Chapter III

Kant’s Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1

 

 

If a theory has in itself stability, the stresses and strains which may at first have seemed very threatening to it serve only, in the course of time, to smooth away its inequalities; and if men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity devote them­selves to its exposition, it may also, in a short time, secure for itself the necessary elegance of statement. [Kt1:xliv]

 

1. The General Structure of Kant’s System

    Kant’s System of Perspectives is a four volume work that aims to provide a thoroughgoing, architectonically-informed interpretation of Kant’s Critical philosophy and its metaphysical implications. Though the first volume [KSP1] was originally published under the title that properly belongs to the entire work, that volume should have been (and in any subsequent editions, will be) entitled Kant’s Critical Philosophy. In this chapter I shall provide a brief overview (and slight revision) of the con­tents of that volume, devoting one section each to the description of its four main parts. Any reader who is well acquainted with the contents of KSP1, and who is in no need of a reminder of the approach to interpreting Kant established therein, can safely skip this chapter and proceed immediately with Part Two.[1]

    Part One of KSP1 sets forth a number of fundamental guidelines for inter­preting Kant’s philosophy. The first is that we must be careful to attend to its systematic nature. Kant, like so many other philosophers of his day, set out intentionally to construct a philosophical system, rather than merely to defend a number of independent theses. For this reason, his arguments are bound to be misunderstood unless the interpreter constantly keeps one eye, as it were, on the validity of the argument, and the other on its context within the system. As components of a system, Kant’s arguments often cannot (and hence, should not be expected to) retain their force if they are removed from their context.

    The second fundamental interpretive guideline, as suggested by the title of the present four-volume project, is that Kant’s philosophy is organized not merely into a single system composed of one set of arguments, but into a com­plex System of systems,[2] each of whose structure is determined by a set of interrelated perspectives. Indeed, the ‘principle of perspective’, as I call it in KSP1:II.1, can be regarded as the single idea that governs the whole structure of Kant’s System. This principle is ‘the universal rule that the truth is always relative to some perspective’, where ‘perspective’ refers to ‘the systematic context into which an object (e.g., a philosophical question) is placed by virtue of the method of reflection assumed by the subject’ [KSP1:28,30]. Because of the pervasiveness of this principle in Kant’s System, his writing often contains claims which, when taken out of context, directly contradict claims clearly advanced elsewhere. Such apparent contradictions are nearly always due to dif­ferences in the perspective adopted, rather than to an outright change in Kant’s own views.[3]

    Although Kant himself does not actually use the word ‘perspective’, he does use a variety of terms that can be taken as equivalent to this term. A search through Kt1 reveals that in this book alone Kant uses well over 500 ‘perspecti­val equivalents’ [see KSP1:II.3]. When these many occurrences of the notion of a perspective are translated as such,[4] the extent to which Kant’s Sys­tem is a System of Perspectives becomes clear. The principle of perspective op­erates on three distinct levels in Kant’s System. The first and most general level is the overall Transcendental (or Copernican) Perspective. Kant’s whole Sys­tem requires the assumption, patterned after Copernicus’ revolution in astron­omy, that knowledge is in one sense determined by the subject rather than the object [see KSP1:III.1]. I distinguish this type of Perspective from all others by capitalizing the ‘P’ [see note III.2, above]. The second level of perspectives defines the general subject-matter (or ‘standpoint’, as I call it) for each of the three systems that constitute Kant’s System. The three Critiques (along with their supporting works) adopt, respectively, the theoretical, the practical, and the judicial stand­points.[5] And on the third level there arises a set of four per­spectives that operate, in turn, within each of the three systems. These per­spec­tives, the transcenden­tal, logical, empirical, and hypothetical, each serve as the point of view from which one ‘stage’ of Kant’s argument is constructed. (The relationships be­tween the three standpoints and the four perspectives is discussed further in AIII.1.)

    After a brief look at the nature of the Copernican Perspective and at the divisions present in the tables of contents to the three Critiques, KSP1.III proposes a logical apparatus for clarifying Kant’s arguments and ‘mapping’ them onto a set of simple geometrical figures. No argument in Kant’s System of Perspectives depends for its validity upon this apparatus or the ac­com­panying geometrical maps; on the contrary, the latter are intended mainly as heuristic devices to aid in the explanation and clarification of arguments and in­terpretations that are worked out independently. This system of mapping logical relations onto geometrical figures is called ‘the geometry of logic’ and has been thoroughly explained elsewhere [see Pa92a, Pa98, and Pa00a]. For our present purposes, the following brief summary will suffice.

    The geometry of logic begins by distinguishing between analytic and syn­thetic forms of relation. Analytic relations are always twofold, while synthetic relations are threefold. The first-level analytic relation (abbreviated 1LAR) merely distinguishes positivity (+) from negativity (-) and maps this simple relation onto the opposite poles of a line segment. Applying a second ana­lytic division to each side of a 1LAR generates a second-level analytic relation (2LAR), consisting of four possible ‘components’:[6] --, +-, -+, and ++. These can be mapped onto two intersecting line segments, as shown in Figure III.1. The rules for constructing all such ‘standard’ maps are to a large extent arbi­trary (or rather, conventional, inasmuch as they are based on traditional cor­relations). Arrows point away from ‘pure’ (i.e., like-termed) components and

towards ‘impure’ (i.e., mixed-termed) components. The + labels po­sitions above and/or to the left of an opposing position, while the - labels posi­tions below and/or to the right.

