The Philosopher as a ÒSecret AgentÓ for
Peace:
Taking Seriously KantÕs Revival of the
ÒOld QuestionÓ
Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
1. Law vs. Philosophy at the Core
ofKantÕs Conflict
Thelast
book Kant completed without assistance, The Conflict of the Faculties
(1798), is typically regarded as a merecomposite of three essays on separate
themes that are held together with nothingbut an artificial appeal to the
four-fold structure of the Prussian university.Philosophy was regarded as the
ÒlowerÓ faculty because it made noattempt to relate directly to the
professional training of public servants, butinstead served as a critical tool
to help keep the three ÒhigherÓfaculties in line. The higher faculties of theology,
law, and medicine wereeach charged with the duty of training a specific type of
public servant:priests, lawyers, and doctors, respectively. The three parts of
KantÕs Conflict examine the relationship betweenphilosophy and each of
these three disciplines in turn. Or so, at least, heclaims in his Introduction.
Infact,
only Part I of Conflict,on the relation between the faculties of
philosophy and theology, really livesup to this stated purpose. Instead of
writing new and original works for theother two parts, Kant adapted essays he
had written previously, probably withother uses originally in mind. Especially
the essay appearing as the SecondPart, entitled ÒAn old question raised again:
Is the human raceconstantly progressing?Ó, seems at first to have little or no
seriousrelevance to the issue of a philosopherÕs duty with regard to both
thefaculty of law in general and the challenge to build a more peaceful world
inparticular. While both the form and the content of that essay undoubtedly
leavesomething to be desired, I believe it offers more insight into
theÒofficialÓ topic (i.e., the relation between the philosophy facultyand the
faculty of law) than meets the eye.
Inorder
to appreciate the full significance of this Second Part of Conflict, we
must first look at its immediatecontext in KantÕs philosophical corpus. Kant
originally drafted thatessay roughly three years before it was published, so it
should not besurprising that the most relevant context is its relationship to a
work Kantpublished at around the same time: Perpetual Peace (1795). In
many ways, the latter bookapplies the same reasoning to the topic of
international relations that Conflict applies to the structure of
auniversityÕs faculties.[1]I
shall therefore begin the present essay by exploring certain elements in PerpetualPeace
that clarify therelevance of what Kant goes on to write about lawyers and
philosophers in theSecond Part of Conflict.
2. The ÒSecret ArticleÓ inPerpetual
Peace:Irony or Transcendental Condition?
Thearguments and main principles of Perpetual Peace are well known, for this is probably the greatest (and certainly themost widely read) of the various works Kant wrote to supplement his primarysystematic writings. After a brief and rather ironic introduction asking thereader to take him seriously despite the apparently impracticable nature of hisclaims, Section I identifies six ÒpreliminaryÓ requirements anystates must follow in order to set in motion a lasting peace in their relationswith other states.[2] These aremeant to be principles of self-regulation that states can begin to implement ontheir own, even before there isan international Òfederation of statesÓ, whose task would be tomake perpetual peace a reality. Section II then explains the threeÒdefinitive articlesÓ that would need to be adopted by every memberstate. Each would need: (1) to establish a ÒRepublicanÓConstitution (i.e., a system of government that requires the mode of administration to be based on a Òseparation ofthe executive power (the administration) from the legislative,Ó sothat the people who make the laws are not the same as the people who enforcethe laws[3]);(2) to uphold a body of international law enacted by the Federation, so thatstates no longer relate to each other in the uncivilized manner of lawlesssavages, but rather according to self-determined principles of Òrationalfreedom;Ó[4] and (3) tofoster a condition of ÒUniversal HospitalityÓ, whereby all humanbeings are regarded as Òworld citizensÓ with the same basic rights,including Òa right of temporary sojournÓ in other countries,without being treated as enemies.[5]
Although KantÕs basic argument appears to be complete at thispoint, some of his most interesting ideas appear in the two Supplements and twoAppendices that follow. These sections are also where we find the mostinteresting common ground between Perpetual Peace and the Second Part of KantÕs Conflict. The First Supplement, for example, is a lengthyanalysis of the progress of thehuman race toward the goal of obtaining the kind of lasting peace betweennations that is envisioned in the main part of the book. Here Kant argues thatnature implements a four-stage ÒmechanismÓ that guarantees the goalof peace will eventually be reached. In the earliest stage of human history, hostility between different groups ofpeople serves the necessary purpose of encouraging them to spread throughoutthe whole earth. As the earth begins to fill up with people, those living inthe same area must establish laws and create civilizations for their ownself-protection; but as a result, conflicts inevitably arise with neighboringcivilizations, and war is the inevitable result. The third stage begins whensomeone (like Kant) realizes that, in order for peace to exist in spite of the differences that have arisen duringthis process (especially differences in language and religion), a federation ofseparate nations must be established. (We are currently living in this thirdstage, Kant would say, though perhaps not much further along than we were 200years ago.) Finally, as the idea of Òworld citizenshipÓ becomesmore and more prominent, so that different civilizations come to recognize thatpeace despite our conflicting ideals really is ineveryoneÕs best interests, the goal of perpetual peace will be realized.
