KantianRedemption: A Critical Challenge to Christian Views of Faith and Works

 

Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)

Department of Religion and Philosophy

Hong Kong Baptist University

(stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

 

       The contributors to Kant andthe New Philosophy of Religion are united in the conviction that Christianreaders have too often rejected Kant prematurely because they believe hisphilosophy has negative implications for their religious or theologicalcommitments. While we disagree on some of the finer points of interpreting Kantand of how best to apply his philosophical insights to the religious life,affirmative interpreters all agree that such rejection of Kant is premature andthat Christians (or indeed, religious persons of any faith) would be better offconsidering more deeply the religious goals Kant himself was aiming to achieve.The most common complaints against Kant center around various challenges he poses to the waymany people practice their religion or conceive of their theological commitments.Thinking Kant is out to destroy their most cherished beliefs, many readersremain unaware that he poses these challenges in the hope of leading us to areligiously healthy way of meeting these very challenges. Here I will brieflymention three of KantÕs most important challenges and how he thoughtreligious persons ought to respond; I shall then devote more attention toexplaining a fourth challenge in more detail.

       Christian philosophers tend tosee the chief problem with Kant as his denial of the possibility that we mayhave theoretical knowledge of God. Anyone who regards the traditional proofsfor GodÕs existence as a crucial building-block of religious faith,will surely regard KantÕs call for a revolution in the way we view therelationship between knowledge and faith as philosophical (if not Christian)heresy. However, Kant himself saw it simply as a call to a more humble, moreauthentically religious epistemological outlook. In short, the allegedauthority of the theoretical proofs must be challenged because reliance on themwill eclipse the authentically religious need to ground our religiouscommitments in our moral disposition, not in our logical reasoning abilities.KantÕs point is not that cognition is irrelevant to religious belief; itis that any attempt to ground religious beliefs and practices in theoreticalknowledge rather than moral reasoning can lead to nothing but dialecticalillusion.

       Christian theologians, bycontrast, tend to find KantÕs challenge to the authority of divine revelationand the historical Jesus to be most problematic: KantÕs claim thatpractical reason has an in-built ÒspaceÓ that predisposes us to bereceptive to the revelation of an incarnation of GodÑwhat Kant calls theÒarchetypeÓ of perfect humanityÑis rejected because itappears to be an attempt to do away with the historical tradition altogether,as if it were simply irrelevant. KantÕs purpose in challenging thesetheological authorities, however, was not to dispense with the tradition, butto insist that philosophers view them from a properly philosophicalperspective. The only way to prevent oneÕs belief in Scripture andoneÕs reliance on Jesus as savior and lord from becoming the objects of afalse assurance, amounting to nothing less than idolatry, is to recognize that,from the transcendental perspective (i.e., when we are considering what makesreligion itself possible), these empirical authorities are secondary to thein-built authority that God has placed within each person as part of ourrational capacity.

       A third reason KantÕsphilosophy is often prematurely rejected by Christians is that he challengesthose who say they have Òexperienced GodÓ to be more honest whenmaking such claims and drawing conclusions from them. The very fact that heraises this challenge has often been interpreted (even by some readers whootherwise recognize the affirmative aims of KantÕs approach to religion)as an indication that Kant rejects the whole notion of an encounter with God.But this view totally ignores the many places where Kant himself bears witnessto his own encounter with God! This third challenge is again KantÕsattempt not to do away with religious experience, but to encourage religiousbelievers to speak more accurately and with greater humility about theirreligious experiences. For Kant, this means recognizing the role of symbols in the religiouslifeÑnot in the sense that ÒsymbolicÓ interpretationsindicate a lack of any real relation between God and human beings, but ratherbecause symbolism is the proper vehicle through which that relationship isauthentically expressed. In KantÕs Critical Religion I call thisKantÕs ÒCritical MysticismÓÑmystical in the sense that he isaffirming the reality of a divine-human encounter, yet Critical in the sense that hewants us to talk about that encounter in an epistemologically legitimate way.