    Synthetic relations require a third term to represent the synthesis of + and -. The mathematical connotations of the letter ‘x’ make it a very appropriate symbol for this purpose. The geometrical figure that best repre­sents such threefold relations is a tri­angle, with either its three sides or its three vertices each representing one

 

Figure III.1:

The Standard 2LAR Cross

component, as shown in Figure III.2. The double-headed arrow represents the direct opposition between the + and - components, whereas the single-headed arrows represent the flow from the two basic analytic components to the new, synthetic component that arises out of their synthetic relation.

    Because of the nature of synthetic and analytic relations, most of Kant’s favorite distinctions are either threefold or fourfold. (Kant himself acknowl­edges this in Kt7:197n.) The most interesting of all his distinctions, however, is twelvefold. He uses the same twelvefold (3x4) pattern to structure the fa­mous table of categories in Kt1 as he does to structure several other similar tables, both in Kt1 and elsewhere. I call this important pattern a ‘twelvefold com­pound relation’ (12CR), because it combines analytic and synthetic forms of

relation by putting four 1LSRs to­gether in the form of a 2LAR. The structure of this relation can be depicted in terms of the geom­etry of logic by dividing a circle into four quadrants, and plotting the com­ponents equidistantly along the cir­cumference, as shown in Figure III.3.

    The 12CR circle can be used as a handy map not only for clarifying the relations between the various terms used in any of Kant’s categorial (twelve­fold) tables, but also for the

 Figure III.2: The Standard 1LSR Triangle

 

Figure III.3:

The Standard 12CR Circle

step-by-step progression of the basic ‘elements’ (cf. ‘components’) in each of the three systems in Kant’s System. This, at any rate, is the claim I make in KSP1:III.3-4 and later substanti­ate in Part Three of KSP1. It will come into play again here in KSP2, when we set out to interpret the structure of Kt8’s basic argument. When used as a map of systematic progression, Figure III.3 should be read clockwise, starting from the -- quadrant (‘stage one’ of the system’s overall argument) and work­ing around to the ++ quadrant (‘stage

 

four’). The 1LSR that makes up each stage is then referred to as composing the three ‘steps’ in that stage of the system’s development. These three steps all follow the same basic pattern, which Kant often refers to as ‘matter’ (-), ‘form’ (+), and ‘synthesis’ (x), re­spectively.

    In addition to explaining some basic distinctions to which Kant applies the above logical patterns, KSP1:III uses a different form of a 12CR (three crosses, arranged in a triangle) to show the relationship between the nine books whose primary purpose was to construct different ‘wings’ of the Sys­tem. Each system has a Critique, a supporting work applying the analytic method to the same (or a very similar) subject-matter, and a work developing the implications of the Critique in question for its corresponding branch of metaphysics. This structural relationship between Kant’s major works is used to determine the numbering for Kt1-Kt10 and, by extension, all Kt entries in the Bibliography. Read­ers who have not read the first volume may therefore wish to consult Figure III.9 [KSP1:101] just to see how this referencing system has been derived. Keeping this pattern in mind will become very important in Chapters XI and XII, when we look more closely at the nature and purpose of Kt9.

 

2. The Epistemological Underpinnings of the Critical Philosophy

    Part Two of KSP1 applies the guidelines established in Part One to the task of interpreting Kant’s most basic epistemological distinctions, those forming the very back­bone of his entire System. Only those distinctions that are both essential to the Critical philosophy and able to be discussed separately from a detailed account of their specific role(s) in the structure of the System are included here. A prior understanding of each of these distinctions is neces­sary in order to avoid misinterpreting not only the details of Kant’s System of Criti­cal philosophy (discussed in KSP1, Part Three), but also his application of that philosophy to metaphysics as such (discussed in KSP2-KSP4). For this reason, any readers who, after reading this section, require a more detailed treat­ment of any of the dis­tinc­tions summarized herein are advised to go (back) to the relevant section(s) of KSP1 before proceeding any further in this volume.

    Chapter IV be­gins by defining the most general technical terms Kant uses to distinguish between various sorts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’. A good way to understand the relation between these two terms is to distinguish be­tween ‘immediate’ and ‘mediate’ experience, where the former is (or at least, can be) one stage in the process of gaining knowledge (akin to what Kant more often calls ‘possible experience’), while the latter is a synonym for empirical knowledge itself. ‘Empirical knowledge is experience’ [Kt1:165-6] in the sense that it is an originally immediate, intuitive awareness of objects that is mediated by concepts. ‘Immediate experience’, by contrast, ‘refers to an indeterminate, nonreflec­tive encounter of subject and object in the ordinary world’ [KSP1: 138]. All the other distinctions examined in Chapter IV relate primarily to the ‘knowledge’ (mediate experience) side of this distinction; but the imme­diate experience side will turn out to play a very important role in our assessment of the religious implications of Kant’s Critical philosophy [s.e. X.2, below].