The Second Supplement, unlike the First, is brief and appears to be
ofquestionable practical value. However, it will turn out to be of
crucialimportance when we assess the relation between Perpetual Peace
and the essay that constitutes the Second Part of Conflict. Here in the
Second Supplement to PerpetualPeace, Kant
introduces a so-called ÒSecret ArticleÓthat he claims must be present
ÒsubjectivelyÓ in any legislationthat is to succeed in leading the nations of
the world along the road toperpetual peace. By this he means that the lawyers
who draft the legislationmust have this article in mind, and employ it in
practice, even though it isnot ÒobjectivelyÓ part of any state Constitution or
body ofinternational law.[6]
The secretarticle states: ÒThe opinions of philosophers on the conditions of
thepossibility of public peace shall be consulted by those states armed for
war.Ó[7]Although
few take Kant very seriously at this point, I believe this is an absolutelycrucial
part of his planfor enduring world peace. It is essential because if those who
draftlegislation depend solely on the objective articles, the path to
peace will be devoid of what we mightcall the transcendental conflictthat
Kant views as a necessary condition for real peace. That is, legislatorsmust be
open to having their professional opinions challenged, analyzed, andsubjected
to the judgment of dispassionate reason by those with expertise inthe latter,
otherwise their legislation, drafted in a context devoid ofcreative conflict,
will fail to establish the desired goal of peace.[8] Unlike Plato, Kant does not
expectÒ[t]hat kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings;Órather,
he only asks that those who belong to the faculty of law be willing togive
those in the faculty of philosophy a fair hearing. Here Kant is clearlyhinting
at what will also turn out to be his central point in The Conflictof the
Faculties: thatthe ideal of peaceful conflict within the university is the
most effectivemodel we can employ to make real progress on the path toward
perpetual peacebetween nations.
AppendixI
expounds further on the necessary opposition, or conflict, that exists
betweenÒpoliticsÓ and Òmorality,Ó at least as regards theirdifferent functions
on the path to peace. Politicians, Kant argues, aretypically immoral because of
the inevitable relationship they have to thoseholding power: Òthey flatter the
power which is then ruling so as not tobe remiss in their private advantage,
and they sacrifice the nation and,possibly, the whole world.Ó[9]In
direct contrast to philosophers, politicians Òmake a great show ofunderstanding
menÉ without understanding manand what can be made of him, for
they lack the higher point of view ofanthropological observation which is
needed for this.Ó[10]Kant concludes that,
although Òobjectively É there is no conflictbetween morals and politics,Ó the
reality of selfishness and evil inhuman nature necessitates that
Ò[s]ubjectively É this conflict willalways remain.Ó[11]
PerpetualPeace
concludes inAppendix II with an explanation of how Òthe transcendental concept
ofpublic rightÓ can be used to establish harmony Òbetween morality
andpoliticsÓÑthe necessary condition for lasting peace. Here Kantproposes a
Òtranscendental condition of public law: ÔAll actionsrelating to the right of
other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistentwith publicity.ÕÓ[12]After
discussing several examples of this merely ÒnegativeÓprinciple, Kant warns that
Òwe cannot infer conversely that the maximswhich bear publicity are therefore
just,Ó because those who wieldsufficient levels of power have little need to
conceal their plans, whetherthey are good or not.[13]The
affirmative version of this basic transcendental principle is:ÒÔAll maxims
which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail theirend, agree
with politics and right [i.e., morality] combined.Ó[14]Careful
attention to KantÕs arguments in the apparently incidentalSupplements and
Appendices reveals that, if KantÕs plan for perpetualpeace between nations is everto
become a reality on earth, then a context must exist wherein
philosophers are not onlyÒallowedÓ but encouraged to engage in open
conflict with legal professionals, throughpeaceful public discussion of
universal principles relevant to actuallegislation. In the remainder of this paper
I shall argue that KantÕstask in the Second Part of Conflictwas to show
that such a context already exists, in the form of the university.
