Kant's Theocentric
Metaphysics
Prof. Stephen
Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of
Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong
Baptist University
Does Kant destroy the possibility of
theology? Does he seek to undermine its legitimacy, or limit it to a merely
negative path, by abolishing its metaphysical foundation? Does he substitute
for metaphysics a positivistic theory of scientific knowledge which not only
denies any hope of attaining knowledge of the transcendent, but also denies
scientists themselves any true knowledge of the world as it is? Does he seek to
undermine organized religion and the religious experience of countless
individuals by reducing these to nothing but morality? The answers given to
such questions will depend on what one believes Kant intended to accomplish in
constructing his philosophy. Unfortunately, they have been answered all too
often in ways that go directly against Kant's own expressed intentions.
Many theologians, especially since Ritschl
and the "back to Kant" movement, have tended to give affirmative
answers, interpreting Kant "as an antimetaphysical moralist"
[B1:655].[1] On
the basis of the "fact-value" distinction which Kant's philosophy
appears to support, such neo-Kantians believed that if theology (like any
other form of speculation) is to survive, it must cut all ties with metaphysics
and perhaps even, following Barth's lead, with philosophy as a whole. Whatever
view on the relation between theology and philosophy a person holds, anyone
who interprets Kant in this way is sure to agree with Cupitt that "we who
live after Kant must walk the negative way" [C4:57]. Collins adopts this
position in C1:183 when he portrays Kant as "destroying every philosophy
of God" and as arguing that "[n]atural theology has no possibility of
providing us with true knowledge about God and should be abandoned."
Philosophers too have often agreed in
assessing the Critique of Pure Reason
[Kt4], at least, as "the most thorough and devastating of all
anti-metaphysical writings" [W2:38]. Shortly after the publication of the
first Critique, Mendelssohn labelled
Kant the "all destroyer"; and since then many have followed him in
regarding Kant as "the arch-destroyer in the realm of thought",
putting forward "destructive, world-annihilating thoughts" [H3:109].
Gilson extends this judgment to the whole of Kant's philosophy, maintaining
that "Kant...had no metaphysical interests of his own" [G3:310].
Since "a new philosophical cycle was to begin" [220] with Kant's
thoroughgoing "rejection of metaphysics" [229], Gilson regards any of
Kant's theories or statements which border on the metaphysical as superfluous
nonessentials which he merely borrowed "from hearsay".[2] Findlay
sums up this tendency rather concisely: "It is usual nowadays to think of
Kant as some sort of incipient positivist, always verging towards a belief in
the total non-significance of ideas lacking all empirical illustration"
[F1:3].
Not all philosophers and theologians,
however, interpret Kant's intentions so negatively. Findlay himself goes on to
say that, even though "Kant's theory of knowledge...has aspects that can
with justice be called ‘positivist', it is not at all positivist in its
account of the necessary underpinnings of such knowledge" [F2:5];
"Kant's theory of knowledge cannot, therefore, be called positivist,
though it is quite right to see something like positivism in his account of
what we can effectively know" [9]. Barth agrees that it is wrong to view
Kant as "a kind of super-sceptic", or as the "all-annihilating
one"; for his criticism is always intended as "an affirmation of
reason.... Kant both has and demands an almost unconditional faith in
reason" [B1:270-1; cf. W6:16]. England adds that it is "only the
validity of a certain type of metaphysics" which Kant denies [E1:207], for
"what is really implied in the critical position is...the substitution of
an immanent metaphysics for the older transcendent metaphysics" [113-4].
And Wood goes so far as to suggest that "Kant himself was in many
ways...an ‘existentialist' theologian" [W6:150]![3]
Numerous of Kant's own comments could be
construed as defending a positivism of some sort. For example, he urges us
"to believe that we have approximated to completeness in the empirical
employment of [a] principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify such unity in empirical
fashion" [Kt4:720, emphasis added]. If this is positivism, however, it is
far from straightforward; for he continues with the caveat: "a
completeness which is never, of course, attainable." Moreover, when Kant
turns away from such empirical considerations, his position becomes
explicitly nonpositivistic. For example, he argues against scepticism in the
same way one could argue against the use of the (unverifiable) principle of
verification as the basis of positivism. To assert "that there is and can
be no a priori knowledge at all", chides Kant, "would be like proving
by reason that there is no such thing as reason" [Kt7:12].
