Appendix IX
Kantian Christianity: 95 Theses and a Critical Catechism
1. Kantian Christianity as a Catholic-Protestant Synthesis
Is Kant’s Critical religion more amenable to Protestant or to Catholic forms of Christian faith? Since Kant was raised as a Protestant and directed a considerable amount of attention to the task of reforming the Reformers (i.e., being even more ‘protestant’ than the Protestants), many have assumed he has more in common with Luther than with Erasmus [e.g., Cr94:128]. But Galbraith goes to the opposite extreme [Ga96:107], arguing that ‘Kant’s account of human freedom actually turns the Lutheran account on its head. For Kant, human freedom amounts to no less than the freedom that Luther attributes only to God.’ She explicitly denies the common view that Kant was trying to ‘demythologize Luther’ [109], preferring to read Kant as defending and/or revising the Catholic position represented by Erasmus [116]. Galbraith ably defends her positive thesis regarding Erasmus’ affinity with Kant [93-135; s.a. Wh90:16]; but a more plausible position, I believe, is to regard Kant as seeking to establish a third approach to Christian faith, one that unites the opposites of Catholicism and Protestantism, while going beyond both, as shown in Figure AIX.1. This suggestion will be defended in KSP4.
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Figure AIX.1: Kantian Christianity as a Catholic-Protestant Synthesis
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Kant was never enough of a political activist to emulate Luther by actually posting his viewpoints on the door of, for example, the University Church in Königsberg, nor was he sufficiently interested in developing his own ideas into a new tradition to express them in the Catholic form of a catechism. Nevertheless, expressing the fundamental tenets and implications of systemr in these two opposite, yet equally provocative forms would show the extent to which his ideas effect a reformation no less radical than Luther’s 95 theses, yet constitute a body of beliefs no less teachable than Catholic dog-ma. The next two parts of this appendix will carry out this task by listing 95 theses Kant |
defends in Kt8 (given in larger print, to facilitate strategically posting them on relevant doors in the reader’s own locale) and by using a question-and-answer format to elaborate the same 95 points in more detail. Kant’s philosophy of religion can thereby be seen to carry Luther’s reformation of the Catholic Church one step further, by reforming the Protestant Church as well, in those areas where it is still enmeshed in idolatrous beliefs and practices. The catechism should likewise dispel any notion that Kant’s theory is too abstract or idealistic to become the basis for a real, living religion. Most of the 95 theses and their corresponding questions represent key issues addressed in Kt8, though some minor points are included because of their special relevance to Christianity. While Kant certainly does present other religious theses in Kt8, these 95 (gathered here roughly in their order of appearance) represent his most significantly protestant (i.e., reforming on principle) and catholic (i.e., universally teachable) ideas.
2. Kant’s 95 Theses for Religious Reformation
{Prefaces: Religion vis-à-vis morality and theology}
1: Morality is transcendentally prior to religion.
2: Morality points beyond itself to a God beyond mankind.
3: Biblical theology is based on revelation but uses reason.
4: Philosophical theology should not be subject to censorship.
5: Moral religion and revealed religion are like concentric circles.
{Book One: The religious problem}
6: Human beings have a predisposition to do good.
7: Every person inevitably starts out in life with an evil disposition.
8: Human actions only appear to be partly good and partly evil.
9: God judges according to a person’s disposition, not their actions.
10: Sin reverses the proper priority in the ground of one’s maxims.
11: Bare reason cannot discover the rational origin of evil.
12: Evil is radical, corrupting the root of a person’s nature.
13: Self-love is evil only when it opposes the moral law.
14: The workings of grace are mysterious, having no rational use.
15: Dependence on the workings of grace produces fanaticism.
{Book Two: The religious individual}
16: Reason constrains us to believe conversion is necessary.
17: Bare reason cannot discover how conversion happens.
18: The archetype of perfection is the universal vehicle of God’s grace.
19: Examples of good people should awaken this archetype within us.
20: Faith is a rational commitment based on moral certainty.
21: Faith is more important to religion than knowledge.
22: We can be morally but not theoretically certain of God’s acceptance.
23: Hope of salvation requires progress in moral living.
24: Good life-conduct cannot be complete enough to earn salvation.
25: Sin incurs a personal debt that cannot be transferred to anyone else.
26: Death of the old self during conversion pays for past sins.
27: Forgiveness of lapses helps a good-hearted person become better.
28: Moral improvement is evidence of a genuine conversion.
29: The idea of hell is useful only if it helps evil people convert to good.
30: Even deathbed conversions should give rise to good acts.
31: God incarnate must not cease to be a moral example.
32: ‘God incarnate’ means a person has God’s disposition.
33: Belief in a virgin mother has no theoretical justification.
34: Belief in a virgin mother can help us resist temptation.
35: A miracle is an event caused by unknowable laws.
36: Miracles are possible because human knowledge is limited.
37: Human beings should not try to perform miracles.
38: Human beings should not depend on miracles happening.
39: A miracle cannot be from God if it contradicts morality.
{Book Three: The religious community}
40: People must band together in order to overcome evil.
41: Political alliances cannot make people virtuous.
42: An ethical community is bound to fail without God.
43: An ethical community governed by God is a church.
44: A true church must be unified, pure, free, and unchangeable.
45: People have a duty to implement these principles in a visible church.
46: God alone is capable of founding a true church.
47: People should act as if the church’s success depends on them.
48: Historical faiths should be grounded in pure rational faith.
49: In the ideal ‘kingdom of God’, visible churches will not be needed.
50: Real churches today do need to be ‘clothed’ in a visible form.
