Emergence, Evolution, and the Geometry of Logic:

Causal Leaps and the Myth of Historical Development

 Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)

Department of Religion and Philosophy

Hong Kong Baptist University

(stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

I. Emergence and the Problem of Emergent Properties

Atwhat stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network ofpulsating neurons as a “thought”? At what point does an accumulationof insightful thoughts deserve to be called a “new idea”? To whatdepth and breadth must a particular person’s ideas and other creativeworks extend before he or she comes to be recognized as “great”?Such questions, despite their apparent diversity, are all instances of the sameunderlying question: How is it possible to discern when (i.e., at what point inits historical development) an “emerging” property becomes what it can be observed to be, once it has fullyemerged? This question has wide-ranging implications not only for science andthe philosophy of science, but also for disciplines as diverse as logic,history, and even theology. Answering such an ambitious question in the limitedspace of a single essay will be impossible without strictly narrowing the scopeof our discussion through several limiting assumptions.

Beforediscussing these interpretive assumptions, a brief overview of how the term“emergence” came to be used as a philosophical concept will providean essential focus for our subsequent analysis.[1] Although varioustheories of emergence can be identified throughout the history of philosophy,the word “emergence” wasfirst introduced as a technical philosophical concept in George HenryLewes’ 1875 book, Problems of Life and Mind, where it referred to the evolutionary processeswhereby non-living matter came to take on life and non-mental beings came tohave mental properties. Early twentieth century philosophers such as and C.L.Morgan,[2] Samuel Alexander,[3] andC.D. Broad[4] were influenced by Lewes as theybrought the concept of emergence into the mainstream of philosophical debate.Since then, especially during the last quarter of the twentieth century, theliterature on emergence and emergent properties has been immense. Essentially,something (e.g., an object, property, or idea) can be said to“emerge” out of another thing (or level of reality) when the formersomehow originates or is grounded in the latter, but displays such unique andunexpected characteristics that it takes on a “life” (i.e., amutually interacting set of new properties) of its own. The issue of whetheremergent properties (e.g., conscious thoughts) can be reduced to their underlying physical ground (e.g., certainbrain states) remains one of most hotly-debated topics related to emergence.[5]Probably the most widely accepted contemporary position on emergence is thatknown as “non-reductive materialism” (see note 3), the view thatemergent properties originate wholly within the physical domain, yet thequalities that manifest themselves cannot be explained merely in terms of theirunderlying physical interactions.[6] That is, once a higher-level propertyhas emerged, we must treat the object (or at least its emergent property) as ifit were more than just physical.[7] In this paper, I shall argue that acareful analysis of how emergence functions in formal logic can shed important light on how this “morethan” actually arises.

Fourassumptions will serve to narrow down the scope of our analysis in such a wayas to avoid the need to deal with most of the philosophical issues thattypically arise in discussions of emergent properties. First, I assume thatproperties do exist. While this assumption is controversial, the onus of proofin this case is on those who take the counter-intuitive position that they donot exist; thus I shall not deal with it any further here.[8] Mysecond assumption is that some properties must emerge from their underlyingobjects or propositions in a way that contrasts with other properties that donot emerge but are somehow there from the start, so to speak. If this were not the case, if all properties were emergent (or if all werenon-emergent), then our question would never arise, for there would be nobackground enabling us to detect an emergent property. I shall clarify thisdistinction shortly, though without attempting to present a full justification.Third, I assume that the difference between emergent and non-emergentproperties is knowable—i.e.,that properties exhibit identifying marks that conform to some logical pattern.Once again, this assumption is necessary, for without it our question would beunanswerable, if not meaningless. One purpose of this essay will be to providea limited defense of this assumption by presenting a systematic, logical way ofdistinguishing between different types of properties. In the end, however, thispoint will retain the status of an assumption, so the most we will be able to concludeis that, if an emergent propertyis knowable, then its emergence should follow the type of logical pattern to beintroduced here.

Myfourth assumption—perhaps the most controversial of all—is thatrelational patterns in formal logic often (if not always) can be correlateddirectly to the spatial relations exhibited by certain simple geometricalfigures. I call the systematic analysis of such analogical relations “TheGeometry of Logic”. This fourth assumption is unlike the other three intwo respects. First, it is not a necessary assumption. Questions about thenature and function of emergent properties may be answered quite apart fromsuch a correlation. Nevertheless, I believe the Geometry of Logic can betreated as a heuristic device thatgreatly enhances our ability to construct a clear and meaningful response tosuch questions. As we shall see, the usefulness of this device is that itexhibits a clear hierarchy of “levels” that can be directlycompared with the levels of scientific explanation that are a core feature ofany emergentist theory.[9] The second difference is that in thiscase I have already defended the assumption at great length elsewhere and havefound it to be very useful in stimulating deeper insight into numerousphilosophical issues.[10] In §II of this essay I shalltherefore present an overview of the essential features of the Geometry ofLogic, before going on to apply those features to a few central issues relatingto emergence and evolution.

Theremainder of this first section will be devoted to the task of clarifying whatan emergent property is. Perhaps thebest way to understand this term is to contrast it with its opposite. For thesake of simplicity of expression, I shall coin the word “mergent”to refer to any properties that are not emergent. What, then, isthe difference between ordinary (mergent) properties and the special emergent properties that will occupy the main focus ofour attention here? A property that is taken by the observer of an object or bythe interpreter of a proposition to be a standard component of the object/proposition in a givencontext (usually one that is being viewed at a relatively low level ofcomplexity) can be described as “mergent”: the property merges with the object and/or with the meaning of theproposition in the eyes of the observer/interpreter.[11] Forexample, the fact that there are words printed on the pages of this essay is amergent property of the essay insofar as we describe the essay in terms of itsphysical properties. Without the appearance of such printed words, we could notidentify these pages as constituting a published essay; the fact that words doappear on these pages is therefore entirely predictable, given the knowncontext.