3. Conflict between
thePhilosophy and Law Faculties as the Model for Perpetual Peace
This brief overview ofKantÕs
masterpiece on peace provides us with a helpful contextualizationfor
understanding the significance of the essay he was also writing around thesame
time, which eventually became the Second Part of The Conflict of
theFaculties. For what Kantonly hints at in the Second Supplement to Perpetual
Peace, that progress toward peace may dependon philosophers (especially
academic philosophers) acting almost as spies (or Òsecret agentsÓ) in
thepolitical realm, comes to look more like a serious contender for atranscendental
condition for the empirical realization of international peace.[15]In
the 1798 publication Kant offers a philosophical interpretation of theactual
structure of the Prussian university system, portraying it as a vehiclefor
promoting just the sort of open public conflict between philosophers andvarious
types of professionals that his previous work had treated as aÒsubjectively
necessaryÓ (i.e., transcendental?) condition forpeace.
The universities ofKantÕs day
had a far simpler structure than our contemporary universitiestypically do.
Instead of a seemingly endless array of departments grouped intoa smaller but
still indeterminate number of faculties, the whole systemconsisted of four
faculties divided into two types. The three higherfacultiesÑtheology, law, and
medicineÑ were charged with the taskof training the professionals (i.e.,
priests, lawyers, and doctors) whose taskwas to assist the public in solving
problems relating to their moral/spiritualwell-being, their property, and their
health, respectively. Philosophy wascalled the lower faculty because its job
was not to train professionals but toeducate, examine, and if necessary, chasten
all the other faculties in matterspertaining to reason. KantÕs book is divided
into three parts, devoted(at least in theory)[16]to
an explanation of how the philosophy faculty engages in creative conflictwith
each of the three higher faculties.
KantÕs assumption wasthat
this ideal of peaceful yet creative conflict in an academic setting can makea
difference to thegeneral public, while causing them no harm, because the
arguments of thephilosophers can and should change the way priests, lawyers,
and doctors dealwith the public. An important difference between the lower and
higherfaculties, however, concerns the role of government regulationÑan
issueKant deals with only incidentally throughout Conflict. (The book,
of course, was publishedsoon after the edict preventing Kant from publishing
anything on religion hadbeen lifted, so the issue was clearly at the forefront
of KantÕs mind.)Because the content taught and published by members of the
higher faculties hasa direct influence on those professionals who deal
immediately with the public,the government has a responsibility to regulate
what is taught by thesefaculties; the philosophy faculty, by contrast, does not
train professionalsand therefore should not have to answer to any authority
other than reason. Inthis way, it fulfills a crucial role in any republican
state, by providing aÒchecks and balancesÓ system from within the
state-sponsorededucational system itself. When the potential of this system is
fully realized,academic debate can not only exemplify the kind of healthy
conflict that hasthe potential to make society a wiser and safer place to live;
it can alsoactually bring aboutthe goal of peace through its indirect
effect on the general public.