51: There is only one true religion, as far as its rational form is concerned.
52: Many types of church faith can reflect this one true religion.
53: Christianity is the only universalizable ecclesiastical tradition.
54: The statutes taught by a true church should serve a moral end.
55: Moral improvement is the highest aim of Scriptural interpretation.
56: Saving faith is hope that God will supplement good life-conduct.
57: Good works alone are insufficient to produce salvation.
58: The division between clergy and laity is harmful to pure religion.
59: Divine revelation is available to all human beings through reason.
60: The original Christian message was purely moral.
61: The Bible’s moral content is the most trustworthy of all scriptures.
62: The Bible unveils the ideal form of both true and false religion.
63: The Bible’s moral content enables us to view it as God’s revelation.
64: As a theoretical dogma, the Trinity is an empty mystery.
65: As a practical symbol, the Trinity profoundly describes God’s nature.
66: Belief in a divine call can encourage moral improvement.
67: Hope for atonement is rational only for good-hearted people.
68: Divine election is an absolute mystery with no practical value.
69: ‘God is love’ means people’s worthiness is judged benevolently.
70: The Holy Spirit judges people’s guilt through their own conscience.
{Book IV: Rational guidelines for serving God}
71: The true service of God is morally good life-conduct.
72: Nonmoral religious actions, as such, do not please God.
73: True religion includes nonmoral acts that encourage goodness.
74: A religious person is one who views duties as God’s commands.
75: True religion contains no special duties to God.
76: Revealed and natural religion hold opposite views on duty’s origin.
77: Both supernaturalism and naturalism are inferior to pure rationalism.
78: Pure rationalism sees religion as both natural and revealed/learned.
79: Christianity is destined to become the universal religion of mankind.
80: Jesus (God’s ‘Son’) was the founder of the first true church.
81: Judaism promotes legalism, while Christianity fosters pure morality.
82: Christians should try to free themselves from their historical roots.
83: Belief in revealed propositions is not a religious duty.
84: Dogma is useful as a means to moral awakening.
85: Putting anything (even reverence for God) above virtue is idolatry.
86: Human beings cannot control God in any way.
87: Devotion attunes the mind to a godly disposition.
88: To insist on knowing how salvation works disguises moral unbelief.
89: Clerics should let people have doubts about dogmas and creeds.
90: Effective service requires some form of nonmoral religious activity.
91: The true spirit of prayer is moral self-improvement.
92: Church-going is a duty when it promotes virtue.
93: Baptism aims at, but does not produce, holiness.
94: Communion promotes community and brotherly love.
95: Virtue is the basis for pardoning grace, not vice versa.
3. A Catechism Based on Kant’s Critical Religion
{Prefaces: Morality vis-à-vis morality and theology}
Q1: Which has primary influence over you, morality or religion?
Religion as a cultural phenomenon (i.e., as historical faith) has empirical priority over morality; as the arena for transmitting moral concepts to each successive generation, it influenced me first in time. Nevertheless, morality as such does not depend on any particular religion. I can use reason alone to determine what is morally good for me to do in any given situation, without referring to any specific religious beliefs or revelation. From the transcendental perspective, therefore, morality is prior to religion.
Q2: Does God exist as a real Being, or is God just an idea in your mind?
Although theoretical reason naturally produces the idea of God in my mind, it does not provide a proof that can conclusively demonstrate God’s existence. Nevertheless, the universal human experience of morality points beyond itself to a highest moral Being ‘outside of mankind’. I must believe such a God really exists in order to explain why morality itself is rational. Moreover, I can successfully obey the universal duty to form an ethical community only if a God exists to guide each individual member from within his or her own reason.
Q3: As a biblical theologian, should you depend more on reason or revelation?
Although I must make use of reason when doing biblical theology, my discipline is properly based on revelation. I use reason as a tool to clarify and defend what revelation teaches me. My use of both theoretical and practical reason is therefore always subject to criticism from philosophers.
Q4: To what extent should your theology be subject to censorship?
Insofar as I claim to present revealed truths to the general public, I must be prepared to subject my theology to official censorship. But unlike biblical theology, philosophical theology is grounded in reason, even when it takes some alleged revelation as its subject-matter. Critical theology gives priority to practical considerations, treating morality rather than mere logic as the rational touchstone for determining what is and is not of value for theology and religion. As a philosophical theologian I dialogue mainly with philosophers and biblical theologians, not with the general public; my theology should therefore be exempt from any government censorship of theology.
Q5: How is pure (moral) religion related to revealed (historical) religion?
The two are like concentric circles, with pure religion in the center and historical religion wrapped around it. This means the former is the kernel that lends meaning and worth to the latter, while the latter is the ‘clothing’ that enables the ‘bare body’ of the former to function effectively in real historical situations.
{Book One: The religious problem}
Q6: As a human being, are you good by nature?
Each of the three aspects of human nature (animality, humanity, and personality) implies that human beings have a good predisposition: to be alive, rational, and responsible are all essentially good attributes. But this does not make me good in actuality; it only means I start life with the potential to do good.
Q7: As a human being, are you evil by nature?
The essence of human nature is not evil. However, the actual disposition (or ‘heart’) of every human being starts out being evil. I must therefore have done something (made some ‘noumenal choice’) at the outset of my moral development that corrupted my disposition. In other words, as a human being, my first truly free act must have been based on a decision to break the moral law.
Q8: As a human being, are you therefore partly good, partly evil by nature?
Viewed from the Empirical Perspective, everything I do can be regarded as a mixture of good and evil; so also every person appears to be good in some ways and evil in others. Philosophy of religion, however, is properly based on the Transcendental Perspective, from which my actions must always be regarded as either good or evil. As a human being, I am therefore either good or evil by nature, not a mixture of both.