Emergentproperties, by contrast, are properties that appear unexpectedly and are not(at least initially) regarded as necessarily connected to theobject/proposition when we consider it at the lower level of complexity. To“emerge” is to “rise out of” or “leap away from”something in such a way that a latent possibility is manifested and becomesknown. Thus, the fact that the words printed on these pages can be readtogether in such a way that they convey a meaning is, from the point of view of the physical paper and the ink printedon it, an emergent property. Whether or not the ink printed on these pagesreally does convey a meaningdepends, of course, on a number of contingent facts about the linguistic skillsof the writer and reader. If a meaning is conveyed, then it would not be merelya mergent property because the meaning is something that cannot be explainedmerely in terms of the paper and ink used to convey it. The meaning could neverbe discovered merely by analyzing the characteristics of the paper and ink, butonly by viewing these objects from a higher level of complexity, as composingwords, sentences, and paragraphs. As such, the perception of meaning thatjustifies a reader in callingthis collection of papers and ink “an essay” exemplifies one kindof emergent property.

Canan emergent property ever lose its emergent character and somehow become amergent property? Likewise, can a mergent property lose its status and somehowbecome emergent? To answer such questions, a secondary distinction must bemade: both mergent and emergent properties can be either intrinsic orextrinsic.[12] Extrinsic properties are propertieswhose association with their object (whether necessary or contingent) has anonlinguistic source. They may only seemto be what we expect them to be, due to cultural conditioning; or they may bewhat they are as a matter of physical necessity. Intrinsic properties, bycontrast, are properties whose necessary or contingent status depends entirelyon the assumed meaning of the words (i.e., on purely linguistic conventions).[13] Thus, the fact that apublished essay has the property of having words on a printed page is anintrinsic property: only if we use the word “essay” in a way thatradically departs from the standard definition would we be able to conceive ofan essay that did not exhibit theproperty of having readable words. But the blackness of the ink conventionally used to print a scholarlyessay is an extrinsic property. It is mergent in the sense that we have become so accustomed toseeing black words on the printed page that anything else would seem“inappropriate” to a scholarly essay, though only contingently. Ifit were printed in red ink, for example, this property might make some readers(e.g., scholars) question whether it really deserves to be called an “essay”at all.

Thissecondary distinction suggests that extrinsic properties can change from beingmergent to being emergent (or vice versa), when viewed from different contexts,whereas intrinsic properties cannot. For instance, although “printed withblack ink on white paper” is a mergent property of “scholarlyessay”, it is extrinsic insofar as our cultural conventions could changewith time. If the editors and publishers of a few renegade academic journalsdecided to publish all scholarly essays in red ink, the practice mightgradually catch on; as soon as all (or at least most) such journals began tofollow this new convention—say, 100 years from now—red ink willhave become a mergent property of published scholarly essays. People would justassume that if the essay is scholarly it will be printed in red ink. However,the same cannot be said for the more basic property of having words. An essay is still an essay whether it is printed inblack or red ink; but if in 100 years we begin using the word“essay” to refer to blank sheets of paper, then the meaningof the word will itself have changed.Having words is thus an intrinsic mergent property of scholarly essays, as wecurrently understand them.

Emergentproperties are related to this secondary distinction in a similar way. The mostinteresting type of property, as we shall see, is intrinsic emergence. Thisrefers to a new property that arises unexpectedly when an old situation isviewed from a level of higher complexity (or when the situation somehowactually becomes more complex), yet thenew property is necessary to theidentity of the object under consideration. The four questions raised at thevery beginning of this essay—concerning when life begins, when neural firings become a thought, when thoughts become a new idea, and when a person with ideas becomes great—are all examples of intrinsic emergence. Awhole list of other examples, such as when two people who were formerly“just friends” come to be “in love”, would not bedifficult to compile. As we shall see in §III, however, this fourth typeof property is so different from the others that serious doubts can be raisedas to whether it represents a real possibility at all. I shall therefore foregoany further discussion of it until that point.

Afterbriefly introducing the Geometry of Logic in the next section of this essay, Ishall use it to illustrate some of the basic features of how emergenceoperates. I shall then apply it in §III to the task of clarifying thefourfold distinction made above, between different types of properties. Therelationship between the logic of emergence and certain assumptions often madeabout the nature of evolution will be the main focus of our attention in thatsection. I shall conclude the essay in §IV by arguing that the proposedway of understanding the similarities and differences between the fourtypes of mergent/emergent change calls into question a myth that has dominatedacademia—philosophers as much as scientists and other academics—fornearly two centuries. The myth, in a nutshell, is that the best (if not theonly proper) way to examine the origins of an idea is to trace its historicaldevelopment, uncovering the empirically discernable causes that led, step bystep, to the point where a new idea, or “insight” (as I prefer tocall it), was bound to emerge. Questioning this myth on the basis of the logicof emergence opens up a potential (though not a compelling need) fortheological explanation to fill an explanatory gap that appears to remain in astate of inevitable mystery if we appeal to scientific explanation alone.

II. Patterns of Emergence in Geometrical Relations

Letus look now at how the Geometry of Logic can shed light on the nature andfunction of emergent patterns in general. After briefly introducing the fourmain logico-geometric figures used to depict systematic relations, I shallpoint out several interesting patterns of emergence that can be observed byviewing the diagrams as a series. This will demonstrate that geometricemergence, at least, is possible. It will also prepare us for attempting in§III to clarify the distinction made in §I between types of mergentand emergent properties and for examining the special problems associated withevolutionary emergence.

TheGeometry of Logic is divided into two main parts, based on what I call“analytic logic” and “synthetic logic”. For ourpurposes, we can think of the former as relating to any logical distinctionbetween two opposites (i.e., to anydyadic opposition) and the latter, to any logical distinction between three terms (i.e., to any triadic opposition), where twoterms are analytic opposites and the third somehow combines or“synthesizes” the others.[14] The most obvious geometrical maps forthe simplest (or “first-level”) forms of analytic and syntheticrelations are the line segment (with its two opposite endpoints) and thetriangle (with its three vertices), respectively. Figure 1 uses the“+” and “-” symbols to denote the simple conceptualopposition in a first-level analytic relation (1LAR), while Figure 2 adds athird term, “x”, to denote the simple synthesis of opposites in afirst-level synthetic relation (1LSR).[15]

Figure 1: The Line Segment as a 1LAR Map

Figure 2: The Triangle as a ILSR Map

Inboth cases these simple forms of relation also give rise to more complex“levels”. The formula determining the structure of all analyticrelations is:

            2^L = N

where “L” stands for the “level” ofthe distinction (i.e., how many pairs of opposites are being interrelated)and “N” stands for the “number” of differentcombinations. For instance, the most common type of analytic relation, thesecond-level analytic relation (or 2LAR), consists of two pairs of opposites that combine to produce four interrelated concepts (2 x 2 = 4). As such, it isbest mapped onto the four endpoints of a cross (i.e., two line segmentsintersecting at their midpoints, with each segment representing the distinctionbetween one pair of opposites), as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The Cross as a2LAR Map

Theformula determining the structure of all synthetic relations is similar to theone for analytic relations, the only difference being that the “2”is replaced by a “3”:

            3^L = N

Thus the second-level synthetic relation (2LSR) has ninecombinations (3 x 3 = 9) and would need to be mapped onto a geometrical figurewith nine distinct points.[16]

Fromthe two basic applications of the Geometry of Logic (analysis and synthesis)emerges a third application, involving various combinations of analytic and synthetic relations. For ourpurposes the most significant of these “compound relations” (as Icall them) is the twelvefold compound relation (12CR). This consists of a 2LAR with each of itsfour components divided into a 1LSR (4 x 3 = 12). Apparently accidental examplesof this form of conceptual relation abound in daily life (e.g., the twelvehours on our clock dials, the twelve months on our zodiacal calendars, thetwelve tribes of Israel, etc.), with more systematically predetermined examplessometimes playing an important role in philosophy (e.g., Kant’s twelvecategories[17]), social sciences (e.g., Jung’ssystem of psychological types[18]), and even natural science (e.g., thesystem of twelve sub-atomic particles[19]). What is important to note here isthat, in order to be a genuine 12CR, these relations must be regarded notmerely as a haphazard collection of any twelve items, but as an integratedwhole made up of four sets of three, where the four is a 2LAR and each set ofthree is a 1LSR. Of the various ways of mapping a 12CR, I prefer to use acircle divided by a cross into four quadrants, with each quadrant having twoadditional points equidistant between the two poles of the cross (like a clockdial), as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Crossed Circle as a 12CR Map

Ratherthan examining various other, more complex aspects of the Geometry of Logic, Ishall now proceed to explain how certain features even of the simple diagramsintroduced above can serve as instructive illustrations of how emergenceoperates. First, note that the two opposites in Figure 1 arise out of a prior unity that could be represented as a point.[20]Before carrying out the initial analytic division, nobody could have been surethat the point (as a representation of a given conceptual unity) would bedivisible into opposites. But once the 1LAR emerges, it seems obvious.Likewise, the potential for these opposites to be reunited, as shown in Figure2, is an emergent property that no amount of prior analysis could have enabledus to predict. It simply has to happen; then it seems obvious.[21]

WithFigure 3 the emergence of intrinsic properties becomes more complex. Patternsarise that were somehow already implied in Figure 1, yet could never havebecome explicit until they emerged on the figure of a cross. For example, bytracing around the diagram from the 3 o’clock position, we now see forthe first time a movement that passes from the most negative component (--),through the two mixed components (+- and -+), to the most positive component(++)—a movement that becomes even more complex in Figure 4. The mostobvious example of this added complexity is that we now have three distinct types of opposition represented: primarypolarity (-- vs. -+ and ++ vs. +-), secondary polarity (-- vs. +- and ++ vs.-+), and contradiction (++ vs. -- and +- vs. -+). As we shall see in§III, the two types of polarity correspond to the intrinsic-extrinsic andemergent-mergent distinctions, respectively (cf. Figure 5, below), but thecontradictory opposites represent a third set of relationships, not previouslynoted in the foregoing discussion. The Geometry of Logic will therefore providean ideal (i.e., a priori) method of clarifying the logic of emergentproperties.[22]

Eachhigher level of logico-geometrical relation produces more and more complexpatterns of emergence. In Figure 4, for example, we see not only a moredetailed version of the movement from the component with the most negativevalue (---), through a series of gradual permutations, to the component withthe most positive value (+++), but also a complex array of interrelationshipsbetween the twelve components. This includes not only a new form of polarity,defined by the relations between the third term in each component, but alsovarious forms of “bipolarity”, where two terms are the same andonly one differs. Moreover, numerous patterns of triads and quaternities emergeonce we begin to analyze the relationships between the various components.

Atits most extreme levels of complexity, where forms of relation can no longer bedepicted by simple geometrical figures, the Geometry of Logic would have tomake use of something like Mandelbrot’s Fractal Geometry instead. FractalGeometry could provide an antisystematic (indeed, chaotic) alternative tostandard (Euclidean) geometry; yet in the end it would lead to the sameconclusion we have reached here, that geometric forms can provide us with deepinsights into the astonishing ways emergent properties operate.[23] Mypurpose here, however, is not to draw any conclusions about the merits ordemerits of the Geometry of Logic (this being one of the assumptions of this paper put forward in §I), but only toillustrate how emergent properties can lie dormant within lower levels and leap out at us when we examine the higher levels. Thequestion this presents to us is whether what is true in this logical realm isalso true in the ontological realm of our experience of objects in everydaylife. To this question we shall now turn our attention.

III. Evolutionary Emergencein Natural Processes

Keepingin mind the essential features of the Geometry of Logic introduced in §II,we shall now turn our attention back to the basic distinctions made in §I.The first and most obvious point to note is that the two dyadic distinctionsdiscussed there form a perfect[24] 2LAR. By mapping theintrinsic-extrinsic distinction onto the vertical and horizontal axes of across (i.e., associating it with the first term of each dyadic component), withthe emergent-mergent distinction defining the polar opposition on each axis(i.e., the second term of each component),[25] we can construct a maprelating these distinctions to four basic aspects of change, as shown in Figure5.

Figure 5: Four Aspects ofChange

As we saw in §I, extrinsic mergent properties, such asthe blackness of the words on this page, could change but are generally assumed to remain the same. I have chosen theterm “stagnation” to describe this kind of potential change, because a property that changes in this wayis analogous to a pool of water that is stagnant but could become fresh if itever began to move. Being the absence of change, stagnation is appropriatelymapped onto the “--” position of the cross (cf. Figure 3). Thepolar opposite of stagnation is “flux”: a continuous flow of changesthat never seems to settle on one form or content. Extrinsic emergence, as inthe rather odd example of this essay being printed with red ink, typically hasthis characteristic. But this is only an appropriate example to the extent thatsuch a change comes as a surprise. An extrinsic emergent property mustcontinuously change if it is to maintain the element of surprise and resistbecoming mergent. A better example, therefore, is speech itself; for everylanguage is constantly changing. Indeed, the very possibility of communicationarises out of the tension between stagnation and flux, the interaction betweenmergent and emergent types of extrinsic properties.

