KantianRedemption: A Critical Challenge to
Christian Views of Faith and Works
Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
The
contributors to Kant andthe New Philosophy of Religion are united in the
conviction that Christianreaders have too often rejected Kant prematurely
because they believe hisphilosophy has negative implications for their
religious or theologicalcommitments. While we disagree on some of the finer
points of interpreting Kantand of how best to apply his philosophical insights
to the religious life,affirmative interpreters all agree that such rejection of
Kant is premature andthat Christians (or indeed, religious persons of any
faith) would be better offconsidering more deeply the religious goals Kant
himself was aiming to achieve.The most common complaints against Kant center
around various challenges he poses to the waymany people practice their
religion or conceive of their theological commitments.Thinking Kant is out to
destroy their most cherished beliefs, many readersremain unaware that he poses
these challenges in the hope of leading us to areligiously healthy way of meeting
these very challenges. Here I will brieflymention three of KantÕs most
important challenges and how he thoughtreligious persons ought to respond; I
shall then devote more attention toexplaining a fourth challenge in more
detail.
Christian
philosophers tend tosee the chief problem with Kant as his denial of the
possibility that we mayhave theoretical knowledge of God. Anyone who regards
the traditional proofsfor GodÕs existence as a crucial building-block of
religious faith,will surely regard KantÕs call for a revolution in the way we
view therelationship between knowledge and faith as philosophical (if not Christian)heresy.
However, Kant himself saw it simply as a call to a more humble,
moreauthentically religious epistemological outlook. In short, the
allegedauthority of the theoretical proofs must be challenged because reliance
on themwill eclipse the authentically religious need to ground our
religiouscommitments in our moral disposition, not in our logical reasoning
abilities.KantÕs point is not that cognition is irrelevant to religious belief;
itis that any attempt to ground religious beliefs and practices in
theoreticalknowledge rather than moral reasoning can lead to nothing but
dialecticalillusion.
Christian
theologians, bycontrast, tend to find KantÕs challenge to the authority of
divine revelationand the historical Jesus to be most problematic: KantÕs claim
thatpractical reason has an in-built ÒspaceÓ that predisposes us to bereceptive
to the revelation of an incarnation of GodÑwhat Kant calls theÒarchetypeÓ of
perfect humanityÑis rejected because itappears to be an attempt to do away with
the historical tradition altogether,as if it were simply irrelevant. KantÕs
purpose in challenging thesetheological authorities, however, was not to
dispense with the tradition, butto insist that philosophers view them from a
properly philosophicalperspective. The only way to prevent oneÕs belief in
Scripture andoneÕs reliance on Jesus as savior and lord from becoming the
objects of afalse assurance, amounting to nothing less than idolatry, is to
recognize that,from the transcendental perspective (i.e., when we are considering
what makesreligion itself possible), these empirical authorities are secondary
to thein-built authority that God has placed within each person as part of
ourrational capacity.
A third
reason KantÕsphilosophy is often prematurely rejected by Christians is that he
challengesthose who say they have Òexperienced GodÓ to be more honest
whenmaking such claims and drawing conclusions from them. The very fact that
heraises this challenge has often been interpreted (even by some readers
whootherwise recognize the affirmative aims of KantÕs approach to religion)as
an indication that Kant rejects the whole notion of an encounter with God.But
this view totally ignores the many places where Kant himself bears witnessto
his own encounter with God! This third challenge is again KantÕsattempt not to
do away with religious experience, but to encourage religiousbelievers to speak
more accurately and with greater humility about theirreligious experiences. For
Kant, this means recognizing the role of symbols in the religiouslifeÑnot
in the sense that ÒsymbolicÓ interpretationsindicate a lack of any real relation
between God and human beings, but ratherbecause symbolism is the proper
vehicle through which that relationship isauthentically expressed. In KantÕs
Critical Religion I call thisKantÕs ÒCritical MysticismÓÑmystical in
the sense that he isaffirming the reality of a divine-human encounter, yet Critical
in the sense that hewants us to talk about that encounter in an
epistemologically legitimate way.
