Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
Does
Kant destroy the possibility of theology? Does he seek to undermine its
legitimacy, or limit it to a merely negative path, by abolishing its metaphysical
foundation? Does he substitute for metaphysics a positivistic theory of
scientific knowledge which not only denies any hope of attaining knowledge of
the transcendent, but also denies scientists themselves any true knowledge of
the world as it is? Does he seek to undermine organized religion and the
religious experience of countless individuals by reducing these to nothing but
morality? The answers given to such questions will depend on what one believes
Kant intended to accomplish in constructing his philosophy. Unfortunately, they
have been answered all too often in ways that go directly against Kant's own
expressed intentions.
Many
theologians, especially since Ritschl and the "back to Kant" movement,
have tended to give affirmative answers, interpreting Kant "as an antimetaphysical
moralist" [B1:655]. On the basis of the "fact-value" distinction which Kant's
philosophy appears to support, such neo-Kantians believed that if theology
(like any other form of speculation) is to survive, it must cut all ties with
metaphysics and perhaps even, following Barth's lead, with philosophy as a
whole. Whatever view on the relation between theology and philosophy a person
holds, anyone who interprets Kant in this way is sure to agree with Cupitt that
"we who live after Kant must walk the negative way" [C4:57]. Collins
adopts this position in C1:183 when he portrays Kant as "destroying every
philosophy of God" and as arguing that "[n]atural theology has no
possibility of providing us with true knowledge about God and should be
abandoned."
Philosophers
too have often agreed in assessing the Critique
of Pure Reason [Kt4], at least, as "the most thorough and devastating
of all anti-metaphysical writings" [W2:38]. Shortly after the publication
of the first Critique, Mendelssohn
labelled Kant the "all destroyer"; and since then many have followed
him in regarding Kant as "the arch-destroyer in the realm of
thought", putting forward "destructive, world-annihilating
thoughts" [H3:109]. Gilson extends this judgment to the whole of Kant's
philosophy, maintaining that "Kant...had no metaphysical interests of his
own" [G3:310]. Since "a new philosophical cycle was to begin"
[220] with Kant's thoroughgoing "rejection of metaphysics" [229],
Gilson regards any of Kant's theories or statements which border on the
metaphysical as superfluous nonessentials which he merely borrowed "from
hearsay". Findlay sums up this tendency rather concisely: "It is usual
nowadays to think of Kant as some sort of incipient positivist, always verging
towards a belief in the total non-significance of ideas lacking all empirical
illustration" [F1:3].
Not
all philosophers and theologians, however, interpret Kant's intentions so
negatively. Findlay himself goes on to say that, even though "Kant's
theory of knowledge...has aspects that can with justice be called ‘positivist',
it is not at all positivist in its account of the necessary underpinnings of
such knowledge" [F2:5]; "Kant's theory of knowledge cannot,
therefore, be called positivist, though it is quite right to see something like
positivism in his account of what we can effectively know" [9]. Barth
agrees that it is wrong to view Kant as "a kind of super-sceptic", or
as the "all-annihilating one"; for his criticism is always intended
as "an affirmation of reason.... Kant both has and demands an almost
unconditional faith in reason" [B1:270-1; cf. W6:16]. England adds that it
is "only the validity of a certain type of metaphysics" which Kant
denies [E1:207], for "what is really implied in the critical position
is...the substitution of an immanent metaphysics for the older transcendent
metaphysics" [113-4]. And Wood goes so far as to suggest that "Kant
himself was in many ways...an ‘existentialist' theologian" [W6:150]!
Numerous
of Kant's own comments could be construed as defending a positivism of some
sort. For example, he urges us "to believe that we have approximated to
completeness in the empirical employment of [a] principle only in proportion as
we are in a position to verify such
unity in empirical fashion" [Kt4:720, emphasis added]. If this is
positivism, however, it is far from straightforward; for he continues with the
caveat: "a completeness which is never, of course, attainable."
Moreover, when Kant turns away from such empirical considerations, his
position becomes explicitly nonpositivistic. For example, he argues against
scepticism in the same way one could argue against the use of the (unverifiable)
principle of verification as the basis of positivism. To assert "that
there is and can be no a priori knowledge at all", chides Kant,
"would be like proving by reason that there is no such thing as
reason" [Kt7:12].