Thistension would never be able to maintain its balance if it were not for the factthat some properties simply do not change, but remain constant. Intrinsicmergent properties have a permanence that grounds our ability to communicateand enables us to detect something genuinely new when it arises. If wecould not count on an essay containing words, then the question of whetherthe words are printed in black or red ink would never arise. Yet like stagnation,permanence is itself balanced by a polar opposition to properties that are bothlike it (intrinsic) and unlike it (emergent). The type of change thatcharacterizes such intrinsic emergent properties is best called“evolution”, for evolutionary changes help us identify a particular concept or object (e.g., an organism)and distinguish it from others like it. Such changes, like those relatingto geometric emergence (see §II), arise out of a potential that waspermanently present in the prior state, but did not manifest itself until aparticular moment in time.

            Justas stagnation and permanence are somewhat similar (both lacking signs of change)yet also different (only the former has the potential to change without destroying the identity of theproperty itself), so also flux and evolution represent fundamentally differenttypes of change. “Flux” refers to a continuous development thatadvances according to clearly determined increments, though it may well haveproceeded differently. The process that caused the red ink to replace the blackink would presumably be easy to determine; but the new color might just as wellhave been green. “Evolution”, by contrast, refers to a suddenchange that could not have been foreseen, and whose causes (if any) may remainhidden, even though it seems necessary when viewed in retrospect. Biologistsbelieve life evolved from non-living material; yet how this could have happenedremains a matter of speculation that cannot be confirmed in a laboratory.Likewise, every human being was once a tiny foetus, totally dependent onanother organism (i.e., its mother); yet at some point it evolves a distinctlife of its own. Although empirical observation may enable us to make educatedguesses, we cannot know for certain when or in what manner such emergentproperties will arise until they actually emerge.

Theforegoing distinction between “flux” and “evolution”can be clarified by relating it to a corresponding distinction made by Kant. Inhis Opus Postumum, he contrasts twotypes of “transition”: a “step” is a change from oneposition to an immediately adjacent position, whereas a “leap” is achange that skips over one or more intermediate position(s).[26] Theformer describes the type of transition characteristic of flux, while the latter corresponds to that of evolution. Take an object, A, that has a mergent property, X,at time t₁, andimagine it comes to have an emergent property, Z, at time t₃. Property Z is intrinsic ifthere is no third property that mediates between properties X and Z. It isextrinsic if the path from X at t₁ to Z at t₃passes through another property, Y, at t₂. In the former case A evolves, whereas in thelatter it undergoes the constant change characteristic of flux.

Kant’sdistinction foreshadows Kierkegaard’s later treatment of faith as anirrational “leap” across the abyss of one’s own existence.That Kierkegaard’s “stages of life” (the aesthetic, theethical, and the religious) are to be regarded as evolving out of each other,rather than as causally determined by what goes before, is evident from thestress he puts on their paradoxical character. Without going into the detailsof Kierkegaard’s theory, we can take note of the challenging questionthis raises: if evolution (the emergence of a new intrinsic property) requiressomething like a “leap of faith”, then is it even possible? Answering this question will be our main concernfor the remainder of this section.

Intrinsicemergence may be logically possible in the highly abstract realm of mathematics(see §II), but is it a real possibility in the natural world? I believe adetailed analysis of the phenomenon of natural evolution would show that it is,though its epistemological status is highly paradoxical (see note 28,below). Classical (Darwinian) evolutionary theory claims that organisms tend topass on from generation to generation those properties that are more likely tohelp them adapt to their environment, that the organisms carrying out thisselection process most efficiently will survive the longest, and that organismswill tend to find gaps in the natural world in order to evolve in ways that arenot already exhausted by existing organisms. In terms of the framework given inFigure 5, this means natural organisms tend to inherit the most advantageousextrinsic mergent properties and somehow the species has the ability tosupplement these, over a long period of time, with intrinsic emergent properties. Once the latter evolve, they(being intrinsic) become integrally related to the very identity of the speciesin question, so that they too are passed on genetically.

Buthow is this possible? All too often evolutionary theorists, failing todistinguish between the four types of change introduced above, attempt toexplain evolutionary transformations in entirely causal terms. That is,they hypothesize complicated accounts of how a given species might havedeveloped, step-by-step, from having property X, through the intermediate stageof having property Y, to the current stage of having property Z. Such a theoryof smoothly flowing development admittedly describes how many simple causalphenomena undergo observable changes; yet when applied to long-termevolutionary changes, it quickly becomes absurd. For as long as there is no newinput into a system, mere flux cannot produce anything fundamentally new. Evolution proper cannot take place merely as aseries of minute increments that eventually manages to span the gap from oneside of an abyss to the other. It will normally involve such causal fluctuations in some way; but what makesit evolution, as opposed to mere environmental adaptation, is the ability todisclose an unrealized potential that already existed in the original(pre-evolutionary) state.

Howmerely sentient life-forms (i.e., life-forms with pre-conscious awarenesscapable of perception) emerged from the lifeless cosmic “soup”, howanimal consciousness emerged from these simpler sentient life-forms, and howhuman self-consciousness emerged from the lower-level consciousness of ouranimal cousins are all questions that cannot possibly be answered by theoriesof incremental change alone.[27] Consciousness may be rooted in a pre-conscious level of awareness, but it isalso something fundamentally new. Self-consciousness and rationality arelikewise dependent on an evolutionary progression from the kind of consciouslife we observe in the animal kingdom; but to reduce the former to the latter would be to ignore themysterious origin of language itself. This view of evolutionary biology hasbeen developed in considerable detail in Teilhard de Chardin’s manybooks,[28] so I shall not attempt to defend itany further at this point. Of the many other, more recent theories that havebeen developed along lines that are compatible with the position advanced here,two that are particularly worthy of mention are Catastrophe Theory, expoundedby René Thom and Christopher Zeeman,[29] and PaulMacLean’s theory of the Triune Brain.[30]

Themyth assumed by so many (though increasingly few) evolutionists is that, if wecould only observe the evolutionary process as it happened, then we couldlocate the proverbial “missing link” that would enable us to give acomplete, step-by-step explanation of the transition from one level to thenext. Our study of emergent properties, however, has shown this to be acategory mistake. Such an assumption fails to distinguish between evolutionarychange and the causal processes that guide the extrinsic flux studied byordinary science. Genuine evolution refers to intrinsic emergence, which proceeds (whether in branches ofmathematics such as geometry or in branches of natural science such as biology)by sudden leaps—“emergencies”, as it were—rather thanby a step-by-step progression.