Unfortunately, KantÕsstated
plan for this book was more of an idealized hope than an accurateaccount of
what is actually written therein. For as mentioned previously, theonly part
that is treated in full accordance with his stated goal (i.e., toshow how the
philosophy faculty, through its emphasis on rationalself-criticism, can deepen
and further the insights of the other faculties,while chastening their
improprieties) is Part I, on the theology faculty. The othertwo parts only
tangentially touch on the specific issue of conflict between
philosophers and the relevantprofessionals (i.e., lawyers or doctors). As a
result of this defect in thecomposition of KantÕs book, perhaps excusable due
to his old age at thetime of publication, the only detailed explanation of how
empirical conflict inan academic setting can pave the way for peace is to be
found in his account ofthe relationship between philosophers and theologians.
Thetheology
faculty, according to Kant, adopts a wholly different standpoint fromthe
philosophy faculty. Members of the two faculties are, in many
respects,enemiesÑor perhaps Òwarring neighborsÓ would be anappropriate
metaphor.[17]This is because the
fundamental basis of the theology facultyÕs authorityis its appeal to divine
revelation. The Word of God (i.e., the Holy Scriptureof whatever religious
tradition is being taught), and the Spirit of God (i.e.,the presence of GodÕs
voice in the interpreterÕs heart, leading himor her to formulate the right
interpretation) are the fundamental basis for allconsideration, both
theoretical and practical. By contrast, the philosophyfacultyÕs authority is
grounded in reason alone. Because theologians mustinevitably make useof
reason whenever they interpret or apply the statements they find inScripture,
they are necessarily subject to the philosopherÕs criticalanalysis. Conversely,
philosophers may offer interpretations and applicationsof Scriptural statements
withoutsubjecting themselves to the doctrinal restrictions of orthodoxy,
because they(the philosophers) never step outside of their role as messengers
of reason. Ifthis paper were about religion and the conflicts between different
religions,we would need to examine this part of KantÕs book in great detail.
But itis not; our concern is rather with politics and how philosophers can
helpperpetuate peace amidst the conflicts between different states. I
shalltherefore resist the temptation to make further observations about
KantÕsviews on the philosopherÕs conflict with the theologian.[18]
Inapplying
the same principle of free and open (i.e., unregulated, yet peaceful)conflict
in a university-based setting to the faculty of law, KantÕsintention would
obviously be to suggest that the philosopherÕs role is toprovide a universal,
rational standpoint for assessing and improving our actualempirical
legislation. The essay that actually appears as the Second Part of Conflict
deals only with the far more limitedissue of whether Òthe human race [is] constantly
progressingÓ.[19]Our overview of Perpetual
Peace showedthat this same issue was also the focus of the First Supplement
in that work.We must therefore keep in mind that such progress was crucial to
determiningthe potential success of his overall political vision. If the human
race is notprogressing, then thephilosopher has no reason even to try
to be a secret agent for peace.
A few of KantÕsarguments in
the Second Part of Conflict can be applied fairly easily to the
university setting. Forexample, when he explains how the future of human
history can be known a prioriby noting such knowledge is possible Òif the
diviner himself makes and contrives the events which heannounces in
advance,Ó[20]we can surmise that this would
be one of the key differences between the waythe faculty of law and the faculty
of philosophy deal with legal issues.Members of the faculty of law, strictly
speaking, would have the sole task ofteaching and interpreting the given
body of law, as handed down by whatever authorityholds sovereign power in
the state (i.e., the monarch, the aristocracy, or thepeople as a whole).
Members of the faculty of philosophy, by contrast, wouldhave the task of
determining in advance what law reason determines as best, and then
comparing theexisting body of law with this ideal in order to assess its
validity.[21]Beyond this, we can infer
that KantÕs underlying intention was to suggestthat perpetual peace between
nations will become a reality only whenphilosophers are given the right (at
leastÒsubjectivelyÓÑi.e., unofficially, or ÒinsecretÓ) to participate fully in
the dialogue over matters of policy aswell as in the character development of
politiciansÑe.g., through moraland philosophical education.