    After a brief explanation of the difference between ‘pure’ (sensation-inde­pendent) and ‘impure’ (sensation-dependent) kinds of knowledge, two key secondary distinctions are discussed at length. The first is virtually coextensive with, though not identical to, the pure-impure distinction: ‘a priori’ knowledge is knowledge the validity of which can be determined independently of any ref­erence to particular experience(s), whereas ‘a posteriori’ knowledge requires such an appeal to experience(s) in order for its validity to be verified. The ‘analytic-synthetic’ distinction, by contrast, defines the difference between propositions whose truth is rooted entirely in their logico-linguistic structure and those whose truth depends on some fact that must be given in intuition be­fore the proposition’s truth can be known. Among the numerous other ways of making the latter distinction is to say that, whereas the predicate of an analytic proposition is ‘contained in’ the subject, that of a synthetic proposition ‘goes beyond’ the subject.

    By combining these two secondary distinctions, four possible kinds of knowl­edge can be discerned, forming a 2LAR. Kant dismisses one of these, the analytic a posteriori, as obviously nonsensical, inasmuch as there is no need to appeal to experience to test the validity of propositions that are known to be true by logic alone. I argue, by contrast, that there is a definite place for such a classification, provided we give analyticity a sufficiently broad defini­tion. The analytic a priori is more clearly delineated by Kant: it includes any judgment which, given some previously understood meaning for the terms involved, can be reduced to a logical tautology. Synthetic a priori knowledge is by far the most important for Kant, at least within his Critical philosophy. Such knowl­edge is valid independently of any particular experi­ence (a priori) [Kt1:171-2], yet it also supplies new information about the con­cepts involved (syn­thetic)—information not deducible by means of formal logic. Finally, synthetic a posteriori knowledge is the least troublesome (but also, for Kant, the least philo­sophically interesting) of the four classes of knowledge. It is formed by a judgment whose validity is grounded in facts derived from experience (a poste­ri­ori), and whose predicate has intuitive content that is not logically implied by the conventional meaning of the word(s) in the subject (synthetic).

    These four types of knowledge, as it turns out, arise directly out of the four kinds of reflection, or ‘perspectives’, that establish the basic ‘stages’ in each of Kant’s three systems. As summarized in KSP1:138-9:

 

To adopt an empiri­cal perspective is to reflect on what ‘is true’ about one’s expe­ri­ence without taking note of the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge; its goal is to reach synthetic a posteriori knowledge. To adopt a tran­scendental perspective involves distinguishing clearly between the subject and ob­ject in order to reflect on the subjective conditions which ‘must be true’ in order for it to be possible for a subject to experience an object; its goal is to reach synthetic a priori knowledge. To adopt a logical perspective involves abstracting completely from the subject-object distinction in order to reflect on what ‘must be true’ be­cause the logical laws of thought require it to be so; its goal is to reach analytic a priori knowledge. To adopt a speculative per­spective involves distinguishing be­tween the subject and object, but ignoring the role of the subject, in a fallacious at­tempt to reach synthetic a priori knowledge of the thing in itself, even though such knowledge extends beyond the limits set by transcendental reflection. The hypo­thetical perspective re­places the speculative perspective by distinguishing properly between the sub­ject and object as in transcendental reflection, and then reflecting on what we can reasonably treat ‘as if true’ about both transcendent reality and experi­ence in light of the requirements of systematic unity in systemt ...; Kant vaguely suggests its goal is to reach the synthetic a priori, but I have argued that he real­ly means its goal is to reach analytic a posteriori belief.

 

These four perspectives, along with their accompanying methods of reflection, relate together as a perfect 2LAR, as shown in Figure III.4.

    Having established these fundamental epistemological distinctions in Chap­ter IV, KSP1:V then deals with the foremost ‘meta-Critical’ question: what is Kant’s jus­tification for treating the ‘thing in itself’ as the radically unknowable

 

 

Figure III.4:

Kant’s Four Reflective Perspectives on Experience

 

starting point of his System,[7] and so for engaging in transcen­den­tal reflection? Kant himself devotes precious little attention to this question of how Critical philosophy itself is possible. But he does make a number of rather elu­sive statements about ‘faith’ that may be related to this issue. Kant’s theory of ‘rational faith’ is typically regarded as applying solely to his practical philoso­phy, even though his most famous statement—‘I have ... found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ [Kt1:xxx]—appears strategi­cally near the end of the Preface to the first Critique. With this in mind, I ex­plore the possibility of interpreting Kant’s doctrine of rational faith not only as a moral tool used for the systematic justi­fica­tion of the metaphysical ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, but also as a theo­retical tool, required in order to open the door to the entire Critical philoso­phy.