       The contributors to Kant andthe New Philosophy of Religion have already defended Kant at great length onthe above three challenges, as well as on many other points of concern that arerelated to these issues. In addition to my KantÕs Critical Religion, MichelDesplandÕs Kant on History and Religion, Ronald GreenÕs ReligionReasonand subsequent books on Kant, Gene FendtÕs What May I Hope?, John HareÕs TheMoral Gap,Elizabeth GalbraithÕs Kant and Theology, GregoryJohnsonÕs important work on the relationship between Kant and Swedenborg,and the numerous other articles and books by the fourteen contributors presenta wealth of literature that has now reached a critical mass. This should besufficient to turn the tide of interpretative tendencies toward the affirmationof KantÕs overall project as one that aims at reforming the Christian traditionrather than destroying it. The last of the four main challenges has also beentreated in this literature, but not always with the clarity and precision thatI believe is possible, if we keep in mind the perspectival framework ofKantÕs System.

       In my earliest essays on Kant,all written during the 1980s and brought together in my book, KantÕsSystem of Perspectives (1993), I argued that interpreters are bound tomisunderstand many of KantÕs complex arguments if they are not aware ofthe precise role each argument plays in the architectonic pattern (i.e., theartful logic) that determines how the parts of his system hang together. Theoverall, ÒCopernicanÓ or ÒTranscendentalÓ Perspectivethat governs the entire System assumes that what we are looking for asphilosophers are the subjective conditions that make possible whatever subject matterwe are dealing with. The first Critique adopts the theoretical standpoint inorder to discern the boundary between what we can and cannot know. The second Critique adopts the practicalstandpoint in order to discern the boundary between moral action and morallyirrelevant action. The third Critique then adopts the judicial standpoint in order todiscern to what extent we can meaningfully experience traces of freedom withinthe natural world. And within each standpoint, Kant develops his argument byadopting four successive perspectives, as different angles from which toexamine the subject-matter in question. I call these the transcenden­tal,the logical, the empirical, and the hypothetical. KantÕs book onreligion, written soon after he had completed the third Critique, also adopts thejudicial standpoint as it moves through these same four perspectives. Althoughinterpreters differ on this point, I regard Religion as essentially atreatise on religious experience, whose main focus is to determine how theprior standpoints of nature and freedom ought properly to be balanced in thereligious life. As I argued at great length in a 1987 essay that eventuallyappeared in Kant-Studien (1992), Kant was attempting not to reduce religion tomorality, as is so often claimed, but to raise morality to the higherperspectival level of religion. With this brief overview of the perspectivalstructure of KantÕs System, let us now examine his fourth challenge.

       Kant has traditionally beenregarded as defending a religion of salvation by works, devoid of any genuineappreciation for divine forgiveness and graceÑa posi­tion that wouldbe not only anti-Christian but theologically suspect for purely philo­soph­icalreasons. The inaccuracy of this interpretation has been demonstrated not onlyin Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (see especially the article by PhilipRossi), but also in several of the articles and books published by othercontributors (including both The Moral Gap and KantÕs Critical Religion). But because it hasbeen so rampant among readers and inter­preters of Kant, I shall devote thebulk of this essay to a clear demonstration of how KantÕs emphasis ongood works is not only consistent with Christian faith, but constitutes asignificant challenge to Christians to remain faithfully open to GodÕs un­meritedgrace. This aspect of KantÕs theory falls under the category ofÒredemp­tionÓ in systematic theologyÑi.e., theexplanation of how human beings are set free from the consequences of theirsins. In particular, it is KantÕs response to the long-standinghistorical controversy over the proper relationship between faith and works.The Bible seems to teach in some places that faith redeems us regardless ofwhether or not we perform good works, while elsewhere it seems to treat thelatter as a necessary requirement for salvation.[1]How then does Kant deal with this issue?

       First, Kant insisted on viewingredemption as a primarily prac­ti­cal rather than atheoretical issue. That is, he viewed it actively, as related in some way tothe good life-conduct of the person who is to be saved, rather than solely tothe passive reception of GodÕs grace by the saved person. While thisposition of KantÕs is clearly a challenge to the way many Christians viewGodÕs redemptive activity, it is often taken out of its properperspectival context in KantÕs System. Interpreters tend to neglectKantÕs simultaneous recognition, in Part One of Religion and throughout thebook, that the reality of evil implies the insuffi­ciency of goodlife-conduct and the real need for a morally-attuned faith in GodÕsinscrutable grace.[2] As aresult, Chris­tian readers in par­ticular are often quick to rejectKantÕs position, as if it were more than just a challenge to maintain abalanced interpretation of redemption, but a denial of the whole doctrine. Sucha premature re­jection is often caused by the failure of interpreters totake KantÕs principle of perspective into consideration. Otto typifiesthis common tendency when he says Kant Òwill have no gospel, and noscheme of morals ever stood in more need of one. His yoke is not easy and hisburden is not light.Ó[3]While this charge may be true of the second Critique, where Kant isattempting to establish the strict universality of the moral demand, it is farfrom being true of Religion, where the good news of a solution to the problem ofradical evil forms the heart of the book (i.e., the middle two of thebookÕs four main parts).