Althoughthe
Second Part of Conflictdoes not deal directly with the conflict between
philosophers and lawyers inthe university, we may glean some important insights
by looking further intowhat Kant does say there about the issue of world peace
and its relation todifferent approaches to conflict. After making the above
point aboutforeknowledge being a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, Kant goes on
to comparepoliticians who institute laws aimed at preventing revolt (but who
thereby create the very conditions for revolt) withpreachers who
Òprophesy the complete destruction of religion and theimminent appearance of
the Antichrist; and in doing so they are performingprecisely what is requisite
to call him up.Ó[22]Next, Kant proposes three
possible scenarios that would make prediction possible:the human race must
either be Òin continual retrogression toward wickedness, or in perpetual
progression toward improvement É, or ineternal stagnation inits
present stage of moral worth ÉÓ.[23]He
refers to the first option as Òmoral terrorism,Ó but points out problems
with allthree options that make them equally untenable. Experience can never be
asufficient basis for solving Òthe problem of progressÓ becausehuman beings are
freeand can at any point in time act in accordance with either a good or
an evildisposition: what people Òought to do may be dictated in
advance, but É it may not be predicted what they will do ÉÓ.[24]To
assume otherwise would be to adopt Òthe standpoint of Providence whichis
situated beyond all human wisdom;Ó for only God can experience thefuture before
it happens.[25]
Nevertheless, Kant
suggeststhat, if a Òprophetic historyÓ is to be advanced in a
philosophicalmanner, Òsome experienceÓ must be cited as an empirical
groundingfor oneÕs reasoning.[26]A
good example of such an experience, he claims, is the reaction of the
generalpublic in France to the revolution that had begun in 1789; he interprets
thisreaction as a clear sign of two moral causes operating in the society:
first, that of the right,
that a nation must not be hindered inproviding itself with a civil
constitution, which appears good to the peoplethemselves; and second, that of
the end É, that that same national constitution alone be just and
morally good in itself, created insuch a way as to avoid, by its very nature,
principles permitting offensivewar.[27]
What reason can discern as theÒpureÓ (a
priori) lesson to be drawn from this experience is thatpeople are inclined, as
a matter of their inner moral nature, Òtostriv[e] after É a republican
constitution.Ó[28]This memorable experience
Òhas revealed a faculty in human nature for improvement suchthat no
politician É might have conjured out of the course of thingshitherto existing
ÉÓ.[29]On
this basis, Kant advances a Òphilosophical prophecyÓ: Òthehuman race has always
been in progress toward the better and will continue tobe so henceforth.Ó[30]
Althoughthe
bulk of this part of KantÕs book does not deal very explicitly withthe actual
conflict between the university faculties of philosophy and law, hedoes
emphasize at one point (in ¤8) that Òpublic instruction of thepeople in its
duties and rights vis-ˆ-vis the state to which theybelongÓ constitutes nothing
less than ÒEnlightenmentÓ itself.[31]He
then argues that the Òfree professors of lawÓ who are Òthenatural heralds and
expositors of theseÓ duties and rights must not bethe ones Òofficially
appointed by the stateÓ (i.e., members of thehigher faculty of law, and all the
professionalsÑlawyers andjudgesÑwho are taught by them); rather, they are
Òphilosophers who,precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are
objectionable to thestate, which always desires to rule alone ÉÓ.[32]Only
philosophers are fully equipped to teach Òthe eternal normÓ(or ÒPlatonic idealÓ)of
Òa constitution in harmony with the natural right of humanbeings,Ó a norm Òfor
all civil organization in generalÓ thatÒaverts all war.Ó[33]For
Òthe duty of the monarchsÓÑand in a democratic system,the people themselvesare
the monarchÑis Òto treat people according to principles whichare commensurate
with the spirit of laws of freedom (as a nation with matureunderstanding would
prescribe them for itself);Ó and philosophers, unlikethe members of the faculty
of law, are able to convey this insight to thepublic, for they appeal to reason
as their sole authority.
4. Can Philosophers Be Secret (i.e.,Transcendental)
Agents for Peace?
HadKant
paid more attention to the stated theme of his Conflict book in its
Second Part, he surely wouldhave said more about the disputes that will
inevitably arise betweenphilosophers who attempt to take up this duty (i.e., to
educate the public inthe true nature of law) and the legal professionals and
teachers who teachmerely the status quo.Instead, the remainder of his
essay merely clarifies two concluding points.These points also raise for us the
concluding question of this paper: doesKantÕs vision of the philosopher as a
secret agent for peace have anymeaningful application in todayÕs academic and
political context?