A
popular myth concerning Kant's development, which helps to breed such
misconceptions about his true attitude towards metaphysics, is that he started
out as a typical Wolffian rationalist, and only began formulating his
"Critical" principles after being jarred by Hume out of his rationalist
complacency. Yet a careful and open-minded reading of Kant's early (so-called
"pre-Critical") works yields quite a different impression: "From
the beginning he made no attempt to hide his dislike of the compact mass of
Wolffian doctrine" [V2:3]; rather, his lifelong goal was to discover and
follow "the correct philosophical method and by means of it to construct
an eternal metaphysics" [2; see also G4:63]. A good example comes in
Kt2:71(229), where Kant announces (in 1763) that he has "sought in vain from
others" for an adequate philosophical method to replace "the
imitation (or rather the aping) of the mathematician", which "has on
the slippery ground of metaphysic occasioned a multitude of...false
steps". Moreover, as I have argued in P7, by 1766 (fifteen years before
the publication of Kt4) Kant had already shown his awareness (in Kt3) of the
crucial difference between "speculative" and "Critical"
metaphysics, and of his desire to concentrate his attention on the latter. His
philosophical "panacea", then, "was not discovered by a sudden
stroke of intuitive genius but [was] allowed slowly and painfully to reach
ripe elaboration" [V2:3; see also M3 and W4].
Kant
expresses his true attitude towards metaphysics quite clearly in a number of
explicit statements throughout his writings. In Kt3:367-8(112-13), for example,
he confesses:
Metaphysics, with which it is my fate to be
in love, although only rarely can I boast of any favours from her, offers two
advantages. The first is that it serves to solve the tasks which the
questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it inquires into the
hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too often falls below
expectation...
The other
advantage is more adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing
whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation
to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the
foundation of all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the
boundaries of human reason. And...this use of metaphysics...is at the same time
the least known and the most important, and...is obtained only late and by long
experience.
In a letter written at about the same time
(1766), Kant reveals a similar position:
I am far
from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to be trivial or
dispensable; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that I understand
its nature and its proper place in human knowledge and that the true and
lasting welfare of the human race depends on it... [K1:10.67(Z1:55)].
The significance of this early stage in
Kant's development, and the nature and extent of the influences of Hume, are
thoroughly discussed in P7. For our present purposes it will suffice to say
that Kant did not see the first Critique
as a denial of his love of metaphysics, but as its truest and most secure
foundation. For in a letter written just after its publication in 1781 he
explains that this book "includes the metaphysics
of metaphysics."
Such
claims suggest quite clearly that Kant saw his contribution to metaphysics in
terms of neither positivistic empiricism nor "pure rationalism"; instead, he sees himself as offering—to borrow one of his own
favourite expressions—"a third thing". The label most often used to
denote Kant's synthesis between empiricism and rationalism is the easily
misunderstood title, "transcendental idealism". But this phrase
properly refers to just one aspect of his philosophy. A more general and
inclusive title would be to call it a "System of Perspectives".
Interpreting Kant's philosophy in terms of the "principle of perspective"
enables us to account for the potentially confusing recurrence of both
empiricist and rationalist (as well as other) elements in his philosophy.
If
Kant was neither a straightforward positivist nor a traditional rationalist,
the question yet remains how he intended his philosophy to relate to theology.
As far as methodology and terminology are concerned, Barth is largely correct
to say Kant "was purely a philosopher and his philosophy is not in the
least dressed in the garb of theology" [B1:339]. Indeed, as Sykes points
out, Kant wrote an entire essay [Part I of Kt11] "the whole object of
[which] is to demonstrate the necessity of an institutionalized rivalry between
theology and philosophy..." [S3:100]. But "theology" in these
instances refers for Kant only to what is more accurately called "biblical
studies" or "revealed theology", a discipline which Kant himself,
even in his book on religion, never practised [see Kt10:8-11(7-10)]. Once the
meaning of the word is widened to include any serious, scholarly study of God,
religion and related subjects, his philosophy can be seen in many respects to
be "theocentric" in orientation. By "theocentric" I do not
mean that Kant adopted the view that our knowledge
of God must serve as the basis of or centre for all other types of knowledge.