       I have shown elsewhere (see KantÕsCritical Religion,VI.2) that, although Kantian religion is properly viewed from the judicialstandpoint (that of the third Critique), KantÕs strategy throughout thebook is to assess whether our various religious beliefs and practices should beinterpreted as grounded more in the theoretical standpoint or in the practicalstandpoint. This is the source of KantÕs careful distinction between purereligion (i.e., religious belief and practice that derives its meaning from thepractical stand­point) and ecclesiastical faith (i.e., religious belief andpractice that derives its meaning from the theoretical standpoint). Kant doesindeed refuse to take refuge in a gospel that would overrule the authority ofthe practical standpoint, for, as he says in Religion 3(3), Òmoralitydoes not need religion at allÓ in order for philosophers to define what beinggoodmeans. However, he readily admits that a doctrine of redemption does have aproper place within a religious system, inasmuch as such a system goes beyondthe practical to the judicial stand­point. (I discuss KantÕs viewof good life-conduct as a necessary, but not sufficient, con­dition forsalva­tion near the end of VIII.2.B [s.a. VII.2.B] of KantÕsCritical Religion.)His caution on this issue is closely connected with his intent to avoid thepride associated with a dogmatic acceptance of the morally-transcendent ideathat arises as a by-product of the first stage in his religious system (i.e.,what he calls the Òworkings of graceÓ [see KCR, AVII.1]). With thisdanger in mind, and with the awareness that Kant may have his own subtle way ofresponding to the challenge that practical reason presents to all religiousbelieversÑi.e., the challenging reminder that any claim to righteousnessmust be grounded in good worksÑlet us take a closer look at KantÕsCritical reply to the theological problem of the conflict betweenfaith and works.

       KantÕs clearest account ofthe role of good works in redemption comes in Book Three [Religion 115-20 (106-11)], wherehe reveals Òa remarkable antinomy of human reasonÓ [116(107)].ÒSaving faith involves two elements ...The first is the faith in an atonement ...;the second, the faith that we can become well-pleasing to God through a goodcourse of life in the futureÓ [116(106)]. But which comes first, when thereligious believer is standing at the point of religious experience andattempting to explain its meaning: faith in vicari­ous atonement, or faithin oneÕs own works? A belief in the prior­ity of the former runs therisk of ignoring that, for any Òthoughtful personÓ, such faith mustimply a commit­ment to Òimprove his way of lifeÓ [117(107)];but a belief in the priority of the latter runs the risk of ignoring theseriousness of the threat posed by the thoroughgoing Òpower of the evilprincipleÓ [117(108)]. For this reason, the antinomy Òcannot beresolved theoreticallyÓ, but only by appealing to the practicalstandpoint [117-8(108)]: ÒThe acceptance of ... faith in avicari­ous atonement is ... necessary only for the the­oreticalconcept [of salvation]; in no other way can we make comprehensible to ourselves such anabsolution. In contrast, the necessity for the second principle [goodlife-conduct] is practical and, indeed, purely moral.Ó

       This conflict between genuinegood works and genuine faith is therefore only apparent, once we recognize theperspec­tival relationship between their fundamental principles [Religion 119(110)]:

 [they] are not two principles which inthemselves so differ that to begin with the one, or the other, would be toenter upon opposing paths, but only one and the same practical idea ...representing the archetype now as found in God and proceeding from Him [towhich a person responds with faith as the basis for good works], and now, asfound in us [to which a person responds with good works as the basis forfaith], but in both instances as the gauge for our course of life.