First, the
successfulimplementation of KantÕs planÑstarting, we may presume, with
anopenness in university law faculties to input from philosophersÑwill giverise
only to a legallybetter society, where peopleÕs external actions conform
to principles ofcivility, without necessarily requiring any change in the moral
corruption ofhuman nature; as such, his plan must be distinguished from all utopian
visions, whereby a religious revolution based on Òa kind of newcreation
(supernatural influence) would be necessary.Ó [34]This
point coincides nicely with the distinction Kant makes in the firstAppendix to Perpetual
Peace,between the moral and political realms. Once again, we can see how
these twoessays feed into each other. The philosopher as secret agent is not
concernedso much with the moralimprovement of the human race (this would
be an issue of concern only for thephilosopher who is dialoguing with the
theologian), as with how we can improvethe quality of civil society,the
external relations between persons and between states.
Second, the plan can
beexpected to succeed only if it is implemented Òfrom top to bottomÓÑi.e.,
according to Òawell-weighed plan of the sovereign powerÓÑfor the simple
reasonthat if the state is not supporting the plan, then it will have Òno
moneyleft É for the salaries of its teachers who are capable and
zealouslydevoted to their spheres of duty, since it uses all the money for
war.Ó[35]Thus,
even with all its imperfections and awkwardness, the existing Second Partof The
Conflict of the Facultiesdoes provide ample evidence to enable us to
conclude that for Kant theuniversity was to be the primary context
wherein, through the education of the public in an approachto law that is
grounded in reason, the drama of the evolution of the human racefrom a random
collection of warring nations to a single, peacefully coexistingpartnership of
nations with radically conflicting ideas, would evolve.
Thefact
that Kant closes his essay with these two points, and that the same twopoints
are also made with even greater force in Perpetual Peace, indicates how
serious Kant meant us totake his mandate. The otheraspects of KantÕs
plan in Perpetual Peace have already had a major influence onthe
thinking of politicians and political philosophers in the shaping of
publicpolicy during the intervening two centuries. Yet such attempts have still
beenfar from eliminating war: the century that saw the creation of the
UnitedNations and the institution of a whole body of international law aimed
atprotecting universal human rights also witnessed the most horrifying
atrocities ever committed byhuman beings against other human beings throughout
the whole history ofhumanityÕs time on earth. As technology advances,
governments have becomemore adept at killingoff their perceived enemies
and less willing to sit down with them and dialogue until they reachthe
point where they can find a way to live in peace in spite of theirconflicting
perspectives.
Although he acknowledges
anatural purpose for war in the early stages of human civilization, Kant
arguesthat this initial purpose has long since been fulfilled, rendering
warunnecessary in the modern era. Cultural differences, including differences
oflanguage and of religion, should now be viewed in an altogether
differentlight, as shades and hues on the single tapestry of humanity itself.
As we sawso clearly from our review of KantÕs Conflict, these
differences are not to beabolished, but highlighted,if the beautiful
image of one world at peace with itself is to become areality. Here, as
throughout his major critical writings, Kant sees conflictnot as an evil to be
abolished but as a preliminary step on the road toconcord. Despite its
idealistic overtones, Kant seemed to be quite serious inpromoting his plan as a
realistic solution to the greatest human social problem, war.
Why, then, do the conflicts we havewitnessed during the past centuries, and in
recent years, so rarely lead to thecreative concord Kant had in mind? That is,
why is war an even greater problemtodayÑespecially given the threat from
weapons of massdestructionÑthan it was in KantÕs day?
KantÕsanswer,
I suggest, would be that the worldÕs universities in general, andtheir
philosophy departments in particular, have largely failed to realizetheir
calling as the agents for peace in their respective societies. This may
be due in part to alack of receptiveness on the part of governments and/or the
law schools andthose trained by them to give ear to the rational arguments
being put forwardby philosophers. But in larger part the responsibility lies
with philosophersthemselves, who in a majority of cases are quite happy to live
in the falsepeace of their ivory towers, talking only with each other
about the problems and issues theyshould be promoting in the public square. Is
it any wonder that few outside thediscipline of philosophy have listened
seriously to what we philosophers havebeen saying?