    This view of faith can help reveal the inadequacies of a purely epistemo­log­ical interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of the thing in itself (as defended, for instance, by Allison). In order for such an interpretation to hold, its pro­ponents must virtually ignore a number of explicitly ontological statements Kant makes about the thing in itself, such as when he regards it as the ‘non-sensible cause’ of appearances [e.g., Kt1:334]. Without neglecting the merits of an epistemo­logical interpretation, an emphasis on the role of faith in Kant’s theoretical system, as the tool for opening up a ‘transcendent space’ outside the field of appearances, can explain how such ontological statements can coexist with Kant’s treatment of the thing in itself as a special ‘way of considering’ ap­pearances. Such transcendental faith is required, I argue, in order to defeat the skeptic’s need to resort to empirical faith in the reality of the external world.

    Transcendental faith would be unnecessary, of course, if it were possible to construct a valid transcendental argument for the necessity of presupposing an unknowable thing in itself at the beginning of one’s inquiries. In KSP1:V.3 I therefore explore this possibility, rejecting it as a mistaken use of transcenden­tal arguments. Instead, the theoretical (and so also, the practical) aspect of Kantian faith ought to be regarded as Kant’s concession to the skeptic. As with all Critical philosophizing, Kant does not merely reject the skeptic’s point of view, but incorporates it into a higher standpoint that makes sense out of both it and its opposite (in this case, dogmatic insistence on the knowability of ultimate reality). Chapter V concludes with a discussion of how theoretical faith as the starting point of Kant’s System differs from practical faith as the goal it aims to fulfill.

    The epistemological considera­tions of Part Two come to a head in Chapter VI, wherein the principle of perspec­tive is applied to Kant’s theory of the ‘object’ of knowledge, in hopes of clarifying two ambiguous sets of terms that often stand in the way of a clear understanding of Kt1, and so also of his entire System. The terms ‘thing in itself’, ‘transcen­dental ob­ject’, and ‘appearance’ denote three distinct ways of viewing the object from the tran­scenden­tal per­spective, while ‘positive noumenon’, ‘negative noumenon’, and ‘phe­no­menon’ denote three distinct ways of viewing the same object from the empiri­cal per­spec­tive. The former perspective is concerned with our knowledge of ‘objects in general’, while the latter is concerned more with our knowledge of particular objects. After explaining how these object-terms and their corresponding per­spectives relate to the major divisions of Kt1, KSP1:VI elucidates the distinc­tive meaning of each term in some detail. The progression of Kant’s argument in Kt1 goes from the most abstract transcendental object-term (thing in itself) to the most concrete (appearance), then moves from the most concrete empirical object-term (phenomenon) to the most abstract (positive noumenon) [see Fig. III.5].

    The transcendental perspective begins by viewing an object as if it were not an object at all, but a mere ‘thing’ that has not yet been affected by any of

 

Figure III.5:

Kant’s Six Object-Terms, Progressing Synthetically

 

the subjective conditions that make knowledge possible. This is the root mean­ing of the infamous ‘thing in itself’, and explains why it must be regarded as unknowable. From there the transcendental perspective progresses to the bare recognition that things must become objects in order to be known by us. The precise transcendental condi­tions for becoming objects are not yet taken into consideration, but only the fact that there must be a ‘something in general=x’ [e.g., Kt1:A104]. This is what I call Kant’s ‘doorway’ concept, the notion of the ‘transcendental object’. Once the transcendental conditions (time and space) are taken into consideration, the object can be regarded as appearing to the sub­ject, and the possibility of con­scious awareness (and eventually, knowl­edge) of the object first arises. This is the basic meaning of Kant’s term, ‘appearance’, though there are several other subordinate meanings as well [see KSP1:174-8].

   The empirical perspective takes over right where the transcendental per­spective leaves off, by considering the status of the ordinary objects we experi­ence in the world. But now, Kant views the objects not in terms of the general conditions that make them possible, but in terms of already known objects of experience, called ‘phenomena’. The key difference between the ap­pearance and the phenomenon is that only the latter has come under the limiting condi­tions of the categories.[8] Phenomena, in other words, are know objects, where­as appearances are one of the main ingredients that make up such objec­tive knowledge. From this point, Kant now begins to abstract from known ob­jects (phenomena) in the hope of determining whether or not it is possible to obtain a purely intellectual knowledge of objects. Removing the conditions of appearing (time and space) from the phenomenon, without removing the cate­go­rial condi­tions (causality, etc.), yields the notion of a ‘noumenon’. Kant uses this new notion to explain the difference between a proper and an improper view of pure, intellectual knowledge. The ‘negative noumenon’ corresponds to the transcen­dental object and is a mere limiting concept: it shows us the boundary beyond which our reason cannot establish knowledge. Provided our claims to establish intellectual knowledge relate only to the boundary (i.e., only to the transcen­dental conditions of knowing), they are justified. But if we attempt to establish knowledge of the ‘positive noumenon’, we inevitably fall into illusion (as Kant demonstrates in the Dialectic). Thus, just as the thing in itself is defined as un­knowable from the start, the positive noumenon must be regarded as an empty concept, unable to be grasped by any human being searching for theoretical knowledge.

