Triangulating
God:
A Kantian
Rejoinder to Perovich
Prof. Stephen Palmquist,
D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
"I recommend...that the Kantian, who believes that reason alone leads to
practical analogues of so many Christian beliefs, employ these practical
teachings along with the intuitions of the mystics as two points from which to
'triangulate' Christian doctrine."[1] Anthony Perovich has recently offered these words as the key to a
properly Christian response to Kant's philosophy of the Christian religion.
They appear in the conclusion of his recent Faith and Philosophy
article, written in reply to an earlier article[2] in which I argued that
the basic principles of Kant's Critical philosophy and of Kant's own
application of it to religion and theology are thoroughly consistent with a
Christian way of thinking, acting and being. Perovich
begins his reply with a fairly accurate summary of my "perspectival"
method of interpreting Kant (pp.95-96). Unfortunately, when he describes my proposal
as to how a perspectival interpretation of Kant can
show the Christian philosopher a whole new way of responding to the Critical
philosophy (pp.96-99), Perovich fails to portray my
position quite so astutely; as a result, he is easily able to unveil problems
which appear to be "fatal" (p.99) to my interpretation, supposedly
rendering it "demonstrably wrong as an interpretation of Kant's
views" (p.96). In this rejoinder I shall respond to such accusations by
clarifying this aspect of my perspectival
interpretation; in so doing, I will argue that the solution Perovich
himself suggests as a "revision" of Kant (pp.99f) is in fact Kant's own
position.
The general perspectival approach to interpreting
Kant, which Perovich concedes "is undoubtedly
correct" (p.96), operates on three levels: (1) the Perspective of
Kant's three Critiques, taken together, can be distinguished from that
of some of his other systematic writings, such as those applying the Critical propaedeutic to metaphysics proper;[3] (2) the standpoint
of each Critique can be distinguished from that of the other two; and
(3) within each Critique, four distinct perspectives can be
discerned. The first level includes the Perspectives (note the capital
"P") of Experience, Logic, Transcendental (or Critical) philosophy
and Metaphysics. The second level includes the theoretical, the practical and
the judicial standpoints (corresponding, respectively, to Kant's three Critiques).
And the third level includes the empirical, logical, transcendental and
hypothetical perspectives.[4] Perovich's
comments all focus on the issue of the relation between the three standpoints
in Kant's System, so I will limit my present comments in the same way, even though
the full profundity of Kant's religious philosophy cannot be appreciated
without seeing in it the role of the other two levels of perspectives as well.
Perovich's biggest mistake is to assume that a perspectival interpretation implies that Kant was
recommending an attitude of "openness and flexibility" which would be
"accommodating" to a wide variety of perspectives which might come to
a person's mind, so that "religious phenomena" would "admit of
multiple interpretations" (p.97). My view, on the contrary, is that, to
call these "perspectives" does not mean they are arranged
arbitrarily, or related in such a way that one is just as good as another, or
can be replaced by another at will. Rather, Kant sees them as having a
definite, "architectonic" order, determined by reason itself. Their perspectival character simply means that what is true or
certain in one case might not be true or certain in another, so that one must
be careful to discern the proper perspective before answering any philosophical
question. And religion, like everything else to which
Kant applies his Critical acumen, does have its proper perspective.
Before explaining just what that proper perspective is for Kant, I must
say a word about the development of my own interpretation. The article Perovich is criticizing was first written in 1985, when my
own application of a perspectival interpretation of
Kant to his views on theology and religion was still in its infancy. At that
time I was by no means claiming to have demonstrated that the views
expressed in that article were accurate as interpretations of Kant. Rather, I
saw the article as a kind of "manifesto": a public declaration of my intention
to demonstrate the validity of a new way of interpreting the religious
implications of Kant's philosophy. Although the full-fledged demonstration is
not yet complete even today, many of its key points have already appeared in
print.[5] So I am now in a far
better position to state clearly and precisely just what it is that a perspectival interpretation implies for the Kantian
Christian.
In my previous Faith and Philosophy article I did indeed give the
impression that for Kant religion is properly interpreted from the practical
standpoint, but that other standpoints are not ruled out in principle. My
argument at that point was weak, if not non-existent—a fact which did not
escape Perovich's notice. I would now like to explain
more clearly the position I was working towards at that time. For Kant,
religion is primarily an experience involving a complex combination of
actions and thoughts. It is, as such, analogous to the experiences of judging
natural objects to be beautiful, sublime or objectively purposeful. The proper
standpoint for understanding all such experiences, experiences in which
something mysterious and "supersensible" breaks through the
barrier of the mechanistic world (i.e., the world of "empirical
knowledge", as it appears from the theoretical standpoint of the first Critique),
is the judicial standpoint. But a question arises whenever we adopt
this standpoint: from which non-judicial standpoint can I best explain
why this experience is so meaningful to me? Kant's answer to this is always
the same, whether he is examining beauty, religion, natural organisms or any
other deep human experience. His answer is that the practical standpoint
always has "primacy" over the theoretical.[6] In other words, the value
of any human experience of meaning comes from its participation in practical
reason, since the limits of theoretical reason exclude the possibility of
grasping transcendent reality from the latter standpoint.