Q9: How does God judge whether you are good or evil?
When making judgments about my moral status, God does not look at my outer actions but at my inner disposition. This must be the case because morality itself is rooted in the latter, not the former, and because God must be a moral being in order to be worthy of our devotion. Knowing this does not enable me to predict God’s judgments, because I cannot see my own disposition clearly enough to make an accurate assessment.
Q10: What is sin?
For the philosophical theologian, sin is moral evil, which can be defined as the reversal of the proper order in the ground of a person’s maxim. That is, I sin if, instead of regarding duty as more important than happiness, I treat my own happiness as more important than the call to obey the voice of duty.
Q11: Where does evil come from?
Reason on its own cannot answer this question, though it prompts us to look for an answer. This is the first of several respects in which bare reason needs to clothe itself with revelation. Unfortunately, some traditions attempt to fill this gap with an account of the origin of evil in time; but this fails to address the issue of evil’s rational origin. Any coherent solution to this mystery must take into account that moral evil always arises out of a person’s free choice.
Q12: What is original sin?
Original sin does not refer to a literal inheritance of moral evil passed on from one generation to the next. Rather, it means that evil originates in my disposition and that its influence is ‘radical’ (i.e., evident in my very first free act). Radical evil corrupts the very heart of my will, making it impossible (without a conversion) for me to be genuinely good.
Q13: Is self-love good or evil?
In and of itself, my natural inclination to act in accordance with my own happiness (i.e., self-love) is neither good nor evil. It becomes evil only when I must disobey the moral law in order to satisfy an inclination.
Q14: Can belief in inward experiences of God (‘workings of grace’) be rational?
As a principle for either theoretical knowledge or practical action, such a belief is not rational. However, this does not prevent me from accepting the possibility of such experiences as a mysterious supplement to my faith, provided I am careful not to base any theological knowledge on them and not to use them as an excuse to neglect my duties.
Q15: What happens if you over-emphasize such inward experiences?
I would be in danger of becoming a religious fanatic. Fanaticism is the habit of letting presumed inner illumination take the place of external actions devoted to promoting moral goodness. The fanatic uses devotional exercises in hopes of manipulating God into bestowing grace, regardless of whether the devotee may be neglecting his or her moral duties.
{Book Two: The religious individual}
Q16: Is a conversion necessary for everyone?
Yes, as far as we know. By demonstrating the inevitability of radical evil, bare reason shows us that every human person needs a conversion (a radical change of heart). A revealed faith must be consistent with this claim, though we need not appeal to revelation to know it is true. Whether or not exceptions to this rule are possible is an empirical question that must be answered by anthropological research, not by philosophy. But I have no empirical grounds for regarding myself as such an exception.
Q17: Is there a rational explanation for how a conversion takes place?
Bare reason cannot tell us how conversion happens. One of the tests of a revealed faith is its ability to clothe reason with an appropriate answer to this question—i.e., one that helps us experience conversion without contradicting or diminishing our commitment to pure religious (moral) faith.
Q18: What is grace and how does God communicate it to you?
Grace is God’s offer to accept me as an imperfect human being. God communicates this offer to me by means of the ‘archetype’ (i.e., original idea) of moral perfection that is rooted in my good predisposition. This archetype is the vehicle through which God’s grace can be and is manifested in human nature. Its presence enables me to recognize examples of moral goodness in the world and empowers me to follow the moral law. Without an awareness of this archetype, no conversion would be possible.
Q19: What is the function of examples in your religious development?
Examples of moral goodness can awaken the archetype of perfect humanity within me. But I must be careful not to regard any single example as absolutely necessary for my salvation. Otherwise, I might easily neglect my responsibility to make myself into a living example of this archetype. Thus, for instance, I may choose to honor Jesus as the most perfect realization of the archetype, as long as his example empowers me to live a better life; but if my belief in Jesus becomes an excuse for moral laziness, then it will actually block God’s ability to communicate grace through the archetype.
Q20: What kind of certainty does faith produce?
Faith is a manifestation of practical reason. It therefore provides me with moral certainty, not theoretical certainty. That is, I cannot expect to be able to prove the basic tenets of my religious faith by using logical arguments on their own (i.e., in abstraction from considerations based on my moral nature). This would replace faith with (presumed) knowledge and would replace the humility that is proper for a religious person with a sophisticated pride that is contrary to the spirit of religion.
Q21: How are faith and knowledge related in a true religion?
Practical reason (faith) has primacy over theoretical reason (knowledge) in religious matters. If theoretical reason leaves me ignorant of a given truth-claim, then I am permitted to believe it if practical reason provides moral grounds for doing so. Since most religious issues are theoretically indeterminate (i.e., unknowable), moral faith should be the focus of a theologian’s concern. Belief in such a truth-claim cannot be part of a true religion, however, if it is contrary to practical reason—i.e., if it discourages obedience to the moral law.
Q22: Can you ever be absolutely certain God has accepted you?
No, theoretical certainty is not possible on the issue of our eternal destiny. But such theoretical uncertainty is good for my moral development: if I had absolutely no doubt that God accepts me, I would probably begin to neglect my moral duties. Instead, my confidence is (or should be) directly proportional to my commitment to obey the moral law. On this basis, I can have a high degree of hope (or moral confidence) that God accepts me.
Q23: What is the rational basis for your hope that God will save you?