On the contrary, I mean that the problems surrounding our understanding of the
nature and reality of God served as the driving force of his philosophy (see
below).
Prior
to Kant most philosophers used theology—and in particular the implications of God's existence (which many believed
they had proved)—to bridge gaps they
were unable to bridge by philosophical means alone. Two obvious examples are
Descartes' assumption that God's existence guarantees that "regarding objects
which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can
never be deceived" [D1:4.119], and Berkeley's theory that objects which are
not being perceived by any subject can be said to persist only because they are
being perceived by God. Kant, however, severely criticizes such an approach:
To have
recourse to God...in explaining the arrangements of nature and their changes
is...a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philosophy,
since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he otherwise has
no concept in order to conceive of the possibility of something he sees before
his very eyes. [Kt7:138]
This removal of God from his traditional
place in the "gaps" of philosophical inquiry is commonly interpreted
as an example of Kant's positivistic and antitheological disposition. What is
often ignored by such interpreters is that, as I argue elsewhere [see P1 and
P3:126-134], Kant replaces this traditional assumption with that of his famous,
or infamous, concept of the "thing in itself". He has a number of
reasons for doing so, among which are the preservation of the integrity of
philosophy and the protection of
theology from its sceptical and agnostic
critics. For he regards the thing in
itself as the unknowable question mark of philosophical inquiry [see P2];
God is freed to play a far more important and determinant role. There is a
sense in which God transcends even the thing in itself, and so, for Kant, is
radically unknowable. But there is another sense in which God is immanent; indeed, this rich concept of
"a living God" [Kt4:661] forms the very heart of Kant's entire
philosophical project. (In other words, as I argue in P8, a real (though mysterious) God—not just an
"idea" of reason—is the central focus towards which Kant's entire
System points.) The interplay between these two aspects of his concept of God
constitutes a valuable contribution to theology, for which he has rarely, if
ever, been given full credit.
Although
it is true that Kant always spoke primarily as a philosopher, it is also true
that "the Critical philosophy left his basic beliefs untouched"
[W4:143] and that the three "ideas" which guided his entire
philosophical endeavour, viz., "God, freedom, and immortality" [e.g.,
Kt4:xxx; Kt7:3-4; Kt8:473], are all primarily theocentric in their
orientation. Thus it should come as no surprise that the concept of God
"was constantly recurring throughout the various stages of [Kant's]
intellectual development" [H4:13]. The inordinate attention interpreters
usually give to the arguments in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique ironically veils the fact that Kant intends Kt4 "to clear the way
for a positive account of what he regards as the correct theology for human
beings" [A1:310]. Even Heine, who views Kt4 as "the sword that slew
deism in Germany" [H3:107], agrees that Kant's criticism of the
traditional proofs for the existence of God "forms one of the main points
of [Kt4]" [H3:115], and that we ought to "recognise everywhere
visible in [Kt4] his polemic against these proofs" [116]. Unfortunately,
he believes Kant was trying to prove that "this ideal...being, hitherto
called God, is a mere fiction" [115]—a view which is thoroughly refuted in
P10.
Wood
is one of the few interpreters to acknowledge and develop the constructive,
theocentric tenor of Kant's philosophy [see note 7]. He says in W6:17:
Kant is fundamentally unable to conceive of
the human situation except theistically... For Kant's real aim is not to
destroy theology, but to replace a dogmatic theology with a Critical one: to
transform rational theology from a complacent speculative science into a
critical examination of the inevitable but perpetually insoluble problems of
human reason, and a vehicle for the expression of our moral aspirations under
the guidance of an autonomous reason.
He claims, quite rightly, that "there
is widespread misunderstanding of Kant's ideas" concerning his criticism
of the proofs for God's existence [10]. Moreover, Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology [Kt5] show, according to Wood,
"that [even] the traditional theology was to a large extent compatible
with Kant's critical philosophy" [W6:149]. Indeed, Kant's concern for and
influence on theology extended to numerous empirical details: not only does
Barth credit him with having "understood what the idea of a Church
was" and as having also "understood what grace was" [B1:339],
but Sykes regards him "as one of those who prepared the way for the
fragile advances of the Second Vatican Council" [S3:103]—three theological
accomplishments of no small merit!