IV. Evolutionary Emergence, Insight, and the Myth ofHistorical Development

Inthe foregoing discussion of natural evolution we noted a common tendency tointerpret evolutionary change as a continuous flux, rather than in terms of thediscontinuity characterized by intrinsic emergent properties. The best way tocounteract this common assumption is to observe the interesting parallels thatexist between evolution on the grandest scale and other, smaller-scale forms ofevolution. Recall the opening question of this essay. Just as we cannot observeany “magic moment” in the development of a foetus when it suddenlyceases to be a piece of “dependent tissue” and becomes anindependent human being, so also genuinely evolutionary changes in generalcannot be localized as happening at any given point in time. The reasonbio-ethicists have such difficulty determining when life “begins”is essentially the same as the reason archaeologists cannot find the“missing link”. Step-by-step growth is nowhere more apparent, andour knowledge of the stages nowhere more carefully studied, than in thetransformation of a tiny sperm-approaching-an-egg into a newborn baby; videocameras have captured virtually the entire process on film, yet none have everbeen able to detect the moment when human life as such begins. We simply do notknow if it is present until after it has already clearly emerged. The onset oflife, like all evolutionary change, isrecognizable only a posteriori—i.e.,only after the change has taken place.[31]

Withthis in mind, let us return now to the common assumption mentioned briefly nearthe end of §I, that new ideas emerge through a step-by-step process ofcause and effect, not unlike the kind of process that is often assumed to takeplace in natural evolution. Understanding a philosopher’s“development”—how he or she arrived at a new idea—is often regarded as a prerequisitefor (and sometimes even as more important than) understanding the ideasthemselves. The effects of this typically unquestioned assumption on scholarshipcan range from a very legitimate conviction that such historical knowledge willassist one in forming a goodinterpretation, to an illegitimate belief that the latter is impossible without(and can perhaps even be replaced altogether by) the former. Obviously, gaininginsight into the historical factors that gave rise to a given idea can help us understand the idea. But if a new idea arises (asI believe great ideas typically do) as an intrinsic emergent property inrelation to its historical roots (i.e., as a “leap” rather than asa “step”), then a detailed knowledge of its historical background(though unquestionably helpful) is not as essential as it is often assumed to be.[32]

Ourstudy of the logic of emergence reveals that this “myth” (i.e.,unquestioned assumption) can be applied properly only to properties (in thiscase, ideas) that arise through an extrinsic emergent process. The far more interesting, intrinsic emergent properties (such as insights, in the caseof human thought processes) always manage to elude the grasp of those who seekto tie them down in this way. Once this distinction is clearly recognized,scholars in all disciplines will be empowered to make more accurate assessmentsof the way old ideas pass away and new ideas emerge. An example from thehistory of philosophy may help to clarify how important this can be for anyoneinvolved in the task of interpreting another person’s ideas.

Theold “patchwork” interpretation of Kant’s Critique of PureReason, advanced during the first half ofthis century by Erich Adickes in Germany and Norman Kemp Smith in the U.K., isa case in point. These scholars and those who followed their lead assumed thatby carefully estimating the date when Kant wrote each of his various argumentsthey could reconstruct a step-by-step account of how Kant developed his ideas;they then attempted to explain apparent inconsistencies as due merely toKant’s tendency to forget what he had previously written as his ideasevolved. One paragraph may be judged to be a late addition, while the next maybe regarded as a leftover from an earlier way of thinking. In some cases, suchan analysis may succeed in recovering the actual flow of Kant’s (or any other scholar’s)thinking, in its chronological development; but it will never reveal the evolutionary source of his new insights. By completely ignoringKant’s own emphasis on the systematic coherence of his philosophy, thishistorical approach provides an easy excuse for the interpreter to avoid thedifficult task of finding a higher perspective that enables us to fit allKant’s ideas together into a coherent whole. Moreover, it neglects thefact that insights (especially those of a truly great thinker, such as Kant)are more likely to emerge as leaps than as steps.

Where,then, do insights come from? Such a question, as our overview of the Geometryof Logic in §II so clearly illustrates, can only be answered from theperspective of the next higher stage of an evolutionary process. In the case ofhuman rationality, this suggests that the origin of our insights, of the newideas that characterize the historical development of any creative thinker, isfundamentally inexplicable when viewed from our own evolutionary stage. Thisleaves us with one of two alternatives: we can either admit our ignorance andstop trying to answer the question, or we can postulate the existence of ahigher level in the evolution of consciousness and try to imagine what it wouldbe like to view human rationality from that perspective.[33]

Thesecond option, for those who are willing to take it—something nobodycontent with the first option can be forced to do—suggests an interestingway of applying the logic of emergence to the question of God’s existence.The study of how intrinsic emergent properties have evolved in life-forms givesrise to the possibility of developing a theological proof “fromevolution”. Such a proof could take two forms. First, it could argue onthe basis of the evolution of consciousness that insights themselves (i.e., theexperience of thinking a thought that has an intrinsic emergent character) mustcome from a higher-level consciousness that somehow transcends humanconsciousness. The problem here is that the way ideas emerge in the minds ofrational beings can also be explained (though I believe only partially) in thefluctuating terms of extrinsic properties—properties that can and oftendo eventually become mergent, as explained in §I.