My moral certainty of God’s acceptance (i.e., of my salvation) does not require me to live a perfect life (i.e., never again to break the moral law). Even after conversion, I will continue to do evil things from time to time. Since I cannot be certain that my disposition has really changed (i.e., that my conversion was genuine), the only rational basis for hoping that God will provide the assistance needed to effect my salvation is if I can detect moral progress as I assess my life over a period of time. This is because a person with a good disposition will always be striving to live a better life. If I cannot see evidence of such attempts in my own life, my disposition may not be good.
Q24: Can you earn God’s acceptance simply by living a virtuous life?
No, because radical evil guarantees that nobody can live a perfectly good life. Each person begins with an evil disposition, and this inevitably gives rise to some evil (sinful) acts. Since my life-conduct cannot be perfectly good, I am in need of God’s grace. This is why morality cannot succeed if it stands on its own, but must point beyond itself to religion. Nevertheless, good conduct is a firm basis for my hope that God will provide what is lacking.
Q25: Is belief in the doctrine of vicarious atonement rationally justifiable?
No. The view that God will atone for my sins by punishing someone else (e.g., Jesus) is irrational because moral debts cannot be transferred to others the way financial debts can. Practical reason requires me to reject any literal interpretation of vicarious atonement, because believing it could entice me to be morally irresponsible, to ignore the moral law on the grounds that someone else has suffered instead of me. The doctrine may nevertheless have some symbolic value, if I identify myself with the one who suffers (e.g., by regarding Jesus as atoning for my sins insofar as I participate in his suffering).
Q26: What is the rational basis for believing in the doctrine of justification?
Belief in personal justification, the doctrine that God has forgiven me for the moral evil I did before my conversion, can be grounded in reason only if I can show that I have suffered some punishment for my sins. This suffering cannot have occurred before my conversion, because my disposition was evil at that time, so God would have condemned me no matter how much suffering I experienced. Likewise, it could not occur after my conversion, because the ‘new me’ is a morally different person from the ‘old me’, and moral debts cannot be transferred. The process of conversion itself, the transition from the ‘old me’ to the ‘new me’, must therefore involve a form of suffering that is sufficient to enable a just God to view the ‘new me’ as innocent of the evil deeds performed by the ‘old me’. This is what Christians call ‘dying to self’.
Q27: What is the rational basis for believing in the doctrine of sanctification?
The belief that God forgives me for any moral evil I continue to do after my conversion can be grounded in reason by recognizing that God judges people’s underlying disposition, not their actions. If I am genuinely a good-hearted person, this continued forgiveness will have the effect of encouraging me to be more and more diligent in following the moral law—an effect often called ‘sanctification’. Sanctification thereby enables me to come closer to being an example of the archetype of perfect humanity (e.g., it makes me more like Jesus).
Q28: How can you know whether or not your conversion is genuine?
A genuinely good-hearted person will experience gradual moral improvement over time. Although I cannot see my own disposition, the way God can, I can see my actions and judge their moral worth with a moderate degree of accuracy, based on my own limited awareness of my motives. When I look back over my life story since being converted, if I can detect clear signs of moral improvement (i.e., an increasing ability to choose right actions with good motives), then I have ample reason to believe my conversion was genuine.
Q29. Will the punishments of hell be terminable or everlasting?
This is a childish question, because we cannot possibly know the answer. Believing either answer could weaken my moral resolve, so even practical reason provides no clues. Nevertheless, an indeterminate belief in hell can be meaningful and appropriate as a way of emphasizing the gravity of a person’s decision to follow the evil principle. If I include the idea of hell in my teaching, it should therefore be for the sole purpose of providing an added incentive for evil people to be converted to the cause of good.
Q30: Can a deathbed conversion serve as a reliable basis for hope in salvation?
The only way we can judge whether a deathbed conversion is genuine is to see if it changes how the person acts. Anyone ministering to a person in this situation should therefore encourage him or her to do anything possible to set right any wrongs he or she is aware of having committed earlier in life. A genuine conversion will make a person want to use the last few moments of life to do whatever good remains in their power.
Q31: Is there any danger in viewing a person as a special incarnation of God?
Yes. The chief danger is that we may cease to regard such a person as a moral example. For instance, a Christian who thinks of Jesus as the Son of God, but fails to regard all Christians as ‘God’s children’ (i.e., as Jesus’ younger siblings), is likely to believe that worshipping Jesus can take the place of his or her own obedience to the moral law. This is as example of the most dangerous type of religious illusion.
Q32: In what sense could it be rational to call a human being ‘God incarnate’?
This phrase can be both meaningful and religiously beneficial if we interpret it to mean that the person in question has God’s disposition, despite being a normal human being in every other respect. It then becomes another way of saying such a person has attained a level of holiness that makes him or her a living example of the archetype of perfect humanity—an example any other normal human being may also hope to emulate.
Q33: Does the idea of a virgin mother have any theoretical value?
No. The idea contradicts what we know about how childbirth normally takes place and so could never be proved theoretically. Even if it could, relying on such an idea as the basis of one’s faith would do nothing but harm to a person’s moral disposition. It is based on an incorrect theory of sexuality that assumes anyone born out of the pleasure of intercourse must be corrupted with evil, and that such evil is passed on only through the man’s sperm.
Q34: Can the idea of a virgin mother have any practical value?
Yes. A person’s belief in a virgin mother can serve as a practical symbol of the need for human beings to rise above the temptation to evil, in order to achieve a holy disposition.
Q35: What is a miracle?
A miracle is an empirical event caused by laws that necessarily remain unknown to human beings. Miracles can be either good (‘theistic’ or ‘angelic’) or evil (‘demonic’ or ‘devilish’).