A popular myth concerning Kant's
development, which helps to breed such misconceptions about his true attitude
towards metaphysics, is that he started out as a typical Wolffian rationalist,
and only began formulating his "Critical" principles after being
jarred by Hume out of his rationalist complacency. Yet a careful and
open-minded reading of Kant's early (so-called "pre-Critical") works
yields quite a different impression: "From the beginning he made no
attempt to hide his dislike of the compact mass of Wolffian doctrine"
[V2:3]; rather, his lifelong goal was to discover and follow "the correct
philosophical method and by means of it to construct an eternal
metaphysics" [2; see also G4:63]. A good example comes in Kt2:71(229),
where Kant announces (in 1763) that he has "sought in vain from
others" for an adequate philosophical method to replace "the
imitation (or rather the aping) of the mathematician", which "has on
the slippery ground of metaphysic occasioned a multitude of...false
steps". Moreover, as I have argued in P7, by 1766 (fifteen years before
the publication of Kt4) Kant had already shown his awareness (in Kt3) of the
crucial difference between "speculative" and "Critical"
metaphysics, and of his desire to concentrate his attention on the latter. His
philosophical "panacea", then, "was not discovered by a sudden
stroke of intuitive genius but [was] allowed slowly and painfully to reach
ripe elaboration" [V2:3; see also M3 and W4].
Kant expresses his true attitude towards
metaphysics quite clearly in a number of explicit statements throughout his
writings. In Kt3:367-8(112-13), for example, he confesses:
Metaphysics, with
which it is my fate to be in love, although only rarely can I boast of any
favours from her, offers two advantages. The first is that it serves to solve
the tasks which the questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it
inquires into the hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too
often falls below expectation...
The other advantage is more
adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing whether the task be
within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation to the
conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the foundation of
all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of
human reason. And...this use of metaphysics...is at the same time the least
known and the most important, and...is obtained only late and by long
experience.
In a letter written
at about the same time (1766), Kant reveals a similar position:
I am far from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to
be trivial or dispensable; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that
I understand its nature and its proper place in human knowledge and that the
true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on it... [K1:10.67(Z1:55)].
The significance of
this early stage in Kant's development, and the nature and extent of the
influences of Hume, are thoroughly discussed in P7. For our present purposes it
will suffice to say that Kant did not see the first Critique as a denial of his love of metaphysics, but as its truest
and most secure foundation. For in a letter written just after its publication
in 1781 he explains that this book "includes the metaphysics of metaphysics."[4]
Such claims suggest quite clearly that
Kant saw his contribution to metaphysics in terms of neither positivistic
empiricism nor "pure rationalism";[5] instead, he sees himself as offering—to borrow
one of his own favourite expressions—"a third thing". The
label most often used to denote Kant's synthesis between empiricism and
rationalism is the easily misunderstood title, "transcendental
idealism". But this phrase properly refers to just one aspect of his
philosophy. A more general and inclusive title would be to call it a
"System of Perspectives". Interpreting Kant's philosophy in terms of
the "principle of perspective" enables us to account for the
potentially confusing recurrence of both empiricist and rationalist (as well as
other) elements in his philosophy.[6]
If Kant was neither a straightforward
positivist nor a traditional rationalist, the question yet remains how he
intended his philosophy to relate to theology. As far as methodology and
terminology are concerned, Barth is largely correct to say Kant "was
purely a philosopher and his philosophy is not in the least dressed in the garb
of theology" [B1:339]. Indeed, as Sykes points out, Kant wrote an entire
essay [Part I of Kt11] "the whole object of [which] is to demonstrate the
necessity of an institutionalized rivalry between theology and
philosophy..." [S3:100]. But "theology" in these instances
refers for Kant only to what is more accurately called "biblical studies"
or "revealed theology", a discipline which Kant himself, even in his
book on religion, never practised [see Kt10:8-11(7-10)]. Once the meaning of
the word is widened to include any serious, scholarly study of God, religion
and related subjects, his philosophy can be seen in many respects to be
"theocentric" in orientation. By "theocentric" I do not
mean that Kant adopted the view that our knowledge
of God must serve as the basis of or centre for all other types of knowledge.
On the contrary, I mean that the problems surrounding our understanding of the
nature and reality of God served as the driving force of his philosophy (see
below).
