says quantities (--) can be 'exhibited a priori in intuition', while qualities (+-) can be known 'only through concepts'. In any case, our need to abstract from experience in order to arrive at the categories [Kt1:165] does not contradict the fact that they function in systemt as 'independent cognitive acts' [R11:89]. For as Wallace says: 'The pure or abstract categories have their home in logic' [W5:171]-i.e., in the logical perspective of systemt. So we can sum­marize the general function[32] of this formal (+) step in the logical perspec­tive (+-) of systemt as:

 

 

 

      Even though Kant establishes the categories by abstracting all sensibility from experience, he is careful to remind us that 'the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality' only when they are applied 'to objects which can be given us in intuition' [Kt1:150-1]. That is, since 'the categories are not in themselves knowledge, but are mere forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions', it follows that 'no synthetic proposition can be made from mere categories' [288-9]-in them­selves they define the formal character of the logical perspective in systemt. So, although in the second stage Ka