Q36: Are miracles possible?
Yes. Our necessary ignorance of transcendent reality means we cannot rule out the possibility of miracles from the standpoint of theoretical reason. However, any miracle devoid of practical value has no place in a true religion.
Q37: Could you, as a human being, perform a miracle?
Perhaps. But it would be wrong for me to desire this. Those who try to perform miracles are storming heaven and attempting to take control of the power of God. The timing of miracles, if any, must be left entirely up to God.
Q38: Should you, as a human being, depend on miracles?
No. Depending on miracles would make me passive and morally irresponsible. God wants me to be responsible for my own moral and spiritual growth. Only those who do not depend on miracles are worthy of benefiting from them.
Q39: How can you judge whether or not a purported miracle is from God?
Negatively, if an alleged miracle contradicts the moral law in any way, then it cannot be from God. Positively, if what appears to be miraculous helps to bolster my moral disposition, then I may safely regard it as a gift from God. However, I should not speak as if I am theoretically certain of its status as a miracle. For such certainty is never possible for us human beings.
{Book Three: The religious community}
Q40: Must you be part of an organized community in order to overcome evil?
In one sense my moral character is an entirely individual issue: I am solely responsible for my own free choices and cannot expect others to become good on my behalf. In practice, however, my motives are frequently corrupted as a direct result of my contacts with other persons. Even other good-hearted individuals can have a bad influence on me. Most human evil, in fact, arises in just this way. Overcoming evil is therefore a goal for the entire human race, requiring individuals to band together in a moral community. Only in this way can we assist each other in making good choices and in overcoming the evil desires and motives that inevitably crop up.
Q41: Can a community based on political laws achieve this goal?
No. Political alliances utilize external coercion, which detracts from the possibility of ethical (internally legislated) motivations for action. Political systems can enforce right actions, but they cannot force people to be virtuous. Yet only the latter (virtuous action) is pleasing to God. A political community is therefore powerless in overcoming evil. The community must be ethical.
Q42: Can an ethical community overcome evil without assuming God exists?
No. To reach the goal of helping its members become virtuous by overcoming evil, a community based on ethical laws must assume good will conquer evil in the end. But it cannot use external coercion to guarantee uniformity among its members. The only way to empower the members to trust each other (given their inevitable differences of opinion) is for them to regard God as the lawgiver for the community. Only by trusting in a God who legislates internally to each individual can an ethical community avoid a situation of hopeless diversity. In order to be effective an ethical community must therefore be a church.
Q43: What is a church?
The term ‘church’ can refer either to an invisible or to a visible organization. The invisible church consists of all good-hearted human persons who regard human duties as divine commands. God guides this organization in ways no human being can fully comprehend. A visible church, by contrast, is any human organization that claims to be governed by God. A true church is a visible church whose basic principles conform to those of the invisible church.
Q44: What are the basic principles of a true church’s organization?
The basic principles of any true church must conform to the categories: for the invisible church is unified (having a quantity of one, and therefore nonsectarian), pure (having a moral quality, unencumbered by superstition or fanaticism), free (both in the internal relations between members and in the relation of the church to political authorities), and founded on an unchangeable constitution (one whose modality is necessary, though specific administrative decisions may change over time).
Q45: Do you really expect a visible church to implement these principles?
Yes. In fact, trying to realize the principles of the invisible church in a real human community is a universal human duty. The fact that I cannot say in advance how this can ever come about is not a good reason to abandon my duty. Rather, it strengthens my trust in God as the community’s ultimate guide.
Q46: How then can a true church actually be realized on earth?
As just explained, I do not know how. In fact, I believe only God is capable of founding a visible church with genuinely invisible roots. Human organization on its own will always fall short of this goal. This is why an ethical community cannot succeed unless it becomes a church.
Q47: Why don’t you just relax, then, and just let God do it alone?
To respond in this way would be to make myself unworthy of receiving God’s assistance. In building a church I must act as if everything depends on human effort. Realizing that our efforts will inevitably be inadequate, I must hope that God will respond to my good will by supplying whatever is lacking.
Q48: What is the proper relationship between historical and pure rational faith?
Faith in a specific historical tradition is, or ought to be, a vehicle for pure rational (i.e., religious) faith—the latter being the essence of all genuine (moral) religion. No historical tradition can claim to be absolutely necessary or final; but each person should embrace some historical faith as a vehicle. As long as we are imperfect, embodied creatures, pure rational faith cannot stand on its own, though we should still regard this as an ideal goal.
Q49: Will some form of visible church always exist?
No. When the kingdom of God arrives in all its fullness, it will be identical to pure rational religion. Everyone will then participate in the invisible church, without any outward historical form being needed. However, at the current stage of human history we must regard such a future state as a visionary ideal.
Q50: Must good-hearted people today support some visible form of church?
Visible forms of church being contingent, membership cannot be treated as an absolute requirement. Salvation comes through membership in the invisible church (as determined by God alone), not through any of its various visible approximations. Nevertheless, good-hearted people should fulfill their duty to help the latter conform more and more closely to the former. The decision as to whether this is best accomplished as a member of a particular church or as an outsider may depend on how closely the reality conforms to the invisible ideal.
Q51: Can there be more than one true religion?
No, not in the transcendental sense of ‘religion’. Insofar as religion is rational, its true form must be necessary and universal. Many different religious traditions may capture aspects of this truth. But this simply means that different traditions may share the same rational form.
Q52: Can there be more than one true ecclesiastical faith?
Yes, as long as ‘true’ here means ‘accurately reflecting true religion’. More than one faith—i.e., more than one empirical manifestation of religion—can and do effectively encourage the implementation of true, moral religion.
