Book Review by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
Regina O.M. Dell'Oro: From Existence to the Ideal: Continuity and Development in Kant's Theology. New York: Peter Lang, 1994. viii + 183 pages.
This book challenges a set of assumptions concerning Kant's intellectual development that has long been taken for granted among most Kant-scholars. Lewis White Beck defends what could be called the discontinuity thesis when he says "even a moderately perceptive reader" of Kant's pre-1770 writings will easily recognize that "a theory of continuous and slow development without a major turning point cannot be maintained" [Early German Philosophy (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1969), 438-439]. In opposition to such sweeping claims Regina Dell'Oro amasses substantial textual evidence that calls into question the key tenets of the discontinuity thesis: that a sudden and radical change occurred in Kant's thinking around 1768-1770, that before this revolution Kant mainly just aped the ideas of his rationalist predecessors (especially Leibniz and Wolff), that epistemology was the core of his philosophical concern, and that the Critical philosophy aims to destroy all metaphysics (especially theology) [see 7, 149n, 173-174].
Dell'Oro's aim, as she explains in a short Preface, is to perform an historically-sensitive textual analysis that can serve as the foundation for a "fresh" interpretation "of the development of Kant's thought" [viii]—especially his theology. The Introduction sets her approach in the context of three schools of German Kant interpretation. Addressing herself to issues raised in secondary sources written in an impressive array of languages (most notably, works by Schmucker in German, Labèrge in French, and Beck in English), Dell'Oro claims to demonstrate that "[Kant's] thought did not suffer a radical transformation, but rather evolved slowly over time" [7], that the kind of interpretation that "endows Kant's epistemology with an almost absolute and exclusive importance" should be replaced with one that explains "the transformation of Kant's thought" as arising just as much "from a need to redefine the metaphysical concept of ‘existence'" [7], and that the "proof from possibility" is the "cornerstone of Kant's pre-critical metaphysics" [8]. With some important qualifications (see below), she succeeds quite well in meeting these goals.
Dell'Oro's book employs a rather awkward mix of topical and chronological exposition. Each of the five chapters examines Kant's treatment of one of the four theoretical arguments for God's existence—"the physico-theological proof", "the proof from contingency", "the ontological argument", and Kant's own "proof from possibility", respectively—with the last two chapters both devoted to the latter proof. (This order, incidentally, reflects Dell'Oro's intent to portray Kant as moving "from existence to the ideal", from "a Natural Theology into a Transcendental Theology" [8], though Kant himself discusses the arguments in exactly the opposite order in the first Critique.) Each chapter progresses chronologically, devoting separate sections to "Historical Background", Kant's New Exposition (1755) and/or other early essays, his One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1762), and the first Critique (1781). The only exception is that the role of the possibility proof in the first Critique is given a separate chapter (Chapter Five), because the proof is there transformed into the Transcendental Ideal.
This overall strategy proves to be awkward because it necessitates a rather annoying degree of repetition. Similar points are made over and over again in each chapter, many of which are then repeated again (perhaps in a slightly different form) in subsequent chapters. To some extent, such repetition is necessary in order to confirm the presence of continuity on different topics and at different periods in Kant's development. But much of the repetition could have been avoided with more careful editing. Acknowledging that her strategy "may discourage some readers", Dell'Oro advises those who are not so interested in "the detailed descriptions" to skip the first three chapters and "go directly to chapters 4 and 5" [viii]. Anyone who wishes to grasp this book's main thesis without taking the time to examine the details relating to the three traditional proofs can safely heed this advice without missing any of Dell'Oro's main points.
These main points, which together constitute what can be called the continuity thesis, are as follows. The historical background of the four types of proof reveals that in each case Kant's position had significant elements of innovation that set him apart from his rationalist predecessors. In spite of some interpreters' claims to the contrary, Kant never supported the three traditional proofs. The seeds of his criticisms of each can be found in various pre-1762 essays. His One Possible Basis (1762) refines these criticisms, stating them in a form similar [41] if not "identical" [65] to that used in the firstCritique.During the mid-1760s there is ample evidence (especially from variousReflections) that Kant was already in the process of transforming the possibility proof (defended as legitimate in 1762) into what was to become the Transcendental Ideal in the first Critique. The overwhelming textual evidence concerning the slow and unidirectional evolution of Kant's thought on each of the four types of proof therefore demonstrates, argues Dell'Oro, that his development did not, in fact, happen in two discreet stages, but was uniform and continuous [see e.g., 87, 88n, 95, 120n, 133n, 160n], and that his discussion of transcendental theology in the first Critique should be read not as "a devastating critique of all theology", but as "part of an ongoing dialogue which began at the outset of his philosophical career" [42n].