As philosophers, we must
takeseriously our potential role as peacemakers by encouraging our governments
toadopt policies of engagement that promote balance and mutual respect
betweendifferent nations and people groups. Although our modern universities
arestructured differently from those in KantÕs day, with the departments
ofphilosophy no longer enjoying a privileged positionÑindeed, in
someuniversities they no longer exist at all!Ñwe should still aim to
practiceKantÕs high ideal of peaceful, creative conflict. If Kant could send
usany message from his resting place in the grave, I believe it would be
toremind us philosophers that we really can help solve contemporary
politicalproblems, and that once we realize this fact, we shall find we are
closer thanwe ever before realized to the day when all the nations on earth,
despite theirradically conflicting perspectives, may live together in lasting
peace.
ENDNOTES
[1] See my
paper,ÒKantÕs Ideal of the University as a Model for World PeaceÓ(presented at
the conference, ÒTwo Hundred Years After KantÓ, heldin Tehran, Iran, 20-22
November, 2004), especially section 1, for details ofthe role conflict played
throughout KantÕs mature writings.
[2] In brief, these preliminary
requirements are: (1) the only valid peacetreaties shall be those
that do not provide a justification for some futurewar; (2) nations must not be
treated as objects that can be bought, inherited,exchanged, or otherwise
manipulated by larger nations; (3) armies mustgradually be abolished; (4) a nation
must not use credit to pay for anymilitary conflict; (5) no nation shall use
force to interfere with the internalgovernance of another nation; and (6) if or
when a war is unavoidable, nonation shall engage in dishonorable strategies in
carrying out their hostileacts. See Immanuel Kant, PerpetualPeace, tr. Lewis White Beck in
OnHistory, ed. Lewis White Beck(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1963), 343-347. Page numbersrefer to the pagination of the German Akademie
edition, provided in the margin of the translation.
[3]Perpetual Peace, 352. Any governmentthat allows the ones who make the laws also to administer them is necessarily despotic, even if thedespotism is hidden under the cloak of a popular, democratic vote. Democracywithout separation of powers (i.e., non-republican democracy) is despoticbecause Ò ÔallÕ decide for or even against one who does notagree; that is, Ôall,Õ who are not quite all, decide, and this is acontradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.Ó
[4]Perpetual Peace, 354f. Perhaps the mostfundamental among the principles of international law is that thefederationÕs purpose cannot be that of establishing Òa law ofnations as a right to make warÓ (356). Kant goes on to say (357):ÒThe only conceivable meaning of such a law of nations [i.e., conceivedas a right to make war] might be that it serves men right who are so inclinedthat they should destroy each other and thus find perpetual peace in the vastgrave that swallows both the atrocities and their perpetrators.Ó
[5] Perpetual
Peace, 358.
[6] Perpetual
Peace, 368.
[7] Perpetual
Peace, 368.
[8]
Objective legislationmade withoutthe controlling conflict of the
philosopherÕs voice echoing in thesubjective background will never lead to
world peace, because on their own,lawyers can be expected to do nothing other
than look after their own selfinterest. As Kant puts it (Perpetual Peace,
369): ÒThe lawyer, who has madenot only the scales of right but also the sword
of justice his symbol,generally uses the latter not merely to keep back all
foreign influences fromthe former, but, if the scale does not sink the way he
wishes, he also throwsthe sword into itÉ, a practice to which he often has the
greatesttemptation because he is not also a philosopher, even in morality.Ó
[9] Perpetual
Peace, 373.
[10] Perpetual
Peace, 374. Kant proceeds toexplain three rather cynical (though all too
often, penetratingly accurate!)ÒmaximsÓ that guide the typical professional at
law. He thenchallenges his reader to stand up and be courageous in fighting
against thisfeature of modern culture (376): ÒLet us É force the
falserepresentatives of power to confess that they do not plead in favor of
theright but in favor of might.Ó
[11] Perpetual
Peace, 379.