Q53: Could one church tradition be necessarily applicable to everyone?
Church traditions are typically not universalizable, because they consist of a mixture of statutes that are moral with those that are nonmoral and of dogmas that can be rationally justified with those that cannot be. Only the moral statutes and rationally justifiable dogmas can be universalized. If a particular tradition were to consist solely of these, universalizing that tradition would be possible. Christianity, in its purest form as originally taught by Jesus, is the only example to date of such a universalizable ecclesiastical tradition.
Q54: What is the proper function of statutes within a visible church?
The statutes (rules of conduct) taught by a church should either be a direct application of the moral law or else they should encourage attitudes and forms of behavior that are likely to predispose the followers to be moral. No statute should exist that contradicts the moral law, and following church statutes in general should not be regarded as necessarily pleasing to God. The belief that obedience to a nonmoral statute testifies more fully to a person’s devotion to God is a sure sign of false religion.
Q55: What is the church’s highest principle for interpreting Scripture?
When church members interpret Scripture, their main aim should be to gain insight into the moral improvement of human beings. Pastors and other church teachers sometimes loose their genuinely religious focus by looking to theologians or historical scholars for guidance as to the original author’s meaning. But knowing the text’s historical background is of no religious value unless it deepens our understanding of its moral meaning. Too much attention to theoretical or dogmatic interpretations can be as detrimental to religion as the approach that allows subjective feeling to determine the text’s meaning.
Q56: What constitutes a saving faith?
The common belief that good life-conduct is totally irrelevant to the saving power of faith is a religious illusion. There is no rational basis for believing God will save people merely as a response to their intellectual assent to a dogma. Faith has saving power only if it is based on a person’s good life-conduct. That is, I have good reason to believe God will save me, in spite of any evil deeds I may do, only if I seek to obey the moral law. Saving faith is the rational hope that God will supplement what is lacking in my good life-conduct.
Q57: Could your good works be sufficient to earn your salvation?
No, because I am still influenced by radical evil. The ‘antinomy’ of faith and works is that historical faith (e.g., faith in some event God may have used to save all those who believe) is rationally justifiable only for people who endeavor to obey the moral law, yet nobody can ever hope to obey the moral law completely enough to earn salvation on this basis. The solution is to regard faith and works as two sides of the same archetype: just as faith must be grounded in the human side of the archetype (the reality of good life-conduct) in order to be rational, so also good life-conduct must be supported by its divine side (the possibility of moral perfection) in order to be practically viable.
Q58: Should a true church make a distinction between clergy and laity?
Ideally, no. Such class divisions foster a misuse of religious power, obscuring people’s awareness of their equal status as members of the invisible church. If such a division does exist in a visible church, the clergy should seek to empower the laity with a clear sense of their freedom before God.
Q59: Does rational religion leave any room for divine revelation?
Yes. But such revelation comes to us internally, through our own reason, not externally, as an empirically constructed master-plan. The recognition that all human beings have access to revelation, and that external forms are vehicles for true religion that should be gradually transformed into their pure rational forms, is the basis for the ‘coming’ of God’s kingdom.
Q60: What, then, was the original purpose of the Christian message?
Jesus’ teaching is the best example of pure moral religion in any existing Scripture. Nonmoral elements were grafted on to the Christian tradition by its subsequent proponents. Jesus’ central message, that the kingdom of God is at hand, was an attempt to break people’s illusory belief that false religious ‘works’ could save them, thus empowering them to improve their life-conduct.
Q61: Can you trust the Bible as a reliable guide for discovering true religion?
Yes, provided I focus on its moral content, not on its dogmatic or historical claims.
Q62: Is the Bible’s religion consistent with the pure religion of reason?
The Old Testament shows us an ideal example of false religion, in the form of the Jewish belief in nonmoral works as a form of expiation. The New Testament, by contrast, unveils the ideal example of true religion, in the life and teachings of Jesus.
Q63: To what extent can we regard the Bible as the revelation of God?
The fact that it contains teachings on the purest form of moral religion and that it represents a huge improvement over anything that came before it provides a good practical reason for treating it as a revelation from God, though this could never be proved theoretically.
Q64: Does the concept of God as a Trinity have any theoretical meaning?
From the standpoint of theoretical reason the Trinity is, at best, a mystery. This means it might have a private meaning aroused by each believer’s feelings; but it has no meaning that can be publicly shared. Believing in it too literally leads to a dangerous, morally deficient form of anthropomorphism.
Q65: Does the concept of God as a Trinity have any practical meaning?
Yes! From the practical standpoint, the Trinity has a profound meaning. The moral nature of God must be regarded as having three distinct aspect: God is a holy Legislator (cf. the theoretical standpoint), a benevolent Ruler (cf. the practical standpoint), and a just Judge (cf. the judicial standpoint). If the Trinity is interpreted in this way as a practical symbol, then it can be a meaningful part of a truly religious outlook.
Q66: Does the mystery of the divine call have a rational meaning?
Theoretical reason gives us no tools with which to comprehend the reality or nature of a divine call. Practical reason, however, provides ample room for interpreting such a call in a rationally meaningful form. For instance, all members of the invisible church are called to be citizens in a divine state by virtue of their commitment to work continuously on moral self-improvement.
Q67: Does the mystery of atonement have a rational meaning?
Theoretical reason provides no tools for comprehending the reality or nature of a divine atonement. Practical reason, however, warns against the dangers of a false, theoretical interpretation of atonement. That is, if I claim to know that God has made me good irrespective of my own moral responsibility, then I am deceiving myself and may use this as an excuse to continue doing evil. But if I believe God will somehow (mysteriously) make up for my inevitable moral weakness because of my good disposition (i.e., after I have experienced a change of heart), then hope for atonement can be part of a truly religious outlook.