    KSP1:VI.4 concludes Part Two by providing two versions of a summary of the relationship between the six object-terms described above: one progress­ing synthetically, and treating the transcendental perspective as primary; the other progressing analytically, and treating the empirical perspective as pri­mary. Since Kant’s own emphasis in Kt1 is very much on the transcendental perspective, I have reproduced here only the diagram used to depict the former summary [see Fig. III.5]. Part Two closes with an attempt to unite these two summaries in a single map and with a consideration of how Kant’s actual in­consistencies affect my interpretation of his six object-terms.

 

3. The Structural Elements of Kant’s Three Systems

    Part Three uses the abstract interpretive framework established in Parts One and Two to construct a concrete, detailed account of the elements of the three Critical systems themselves. Each of the three chapters traces, as far as possible, the step-by-step argument presented in the ‘Doctrine of Elements’ (or equivalent) section(s) of one of the Critiques. In each case, the exposition proves to be divisible into four main parts (or ‘stages’), each governed by a

distinct faculty of reason (and its corresponding perspective), and each elabo­rated in terms of a three-step argument. Rather than going into the details of each step here, it will suffice merely to describe the four stages in each system, and then reproduce the summaries of the twelve steps, along with the analytic maps, given at the end of each chapter.[9] Readers who seek more detail should refer to the text of KSP1.

    Kt1 [s.a. Kt2] propounds a system based on the theoretical standpoint (the standpoint that takes the logical perspective as its ‘governing’ perspective). Its short-range goal is epistemological: to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge. This goal is accomplished in the Aesthetic and the Analytic. Its long-range goal, however, is metaphysical and is hardly even addressed until the Dialectic: to explain why theoretical knowledge of metaphysical realities (especially the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality) is impossi­ble and how a proper understanding of the nature and purpose of em­pirical knowledge can provide an adequate means of coping with our necessary ignorance. Table VII.1 in KSP1, reproduced here as Table III.1, provides a comprehensive summary of the re­lationship between Kant’s four fundamental perspectives, the section of Kt1 where it is primarily applied, the transcendental forms (or conditions) estab­lished therein, the faculty governing those forms (and defining the perspective), and the empirical function normally associated with that faculty.

 

Table III.1: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemt

 

 

    KSP1:VII.4 provides the following summary of the four stages in sys­temt, progressing analytically (from the final step, backwards to the initial step):

 

     Stage four. The hypothetical perspective (++) is concerned with viewing an experience (a posteriori) as if it is contained (analytical­ly) in a regu­la­tive idea of an unconditioned object. Practical belief (x), the legitimate goal of reason’s unifying influence on expe­rience, arises as a result of such hypo­theti­cal reasoning. (Speculative reason­ing, the illegitimate alternative to hypothetical reasoning, is be­lieved by speculative metaphysicians to yield syn­thetic a priori knowledge through a direct apprehension of the uncondi­tioned object, by means of a constitutive idea.) The idea (+), which is the formal aspect of infer­ring reason, provides a way of see­ing the empirical world as a rational unified whole; such unity is inferred to exist on the basis of an idea of the whole. The material aspect (-) is the object as unconditioned (and thus, as such, unknown), which itself arises out of the application of the schema­tism of reason to items of empirical knowledge. In this way reason guides and limits the understanding (stage two) in its formation of judgments (stage three).

     Stage three. The empirical perspective (-+) is concerned with the real objects (synthetic) presented to us in experience (a posteriori). Empirical knowledge of an object (x) is attained by judging its nega­tively noumenal (i.e., independently per­manent) character. (Speculative reasoning requires the ob­ject to be viewed here as a positive noumenon.) Such a judgment is ‘ob­jec­tive­ly valid’ in virtue of its con­formity to the principles of pure under­stand­ing, through which the object first comes to be determined as a phe­nomenon (+) in space and time. The principles are applicable only to objects which have been schematized—i.e., only to those cate­gorized appearances which have been synthesized according to the imagination’s inner determina­tion of time. The schematized object (-) can therefore be analyzed into its conceptual (stage two) and its intuitive (stage one) components.

     Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) is concerned with the concep­tual form (analytic) of an object as abstracted completely from experience (a priori). Self-con­scious thought (x) arises out of the imposition of the bare ‘I’ (pure apperception) onto the various concepts a person forms on the basis of his or her experience. These concepts (+) are formed through categorial con­ception, in which pure cate­gories are applied to conscious perceptions (-). The latter, in turn, are produced as a result of the imagination’s transcendental synthesis of the sensations presented to it by sensibility (stage one).

     Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) concerns that which must hold true of an intuited object (synthetic) before it can be processed (a priori) by the syn­thetic functions of the understanding in stages two and three. The object at this point is therefore merely a sensation (x), which is to say, it is a manifold of ap­pearances (+) received by the senses. An appearance is an object represented to the inner and/or outer sense through the function of pure spatio-temporal intuition. If it is an appearance of something real, it will be related in this way to the transcen­dental object. The transcendental object (-) is the general and totally undetermined original representation of the thing in itself. And the thing in itself (0) is the un­represented and thus unknowable form of an object of experience, considered apart from the conditions which enable us to experience it. We can have no knowledge of it, because there is no perspec­tive from which we can view it as such.