Asecond form of the theological proof from evolution could start not frominsight (i.e., the peculiarly human ability to think new thoughts), but fromthe inexplicable fact that natural events other than life-forms also emerge.The principle of continuous development postulated by the theory of NaturalSelection can explain only extrinsicmergence and emergence, not their intrinsic counterparts. For as suggestedabove, such properties can change and develop only by combining old propertiesof existing objects in new ways. “There is nothing new under thesun” is a basic principle of extrinsic properties. The surprise thatcharacterizes our experience of extrinsic emergence is due not to the propertybeing genuinely new, but merelyto our cultural conditioning. If red ink is used to print this essay, this factwill not imply that red ink has in any way evolved; it has been here all along, waiting to surpriseus—and perhaps eventually to become a mergent property of scholarlyessays, should the process of flux begin to stagnate. But if, by contrast,genuinely new properties emerge instead—that is, if evolution (defined interms of intrinsic emergence) happens—and if the origin of such changescannot be attributed to human rationality (as in the case of new ideas), then a gaping hole is left in our explanatoryscheme. That hole could be filled, at least potentially, by God.

Inthis essay I have not even begun to construct a formal argument for God’sexistence based on the discovery of intrinsic emergent properties inevolutionary processes. At most, I have merely established the framework withinwhich such an argument could be constructed. The argument could be two-pronged:beginning from the nature of geometrical evolution (as outlined in §II),it would demonstrate that intrinsic emergence requires a higher-levelperspective in order for the source of a lower-level property to be fullyidentified; the argument would proceed to examine particular examples ofnatural evolution, arguing that the only way the emergence of such intrinsicproperties could ever be adequately explained (if an explanation is desired)would be to trace them to a Being who is somehow at a higher-level of evolutionthan human consciousness on the one hand and at a higher level of evolutionthan the material world on the other. That is, just as the evolution of humanrationality (with its capacity for insight) can be explained only by referringto the emergence of a higher-level mental reality, so also the evolution ofphysical properties in nature can be explained only by regarding them as rootedin the emergence of a higher-level physical reality. Although such teleologicalexplanations are far from being generally accepted by philosophers andscientists these days, they do find significant prima facie support from our study of how emergence functions inthe Geometry of Logic.

Theforegoing answer to the question of how emergent properties are possibleremains admittedly tentative at this point. However, I believe it is the onlyanswer possible, given the limitations imposed upon us by the logic ofemergence. The clear example of how emergence functions with logicalnecessity in the Geometry of Logic providesirrefutable evidence that intrinsic properties do emerge, at least in a purelymathematical context; and evolutionary biology supplements this with numerousexamples of such emergent “leaps” in nature. Unfortunately, takenon its own terms, the possibility of such intrinsic emergence is unexplainable.It simply happens.[34]Those who are dissatisfied with such a conclusion do have recourse to a way outof the dilemma, but the way of escape remains as hypothetical as the proposedsolution—until the day when human rationality itself evolves again and ahigher level of understanding emerges.

FOOTNOTES

---

[1] I would like to thank three anonymousreviewers of a previous draft of this essay for providing criticisms andsuggestions that prompted numerous improvements, such as the addition of thepresent paragraph providing historical contextualization.

[2] C.L. Morgan, Emergent Evolution (New York: Holt, 1923). Morgan was a biologist morethan a philosopher, but he appealed explicitly to Lewes in countering thereductionist trend in early twentieth century psychology with the claim that agradation of different levels of mentality exists across different animalspecies.

[3] In Space, Time, andDeity (London: Macmillan, 1920),Alexander (influenced by Morgan) develops a theory of emergence that isprobably the closest of all these early defenders of emergence to that ofcontemporary non-reductive materialism: even though the neuro-chemical level ofreality is the ultimate foundation of all conscious life, the latter levelemerges from the former in such a way that explanations at this higher levelcannot be reduced to those at the lower level. Nevertheless, Alexander, likestandard non-reductive materialists today, regarded this emergence as causallylinked in such a way that (all physical factors being known) prediction could take place between levels. Emergence, according toAlexander, only reveals new qualities, not fundamentally new realities.

[4] C.D. Broad, The Mindand Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1925). Broad expands the application of emergent thinkingbeyond the issues of the origin of life and mind, applying it to the questionof whether any given science (such as chemistry) is reducible to another (suchas physics). For Broad emergence is the chief alternative to a mechanistic viewof nature whereby all sciences ultimately reduce to one. In Broad’s view,the laws and principles of each specific science cannot be predicted from knowledge (even a completeknowledge) of the lower, more general levels of science alone. Instead, “we must wait till we meet with an actual instance of an object of thehigher order before we can discover such a law” (p.79). What emerges, onthis view, really is something new.

[5] Scientists often merely assume thatsuch emergence takes place. See, for example, Higher Brain Functions: Recentexplorations of the brain’s emergent properties, ed. Steven P. Wise (New York: John Wiley &Sons, 1987); none of the contributors show any awareness that there might bephilosophical problems arising out of the very notion of emergence. Probablythe most important writer on emergence during the middle half of the twentiethcentury was the chemist-philosopher, Michael Polanyi, though his work is oftenneglected by mainstream philosophers. For an exception to this trend, see thespecial issue on emergence in Tradition and Discovery XXIX.3 (2003), especially Philip Clayton’sarticle, “Emergence, Supervenience, and Personal Knowledge,”pp.8-19.

[6] Non-reductive materialism remainspopular despite the serious criticisms advanced by Jaegwon Kim,especially in his influential article, “Making Sense of Emergence,”Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), pp.3-36; hereafter abbreviated“MSE”. The most important of Kim’s numerous earlier essays onthis and related subjects are compiled in his book, Supervenience and Mind:Selected philosophical essays (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993); see especially chapter 8, “Supervenience as aPhilosophical Concept,” and chapter 14, “The Myth of Non-reductiveMaterialism.” Kim develops his position still further in Mind in aPhysical World: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999). For a good example of aphilosopher who has not been put off by Kim’s skepticism, see MarioBunge’s Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative novelty and the unityof knowledge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,2003); hereafter E&C. This tour de force interprets emergence within the context of systems theory, relating itto a wide range of scientific, philosophical, and cultural (e.g.,socio-economic) issues.

[7] Recent works on emergence are far toonumerous to list here. For a detailed summary of the history of emergence inphilosophy, see “Emergent Properties” in The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/.Robert Van Gulick surveys the recent literature in “Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/BodyProblem: A Philosophic Overview,” Journalof Consciousness Studies 8.9-10 (2001), pp.1-34, thefirst article in a special issue on emergence. Tim Crane, Elements ofMind: An introduction to the philosophy of mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), offers a helpful summary and analysis of the keyissues (see especially pp.62-66). See also Mark C. Taylor’sintriguing book, The Moment of Complexity: Emerging network culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).Interest in all aspects of emergence and its applications reached a new peak in1999, with the founding of the journal Emergence: Complexity &Organization (see http://emergence.org).