[12] Perpetual
Peace, 381.
[13] Perpetual
Peace, 385.
[14] Perpetual
Peace, 386.
[15] Since
Kant wrote muchof this book earlier, he may have initially conceived of the
idea of publishingit as a book around the same time he wrote Perpetual Peace.
Kant had to wait untilthe Prussian king died in 1798 to publish The Conflict
of the Faculties, because the First Partdealt with his religious views,
which he had been banned from publishing duringthe reign of that king.
[16] See
note 15, and thefurther discussion of this issue in the main text, below.
[17] Kant
uses a similar,territorial metaphor in the Preface to the first edition of his
1793 book, Religionwithin the Bounds of Bare Reason. This was the book
whose publication wasregarded by the kingÕs censor as a violation of the edict
againstpublishing anything contrary to the churchÕs official position on
mattersof religion. The Preface discusses the basic differences between what
Kantthere calls the Òphilosophical theologianÓ and the Òbiblicaltheologian,Ó
concluding that the two neighbors, despite their fundamentaldifferences, have
the potential to be Òat one,Ó if only they willrespect each otherÕs fundamental
perspectives and work towards mutualself-understanding.
[18] I
have, however,discussed this issue in significant depth in two other
publications: first, inmy book, KantÕs Critical Religion: Volume Two of
KantÕs Systemof Perspectives(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), especially Chapter
IX; and second, in my essay,ÒPhilosophers in the Public Square: A Religious
Resolution ofKantÕs Conflict of the Faculties,Ó Chapter 12 in Kant
and theNew Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R.
Palmquist(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).
[19]
Immanuel Kant, TheConflict of the Faculties, tr. and ed. Allen W. Wood
and George Di Giovanni(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79. Page
numbers refer to the Germanpagination provided in the margin. Section numbers,
where cited, refer toKantÕs numbered sections in Part 2 of the book.
[20] Conflict,
80 (¤2).
[21] This
is precisely whatKant did in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,
only as applied to thefaculty of theology. The Preface to the second edition of
that work describesthese two tasks (determining in advance what rational
religion should be, thencomparing one empirical religion with that ideal) as
the twoÒexperimentsÓ being conducted in that work. KantÕs decisionnot to
address directly (in the Second Part of Conflict) the need for such
apair of experiments as applied to the faculty of law might suggest thatKantÕs
own experience of a very real threat of legal prosecution, as aresult of
his own violation of government censorship, was simply too fresh inhis mind for
him to address the issue explicitly, even after the censorship waslifted.
Perhaps he was all too aware that his own failure to take up the roleof a true
philosopher in that situation would have been all-too-apparent, hadhe written
the Second Part in the same direct way he wrote the First Part.
[22] Conflict,
80 (¤2).
[23] Conflict,
81 (¤3).KantÕs use of the words ÒcontinualÓ, ÒperpetualÓ,and ÒeternalÓ provide
further evidence that Kant is here dealingwith essentially the same theme he
was addressing in Perpetual Peace.
[24] Conflict,
83 (¤4).
[25] Conflict,
84 (¤4).
[26] Conflict,
84 (¤5).
[27] Conflict,
89 (¤8).
[28] Conflict,
87-88 (¤7).
[29] Conflict,
88 (¤7), emphasisadded. KantÕs use of the term ÒfacultyÓ here refers, ofcourse,
to a power of the mind, not to a university department. This parallelusage of
the same term does suggest, however, that a metaphorical relationshipexists (or
should exist) between these two organizational structures.
[30] Conflict,
88-89 (¤7). Kantqualifies this prophetic proposition in a way that could be
regarded asforeshadowing NietzscheÕs Ÿbermensch: Òprovided atleast that
there does not, by some chance, occur a second epoch of naturalrevolution which
will push aside the human race to clear the stage for othercreaturesÉÓ (89).
[31] Conflict,
89 (¤8).
[32] Conflict,
89 (¤8).
[33] Conflict,
90-91 (¤8).
[34] Conflict,
91-92 (¤9).
[35] Conflict,
92-93 (¤10).
This
etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this
essay.
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