The
contributors to Kant andthe New Philosophy of Religion have already
defended Kant at great length onthe above three challenges, as well as on many
other points of concern that arerelated to these issues. In addition to my KantÕs
Critical Religion, MichelDesplandÕs Kant on History and Religion,
Ronald GreenÕs ReligionReasonand subsequent books on Kant, Gene FendtÕs What
May I Hope?, John HareÕs TheMoral Gap,Elizabeth GalbraithÕs Kant
and Theology, GregoryJohnsonÕs important work on the relationship between
Kant and Swedenborg,and the numerous other articles and books by the fourteen
contributors presenta wealth of literature that has now reached a critical
mass. This should besufficient to turn the tide of interpretative tendencies
toward the affirmationof KantÕs overall project as one that aims at reforming
the Christian traditionrather than destroying it. The last of the four main
challenges has also beentreated in this literature, but not always with the
clarity and precision thatI believe is possible, if we keep in mind the
perspectival framework ofKantÕs System.
In my earliest essays on Kant,all written during the 1980s and brought together in my book, KantÕsSystem of Perspectives (1993), I argued that interpreters are bound tomisunderstand many of KantÕs complex arguments if they are not aware ofthe precise role each argument plays in the architectonic pattern (i.e., theartful logic) that determines how the parts of his system hang together. Theoverall, ÒCopernicanÓ or ÒTranscendentalÓ Perspectivethat governs the entire System assumes that what we are looking for asphilosophers are the subjective conditions that make possible whatever subject matterwe are dealing with. The first Critique adopts the theoretical standpoint inorder to discern the boundary between what we can and cannot know. The second Critique adopts the practicalstandpoint in order to discern the boundary between moral action and morallyirrelevant action. The third Critique then adopts the judicial standpoint in order todiscern to what extent we can meaningfully experience traces of freedom withinthe natural world. And within each standpoint, Kant develops his argument byadopting four successive perspectives, as different angles from which toexamine the subject-matter in question. I call these the transcendental,the logical, the empirical, and the hypothetical. KantÕs book onreligion, written soon after he had completed the third Critique, also adopts thejudicial standpoint as it moves through these same four perspectives. Althoughinterpreters differ on this point, I regard Religion as essentially atreatise on religious experience, whose main focus is to determine how theprior standpoints of nature and freedom ought properly to be balanced in thereligious life. As I argued at great length in a 1987 essay that eventuallyappeared in Kant-Studien (1992), Kant was attempting not to reduce religion tomorality, as is so often claimed, but to raise morality to the higherperspectival level of religion. With this brief overview of the perspectivalstructure of KantÕs System, let us now examine his fourth challenge.
Kant has
traditionally beenregarded as defending a religion of salvation by works,
devoid of any genuineappreciation for divine forgiveness and graceÑa position
that wouldbe not only anti-Christian but theologically suspect for purely philosophicalreasons.
The inaccuracy of this interpretation has been demonstrated not onlyin Kant
and the New Philosophy of Religion (see especially the article by
PhilipRossi), but also in several of the articles and books published by
othercontributors (including both The Moral Gap and KantÕs Critical
Religion). But because it hasbeen so rampant among readers and interpreters
of Kant, I shall devote thebulk of this essay to a clear demonstration of how
KantÕs emphasis ongood works is not only consistent with Christian
faith, but constitutes asignificant challenge to Christians to remain
faithfully open to GodÕs unmeritedgrace. This aspect of KantÕs theory falls
under the category ofÒredemptionÓ in systematic theologyÑi.e., theexplanation
of how human beings are set free from the consequences of theirsins. In
particular, it is KantÕs response to the long-standinghistorical controversy
over the proper relationship between faith and works.The Bible seems to teach
in some places that faith redeems us regardless ofwhether or not we perform
good works, while elsewhere it seems to treat thelatter as a necessary
requirement for salvation.[1]How
then does Kant deal with this issue?
First, Kant
insisted on viewingredemption as a primarily practical rather than
atheoretical issue. That is, he viewed it actively, as related in some way
tothe good life-conduct of the person who is to be saved, rather than solely
tothe passive reception of GodÕs grace by the saved person. While thisposition
of KantÕs is clearly a challenge to the way many Christians viewGodÕs
redemptive activity, it is often taken out of its properperspectival context in
KantÕs System. Interpreters tend to neglectKantÕs simultaneous recognition, in
Part One of Religion and throughout thebook, that the reality of evil
implies the insufficiency of goodlife-conduct and the real need
for a morally-attuned faith in GodÕsinscrutable grace.[2]
As aresult, Christian readers in particular are often quick to rejectKantÕs
position, as if it were more than just a challenge to maintain abalanced
interpretation of redemption, but a denial of the whole doctrine. Sucha
premature rejection is often caused by the failure of interpreters totake
KantÕs principle of perspective into consideration. Otto typifiesthis common
tendency when he says Kant Òwill have no gospel, and noscheme of morals ever
stood in more need of one. His yoke is not easy and hisburden is not light.Ó[3]While
this charge may be true of the second Critique, where Kant isattempting
to establish the strict universality of the moral demand, it is farfrom being
true of Religion, where the good news of a solution to the
problem ofradical evil forms the heart of the book (i.e., the middle two of
thebookÕs four main parts).