Prior to Kant most philosophers used
theology—and in particular the implications of God's existence (which many believed
they had proved)—to bridge gaps they
were unable to bridge by philosophical means alone. Two obvious examples are
Descartes' assumption that God's existence guarantees that "regarding objects
which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can
never be deceived" [D1:4.119], and Berkeley's theory that objects which
are not being perceived by any subject can be said to persist only because they
are being perceived by God. Kant, however, severely criticizes such an
approach:
To have recourse to God...in explaining the arrangements of nature and
their changes is...a complete confession that one has come to the end of his
philosophy, since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he
otherwise has no concept in order to conceive of the possibility of something
he sees before his very eyes. [Kt7:138]
This removal of God
from his traditional place in the "gaps" of philosophical inquiry is
commonly interpreted as an example of Kant's positivistic and antitheological
disposition. What is often ignored by such interpreters is that, as I argue
elsewhere [see P1 and P3:126-134], Kant replaces this traditional assumption
with that of his famous, or infamous, concept of the "thing in
itself". He has a number of reasons for doing so, among which are the
preservation of the integrity of philosophy and the protection of theology from its sceptical and agnostic critics.[7] For
he regards the thing in itself as the
unknowable question mark of philosophical inquiry [see P2]; God is freed to
play a far more important and determinant role. There is a sense in which God
transcends even the thing in itself, and so, for Kant, is radically unknowable.
But there is another sense in which God is immanent;
indeed, this rich concept of "a living
God" [Kt4:661] forms the
very heart of Kant's entire philosophical project. (In other words, as I argue
in P8, a real (though mysterious)
God—not just an "idea" of reason—is the central focus
towards which Kant's entire System points.) The interplay between these two aspects
of his concept of God constitutes a valuable contribution to theology, for
which he has rarely, if ever, been given full credit.
Although it is true that Kant always spoke
primarily as a philosopher, it is also true that "the Critical philosophy left
his basic beliefs untouched" [W4:143] and that the three "ideas"
which guided his entire philosophical endeavour, viz., "God, freedom, and
immortality" [e.g., Kt4:xxx; Kt7:3-4; Kt8:473], are all primarily
theocentric in their orientation. Thus it should come as no surprise that the
concept of God "was constantly recurring throughout the various stages of
[Kant's] intellectual development" [H4:13]. The inordinate attention
interpreters usually give to the arguments in the Transcendental Analytic of the
first Critique ironically veils the
fact that Kant intends Kt4 "to
clear the way for a positive account of what he regards as the correct theology
for human beings" [A1:310]. Even Heine, who views Kt4 as "the sword
that slew deism in Germany" [H3:107], agrees that Kant's criticism of the
traditional proofs for the existence of God "forms one of the main points
of [Kt4]" [H3:115], and that we ought to "recognise everywhere
visible in [Kt4] his polemic against these proofs" [116]. Unfortunately,
he believes Kant was trying to prove that "this ideal...being, hitherto
called God, is a mere fiction" [115]—a view which is thoroughly
refuted in P10.
Wood is one of the few interpreters to
acknowledge and develop the constructive, theocentric tenor of Kant's philosophy
[see note 7]. He says in W6:17:
Kant is
fundamentally unable to conceive of the human situation except theistically...
For Kant's real aim is not to destroy theology, but to replace a dogmatic
theology with a Critical one: to transform rational theology from a complacent
speculative science into a critical examination of the inevitable but
perpetually insoluble problems of human reason, and a vehicle for the
expression of our moral aspirations under the guidance of an autonomous reason.
He claims, quite
rightly, that "there is widespread misunderstanding of Kant's ideas"
concerning his criticism of the proofs for God's existence [10]. Moreover,
Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology
[Kt5] show, according to Wood, "that [even] the traditional theology was
to a large extent compatible with Kant's critical philosophy" [W6:149].
Indeed, Kant's concern for and influence on theology extended to numerous
empirical details: not only does Barth credit him with having "understood
what the idea of a Church was" and as having also "understood what
grace was" [B1:339], but Sykes regards him "as one of those who
prepared the way for the fragile advances of the Second Vatican Council"
[S3:103]—three theological accomplishments of no small merit!