 

The ‘+’, ‘-’, and ‘x’ terms included in this summary refer to the logical status of the step or stage under consideration, according to the principles of the geometry of logic, outlined in KSP1:III.3-4.

    Chapter VIII applies the same principles to inter­pret Kt4 [s.a. Kt5], where­in Kant constructs a system based on the practical standpoint (the standpoint that takes the hypothetical perspective as its governing perspective). Its short-range goal is ethical: to establish the necessary conditions for the possi­bility of moral actions. This goal is accomplished in the three chapters of the Analytic. Its long-range goal, however, is (like that of systemt) metaphysical and does not come into full view until the Dialectic: to explain how practical knowledge

 

Table III.2: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemp

 

 

of metaphysical ideas is not only possible, but necessary, because of how intimately bound up they are with the nature and purpose of moral ac­tion. Table VIII.1 in KSP1, reproduced above as Table III.2, provides a com­prehensive summary of the architec­tonic structure of the four stages of systemp—one that exactly parallels the summary given above for systemt.

    KSP1:VII.4 provides the following summary of the four stages in systemp, likewise running directly parallel to the one given for systemt:

 

     Stage four. The hypothetical perspective (++) in systemp aims to establish the ultimate purpose, or ‘final end’, of moral action. This end, called the ‘highest good’ (x), can be conceived to be possible only by setting before oneself an ideal­ized ‘realm of ends’, in which perfect virtue (-) is com­bined with happiness (+) propor­tional to each person’s virtue. Because hu­mans are not only intellectual but also sensible beings, they do not always act virtu­ously; and when they do, they are not always rewarded with happi­ness. We who do not yet live in the ideal realm must therefore adopt a moral faith to postulate the reality of a God who, as a righ­teous judge, will insure happiness for the vir­tuous, and an immortal life in which human beings can gradually attain per­fect virtue.

     Stage three. The empirical perspective (-+) deals with the actual real­ization of moral action. The real experience of moral action is called duty (x), and it results from a practical judgment impelling us to follow some uncondi­tion­al rule for ac­tion (+). The agent is obligated to obey such rules because they are com­manded by the ‘categorical imperative’, which is the moral law viewed from the empirical per­spective. The autonomous choice to obey (-), which signals an agent’s adoption of this impera­tive, is motivated by a feel­ing of respect for the moral law. (This pro­vides an interest in obeying the law which counteracts the agent’s natural interest in pursuing happiness through the heteronomous choice to fulfill sensuous incli­na­tions.) Such re­spect func­tions as a schema, synthesizing the moral law (stage two) with free will (stage one).

     Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) deals with the conceptual form of moral actions, as expressed in the moral law. Because the moral law legis­lates through human reason, the ‘we’ of humanity must be regarded as an end in itself, so that all moral ends will be personal ends (x). A personal end can be adopted only by someone who can understand the concepts of good and evil (+), as determined by the categories of freedom. The categorial concep­tion of freedom (and so also personhood itself) requires the capacity to univer­salize a maxim of the will (stage one) in order to produce a moral principle (-).

     Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) concerns that which must hold true of an object of desire in order for it to produce materi­al for a moral action. A maxim (x) is the subjective rule of action which results from an agent’s choice of an end (i.e., a possible object) from among the manifold of desires (+). The latter arises when the fact of practical freedom is imposed upon a good will (-). This wholly undetermined concept of a ‘good will’ can be regarded as the original mani­festation of a moral agent’s transcen­dent disposition (0), which is the ultimate basis of the agent’s desire to act.

 

 

 

 

 

Figure III.6: Schematic Analysis* of Systemt

The analytic maps of systemt and systemp, given in KSP1:239,285, are repro­duced on this and the previous page, for easy reference and comparison.

    Chapter IX concludes KSP1’s Part Three with an application, as far as possible, of the same principles of interpretation to Kt7. The problem is that the third Cri­tique is far less systematic, far less carefully structured according to Kant’s ar­chitectonic plan, than the first two [see note III.9, above]. Part of the rea­son for this, no doubt, is that the standpoint it assumes, the judicial stand­point, takes the empirical perspective as its governing perspective (the transcen­dental per­spective being the gov­erning perspective for the entire Copernican Perspec­tive [see KSP1:III.4]). Another factor is that Kt7 is the only Critique divided into two distinct halves. (I offer a new explanation of the architectonic

 

 

Figure III.7: Schematic Analysis* of Systemp

 

Figure III.8:

The Three Revolutions of Kant’s Critical Philosophy

 

basis for this division in AIII.1.) The first half of Kt7 uses the notion of ‘subjective finality’ to examine the rational conditions under which judgments of beauty (and later, sublimity) are made. Appealing to para­doxical notions such as ‘disinterested delight’ and ‘subjective universality’, Kant seeks to es­tablish a moral source for such judgments, even though they relate to sen­sible (and thereby apparently theoretical) objects. The second half, by contrast, achieves such a synthesis by placing more emphasis on the theoret­ical: the no­tion of ‘objective finality’ is used to ex­amine the rational conditions under which natural objects can be viewed as pur­poseful ends, or ‘organisms’.