I have
shown elsewhere (see KantÕsCritical Religion,VI.2) that, although
Kantian religion is properly viewed from the judicialstandpoint (that of the
third Critique), KantÕs strategy throughout thebook is to assess whether
our various religious beliefs and practices should beinterpreted as grounded
more in the theoretical standpoint or in the practicalstandpoint. This is the
source of KantÕs careful distinction between purereligion (i.e., religious
belief and practice that derives its meaning from thepractical standpoint) and
ecclesiastical faith (i.e., religious belief andpractice that derives its
meaning from the theoretical standpoint). Kant doesindeed refuse to take refuge
in a gospel that would overrule the authority ofthe practical standpoint, for,
as he says in Religion 3(3), Òmoralitydoes not need religion at allÓ in
order for philosophers to define what beinggoodmeans. However, he
readily admits that a doctrine of redemption does have aproper place within
a religious system, inasmuch as such a system goes beyondthe practical to
the judicial standpoint. (I discuss KantÕs viewof good life-conduct as
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition forsalvation near the end of
VIII.2.B [s.a. VII.2.B] of KantÕsCritical Religion.)His caution on this
issue is closely connected with his intent to avoid thepride associated with a
dogmatic acceptance of the morally-transcendent ideathat arises as a by-product
of the first stage in his religious system (i.e.,what he calls the Òworkings of
graceÓ [see KCR, AVII.1]). With thisdanger in mind, and with the
awareness that Kant may have his own subtle way ofresponding to the challenge
that practical reason presents to all religiousbelieversÑi.e., the challenging
reminder that any claim to righteousnessmust be grounded in good worksÑlet us
take a closer look at KantÕsCritical reply to
the theological problem
of the conflict betweenfaith and works.
KantÕs
clearest account ofthe role of good works in redemption comes in Book Three [Religion
115-20 (106-11)], wherehe reveals Òa remarkable antinomy of human reasonÓ
[116(107)].ÒSaving faith involves two elements
...The first is the faith in an atonement ...;the second, the faith that we can become well-pleasing to
God through a goodcourse of life in the futureÓ [116(106)]. But which comes
first, when thereligious believer is standing at the point of religious
experience andattempting to explain its meaning: faith in vicarious atonement,
or faithin oneÕs own works? A belief in the priority of the former runs
therisk of ignoring that, for any Òthoughtful personÓ, such faith mustimply a
commitment to Òimprove his way of lifeÓ [117(107)];but a belief in the
priority of the latter runs the risk of ignoring theseriousness of the threat
posed by the thoroughgoing Òpower of the evilprincipleÓ [117(108)]. For this
reason, the antinomy Òcannot beresolved theoreticallyÓ, but only by appealing
to the practicalstandpoint [117-8(108)]: ÒThe acceptance of ...
faith in avicarious atonement is ... necessary only for the theoreticalconcept
[of salvation]; in no other way can we make comprehensible to ourselves
such anabsolution. In contrast, the necessity for the second principle
[goodlife-conduct] is practical and, indeed, purely moral.Ó
This
conflict between genuinegood works and genuine faith is therefore only
apparent, once we recognize theperspectival relationship between their
fundamental principles [Religion 119(110)]:
[they] are not two principles which
inthemselves so differ that to begin with the one, or the other, would be
toenter upon opposing paths, but only one and the same practical idea ...representing
the archetype now as found in God and proceeding from Him [towhich a person
responds with faith as the basis for good works], and now, asfound in us [to
which a person responds with good works as the basis forfaith], but in both
instances as the gauge for our course of life.