Kant himself leaves no doubt as to the
theocentric orientation in his understanding of metaphysics. In 1763 he writes
that "the most important of all our cognitions" is "THERE IS A
GOD", and that it is so important that it is in no danger of being refuted
by metaphysical speculation [Kt2:65(219)]. In 1770 he wrote to his friend
Lambert, explaining that the purpose
for fixing the principles and limits of knowledge is "so that these
principles could not be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason"
[K1:10.94(Z1:59)]. That these "objects" are the ideas of God, freedom
and immortality is repeatedly stressed by Kant: "Metaphysics has as the
proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality" [Kt4:395n];
"metaphysics has engaged so many heads up till now and will continue to
engage them not in order to extend natural knowledge ..., but in order to
attain to a knowledge of what lies entirely beyond all the boundaries of
experience, namely, God, freedom, and immortality" [Kt6:477]. And in Kt9:292
he emphasizes the theocentric orientation of all metaphysics even more
explicitly: "The supersensible in the world (the spiritual nature of the
soul) and out of the world (God), hence immortality and theology, are the ultimate
ends towards which metaphysics is directed."
Kant also makes it clear in numerous
places that his own task is ultimately constructive with respect to theology
and religion, just as it is for metaphysics in general. His famous claim
"to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith" [Kt4:xxx]
certainly implies something of this sort [but see also P1:442-444], especially
when it is seen in context. For a large portion of the second edition Preface
to Kt4 is devoted to clarifying that "all objections to morality and
religion" have been "for ever silenced" by this critique of
reason's powers.[8] Elsewhere in Kt4 he explains that theology,
morals and religion, which correspond to these three ideas, respectively, are
"the highest ends of our existence" [395n; see also 494,656]. And in
the last few pages of the Critique he
concludes that, "although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of
religion, it must always continue to be a bulwark of it", and that a Critical metaphysics "prevents the
devastations of [speculation]...in the field of morals as well as in that of
religion" [877]. In the Critique of
Practical Reason [Kt7] he therefore continues his task of preventing
"the possibility of making theology merely a magic lantern of
phantoms" [141]. Even at the end of his life, in Kt12:22.63 Kant reminds
us of the theocentric orientation of his philosophy: "The highest level of
the transcendental philosophy...lies in this twofold task: 1. What is God? 2.
Is there a God?" [as quoted in S2:117]. Moreover, if Kant's own testimony is not evidence
enough, "his friend and biographer, Jachmann" informs us, as
Greene notes, "that, in private conversations with his friends ‘the
philosopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to an inner feeling
and a genuine conviction [of God's existence]';
and that ‘in the true
sense of the word he was a worshipper of God.'"[9]
Copleston argues against the common trend
in both theology and philosophy according to which philosophers such as
Heidegger and theologians such as Barth stand willingly back to back, facing opposite
directions. He urges "that an adequate understanding of the Christian
faith requires philosophical reflection, and that it is not facilitated by a
wholesale rejection of metaphysics" [C3:53]. Taking into account the
theocentric orientation of Kant's philosophy may help to reverse this trend,
which is traceable in both disciplines to various misinterpretations of Kant.
The theologian and the philosopher might then be more willing to stand face to
face; for Kant destroyed the old parent-child relationship of theology to
philosophy not in order to make them complete strangers, but rather to enable
them to work side by side towards a common goal. "The ultimate aim"
of such cooperation, Smith suggests, is "to overcome the emptiness and
formality of philosophy and to frustrate the obscurantist and parochial tendencies
in theology" [S1:8].
Learning to read Kant's philosophy always
in the light of its theological and religious implications can be particularly
helpful in fulfilling this task because he is respected almost universally by
philosophers as one of the great philosophical thinkers in the history of
Western philosophy—if not the greatest. Indeed, many would agree that
"Kant, in modern times, has replaced Aristotle as a kind of intellectual
reference system" [G1:135]. Likewise, the number of theologians and
philosophers of religion who acknowledge Kant's achievement is so large as to
render it hopeless even to attempt to draw up an exhaustive list. Many theologians
would agree with MacKinnon's view that Kant is "surely the supreme German
philosopher" [M1:135; see also M2:22-6 and L1:16]. Even Gilson, who has
fundamental disagreements with Kant, regards him as the primary philosophical
alternative to Thomas Aquinas for the Christian [G2:114]. What Barth says of
Kant's influence on nineteenth-century theologians would apply to most
(non-Barthian) theologians in the twentieth century as well: "He stands by
himself...a stumbling-block and rock of offence..., someone determinately
pursuing his own course, more feared than loved, a prophet whom almost everyone
even among those who wanted to go forward with him had first to re-interpret
before they could do anything with him" [B1:267].