Kant is here describinga perspectival shift that occurs in his religious system during the transitionfrom Book ThreeÕs empirical perspective to Book FourÕs hypotheticalperspective. From the former per­spective grace (in the form of thearchetype of perfect humanity) precedes good works, whereas from the latterperspective good works precede and lead to the hope of salva­tion, inasmuchas a personÕs Òsaving faithÓ is au­thentic only if it is also a Òpure religious faith, [which] is practical.Ó (The paradoxical relationbetween saving faith and good life-conduct is therefore equivalent inKantÕs religious system to the antinomy of practi­cal reason in stagefour of his practical system.[4]In both systems the antinomy has no theo­retical solution, only a practicalone.) The biblical theologian rightly relies more on the logical perspective(revelation being the communication of the divine logos) and the empiricalperspective (i.e., the Scriptures as we have them passed down to us by ourhistorical tradition), just as the philosophical theolo­gian rightlyfocuses more on the transcendental perspective (i.e., on discerning thenecessary requirements for the possibility of religion) and the hypotheti­calperspective (i.e., on discerning the principles that distinguish true serviceof God from false service). For a complete theological understand­ing of aliving religious faith and its proper relation to genuinely good works, thesetwo complementary Perspectives (the biblical and the philosophical) must worktogether [see KantÕs Critical Religion, IX.1].

       Kant further clarifies theproblem of faith and works by dis­tin­guishing be­tween truly good works (i.e.,morally good actions) and works that are wrongly believed to be good pre­ciselybecause there is no reason to do them other than to please God [see e.g., Religion106(97)].Kant would assess Luther as being right for rejecting the CatholicChurchÕs belief that Ògood worksÓ of the latter type (i.e.,churchly activities) can effect salva­tion in themselves, but wrong toÒthrow out the baby with the bathwaterÓ by also downplay­ingthe importance of truly moral deeds [cf. KCR, note IX.19]. From thePerspective of human reason, the latter provide the proper basis for hope in salvation, eventhough, with Luther, Kant agrees that from GodÕs Perspective they willnever be sufficient to redeem us [see e.g., KCR, note VI.26 andVII.3.B].

       The fact that Kant treats goodlife-conduct as a philosophical litmus test for a genuine faith must not beconstrued to mean that he thinks good works can themselves redeem us or that an appeal toGodÕs grace is but an optional extra. Kant makes his position crystalclear as early as 1775, in a letter to Lavater, where he says his trustÒin the unknown and mysteri­ous help of GodÓ is mostemphatically accomplished Òwithout meritorious ÔworksÕ of anysortÓ [AA10:170 (Zw67:81-2)]. In the same letter [169(81); s.a. 171(83)]he says: ÒBy Ômoral faithÕ I mean the unconditioned trust indivine aid, in achieving all the good that ... lies be­yond our power.Ó Inthe process of solving the three difficulties in Book Two, especially thethird, Kant fre­quently appeals to the need for such a faith in GodÕsforgiveness and grace. Because Òwe really have no legal claimÓ tothe Òsurplus ... over the profit from good worksÓ,it must be Òreckoned to us by graceÓ [Religion 75(70)]. When thephilosophical ÒdeductionÓ of GodÕs redemptive for­givenessis taken as a regula­tive symbol, its Ònegative benefit to religion andmorality ... is veryfar-reachingÓ (e.g., it prevents us from a false sense ofself-sufficiency); nevertheless, this deduction has no Òpositive useÓ (i.e., onethat can be manipulated as an item of theoretical knowledge), for itpresupposes that Òthe individual in question is already in actualpossession of the required good dis­positionÓ [76(70-1)]. This doesnot mean Kant has no use for divine grace, nor does it make him a Pelagian (acharge I refute more thoroughly in KCR, IX.4). Rather, it means we cannot takecredit for earningGodÕs grace at all; the most we Òcan credit to our­selvesÓis our Òcapability of receivingÓ grace [75n(70n)]. This Critical view ofredemption defines grace as Òa superiorÕs decree conferring a goodfor which the subordinate possesses noth­ing but the (moral)receptivityÓ. This ÒreceptivityÓ is what Kant means byÒmoral faithÓ;it is moralinso­far as its rational support (i.e., the reason we are justified inbelieving we have received it) can come only from evidence drawn from the goodworks we perform, yet it is faith insofar as it represents not something weactively door earn,but something we find within ourselves and merely accept.