Kant
himself leaves no doubt as to the theocentric orientation in his understanding
of metaphysics. In 1763 he writes that "the most important of all our
cognitions" is "THERE IS A GOD", and that it is so important
that it is in no danger of being refuted by metaphysical speculation
[Kt2:65(219)]. In 1770 he wrote to his friend Lambert, explaining that the purpose for fixing the principles and
limits of knowledge is "so that these principles could not be confusedly
applied to objects of pure reason" [K1:10.94(Z1:59)]. That these
"objects" are the ideas of God, freedom and immortality is repeatedly
stressed by Kant: "Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries
three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality" [Kt4:395n]; "metaphysics has engaged so many
heads up till now and will continue to engage them not in order to extend
natural knowledge ..., but in order to attain to a knowledge of what lies
entirely beyond all the boundaries of experience, namely, God, freedom, and
immortality" [Kt6:477]. And in Kt9:292 he emphasizes the theocentric
orientation of all metaphysics even more explicitly: "The supersensible in
the world (the spiritual nature of the soul) and out of the world (God), hence
immortality and theology, are the ultimate ends towards which metaphysics is
directed."
Kant
also makes it clear in numerous places that his own task is ultimately
constructive with respect to theology and religion, just as it is for
metaphysics in general. His famous claim "to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith" [Kt4:xxx] certainly implies something of this sort [but
see also P1:442-444], especially when it is seen in context. For a large
portion of the second edition Preface to Kt4 is devoted to clarifying that
"all objections to morality and religion" have been "for ever
silenced" by this critique of reason's powers. Elsewhere in Kt4 he explains that theology, morals and religion,
which correspond to these three ideas, respectively, are "the highest
ends of our existence" [395n; see also 494,656]. And in the last few pages
of the Critique he concludes that,
"although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion, it must always
continue to be a bulwark of it", and that a Critical metaphysics "prevents the devastations of
[speculation]...in the field of morals as well as in that of religion"
[877]. In the Critique of Practical
Reason [Kt7] he therefore continues his task of preventing "the
possibility of making theology merely a magic lantern of phantoms" [141].
Even at the end of his life, in Kt12:22.63 Kant reminds us of the theocentric
orientation of his philosophy: "The highest level of the transcendental
philosophy...lies in this twofold task: 1. What is God? 2. Is there a
God?" [as quoted in S2:117]. Moreover, if Kant's own testimony is not evidence
enough, "his friend and biographer, Jachmann" informs us, as
Greene notes, "that, in private conversations with his friends ‘the
philosopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to an inner feeling
and a genuine conviction [of God's existence]';
and that ‘in the true sense
of the word he was a worshipper of God.'"
Copleston
argues against the common trend in both theology and philosophy according to
which philosophers such as Heidegger and theologians such as Barth stand
willingly back to back, facing opposite directions. He urges "that an
adequate understanding of the Christian faith requires philosophical
reflection, and that it is not facilitated by a wholesale rejection of
metaphysics" [C3:53]. Taking into account the theocentric orientation of
Kant's philosophy may help to reverse this trend, which is traceable in both
disciplines to various misinterpretations of Kant. The theologian and the
philosopher might then be more willing to stand face to face; for Kant
destroyed the old parent-child relationship of theology to philosophy not in
order to make them complete strangers, but rather to enable them to work side
by side towards a common goal. "The ultimate aim" of such
cooperation, Smith suggests, is "to overcome the emptiness and formality
of philosophy and to frustrate the obscurantist and parochial tendencies in
theology" [S1:8].
Learning
to read Kant's philosophy always in the light of its theological and religious
implications can be particularly helpful in fulfilling this task because he is
respected almost universally by philosophers as one of the great philosophical
thinkers in the history of Western philosophy—if not the greatest. Indeed, many
would agree that "Kant, in modern times, has replaced Aristotle as a kind
of intellectual reference system" [G1:135]. Likewise, the number of
theologians and philosophers of religion who acknowledge Kant's achievement is
so large as to render it hopeless even to attempt to draw up an exhaustive
list. Many theologians would agree with MacKinnon's view that Kant is
"surely the supreme German philosopher" [M1:135; see also M2:22-6 and
L1:16]. Even Gilson, who has fundamental disagreements with Kant, regards him
as the primary philosophical alternative to Thomas Aquinas for the Christian
[G2:114]. What Barth says of Kant's influence on nineteenth-century theologians
would apply to most (non-Barthian) theologians in the twentieth century as
well: "He stands by himself...a stumbling-block and rock of offence...,
someone determinately pursuing his own course, more feared than loved, a
prophet whom almost everyone even among those who wanted to go forward with him
had first to re-interpret before they could do anything with him"
[B1:267].