If indeed Kant is the primary figure in
the modern Western philosophical tradition, the theologian can hardly ignore
him. For, as Wood suggests: "To face up squarely to the problems of the
tradition, as Kant did, remains by far the most straightforward and intellectually
honest way for a modern theologian to discharge his philosophical
responsibilities" [W6:151]. To interpret Kant in a way that is
philosophically acceptable and yet leaves open a legitimate field in which the
theologian can work [see e.g., Part Four of P11] would therefore effectively
establish much-needed common ground between philosophy and theology.
But the respect Kant evokes from
philosophers and theologians is not the only reason for recommending a
theologically-conscious way of reading this over-worked philosopher. An even
more important reason stems from a problem we acknowledged near the beginning
of this article. Kant is far too frequently interpreted in a one-sided
fashion, especially by those who (conveniently) claim that large portions of
his work are irrelevant to or inconsistent with the "truly Kantian"
material. Because of the confusion this creates, especially for anyone whose
primary concern is not philosophical, many theologians and philosophers of
religion have ignored or repudiated the importance of Kant. A typical example
is Flew's book on the philosophy of religion [F3], which entirely ignores the
relevance of Kant's views on the subject:
he devotes only two paragraphs [5.44-5] to a brief
description and trite
criticism. Rather than merely listing
other works which make such a
mistake, let us examine one case in slightly more detail.
Hartshorne's treatment of Kant is even
more misleading than Flew's, because he gives the impression of being more
knowledgeable. With Reese he voices the common objection: "Of all
criticisms of philosophical theology, probably none has been so influential as
those of Kant.... [However,] Kant's criticisms depend, more than is commonly
noted, on certain features of his own system which are now usually
rejected" [H2:142]. They then severely misinterpret and trivialize, among
other things, Kant's doctrine of sensibility [147]. As evidence of their
failure to grasp the essential thrust of Kant's philosophy, they accuse him of
being "imprisoned in the half-truths in which the monopolar prejudice,
the neglect of the principle of polarity, is bound to result" [146]. Each
of these criticisms, however, and especially the latter, betrays an acceptance
of an overly simplified or one-sided interpretation of Kant—an
interpretation of the type which assumes that theologians who accept Kant must
give up most or all of their endeavours. The implications of such a second-hand
approach are brought out more clearly in Hartshorne's defense of the ontological
argument [H1], which is itself based on a neglect of Kant's principle of
perspective. Describing Kant as a "calamitously overestimated German
philosopher" [221], Hartshorne explicitly rejects Kant's Copernican
revolution [232], and evinces his neglect of Kantian methodology in general
when he boldly states: "Unbelief [in God] is confusion or else belief is
confusion. There is no third possibility" [135; but see P1]. Such
philosophers of religion and theologians remain unaware of—or at least,
unreceptive towards—the true contribution Kant has made to their
subject. This alone, if nothing else, calls for a fresh reminder of just what
that contribution is, so that the doors of theological reflection can remain
open even (or especially) for the
Kantian—and, indeed, vice versa.
Our tentative answer to the question with
which we began, therefore, is that Kant destroyed not so much the possibility
of theology as that of the one-sided rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, under
which he himself
had been nurtured. His genius, however, was to have done this without going
to the opposite extreme
of positivism. In the process of working out his new approach, he proposed
numerous theories which are highly relevant to the theologian. (I have
discussed some of these in P1 and P6-P10.) But because his theological
interests are so deeply imbedded within
his philosophy, and because the commonly accepted interpretations ignore this and other
important emphases, such as the dependence of his
arguments on the principle of perspective, it would be necessary to reinterpret
his entire Critical System in the light of such issues [see P11] before bringing
into full view all the details arising out of its thoroughly theocentric
orientation.
Bibliography
I. Works by Kant (abbreviated
"Kt")
Kt1: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des
Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des
ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt, 1755, in
K1:1.215-368. Tr. S.L. Jaki as Universal Natural History and Theory of the
Heavens (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981).
Kt2: Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer
Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763, K1:2.63-163. Tr. anonymously (by J.
Richardson) as The Only Possible Argument for the Demonstration of the
Existence of God in his Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, Religious and
Various Philosophical Subjects, vol. 1 (London: William Richardson, 1798),
pp.217-366.
Kt3: Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch
Träume der Metaphysik, 1766, K1:2.315-73. Tr. E. Goerwitz as Dreams of a Spirit
Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics, ed. F. Sewal (London: Swan
Sonnenschein, 1900).