[8] For an example of a typical scholarlyexchange relating to this issue, see D. Wiggins, “The Sense and Referenceof Predicates: A Running Repair to Frege’s Doctrine and a Plea for theCopula”, Philosophical Quarterly34 (1984), and P.F. Strawson’s response: “Concepts and Properties orPredication and Copulation”, in P.F.Strawson, Entity and Identity and Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.85-91.

[9] Kim rightly observes (in“MSE,” p.19) that this feature of emergentism, this “talk of‘levels’ … has thoroughly penetrated not only writings aboutscience, including of course the philosophy of science, but also the primaryscientific literature of many fields.” See note 5 for several examples.By demonstrating how the Geometry of Logic illustrates the emergence of newlevels in a purely mathematical (a priori) context, I intend to provide auseful mapping tool to those scientists whose empirical research requires themto deal with such levels.

[10] {References omitted for blindreview.}

[11] Morgan, following Lewes, refers tosuch non-emergent properties as “resultant” (see note 2). Kimadopts their use of this term in “MSE” (seepp.6-8,21-22), as does Bunge in E&C (seechapter 1, especially p.16). The term is misleading, however, inasmuchas emergent properties “result” from the basal conditions at thelower levels of complexity just as much as mergent properties do. As Kim pointsout, the defining feature of resultant properties, in contrast to emergentproperties, is that only the former “are predictable fromlower-level information” (21), as provided by “asystem’s total microstructural property” (p.7). Neither Kim norBunge raise the issue of whether “resultant” is adequate as atechnical term, so neither attempts to provide a better one, as I have donehere by proposing the use of “mergent”.

[12] Kim also uses both of these words(“MSE,” pp.6,10-11,18,34), yet does not attempt to explain theirmeaning in any technical way. He does state in passing that“nonintrinsic” properties are “relational with respect toother properties in [the material base]” (pp.10-11); that is, they arisecontingently out of one or more mergent properties. As an example of anextrinsic property Kim cites “being 50 miles to the south ofBoston” (p.34). Bunge also contrasts “intrinsic” with“relational” in E&C 17.

[13] This distinction is closely relatedto the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction, where intrinsic propertieswould be definable as analytic, with extrinsic properties being synthetic.However, I have avoided this terminology throughout this essay because of themany problems associated with it. For a thorough discussion andreinterpretation of this more traditional distinction, see {reference omittedfor blind review}. Although Kim is correct to say that “the boundarybetween what’s conceptual and what isn’t is certain to be a vagueand shifting one” (“MSE,” p.11), this does not, in my view,render such distinctions useless. Rather, as Bunge recommends, we should alwaysseek to employ both analysis and synthesis as complementary methodologicalfunctions (E&C 24-25).

[14] I am not here attempting to defendthese claims, but merely summarizing the essential features of claims I havedefended at great length elsewhere (see note 2).

[15] The basic diagrams used in theGeometry of Logic are labeled with mathematical symbols (“+”,“-”, or “x”) in order to represent purelyformal-logical relations, which can then later be filled with some content. Anyone symbol, when viewed individually, is called a “term”. A term orcombination of terms (as in Figures 3 and 4, below) that stands in a logicalrelationship to one or more other (combination of) term(s) is called a“component”, especially when used as a label for one distinct partof a diagram. The arrows on the diagrams represent different sorts ofopposition. Double-headed arrows represent contradictory opposition (i.e.,opposition between two components that do not share any of the same terms),whereas single-headed arrows represent polar opposition (i.e., oppositionbetween two components that have at least one common term and at least onedifferent term). For more detailed discussions of these mapping rules and thelogical apparatus used to label the maps, see the references listed in note 2.

[16] A good example of a figure with thislogical form is the “Enneagram”, a term taken from the Greek wordsmeaning “nine” and “line”. This logico-geometricalfigure, constructed out of a circle with nine lines passing through it, wasoriginally used by early Muslim mystics as a tool for distinguishing betweenpersonality types. After passing into virtual oblivion for several centuries,it has recently been revived by a growing number of writers interested in usingit to encourage spirituality and personal growth. See for example, MariaBeesing, Robert J. Nogosek, and Patrick H. O”Leary, The Enneagram: AJourney of Self Discovery (Denville, NewJersey: Dimension Books, 1984). {Additional reference omitted for blindreview.}

[17] See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason (1781/1787), Chapter I of theAnalytic of Concepts. I demonstrate the precise 12CR structure of Kant’stable of the logical forms of judgment (from which he derives the twelvecategories) in {reference omitted for blind review}.

[18] Most interpreters regard Jung’stypes as a 16-fold theory (i.e., a 4LAR); but I have argued in {referenceomitted for blind review} that it can also be interpreted as a 12CR.

[19] Quantum physicists are far from beingin agreement over how best to describe the fundamental building-blocks of thephysical world; but the standard view (if there is one) portrays six quarksbeing opposed by six leptons, for a total of twelve basic sub-atomic particles.See, for example, … (????). Idiscuss some of the philosophical implications of quantum physics in{references omitted for blind review}.

[20] This feature is explained in moredetail in {references omitted for blind review}.

[21] This becomes particularly evidentwhen actual examples of synthetic relations are examined: the syntheticcomponent always contains more than just a combination of the two oppositesthat went before it. This mysterious and unpredictable feature of syntheticlogic, wherein opposites unite in the form of a newly emerging reality, isreflected by the convention of labeling the third term “x”.