Kant is
here describinga perspectival shift that occurs in his religious system during
the transitionfrom Book ThreeÕs empirical perspective to Book FourÕs
hypotheticalperspective. From the former perspective grace (in the form of
thearchetype of perfect humanity) precedes good works, whereas from the
latterperspective good works precede and lead to the hope of salvation,
inasmuchas a personÕs Òsaving faithÓ is authentic only if it is also a Òpure religious faith, [which] is practical.Ó (The paradoxical relationbetween saving faith and good
life-conduct is therefore equivalent inKantÕs religious system to the antinomy
of practical reason in stagefour of his practical system.[4]In
both systems the antinomy has no theoretical solution, only a practicalone.)
The biblical theologian rightly relies more on the logical
perspective(revelation being the communication of the divine logos) and
the empiricalperspective (i.e., the Scriptures as we have them passed down to
us by ourhistorical tradition), just as the philosophical theologian
rightlyfocuses more on the transcendental perspective (i.e., on discerning
thenecessary requirements for the possibility of religion) and the hypotheticalperspective
(i.e., on discerning the principles that distinguish true serviceof God from
false service). For a complete theological understanding of aliving religious
faith and its proper relation to genuinely good works, thesetwo complementary
Perspectives (the biblical and the philosophical) must worktogether [see KantÕs
Critical Religion, IX.1].
Kant
further clarifies theproblem of faith and works by distinguishing between truly
good works (i.e.,morally good actions) and works that are wrongly believed
to be good preciselybecause there is no reason to do them other than to please
God [see e.g., Religion106(97)].Kant would assess Luther as being right
for rejecting the CatholicChurchÕs belief that Ògood worksÓ of the latter type
(i.e.,churchly activities) can effect salvation in themselves, but wrong
toÒthrow out the baby with the bathwaterÓ by also downplayingthe importance of
truly moral deeds [cf. KCR, note IX.19]. From thePerspective of human
reason, the latter provide the proper basis for hope in salvation,
eventhough, with Luther, Kant agrees that from GodÕs Perspective they
willnever be sufficient to redeem us [see e.g., KCR, note VI.26
andVII.3.B].
The fact
that Kant treats goodlife-conduct as a philosophical litmus test for a
genuine faith must not beconstrued to mean that he thinks good works can
themselves redeem us or that an appeal toGodÕs grace is but an optional
extra. Kant makes his position crystalclear as early as 1775, in a letter to
Lavater, where he says his trustÒin the unknown and mysterious help of GodÓ is
mostemphatically accomplished Òwithout meritorious ÔworksÕ of anysortÓ
[AA10:170 (Zw67:81-2)]. In the same letter [169(81); s.a. 171(83)]he says: ÒBy
Ômoral faithÕ I mean the unconditioned trust indivine aid, in achieving all the
good that ... lies beyond our power.Ó Inthe process of solving the three
difficulties in Book Two, especially thethird, Kant frequently appeals to the
need for such a faith in GodÕsforgiveness and grace. Because Òwe really have no
legal claimÓ tothe Òsurplus ... over the profit from good worksÓ,it must
be Òreckoned to us by graceÓ [Religion 75(70)]. When
thephilosophical ÒdeductionÓ of GodÕs redemptive forgivenessis taken as a
regulative symbol, its Ònegative benefit to religion andmorality ... is veryfar-reachingÓ (e.g., it
prevents us from a false sense ofself-sufficiency); nevertheless, this
deduction has no Òpositive useÓ (i.e., onethat can be manipulated as an
item of theoretical knowledge), for itpresupposes that Òthe individual in
question is already in actualpossession of the required good dispositionÓ
[76(70-1)]. This doesnot mean Kant has no use for divine grace, nor does it
make him a Pelagian (acharge I refute more thoroughly in KCR, IX.4).
Rather, it means we cannot takecredit for earningGodÕs grace at all; the
most we Òcan credit to ourselvesÓis our Òcapability of receivingÓ grace
[75n(70n)]. This Critical view ofredemption defines grace as Òa superiorÕs
decree conferring a goodfor which the subordinate possesses nothing but the
(moral)receptivityÓ. This ÒreceptivityÓ is what Kant means byÒmoral faithÓ;it
is moralinsofar as its rational support (i.e., the reason we are
justified inbelieving we have received it) can come only from evidence drawn
from the goodworks we perform, yet it is faith insofar as it represents
not something weactively door earn,but something we find within
ourselves and merely accept.