Kt4: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1787,
K1:3.passim; also 1781, K1:4.1-252. Tr. N. Kemp Smith as Critique of Pure
Reason (London: Macmillan, 1929). References are to the pagination of the
second German edition.
Kt5: Vorlesungen über die philosophische
Religionslehre, based on lectures delivered in approximately 1783-4 (ed. K.
Beyer, 1937), K1:vol. 28.2,2. Tr. A.W. Wood and G.M. Clark as Lectures on
Philosophical Theology (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978). Translation does
not follow the order of the K1 text.
Kt6: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft, 1786, K1:4.465-565. Tr. J. Ellington as Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
Kt7: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788,
K1:5.1-163. Tr. L.W. Beck as Critique of Practical Reason (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).
Kt8: Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790,
K1:5.165-485. Tr. J.C. Meredith as Kant's Critique of Judgement (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952).
Kt9: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte,
die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht
hat?, 1791 (ed. F.T. Rink, 1804), K1:20.253-311. Tr. T.B. Humphrey as Progress
in Metaphysics (New York: Abaris, 1983).
Kt10:Die Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793, K1:6.1-202. Tr. T.M. Greene
and H.H. Hudson as Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York:
Harper & Row, 1960).
Kt11:Der Streit der
Facultäten, 1798, K1:7.1-116. Tr. M.J. Gregor as The Conflict of the Faculties
(New York: Abaris, 1979).
Kt12:Opus Postumum,
notes written mostly between 1796 and 1803, K1:21-22.passim. German edition
edited by E. Adickes, Kants Opus Postumum (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard,
1920).
II. Other Sources
A1: Axelsen, Diana E., "Kant's Metaphor For
Persons and Community", Philosophy
& Theology III.4 (Summer 1989), pp.301-321.
B1: Barth, Karl, Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 1952. Tr. B.
Cozens and J. Bowden as Protestant
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C1: Collins, James, God in Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1960).
C2: -----, The
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C3: Copleston, Frederick C., Religion and Philosophy (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1974).
C4: Cupitt, Don, "Kant and the Negative
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Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp.55-67.
D1: Descartes, Rene, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason. Tr. E.S.
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Reference is to section and page number.
D2: Despland, Michel, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press,
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E1: England, F.E., Kant's Conception of God (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929).
F1: Findlay, J.N., "Kant Today", P.
Laberge, et. al. (eds.), Proceedings of
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F2: Findlay, J.N., Kant and the Transcendental Object (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
F3: Flew, Antony, God & Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1966). Reference is to
chapter and paragraph numbers.
G1: Genova, A.C., "Kant's Three Critiques: A Suggested Analytical Framework",
Kant-Studien 60 (1969), pp. 135-46.
G2: Gilson, ütienne, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941).
G3: -----, The
Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's, 1950).
G4: Goldmann, Lucien, Introduction á la philosophie de Kant, 1967. Tr. R. Black as Immanuel Kant (London: NLB, 1971).
G5: Greene, Theodore M., "The Historical
Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion", in his translation
of Kt10, pp.ix-lxxviii.
H1: Hartshorne, Charles, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for
God's Existence (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1965).
H2: Hartshorne, Charles and Reese, William L., Philosophers Speak of God (London: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1953).
H3: Heine, Heinrich, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland2, 1852
(1834). Tr. J. Snodgrass as Religion
and Philosophy in Germany (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959 [1882]).
H4: Hicks, G. Dawes, "Forward" in
E1:13-8.
K1: Kants
gesammelte schriften, Preukilchen Akademie der Wissenschaften (eds.), 29
vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-). References are to volume and page
number(s).
K2: Kemp Smith, Norman, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"2 (London: Macmillan, 1923 [1918]).
K3: Kuehn, Manfred, "Kant's
Transcendental Deduction of God's Existence as a Postulate of Pure Practical
Reason", Kant-Studien 76.2
(1985), pp.152-169.
L1: Lewis, H.D., Philosophy of Religion (London: English Universities
Press, 1965).
M1: MacKinnon, Donald M., Explorations in Theology 5 (London: SCM, 1979).
M2: -----, Borderlands
of Theology and Other Essays (London: Lutterworth, 1968).
M3: Martin, Gottfried, Immanuel Kant, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie, 1951. Tr. P.G.
Lucas as Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of
Science (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1955).