       In spite of the bad pressKantÕs doctrine of redemption has so often been given, a per­spectival interpretation reveals it to be a plausible theological account of the relationship be­tween faith andworksÑone that is both philosophically sound and consistent withChristian teaching. Although redemption is admittedly connected at some pointsin the New Testament with a simple Òdeclaration of re­pentanceÓ,as when John the Baptist calls the people to Òrepent and believe in thegospelÓ [Mk. 1:15; see Kt65:42], most Christians would agree that such adeclaration only constitutes a genuine conversion when it comes from the heart;and if it comes from the heart it will result in a change of life-conduct [seee.g., Js. 2:14-26; Rev. 20: 12-13]. We can be assured we have been saved whenwe observe that duties we would have previously put to one side in order tofulfill our inclinations are now being obeyed; they have become far moreimportant because we now view these duties as carrying the full weight of divinecommands[see KCR,VI.2]. Here we come to the heart of the challenge Kant is giving to theChristian community: the view that grace is imputed only to those who give amerely theoretical assent to a given proposition, so that a change in lifestylebecomes an optional extra, must be regarded as a perversion of biblicalteaching. As Kant puts it: ÒNo thoughtful person can bring him­selfto be­lieve thisÓ [Religion  117(107)].

       Kant argues only against sucherroneous approaches to Chris­tianity [See e.g., Kt65:42], not against anauthentically biblical theology. For he is careful to distinguish betweenÒgood worksÓ as morally good actions that are intrinsicallypleasing to God and Ògood worksÓ as nonmoral actions that some religiouspeople believe can induce God to redeem them without requiring any change intheir moral disposition.[5]Having no direct access to our disposition, we must regard its reworking from evil to good as afree and unmerited gift from God; good works are merely the evidence we can useto prove to ourselves (not to God!) that our faith in GodÕs redemption isnot in vainÑthey show us that we really have been saved. Grace cannot bea rewardfor good works, because it comes to us while our disposition is still in itscorrupted, evil state.[6]Still less can nonmoral works serve to appease divine displeasure foroneÕs lackof good works in the moral sense, for this would be a futile attempt to con­trolGod.

            KantÕsinsistence on the pri­macy of practical reason entails that faith in thepossibility of good life-conduct has hypothetical priority (in Book Four) overour theoretical confessions of faith (e.g., in an atonement), butonly from the standpoint of philosophical justification of our assurance that we are in factredeemed. Logically, we must conceive of atoning faith as coming first (as Kanthimself does, by placing it in Book Two), for it empowers us to enter into thekind of fellowship with other human beings that we enjoy in a true church. Fromthe latter, empirical perspective, the two types of faith might best be depictedas occurring simultaneously in the experi­ences of conversion(justification) and Christian fellowship (sanctification). Thus our obedience, not our faith in atone­ment,Òmust be the effect of our own action and not ... of a foreigninflu­ence in the presence of which we are passiveÓ [Religion 118(108-9); s.a. 184-5(172-3)]. However,Kant never means to imply that a belief in atonement has no place; on thecontrary, he criticizes those who hold such Ònaturalistic unbe­liefÓfor Òcutting the knot (by means of a practical maxim) in­stead ofdisentan­gling it (theoretical­ly)Ó [118-9(109)]. He arguesinstead that Òthe theo­retical demand can be satisfiedÓ byrecognizing the perspectival relationship between the two types of faith. Thetheoretical misunder­standing caused by the dogmatic tendency to view ourability to do good worksas a matter of grace and our belief in a vicar­ious atonement as a matter of duty must therefore be turned on its head,replaced by a practical understanding of good works as a matter of duty and vicarious atonement as a matter of grace.[7]

            Inconclusion, then, we can see that, like the first three challenges mentioned atthe outset of this paper, KantÕs fourth challenge does not present (ifyou will excuse the expression) the Ògood ChristianÓ with anysubstantial difficulties. Like mainstream Evangelical Christians, Kant does notbelieve human beings can save themselves through their good works, for we areall hopelessly corrupted by radical evil; yet he challenges us to remember thatgood life-conduct is still of utmost importance to the religious life. Likewise, he accepts that grace must bereceived freely, while we are still lost in this hopelessly evil state; yet hechallenges us to remember that Godremains in charge of the distribution of such grace, so that any attempt tomanipulate GodÑe.g., through the profession of prescribed theoreticaldoctrines, or through Ògood worksÓ in the sense of non-moral deedsperformed in hopes of appeasing GodÑamounts to nothing less than moralunbelief. Finally, then,KantÕs reply to the challenge of good works reassures us that, althoughgrace does not replaceour duty to do what is right, it empowers us to be good, so that our former despair can be replacedby a genuine religious hope.