In spite of
the bad pressKantÕs doctrine of redemption has so often been given, a perspectival interpretation reveals it to be a plausible theological account of the relationship between faith andworksÑone that is
both philosophically sound and consistent withChristian teaching. Although
redemption is admittedly connected at some pointsin the New Testament with a
simple Òdeclaration of repentanceÓ,as when John the Baptist calls the people
to Òrepent and believe in thegospelÓ [Mk. 1:15; see Kt65:42], most Christians
would agree that such adeclaration only constitutes a genuine conversion when
it comes from the heart;and if it comes from the heart it will result in a
change of life-conduct [seee.g., Js. 2:14-26; Rev. 20: 12-13]. We can be
assured we have been saved whenwe observe that duties we would have previously
put to one side in order tofulfill our inclinations are now being obeyed; they
have become far moreimportant because we now view these duties as carrying the
full weight of divinecommands[see KCR,VI.2]. Here we come to the
heart of the challenge Kant is giving to theChristian community: the view that
grace is imputed only to those who give amerely theoretical assent to a given
proposition, so that a change in lifestylebecomes an optional extra, must be
regarded as a perversion of biblicalteaching. As Kant puts it: ÒNo thoughtful
person can bring himselfto believe thisÓ [Religion 117(107)].
Kant argues
only against sucherroneous approaches to Christianity [See e.g., Kt65:42], not
against anauthentically biblical theology. For he is careful to distinguish betweenÒgood
worksÓ as morally good actions that are intrinsicallypleasing to God and
Ògood worksÓ as nonmoral actions that some religiouspeople believe can
induce God to redeem them without requiring any change intheir moral
disposition.[5]Having
no direct access to our disposition, we must regard its reworking from
evil to good as afree and unmerited gift from God; good works are merely the
evidence we can useto prove to ourselves (not to God!) that our faith in
GodÕs redemption isnot in vainÑthey show us that we really have been saved.
Grace cannot bea rewardfor good works, because it comes to us while our
disposition is still in itscorrupted, evil state.[6]Still
less can nonmoral works serve to appease divine displeasure foroneÕs lackof
good works in the moral sense, for this would be a futile attempt to controlGod.
KantÕsinsistence
on the primacy of practical reason entails that faith in thepossibility of
good life-conduct has hypothetical priority (in Book Four) overour theoretical
confessions of faith (e.g., in an atonement), butonly from the
standpoint of philosophical justification of our assurance that we are
in factredeemed. Logically, we must conceive of atoning faith as coming first
(as Kanthimself does, by placing it in Book Two), for it empowers us to enter
into thekind of fellowship with other human beings that we enjoy in a true
church. Fromthe latter, empirical perspective, the two types of faith might
best be depictedas occurring simultaneously in the experiences of conversion(justification)
and Christian fellowship (sanctification). Thus our obedience, not our
faith in atonement,Òmust be the effect of our own action and not ...
of a foreigninfluence in the presence of which we are passiveÓ [Religion 118(108-9);
s.a. 184-5(172-3)]. However,Kant never means to imply that a belief in
atonement has no place; on thecontrary, he criticizes those who hold such
Ònaturalistic unbeliefÓfor Òcutting the knot (by means of a practical maxim)
instead ofdisentangling it (theoretically)Ó [118-9(109)]. He arguesinstead
that Òthe theoretical demand can be satisfiedÓ byrecognizing the perspectival
relationship between the two types of faith. Thetheoretical misunderstanding
caused by the dogmatic tendency to view ourability to do good worksas a
matter of grace and our belief in a vicarious atonement as a matter of duty
must therefore be turned on its head,replaced by a practical understanding
of good works as a matter of duty and vicarious atonement as a matter of
grace.[7]
Inconclusion,
then, we can see that, like the first three challenges mentioned atthe outset
of this paper, KantÕs fourth challenge does not present (ifyou will excuse the
expression) the Ògood ChristianÓ with anysubstantial difficulties. Like
mainstream Evangelical Christians, Kant does notbelieve human beings can save
themselves through their good works, for we areall hopelessly corrupted by
radical evil; yet he challenges us to remember thatgood life-conduct is
still of utmost importance to the religious life. Likewise, he accepts that
grace must bereceived freely, while we are still lost in this hopelessly evil
state; yet hechallenges us to remember that Godremains in charge of the
distribution of such grace, so that any attempt tomanipulate GodÑe.g., through
the profession of prescribed theoreticaldoctrines, or through Ògood worksÓ in
the sense of non-moral deedsperformed in hopes of appeasing GodÑamounts to
nothing less than moralunbelief. Finally, then,KantÕs reply to the
challenge of good works reassures us that, althoughgrace does not replaceour
duty to do what is right, it empowers us to be good, so that our former
despair can be replacedby a genuine religious hope.