O1: Oman, John, The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1906).
P1: Palmquist, Stephen, "Faith as Kant's Key
to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection", The Heythrop Journal 25.4 (October 1984), pp. 442-55.
P2: -----, "The Radical Unknowability of
Kant's ‘Thing in Itself'", Cogito
III.2 (March 1985), pp. 101-115.
P3: -----, "Six Perspectives on the Object in
Kant's Theory of Knowledge", Dialectica
40.2 (l986), pp. 121-51.
P4: -----, "The Architectonic Form of Kant's
Copernican Logic", Metaphilosophy
17.4 (October 1986), pp. 266-88.
P5: -----, "Knowledge and Experience—An
Examination of the Four Reflective ‘Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy", Kant-Studien 78 (1987), pp.170-200.
P6: -----, "Immanuel Kant: A Christian
Philosopher?", Faith and Philosophy
6.1 (January 1989), pp.65-75.
P7: -----, "Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (1)
The Critical Dreams", Philosophy
& Theology 3.4 (Summer 1989), pp.355-383.
P8: -----, "Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (2)
Critical Mysticism", Philosophy
& Theology 4.1 (Fall 1989), pp.67-94.
P9: -----, "Does Kant Reduce Religion to
Morality?", Kant-Studien 83
(1992), in press.
P10: -----, "Kant's Theistic Solution to the
Problem of Transcendental Theology", Rodica Croitoru (ed.), Kant and the Transcendental Problem
(Bucharest: Univ. of Bucharest Faculty
of Philosophy, 1991), pp.148-178. Thoroughly revised as "Kant's
‘Appropriation' of Lampe's God", Harvard
Theological Review 85.1 (January 1992), in press.
P11: -----, Kant's
System of Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Univ. Press of America, in press).
R1: Rabel, Gabriele (ed.), Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
S1: Smith, John E., Experience and God (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).
S2: Sullivan, William J., "Kant on the
Existence of God in the Opus Postumum",
The Modern Schoolman 48.2 (January
1971), pp. 117-33.
S3: Sykes, S.W., "Theological Study: The
Nineteenth Century and After", B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland (eds.), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian
Theology (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp.95-118.
V1: Vaihinger, Hans, Commentar zu Kants Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Spemann, 1881 and 1892).
V2: Vleeschauwer, Herman-J. de, L'Evolution de la pensèe Kantienne,
1939. Tr. A.R.C. Duncan as The
Development of Kantian Thought (London: Nelson, 1962).
W1: Walsh, W.H., "Kant's Moral
Theology", Proceedings of the
British Academy 49 (1963), pp.261-289.
W2: -----, Metaphysics
(London: Hutchinson Univ. Library, 1963).
W3: -----,
Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ.
Press, 1975).
W4: Ward, Keith, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1972).
W5: Wood, Allen W., Kant's Moral Religion (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970).
W6: -----, Kant's
Rational Theology (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978).
Z1: Zweig, Arnulf (tr. & ed.), Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967).
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[1]. References which do not require further comment
are included in the main text, as here. The letter-number abbreviation refers
to the corresponding book listed in the Bibliography. After the colon, the
relevant page number(s) of that work is given, unless otherwise specified in
the bibliographical entry. All references to Kant's writings refer to the
Academy edition (= K1); this is followed by the English pagination (in
brackets) for translations which do not provide the German pagination.
[2]. G3:310. This view was popularised in
Germany by Vaihinger [V1], and in Britain by Kemp Smith [K2], both of whom
"take a Kantian doctrine to be ‘critical' in proportion as it
involves a rejection of the metaphysics of Kant's rationalist predecessors"
[W6:59].
[3]. In K3 Kuehn offers a thorough critique of
the position supported by Ward in W4, by Wood in W5 and W6 and by Walsh in W1
and W3:229-241, all of whom "consider Kant's ‘moral arguments' as
‘an integral part of the critical philosophy'" [K3:155, quoting
W5:9]. Kuehn claims "it is highly misleading to say that Kant wanted to
justify a ‘personal' faith" [K3:168]. His main worry is that by
"interpreting Kant's rational faith as a personal commitment..., they turn
Kant's enterprise, which consisted in showing the rationality of religious
faith, upside down" [K3:169]. However, neither of these extremes on its
own does justice to Kant's intentions, which were indeed to justify a kind of
personal faith, but to do so not by appealing to its existential baselessness,
but by demonstrating how it is based on "impersonal" (i.e.,
objective, ahistorical) grounds.