    Part Three ends with an attempt to draw together the systematic relations between all three Critiques. KSP1:VII and VIII use the standard 12CR map [see Fig. III.3, above] as a basis for constructing similar maps of systemt and sys­temp [see KSP1:242,287], which I have not included here. On the basis of these maps, and in the knowledge that the third Critique is meant to serve as a bridge between the first two, the connection between Kant’s three Critiques can be pic­tured as a spiral [see Fig. III.8]. If we regard each revolution as repre­senting a twelve-step system, this map can serve, in an admittedly fanciful way, as a single picture displaying the architectonic (36-fold) structure of Kant’s Critical philoso­phy—or to use Kant’s own words, it can serve as an ‘idea of the whole’ [Kt1:xliv].

 

4. God and Religion in the Context of Kant’s Metaphysics

    Just as each system in Kant’s System appears to be complete once step nine has been fully established, so also KSP1 appears to be complete at the end of Chapter IX. In other words, just as the elements of empirical knowledge are, strictly speaking, fully elaborated by the end of stage three in systemt and those of moral action, by the end of stage three in systemp, so also the elements of Kant’s Critical philosophy as such are fully described by the end of Part Three in KSP1. The fourth stage in each system explains the rational purpose for what has been established in step nine. In the same way, Part Four of KSP1 lays bare the purpose of the Critical philosophy in the context of Kant’s overall System, explaining the relationship between critique and metaphysics proper.

    Part Four of KSP1 begins by introducing a new, comprehensive way of mapping the entirety of Kant’s System. Figure X.1 combines features of a number of previous maps, including those representing the two forms of 12CR [see KSP1, Figs. III.6 and III.9], mainly in order to show the complex rela­tionship between the Critical philosophy (i.e., the systems elaborated in the three Critiques) and the other aspects (‘wings’) of the System. This rather fan­ciful, four-spiral diagram is the only map in KSP1 that is introduced before the elaboration of the ideas it is meant to clarify. The reason for this is quite simple: Part Four is not intended to present any polished arguments, but only to offer up, as it were, a series of heuristic ‘ideas’ to be elaborated more fully in the three proposed sequels to KSP1.

    With this in mind, it is clear that a detailed summary of Part Four is not necessary here. Instead, I shall merely point out that each of its three chapters centers on one of Kant’s three main ideas of reason—God, freedom, and im­mortality, respectively—and that one discrete area of metaphysical ‘application’ of Critical principles is connected to each idea. Kant’s critique of the idea of God gives rise to numerous metaphysical implications regarding religion; his critique of the idea of freedom raises issues relating to the corresponding idea of ‘the world’, thus paving the way for a metaphysics of science; and his critique of the idea of immortality likewise raises issues relating to the correspond­ing idea of ‘the soul’, thus paving the way for a metaphysics of mankind’s po­litical history.[10] The present, second volume of Kant’s System of Perspectives, takes up the first of these three metaphysical themes.

    As suggested in the foregoing summary (and even more so in Chapter X of KSP1), Kant’s Critical Religion is concerned not only with religion as such, but with every aspect of Kant’s understanding of God. Indeed, it could just as well be entitled Kant’s Metaphysics of God. Parts Two through Four of this volume will examine three different aspects of this topic. (The logical relation between these three parts is, incidentally, exactly the same as the logical relation between the three Critiques, though this does not imply that the topics dis­cussed therein will necessarily be more closely related to that Critique than to the other two.) First, Part Two will examine Kant’s theology, with special attention being paid to his views on the possibility of proving that God exists, on the nature of God, and on the relation between theology and morality. Part Three will examine Kant’s view of religion as such, with special attention being given to interpreting how Kt8 constitutes a metaphysical system of religion,[11] and how this system relates to Christianity. And Part Four will examine the extent to which Kant actually achieved his goal of developing a Critical mysti­cism, as hinted in Kt18 and explicated in Chapter II, above. Having already laid the groundwork here in Part One for an examination of these three manifestations of the first and foremost metaphysical idea, let us now proceed to look in more detail at how Kant’s mature System of Perspec­tives provides us with a balanced and healthy approach to the­ology, religion, and religious experience.[12]

 

  [1]. Such readers may first wish to consult AII.1-4, below, where I respond to various critics and provide some important supplementary material. On the other hand, readers in need of a more basic intro­duction to Kant’s Critical philosophy than that provided in KSP1 may wish to consult Pa00a [s.e. Lectures 8,9,11,21,22,29, 32, and 33.

  [2]. Throughout this volume, as in KSP1, the ‘S’ in ‘System’ is capitalized when the word refers to this overall, higher-level structure, but not when it refers to one of the subordinate systems within the System. The same is true for the higher-level (e.g., Copernican) ‘Perspective’ as compared to the lower-level ‘perspec­tives’—except that the name ‘System of Perspectives’ is also capitalized.

  [3]. By no means is it my intention to suggest that Kant’s ideas did not continually develop through­out his lifetime; rather, KSP1 operates on the assumption that in most cases those devel­opments can best be regarded not so much as radical changes, but as the emergence of new levels of thought or application, following upon the previously attained levels as an organic process of growth. My point is to reject the tendency of some interpreters to treat Kant’s develop­ment as a mere fumbling about with an array of different and often contradictory ideas, with nothing but a fab­ricated architectonic to keep them together.