This
etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this
essay.
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[1]. Onthe
one hand, the Bible affirms that Ôfaith without deeds is uselessÕ[Js. 2:20],
yet elsewhere clearly insists that Ôyou have been savedthrough faith ...
not as a result of works, that no oneshould boastÕ [Eph. 2:8-9].
[2]. One of severalnotable exceptions is Wood, who thoroughly examines the role of moral faith inWo70:160-87. For a detailed discussion of the role of nonreligious faith in KantÕs System, as it relatesto both the theoretical and the practical standpoints, see KSP1:V. On the issueof the insufficiency of our good works to save us, the passage quoted inVII.2.B is worth repeating here: ÔEvery man must guard against moralself-conceit, against believing himself morally good and having afavourable opinion of himself. This feeling of moral self-sufficiency isself-deception; it is an incurable hallucinationÕ [Kt35:(246); s.a. Religion68(62)].
[3]. Ot50:186; s.a.note AVI.8. Kant presents a concise explanation of why such a criticism isunjustified in Religion 179n(167n).Obedience to the moral law is a light burden because we impose it uponourselves freely, whereas ecclesiastical ordinances tend to be burdensomebecause they are imposed upon us by another. This key position is one Kant andJesus surely have in common [see AV.2-3].
[4]. See Vo88:185.
[5]. KantÕswhole
intention in formulating notions such as ÔpracticalfaithÕ, in urging us to
pursue actively the goal of good life-conduct,and in criticizing those who
replace this goal with ÔworksÕdirected solely to God, is to expound and defend
the consistency andrationality of the true Christian message as conveyed in
the Bible. WhatChristian would deny that the Bible teaches this very same
position: that aperson Ôwho does what he can, and trusts God to do whatever else
may be lacking, has a truer faith than he who insistsupon knowing what God will
do, and cherishes the hope that his praise of this may somehow do
instead of his own moral serviceÕ[We26:154-5]? This is just what Kant is
saying when he concludes his book in Religion202(190) with the claim
Ôthatthe right course is not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress
fromvirtue to pardoning grace.Õ
[6]. Fromthe
Perspective of the biblical theologian, as adopted in IX.2-3, grace is
bestregarded as being transmitted through the loving relationship God
establishes with human individuals [cf. IX.2.A].The relationship renews the
personÕs heart, and this in turn motivatesthe person to engage in good
life-conduct. A person who believes God will bepleased by the mere observance
of statutory laws and rituals is allowing thesechurchly works to take the
place ofthe God-relationship. Ironically, the very acts such people
believe renderthem worthy to receive GodÕs grace are thereby blocking
the acceptance of grace in their disposition. Thus,the real problem of Ôgood worksÕ
relates to pseudo-religious ÔworksÕ rather than genuinely goodconduct.
Fromthe
biblical theologianÕs Perspective, the gift of grace and itscorollary, freedom,
mean that God loves us no matter what our deeds turn out to be like. But
this knowledge increases our responsibility; it does not decrease it. On
this Ibelieve Paul and Kant are in complete accord. The difference is that
Paul, as abiblical theologian, infers from this that we can be secure in the
knowledge ofour salvation, whereas Kant, as a philosophical theologian, warns
that suchcertainty cannot have a theoreticalbasis and that to believe it
does is to risk having too low an estimate of ourlevel of responsibility before
God [see AVI.3].
[7]. Religion 118(109). In Kt65:65 Kant says Ôit is asuperstition to hold that historical belief is a duty and essential tosalvation.Õ Indeed, Ôfaith in a merely historical proposition is,in itself, deadÕ [66, e.a.]; if not accompanied by pure inner religion,it can be used by the clergy to dominate the laity [50]. As Kant puts it in Religion133(123), Ôtrue religion ...consist[s] not in the knowing or considering of what God does or has donefor our salvation but in what we must do to become worthy of it.Õ