 

 

This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this essay.

 

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[1].     Onthe one hand, the Bible affirms that Ôfaith without deeds is use­lessÕ[Js. 2:20], yet elsewhere clearly insists that Ôyou have been savedthrough faith ... not as a result of works, that no oneshould boastÕ [Eph. 2:8-9].

[2].     One of severalnotable exceptions is Wood, who thoroughly examines the role of moral faith inWo70:160-87. For a detailed discussion of the role of nonreligious faith in KantÕs System, as it relatesto both the theoretical and the practical standpoints, see KSP1:V. On the issueof the insufficiency of our good works to save us, the passage quoted inVII.2.B is worth repeating here: ÔEvery man must guard against moralself-conceit, against be­lieving himself morally good and having afavourable opinion of himself. This feeling of moral self-sufficiency isself-deception; it is an incurable hallucina­tionÕ [Kt35:(246); s.a. Religion68(62)].

[3].     Ot50:186; s.a.note AVI.8. Kant presents a concise explanation of why such a criticism isunjusti­fied in Religion 179n(167n).Obedience to the moral law is a light burden because we impose it uponourselves freely, whereas ecclesiastical ordinances tend to be burdensomebecause they are imposed upon us by another. This key position is one Kant andJesus surely have in common [see AV.2-3].

[4].     See Vo88:185.

[5].     KantÕswhole intention in formulat­ing notions such as ÔpracticalfaithÕ, in urging us to pursue actively the goal of good life-conduct,and in crit­icizing those who replace this goal with ÔworksÕdirected solely to God, is to expound and defend the consistency andrationality of the true Christian mes­sage as conveyed in the Bible. WhatChristian would deny that the Bible teaches this very same position: that aperson Ôwho does what he can, and trusts God to do whatever else may be lacking, has a truer faith than he who insistsupon knowing what God will do, and cherishes the hope that his praise of this may somehow do instead of his own moral ser­viceÕ[We26:154-5]? This is just what Kant is saying when he concludes his book in Religion202(190) with the claim Ôthatthe right course is not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress fromvirtue to pardoning grace.Õ

[6].     Fromthe Perspective of the biblical theologian, as adopted in IX.2-3, grace is bestregarded as being transmitted through the loving relationship God establishes with human individuals [cf. IX.2.A].The relationship renews the personÕs heart, and this in turn motivatesthe person to engage in good life-conduct. A person who believes God will bepleased by the mere observance of statutory laws and rituals is allowing thesechurchly works to take the place ofthe God-relation­ship. Ironically, the very acts such people believe renderthem worthy to receive GodÕs grace are thereby blocking the acceptance of grace in their disposition. Thus,the real problem of Ôgood worksÕ relates to pseudo-religious ÔworksÕ rather than genuinely goodconduct.

                  Fromthe biblical theologianÕs Perspective, the gift of grace and itscorollary, freedom, mean that God loves us no matter what our deeds turn out to be like. But this knowledge increases our responsibility; it does not decrease it. On this Ibelieve Paul and Kant are in complete accord. The difference is that Paul, as abiblical theologian, infers from this that we can be secure in the knowledge ofour salvation, whereas Kant, as a philosophical theologian, warns that suchcertainty cannot have a theoreticalbasis and that to believe it does is to risk having too low an estimate of ourlevel of responsibility before God [see AVI.3].

[7].     Religion 118(109). In Kt65:65 Kant says Ôit is asuperstition to hold that historical belief is a duty and essential tosalvation.Õ Indeed, Ôfaith in a merely historical proposition is,in itself, deadÕ [66, e.a.]; if not accompanied by pure inner religion,it can be used by the clergy to dominate the laity [50]. As Kant puts it in Religion133(123), Ôtrue religion ...consist[s] not in the knowing or consider­ing of what God does or has donefor our salvation but in what we must do to become worthy of it.Õ