  [4]. In KSP1, and throughout this volume as well, I adopt just such a practice, by substituting ‘per­spective’ for the translator’s word(s) whenever Kant’s text contains one of these perspectival equivalents. This nicely highlights the extent to which Kant used perspectival terminology. The drawback, however, is that, because Kant himself did not use these perspectival equivalents as technical terms, replacing them with a single technical term can give the impression that the word ‘perspective’ is being used in too many (often nontechnical) ways. In KSP1:II.3, for example, quotes are given where Kant refers to the ‘epistemological perspective’, the ‘conceptual perspec­tive’, the ‘speculative perspective’, and the ‘human perspective’, none of which (as such) play a constitutive role in Kant’s System. The reader should keep in mind, therefore, that any ambiguity in the use of ‘perspective’ in quotes from Kant is due to this convention, rather than to any ambigu­ity inherent in the technical meaning of ‘perspective’ as established in KSP1.

  [5]. The focus of these standpoints is on what ‘is’ (cf. ‘What can I know?’), what ‘ought to be’ (cf. ‘What ought I to do?’), and what ‘should be regarded as being’ (cf. ‘What may I hope?’) true, respectively [Wi90:34; cf. Kt1:832-3; Kt10:25; Kt66:227-8; AA11:414(Zw67:205)]. As noted in KSP1:317 and Pa00a:50-1, Kant’s fourth question, ‘What is man?’ [e.g., Kt10:25(29)] is supposed to encompass the other three. A better version of this question, however—one that matches the form of the other questions far better—is ‘Who am I?’ Kant’s version may be more appropriate for anthropology, but mine is better for psychology [see Pa97]. An important point to recall for our purposes here in KSP2 is that for Kant this third stand­point, the standpoint of hope, is the Critical standpoint itself [see KSP1:AII and note I.17, above]. Fendt aptly ex­presses its importance when he says [Fe90:202]: ‘Hope is the passion driving the critical project.’

  [6]. A ‘term’ is any individual + or -, whereas a ‘component’ is a set of terms that together la­bel one discrete part of a diagram. Each component consists of the same number of terms as the level (e.g., first-level components have one term, second-level components have two terms, etc.), and the num­ber of different components for analytic relations is always 2n, where n refers to the number of terms (as well as to the level).

  [7]. That the thing in itself must be regarded as unknowable in order to be truly ‘Kantian’ is argued in AV.1-4 of KSP1. Some possible misunderstandings of the view of faith defended in KSP1:V are clarified in AIII.2, below.

  [8]. Having said this, it is important to note that Kant does not always follow his own technical def­initions. Particularly in this case, he often uses the term ‘appearance’ where we would expect the term ‘phenomenon’ to be used. At least part of the reason for this, no doubt, is that for Kant the transcendental perspective takes precedence over all other perspectives.

  [9]. Kt7 is an exception here, inasmuch as it contains no ‘Doctrine of Elements’, and so also, no discernible twelve-step argument [see KSP1:IX.4]. Appendix IX of KSP1 suggests some possible solutions to this problem. See also VII.1-4, below, where Kt8 will be interpreted in such a way as to suggest Kant may have been attempting to make up for the systemat­ic inadequacies of Kt7.

[10].   This threefold division can help make sense out of a number of Kant’s other distinctions as well. For instance, in Kt65:28(45), he refers to ‘clergymen, legal officials, and doctors’ as ‘the business­men of the higher faculties’ (namely, theology, law, and medicine). These three profes­sions correspond to the metaphysical investigations of religion, politics, and science, respective­ly. Taken together with the lower faculty (philosophy), this list therefore corresponds exactly (except for the order) to the four volumes of KSP.

[11].   It is worth pointing out here the difference between referring to Kant’s view of religion, etc., as ‘Critical’ and regarding Kt8 as Kant’s ‘fourth Critique’. In one sense, the latter is a tempting suggestion: for as we shall see in Part Three, Kt8 follows the twelve-step pattern of the first and second Critiques far better than the third Critique does. This is one reason I suggest in VI.2 that Kant may have intended it not as a fourth Critique—as if his architectonic required such—but as a substitute for the third Critique. However, this too could be misleading, because, as suggested above, religion is for Kant primarily a subject for metaphysics rather than for critique as such. Kant never intended to write a Critique of Religion, any more than he intended to write a Critique of Science or a Critique of Political History. Rather, his essays on these subjects reflect his interest in develop­ing positive metaphysical views thereof—informed by the boundary conditions set out in the Critical philosophy. This is what is meant by entitling a series of books on Kant’s meta­physics ‘Critical Religion’, ‘Critical Science’, and ‘Critical Politics’.

[12].   The textual data for this study come from relevant comments and arguments found throughout most of Kant’s writings. The main texts, however, are the three Critiques(the Dialectics), Kt8, Kt9, Kt15, Kt17, Kt18, Kt25, Kt26, Kt35, Kt64, Kt65 (Part One), and Kant’s correspondence [Zw67].

 

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