[22] Here I am assuming that“emergence” refers to the unified whole of a more complex“level” of reality (or logical level, in the case of the Geometryof Logic). Bunge employs a diagram that has exactly the same logical structureas Figures 1-3, combined (i.e., a system consisting of one element, branchingto a system consisting of two elements, and from there to a system with fourelements); but he labels the movement fromthe fourfold to the unity as“emergence” and the reverse movement (i.e., the movement toward the more complex level) as “submergence”(E&C, p.15). This is clearlyan error—though it seems to be an error only in Bunge’s diagrammingskills, since he elsewhere clearly recognizes that emergence occurs at levelswhere more complexity isexhibited. The idea Bunge appears to be presenting with his diagram is thatwhen emergence happens all the complexity is unified under a single organizingprinciple, as when an “organism” (e.g., a human body) unitesnumerous “organs” (heart, lungs, brain, etc.). But if this is whatBunge had in mind, he should have introduced different terms, such as “convergence” (for the movement toward unity) and“divergence” (for themovement toward complexity), in order to avoid giving the technical term,“emergence” multiple meanings. Bunge rightly assumes throughout hisbook that emergence happens only within systems, where a system is “an object with a bondingstructure” (p.20). On this definition, the Geometry of Logic is clearlyone such system, and can therefore exhibit the characteristics of emergence.Bunge later proposes a more complex, four-fold definition of a system, in termsof “composition,” environment,” “structure,” and“mechanism” (p.35)— characteristics that together constitutea perfect 2LAR.

[23] See Benoit B. Mandelbrot, TheFractal Geometry of Nature (New York: W.H.Freeman, 1983). Fractal geometry, the geometry of spaces presumed to havefractional dimensionality, was among the earliest forms of chaos theory; assuch, it is at the opposite end of the spectrum of complexity as EuclideanGeometry. Fractals have the paradoxical feature that properties appearing atfirst to be emerging chaotically, as random changes following no predeterminedpattern, eventually develop into patterns that repeat themselves in a clearlydiscernable way over and over again. In other words, extrinsic emergentproperties come to be regarded as extrinsic mergent properties as thegeometrical pattern (the “fractal”) is viewed at higher and higherlevels of complexity. This, as I shall argue later in this essay, is a keyfeature of all evolutionary logic.

[24] A “perfect” relation inthe Geometry of Logic is one that is “complete”—i.e., onewherein all components represent real possibilities. By contrast, any relationwherein one or more components are either logically impossible or empiricallyunrealizable is “imperfect”.

[25] The decision as to how to correlateeach concept with a specific part of the map is to some extent arbitrary.Because the map is symmetrical, it can be rotated or flipped at will withoutchanging the logical relations betweenits parts. What is far more important is to establish the relativerelationships between each term, so that any alternative way of mapping thesame 2LAR could be rendered identical to any other simply by changing theorientation of the diagram. I have outlined and defended the mappingconventions I use in {reference omitted for blind review}. See also note 5,above.

[26] Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, tr. Eckart Förster (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993); see e.g., pp.13,37.

[27] This problem tends to be glossed overby scientists who employ the concept of emergence in the course of explainingsuch evolutionary changes. See, for example, Jon H. Kaas, “TheOrganization and Evolution of Neocortex,” in Wise (ed.), RecentExplorations (see note 5, above),pp.347-378. Kaas states, matter-of-factly (p.359): “Mammals emerged fromreptiles about 250 million years ago;” he even provides a table showingthe various branches in this “phylogenetic tree” (p.360), though hedoes admit that “[t]here are many uncertainties about the branch pointsand time course of this radiation” (p.359).

[28] See especially Pierre Teilhard DeChardin, The Phenomenon of Man (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1959).

[29] This theory’s distinctionbetween continuous and discontinuous change is roughly equivalent to thedistinction I have made between flux and evolution. For a good introduction,see Catastrophe Theory: A Revolutionary Way of Understanding How ThingsChange (London: Penguin, 1978).

[30] See Paul D. MacLean, The TriuneBrain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions (New York: Plenum Press, 1990). MacLean persuasively argues that thebrain has three layers that correspond directly to the three major evolutionarychanges that have affected life on earth: the Reptilian Brain governssentience; the Mammalian Brain governs our conscious awareness; and theNeocortex governs the higher processes of rationality.

[31] This strongly suggests that intrinsicemergence has the epistemological status of analytic a posteriori. That is, thefact that an evolving property is intrinsic makes it “analytic”whereas the fact that it emerges makes it “a posteriori”. I haveexamined various other applications of this apparently paradoxicalepistemological form in {references omitted for blind review.} However, aspointed out in note 12, I shall not develop such a possibility in this essay.

[32] After noting the emphasis placed bythe early emergentists (e.g., Lewes and Morgan) on understanding the historicaldevelopment that led to the appearance of the different “levels” ofthe world as we now know it, Kim cautions (in “MSE,” p.20):“Contemporary interest in emergence and the hierarchical model is focusednot on this kind of quasi-scientific and quasi-metaphysical history of theworld, but rather on what it says about the synchronic structure of theworld—how things and phenomenon at different levels hang together in atemporal cross section of the world, or over small time intervals.” HereKim seems to be referring to the interest contemporary philosophers have in theories of emergence, for scientists (somescientists, that is) are still as interested as ever in understanding thehistory of evolutionary changes. Kim goes on to discuss what he takes to be thekey philosophical issue relating to emergence: the possibility of supervenienceor “downward causation,” whereby emergent properties (e.g.,conscious thoughts) have a causal influence on lower-level (e.g., physical)states or events. But as Kim persuasively argues (p.25), the non-existence ofdownward causation would render emergentism identical to epiphenomenalism, thuseffectively implying that there are no genuinely emergent properties at all. The issue of downwardcausation is therefore beyond the scope of this paper, because my firstassumption (in SSI) was that emergent properties do exist. Instead of dwelling on downward causation, mycomments in the remainder of this paper could be regarded as an attempt torevitalize philosophical and theological interest in exploring the implicationsof this “quasi-scientific and quasi-metaphysical history.” Perhapsthe reason it is not, and cannotbe, genuinely scientific and genuinely metaphysical is that it is genuinely theological.

[33] As Kim points out (in“MSE,” pp.20-21): “A characteristically emergentist doctrine… [is] that some of the properties of … complex systems, thoughphysically grounded, are nonphysical, and belong outside the physicaldomain.” The concluding paragraphs of this essay will seem to be out ofplace unless this fact about emergentist theories is kept firmly in mind. Bywaxing theological, I am merely pressing emergentism to one of its potentiallyfruitful extremes. That such reflections are far from being devoid ofscientific grounding and philosophical significance is demonstrated by studiessuch as Barrow and Tipler’s The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (…:…).

[34] Kim concurs with this understandingof emergence. In “MSE” he explains that the unpredictability of aproperty’s emergence “may be the result of our not even having the concept of E[the emergent property]” before the emergence takes place; “we mayhave no idea what E is likebefore we experience it.”

This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this essay.

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