Q68: Does the mystery of divine election have a rational meaning?
Neither theoretical nor practical reason enables me to comprehend the reality or nature of divine election. That some form of grace must be presupposed in order to comprehend the possibility of a change of heart has already been affirmed. But how that grace is distributed to some and not to others is an issue that lies wholly beyond the boundaries of reason.
Q69: What is the rational meaning of the statement ‘God is love’?
This statement refers to the second aspect of God’s nature as distinct from the third—i.e., to God the Son in Christian tradition. In this aspect God judges me not by my guilt or innocence but by my worthiness or unworthiness to receive grace. I cannot merit grace as result of my individual actions, because radical evil makes me imperfect. This aspect of God’s judgment is therefore based on my disposition—i.e., on whether or not my heart is open to receive God’s assistance. An open heart results in what Christians call ‘justification’.
Q70: How does judgment by the Holy Spirit differ from the judgment of love?
The Holy Spirit judges me through the agency of my own conscience. Unlike the Son’s benevolent acceptance of anyone whose heart is open, this form of judgment must be just: it determines whether a person is guilty or not guilty in any given situation. Such judgment synthesizes the fear of God (as Legislator) with the love of God (as Ruler). It makes an evil-hearted person aware of the need for a change of heart and enables a good-hearted person to continue improving. The latter is what Christians call ‘sanctification’.
{Book IV: Rational guidelines for serving God}
Q71: How does God wish to be served?
What matters to God is good life-conduct. This, not the performance of nonmoral acts directed exclusively to God, constitutes true religious service.
Q72: Can nonmoral actions please God?
Nonmoral actions, as such, do not please God. To act as if God can be served by performing nonmoral actions alone is pseudo-service. If I perform such actions and they do not encourage me to live a better life, then they are contrary to the purposes of true religion.
Q73: Can nonmoral actions play any legitimate role in true religion?
Yes. Nonmoral actions can be a good and healthy part of a true religion if the performance of such actions encourages good life-conduct.
Q74: What is the best definition of religion’s subjective nature?
Religion is a special form of reason’s judicial standpoint, whereby a person views human duties as God’s commands. This does not reduce religion to a form of morality, for morality as such concerns the practical standpoint. Rather, religion empowers morality to fulfill its true task: realizing the highest good by making humanity well-pleasing to God.
Q75: Do you as a human being have any special duties to God?
No. Duty relates only to human beings: I have duties to myself and duties to other persons. What many religious people regard as direct duties to God (e.g., praise and worship) are at best indirect ways of serving God, because they please God only if they promote good life-conduct. The latter, by contrast, is inherently pleasing to God, so human duties can all be regarded as direct ways of serving God.
Q76: How does revealed religion differ from natural religion?
This question has to do with the origin and possibility of divine commands. In a revealed religion a person must know a command comes from God before regarding it as a duty, whereas in a natural religion duties must be identified as such before taking them as God’s commands. The latter can be shared and spread by appealing to nothing but reason; the former requires special learning and guidance from those who already know and understand the revelation.
Q77: Do you prefer supernaturalism or naturalism?
Both positions are equally incompatible with Critical religion. The supernaturalist regards revelation as absolutely necessary, whereas the naturalist denies the possibility of all revelation. As a believer in Critical religion, I accept the possibility of revelation without regarding it as absolutely necessary. This position, whereby a religion could be both natural and revealed/learned, can be called ‘pure rationalism’.
Q78: How can an empirical religion be both natural and revealed/learned?
This is possible if the religion teaches principles that anyone can and ought to discover through reason alone, but that in fact remained undiscovered until God revealed them at a specific time and place. It is then objectively natural even though it is subjectively revealed. Any revealed (and thus learned) content of a true religion can (and should) serve as a means to the realization of the pure (moral) core of natural religion by its proponents.
Q79: Could a specific revealed religion become the universal religion of mankind?
Yes, provided the objective content of the revelation it teaches consists of the purest natural religion. This is more true of Christianity than of any other world religion. Although it is typically viewed as a learned religion, Christianity is therefore destined to become the universal religion of mankind.
Q80: Who was the founder of the first true church?
Jesus of Nazareth. He was not the first to teach aspects of true religion to mankind. True (moral) religion, as such, can have no unique human founder, but is established (at least in potential form) by God in the heart of every human person. However, Jesus was the human vehicle through whom Christianity began. And the fact that God alone is capable of founding a true church lends symbolic meaning to the Christian view of Jesus as ‘God’s Son’.
Q81: What is the essential difference between Judaism and Christianity?
In practice these two religious traditions exist in many different forms. But the essential difference is that Judaism adopts a legalistic stance, viewing obedience to external statutes as intrinsically pleasing to God, regardless of their moral content, whereas Christianity adopts a pure moral stance, viewing obedience to God as an internal issue tied to each person’s response to the moral law. As such, the former represents false religion and the latter, true religion.
Q82: Should ideal Christianity be extracted from its historical roots?
Yes, except insofar as the contrast with its Jewish roots helps to clarify Christianity’s distinctive character. Historically, Christians have all-too-often followed the Jewish tendency to emphasize statutory faith over good life-conduct. Clearly distinguishing between these two approaches to religion is crucial to the task of universalizing Christianity. Moreover, too much attention to historical forms of Christian belief and practice can easily obscure the pure moral core of Jesus’ teaching. No visible church is a perfect realization of pure religion, so we should expect every historical form eventually to pass away.