Specific issues are raised in each chapter in support of the continuity thesis. For instance, Chapter One reveals that Kant's view of the physico-theological proof, especially as expressed in his "Essays on Optimism", owes more to Pope and his use of analogy than to Leibniz and his emphasis on necessity [13-31]. One of its key advances is to distinguish between moral and physical forms of contingency [35-36]. Chapter Two shows that Crusius had already initiated the demise of the Wolffian system, and that Kant's critique of the proof from contingency (i.e., the cosmological proof) in New Exposition diverged from Wolff by taking Crusius' views a step further [47-58]. Chapter Three explains how Leibniz's revision of Descartes' ontological argument made explicit for the first time the need to regard existence as a predicate, and how Kant's New Exposition (despite some scholars' views to the contrary [see 127-128]) refutes this form of proof in a way that assumes Kant's later distinction between "real" and "logical" existence, and his consequent claim that existence is not a predicate [71-86]. Chapter Four traces the influence of Baumgarten on Kant's possibility proof, though not without acknowledging a significant degree of originality on Kant's part [112]. Dell'Oro then provides a detailed textual analysis of the proof's two steps: (1) "the real must exist with absolute necessity", and (2) "the absolutely necessary existence must be a single being" [118-119]. Chapter Five touches upon some admitted discontinuities that are evident in a selection of Reflections mainly from 1764-1766. These relate to the transformation of Kant's "concept of an absolutely necessary existence" into "a merely subjective and problematic concept" [152], whereby the proof that God exists gives way to a more hypothetical notion of "totality" [153]. The chapter concludes with a fairly superficial look at how the first Critique maintains continuity with these Reflections, treating the Transcendental Ideal as the "fulfillment of the initial intention" of Kant's possibility proof [171].
In addition to her overly-repetitive style, Dell'Oro has two other annoying tendencies. The first, a tendency to be careless and/or inconsistent with details, could have been prevented with more careful editing. Here examples abound. Throughout the book, quotations from German and Latin texts normally appear in the original language, with a translation provided in a footnote. But this pattern is sometimes broken without explanation: some texts appear only in Latin [e.g., 49-50, 77-78n, 110-111], only in German [150], or only in English translation [141]. Moreover, when foreign quotations are imbedded in English sentences, the grammar does not always flow smoothly [see e.g., 107n, 113n]. The references also suffer from various inconsistencies. For instance, essay titles (sometimes even the same one) can be italicized [31], put in quotation marks [23], or both [13n]. An abundance of typographical and/or grammatical errors (well over 50!) pepper the book, though these only become serious on a few occasions, when sentences are rendered incoherent due to a portion of text being accidentally omitted [14n, 95n, 140]. Perhaps the height of carelessness is reached when this book, which devotes considerable attention to dates and other details, refers to Kant's first Critique as his "treatise of 1780" [101]!
The remaining annoyance is less obvious than poor editing and proofreading, but more significant: a reluctance to apply theory to practice. A typical example is that, while devoting her whole book—from the subtitle and Preface [see e.g., viii], through the intricate textual analyses of each chapter, to the Conclusion [174]—to the task of destroying the myth that Kant's philosophical career should be divided into two neat parts ("pre-critical" and "critical"), Dell'Oro nevertheless continues to use the terms "pre-critical" and "critical" in the standard way [see 7 and passim], just as if she fully approves of the distinction! (I have suggested elsewhere that, since Kant employed the basic threefold critical method long before composing the Critical System as such, and since the key change that had begun to take place by 1770 relates to his new Copernican insight regarding the subjective origin of transcendental knowledge, his two periods would be more accurately labeled "pre-Copernican" and "Copernican" [see Kant's Critical Religion, II.1].) Dell'Oro's habit of using the standard terminology is but one of several examples wherein her impressive courage in questioning the tradition is offset by a reluctance to apply her convictions with full force to the task(s) at hand.