[4]. K1:10.252(Z1:95). This claim does not
contradict Kant's assertion in a later letter (1783) that Kt4 "is not at
all metaphysics..., but a whole new science..., the critique of an a priori judging reason"
[10.318(102)]. The latter can be regarded as Kant's explanation of what the
phrase "metaphysics of metaphysics" actually means. In Kt9:316 Kant
explains that metaphysics proper is "the science of proceeding from
knowledge of the sensible to that of the supersensible." The same order
is, in fact, adopted in Kt4, from the Aesthetic to the Dialectic; the
difference is that the Dialectic concludes not with knowledge of the supersensible, but with an explanation of why such
knowledge is impossible.
[5]. See e.g., O1:188 and B1:345. Barth notes
that for Kant such "rationalism" refers only to "practical
reason" [281]. But even taken in its practical sense such a label is
misleading, since it highlights only one aspect of Kant's philosophy.
[6]. I have developed this new way of
interpreting Kant in various articles [see especially P3, P4 and P5]. P11 is a
thoroughgoing application of the principle of perspective to Kant's entire
philosophical System, with a view towards demonstrating its radically
metaphysical (and so also, theological) orientation.
[7]. The almost universally accepted caricature
of Kant is as an agnostic deist, concerned only with a rather fanciful concept
of God as nothing but a "regulative idea of reason", a concept which
is criticized as being dry, theologically uninteresting (or even repugnant) and
scientifically untenable. Several recent scholars, most notably Wood, Collins
and Despland, have done much to dispel this misconception. Wood, for instance,
interprets Kant's theology as "rich, precise, philosophically sophisticated"
[W6:151; see also W5:164]. And Despland asserts that "Kant's doctrine of
God ...is the most important part of his doctrinal metaphysics" [D2:135].
Although in C2 Collins repudiates his own previous assessment of Kant's
theology as entirely destructive [see e.g., C1:183], even in C1 he had
suggested that Kant's "preoccupation with the problem of God" [166]
results in the fact that "his stand on God partly determined his
philosophical position at any given stage" in his development [162]. By
placing Kant's theology in its proper philosophical context I have attempted in
P7-P10 to further this recent trend by eradicating the above-mentioned mistake
once and for all.
Such an emphasis on the
centrality of this "idea of reason" (i.e., God) might appear to
contradict a remark Kant makes in a famous letter to Garve (1798): "It was
not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but
rather the antinomy of pure reason...that...first aroused me from my dogmatic
slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the
scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself" [K1:12.255(Z1:99n)]. If we
remember, however, that Kant is here making an assertion about his own historical
development, not about the essential nature of metaphysics or of his own philosophy,
then the discrepancy disappears. The antinomies may have been the historical
occasion for Kant conceiving of the idea of a critique of reason, but when he
finally carried it out, he did so by directing the focus of the System itself
to the task of understanding the proper place of the three (theologically
oriented) ideas of reason. It is perhaps relevant to note here that in a much
earlier letter to Garve (1783) Kant explains that the solution to the problem of the antinomies "consists in this:
that all objects that are given to us can be interpreted in two ways: on the
one hand, as appearances; on the other hand, as things in themselves"
[K1:10.320n(Z1:103n)]. In other words, the key he discovered entailed the
proper implementation of what I refer to as Kant's "principle of
perspective" [see note 6].
[8]. Kt4:xxxi; see also 781-2. Kant made a
similar remark to Herz as early as 1773, when he confided: "I reveal to no
one but you: the hope that by means of this work philosophy will be given a
durable form, a different and—for religion and morality—more
favorable turn" [K1:10.137(Z1:78); see also E1:79]. Earlier still, in the
preface to Kt1, Kant reveals the importance he placed on the consistency of his
own ideas with religion when he stresses his confidence in the
"harmony...between my system [of cosmogony] and religion" [222(82)].
[9]. G5:lxxvii-lxxviii (Greene's brackets).
Thus Copleston's description of "transcendent metaphysics" as
"the exposition of a religious quest" [C3:9] applies equally well to
Kant's non-transcendent, Critical
metaphysics. For as Rabel points out in R1:vii, and as I argue in detail in P8,
"Kant was a profoundly religious man." This view of Kant is supported
in A1:312: "Kant always saw his philosophical task as fostering faith, not
merely as identifying the demands of duty."
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