Q83: Should theology begin with unconditional belief in revealed propositions?
No. Propositions are required as vehicles for the expression of religious truth. But religious faith is to be directed towards reason’s moral content, not towards the theoretical content contained in any given propositions. In a religion based on belief in revealed propositions the thinking of ordinary church members is likely to be controlled by the learned interpretations of scholars and church officials. This form of religion is not free and therefore not moral.
Q84: What is the proper function of dogma in a true church?
Dogma can have a good and proper function in a church if it is constructed in such a way as to encourage, either directly or indirectly, good life-conduct. Specific dogmas are often first proposed with moral awakening in mind. Unfortunately, this feature tends to be lost over time as the dogma comes to be affirmed abstractly, as an absolute truth.
Q85: What is idolatry?
Idolatry happens whenever a person regards some object or action (including reverence for God) as more important than (or, at its worst, exclusive of) good life-conduct. An idol is any object, person, or action (whether hypothetically imagined or empirically observed) that a person venerates in hopes of pleasing God without the need to perform virtuous acts.
Q86: Can human being control God in any way?
No. Yet the beliefs and actions promoted by a great many historical faiths are based on the false assumption that God can be manipulated. This is the essence of false religion.
Q87: What is the nature and purpose of devotion to God (or any religious acts)?
Devotion is an attitude of mind that aims at acquiring a godly (i.e., morally good) disposition. All religious activities should be forms of devotion in this sense. To perform religious acts in the belief that such displays of devotion, in and of themselves, are pleasing to God constitutes pseudo-service. God does not need my displays of devotion; I do, whenever my moral resolve is weak.
Q88: Must a person know how salvation comes to pass in order to be saved?
No. In fact, those who insist on having such ‘knowledge’ before they will place their hope in God’s saving grace are thereby testifying to their (moral) unbelief. True believers in this sense are those who believe God will supplement their good life-conduct, as needed, even though they cannot claim theoretical certainty as to how such an act of grace will take place. Although I cannot know how God dispenses grace, I can know how to be virtuous: the laws of freedom are available to me immediately, in my own conscience.
Q89: Should clerics urge people to ignore all doubts about dogmas and creeds?
No. This is often done by church leaders who wrongly believe it is better to profess too much belief than too little. But in so doing they encourage dishonesty in people’s religious professions. As a result, a confession of faith that supposedly saves a person ends up being a serious violation of conscience that could render them unworthy to receive salvation. To guard against this, I think of myself as standing before God whenever I make a confession of faith. I need not have absolute certainty that what I claim to believe is true. (Indeed, this is not even possible in matters relating solely to historical faith.) But I should have a heart-felt moral certainty that what I am professing is not contrary to pure religion. With this in mind, clerics should welcome expressions of doubt as an inevitable part of any historical faith.
Q90: Should a visible church abolish all outward forms of nonmoral religious service?
No, this would be going too far. As long as we remain human, some vehicle must be used to ‘clothe’ religion’s ‘naked body’. But church leaders should be careful not to present any particular outward form as necessary in and of itself. Just as human knowledge begins with sensory input, even though its core is intellectual, so also a visible church requires some form of outward activity in order to direct its members to religion’s invisible moral core.
Q91: Should we not regard prayer, at least, as a necessary religious activity?
That depends on what you mean by ‘prayer’. The invisible spirit of prayer —i.e., a heart-felt wish to become a better person—is necessary to all true religion. The letter of prayer must serve this purpose if it is to be an authentically religious activity, but such outward expression is not strictly necessary. The problem is that churches often teach people to view prayer superstitiously, as if God is pleased merely by visible expressions of devotion, regardless of whether they lead to an improvement in the person’s life-conduct. Even worse is the tendency to regard verbal prayer as a means of meriting grace, or to pray as if we can manipulate God into doing what we think needs to be done. I do need to spend time praying in order to remain keenly aware of God’s voice within my conscience, but the fewer words I use to accomplish this, the better.
Q92: Is church attendance a duty?
No, not taken in the literal sense, as an outward act. Helping to build up the one invisible church is a universal duty of human beings. For most people, this will involve active participation in some visible church. Otherwise, we are unlikely to take seriously our common membership as citizens of a divinely-governed state. Unfortunately, religious people tend to think of church attendance as a means of grace—i.e., as pleasing to God in and of itself. This is a religious illusion, promoted all too often for the self-interest of the clergy.
Q93: Can baptism make a person holy?
No. Baptism should be regarded as a symbolic expression of a person’s intent to work towards the goal of becoming holy. As such, practicing this ritual within a visible church can remind the members to be more responsible in their accountability towards each other. To regard it, by contrast, as actually producing holiness is a harmful religious illusion that can easily lead to moral laziness, communal irresponsibility, and an inappropriate sense of control over God’s final judgment of people’s eternal destiny.
Q94: What is the true purpose of communion?
To regard the communion ritual as an activity whereby God bestows special favors on those who participate is yet another religious illusion. Such an interpretation implies that people (especially the clergy) can control when God gives or withholds favors. Instead, communion should be regarded as a ceremony for uniting church members in mutual love and kindness.
Q95: What is the relationship between virtue and grace?
Regarding grace as a gift that produces virtue within the recipient would tend to make people less responsible about fulfilling their duties. Instead, I regard virtue (i.e., the habit of doing what is right even when it is likely to make me unhappy) as the rational basis for hoping that God will pardon me for my inevitable lapses. This viewpoint ensures that a doctrine of grace will promote, rather than detract from, the moral core of all true religion.
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