If
indeed Kant is the primary figure in the modern Western philosophical
tradition, the theologian can hardly ignore him. For, as Wood suggests:
"To face up squarely to the problems of the tradition, as Kant did,
remains by far the most straightforward and intellectually honest way for a
modern theologian to discharge his philosophical responsibilities"
[W6:151]. To interpret Kant in a way that is philosophically acceptable and yet
leaves open a legitimate field in which the theologian can work [see e.g., Part
Four of P11] would therefore effectively establish much-needed common ground
between philosophy and theology.
But
the respect Kant evokes from philosophers and theologians is not the only
reason for recommending a theologically-conscious way of reading this
over-worked philosopher. An even more important reason stems from a problem we
acknowledged near the beginning of this article. Kant is far too frequently interpreted
in a one-sided fashion, especially by those who (conveniently) claim that large
portions of his work are irrelevant to or inconsistent with the "truly
Kantian" material. Because of the confusion this creates, especially for
anyone whose primary concern is not philosophical, many theologians and
philosophers of religion have ignored or repudiated the importance of Kant. A
typical example is Flew's book on the philosophy of religion [F3], which
entirely ignores the relevance of Kant's
views on the subject: he devotes only two paragraphs [5.44-5] to a brief
description and trite
criticism. Rather than merely listing
other works which make such a
mistake, let us examine one case in slightly more detail.
Hartshorne's
treatment of Kant is even more misleading than Flew's, because he gives the
impression of being more knowledgeable. With Reese he voices the common
objection: "Of all criticisms of philosophical theology, probably none has
been so influential as those of Kant.... [However,] Kant's criticisms depend,
more than is commonly noted, on certain features of his own system which are
now usually rejected" [H2:142]. They then severely misinterpret and
trivialize, among other things, Kant's doctrine of sensibility [147]. As
evidence of their failure to grasp the essential thrust of Kant's philosophy,
they accuse him of being "imprisoned in the half-truths in which the
monopolar prejudice, the neglect of the principle of polarity, is bound to
result" [146]. Each of these criticisms, however, and especially the
latter, betrays an acceptance of an overly simplified or one-sided
interpretation of Kant—an interpretation of the type which assumes that
theologians who accept Kant must give up most or all of their endeavours. The
implications of such a second-hand approach are brought out more clearly in
Hartshorne's defense of the ontological argument [H1], which is itself based on
a neglect of Kant's principle of perspective. Describing Kant as a
"calamitously overestimated German philosopher" [221], Hartshorne
explicitly rejects Kant's Copernican revolution [232], and evinces his neglect
of Kantian methodology in general when he boldly states: "Unbelief [in
God] is confusion or else belief is confusion. There is no third
possibility" [135; but see P1]. Such philosophers of religion and
theologians remain unaware of—or at least, unreceptive towards—the true
contribution Kant has made to their subject. This alone, if nothing else, calls
for a fresh reminder of just what that contribution is, so that the doors of
theological reflection can remain open even (or especially) for the Kantian—and, indeed, vice versa.
Our
tentative answer to the question with which we began, therefore, is that Kant
destroyed not so much the possibility of theology as that of the one-sided
rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, under which he himself had been nurtured. His genius, however, was to have done this without going
to the opposite extreme
of positivism. In the process of working out his new approach, he proposed
numerous theories which are highly relevant to the theologian. (I have
discussed some of these in P1 and P6-P10.) But because his theological
interests are so deeply imbedded within
his philosophy, and because the commonly accepted interpretations ignore this and other
important emphases, such as the dependence of his
arguments on the principle of perspective, it would be necessary to reinterpret
his entire Critical System in the light of such issues [see P11] before bringing
into full view all the details arising out of its thoroughly theocentric
orientation.
Bibliography
I. Works by Kant (abbreviated "Kt")
Kt1: Allgemeine
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