Another example relates to Kant's concept of "existence". The book's title naturally leads the reader to expect this to be a recurring theme; and such it is. Unfortunately, Dell'Oro too often appears to be satisfied to demonstrate that this is a crucial concept in Kant's theology, without providing substantial new insights into how we are to understand it. Thus, for instance, she points out the well-known problem that Kant's use of the term "existence" in the first Critique is ambiguous because it normally refers to a category yet is sometimes used to refer to a form of existence that appears to transcend the categories [107-8]. However, she makes no effort to solve or even discuss this problem in any significant detail, choosing instead merely to leave it hanging. Most of her actual conclusions about "existence" are, likewise, disappointingly feeble. On several occasions she admonishes the reader to recognize the importance of undergoing a thoroughgoing study of the meaning of such terms [e.g., 176]; yet this only raises the question as to why this book was not the right place for just such a study.
Probably the best example of a weak conclusion that could have been developed much more thoroughly is Dell'Oro's account of how the continuity of Kant's theology relates to the discontinuity in other areas of Kant's thought (especially his epistemology). Aside from several hints, she says almost nothing about this crucial topic. Yet the information she has provided is sufficient to form the basis of several tantalizing new hypotheses. First, her stimulating account of the possibility proof, with its use of the concepts of necessity, existence, and the real, raises the question as to whether Kant's early theological reflections might have been one of the stimuli that led to the development of his highly influential "transcendental arguments". Such arguments, after all, are remarkably similar in structure (though not in their object) to Kant's possibility proof: both attempt to identify the necessary conditions for the possibility of experiencing what is real in our concepts of what exists. In a footnote [156n] Dell'Oro does mention that, by emphasizing "the importance and the role of sensibility" and by "setting limits to the knowable", Kant is "transforming the metaphysical proof [of Leibniz] into a transcendental argument." But she does not appear to recognize the potential for developing this into a quite remarkable insight concerning the development of Kant's epistemology and how it may have arisen out of his theology.
This tantalizing hypothesis leads to the more general suggestion that the new theological insights Kant had between 1764 and 1766 (examined at length by Dell'Oro [146-164]) may have served as a catalyst for the "great light" that was soon to become the "Copernican revolution in philosophy". Such a conclusion seems almost inevitable in light of Dell'Oro's careful textual analyses; yet she never actually draws it out. What she does say is that Kant gradually recognized that what is special about the concept of God is derived from our own subjective constitution, and must therefore be transcendental, rather than constituting a theoretically incontrovertible proof that such a being really exists. But this insight—given the fact that the arguments Kant uses in the Transcendental Ideal section of the first Critique are prefigured by the arguments he had already sketched in the Reflections of the mid-1760s (before the famous "revolution" in his way of thinking)—could be taken to imply that the Copernican revolution actually had its root in Kant's theological reflections, and was transplanted from there to his epistemology. In other words, had she admitted the obvious discontinuity in Kant's epistemology, Dell'Oro could have argued that a slow and continuous development in his theology provided the well-tilled soil in which alone a genuinely new epistemological plant was able to sprout. This would have been a truly impressive conclusion, inasmuch as it could go a long way to explain the mystery of where the basic Copernican insight came from in the first place. It would cause us to ask what Kant was doing from 1764 to 1766 that might have led him to write the Reflections whose significance Dell'Oro has so rightly pointed out. One of his main projects during that period was to examine the thought and writings of Swedenborg, and to write Dreams of a Spirit-Seer in response. Unfortunately, Dell'Oro stops short of examining the relevance of this text: she mentions it once in passing [142n], without so much as hinting at its possible relevance to the continuity thesis.
With the foregoing limitations in mind, we can conclude that Dell'Oro has succeeded in demonstrating that a narrow (but very significant) part of Kant's intellectual development was, indeed, slow and continuous, with the crucial insights appearing well before 1770. However, she has said very little about how this continuity thesis can be applied to other aspects of Kant's philosophy. The narrow set of arguments she considers is far from being the sole concern of Kant's early writings in general, nor even of his theology. Indeed, Kant's own references to the "great light" that revolutionized his thinking around 1769 and to Hume's formative influence on his thinking relate explicitly to his epistemology, not to his theology. Nevertheless, for any scholars who assume this revolution changed Kant's thinking on all (or even most) philosophical issues, Dell'Oro's book is necessary reading. Its weakness lies in appearing to say "no" to the discontinuity thesis too sweepingly. There is a discontinuity in Kant's intellectual development, and a fairly radical one at that. Dell'Oro's argument could have been much stronger, had she acknowledged this fact and then sought to explain (perhaps along the lines sketched above) why the epistemological discontinuity did not affect Kant's theology as much as is often assumed.
Stephen Palmquist, Hong Kong
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