An important point to note here is that Kant's doctrine of the primacy of
practical reason does not imply that the practical has primacy over the judicial
as well as the theoretical standpoint. Rather, it means only that, whenever we compare
the practical standpoint with the theoretical—such as we must when we
wish to trace our judicial experiences back to some deeper, rational
source—the practical is the standpoint which must be given the primary
place in our interpretation of experience. That Kant actually regarded the
judicial standpoint as having primacy over both the theoretical and the
practical is evident in many respects, not the least of which is the fact that
the name he chose for the three main books in his philosophical system,
"Critique", is itself an explicitly judicial term.[7] Unfortunately, perhaps
because of the chronological order of Kant's three Critiques, scholars
have had an almost irresistible temptation to see Kant's God through the spectacles
of his notion that God is, for theoretical reason, no more than an idea.
What so often goes unnoticed is that Kant wrote his three Critiques in
the opposite order of their logical importance. For Kant's God is most
emphatically the God of the third Critique, as informed by
the God of the second.
Kant's book on religion, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,
should be read not as an appendix to Kant's practical philosophy, but as a
companion to the third Critique, for it follows the latter in adopting
the judicial standpoint, one of the purposes of which is to construct a
bridge over the gap between the theoretical and the practical. This is the main
point I was trying to get across when I previously stated that Kant's interest
in religion extends beyond the practical standpoint (see quote on p.96). Kant's
view is not that "any old standpoint" will do just as well, but that
there is one correct way to understand religion, and that this requires
an understanding of the proper relationship between all three
standpoints as they operate in religion. Religion is first and foremost an
experience of something which we recognize as "divine commands",[8] just as a judgment of
beauty is first and foremost an experience of something which we recognize as
having "subjective finality".[9] Without such basic
experiences, there would be no religion and no judgments of beauty. But the
question then arises: how can we best explain what these divine commands
actually are? Kant's answer is twofold: (1) because they are
supersensible, we can safely understand them only insofar as they can be
regarded as expressions of practical reason, because theoretical reason does
not give us access to the supersensible; and (2) the best theoretical explanation
must therefore remain a matter of faith, not knowledge, and must be formulated
in such a way as to be in the service of what we do know (viz., our
duty), and not vice versa.
Perovich is undoubtedly in the majority of
scholarship when he declares that the "open mind" I attribute to Kant
on matters of supersensible experience "is quite simply not displayed in
the Critical writings"(p.97). I would agree that, if all we had to work
with were the three Critiques, Kant's open mind, as expressed in (2),
would be virtually impossible to discern. But fortunately, we have much more
to go by than just these three books. Many of Kant's other writings, such as
his Religion and his Opus Postumum, to
say nothing of the riches available in his letters and published lectures,
reveal to us the man behind the Critiques in a way that provides us with
quite a different view of what Kant was trying to accomplish. With this as a
context, even the Critiques themselves can be seen to be
extraordinarily open-minded (considering the intellectual milieu of Kant's day)
with regard to the possibility of the supernatural influencing the natural.
This was precisely my point: that we must be careful not to let the apparent
closedness of the Critiques blind us to the real
openness Kant reveals elsewhere.[10]
Moreover, the term "open-minded" here does not mean that Kant
succumbed to the all-too-common view that "whatever you believe is true is
true for you"; rather, it means that he recognized his own inability to
condemn, from the theoretical standpoint as such, anyone who chooses to
interpret their religious experiences in terms of a given set of theoretical
dogmas. What he did feel free to condemn was the tendency of many religious
people to emphasize a certain theoretical interpretation of their experience
more than its practical implications for their moral life. So this whole issue
has little, if anything, to do with Kant's recognition of the fact that the
human mind is not capable of "intellectual intuition" (whereby an
object is created in the very process of thinking it), as Perovich
seems to think it does (pp.97-98,102). Rather, it has to do with what Kant does
and does not claim to be able to deny to religious believers (who
normally do not make the mistake of believing they can take God's place as
Creator).
As an example of Kant's supposedly exclusive (reductionist)
emphasis on the practical standpoint in interpreting religion, Perovich refers to prayer. He claims that "what
Palmquist understands by prayer" is
"stated wishes directed toward God" (p.97). Frankly, I am puzzled to
read this, since it does not in fact represent my understanding of prayer, and
since I never committed myself on this issue in the article in question. Since
I hope to examine thoroughly at a later date the true depth of Kant's
philosophy of prayer as an inner disposition of devotedness to obeying the Law
God puts in our hearts, I will not defend my interpretation of Kant on this
point in any detail here. Instead, I will merely comment that Kant never so
much as hints that prayer is "only" or "nothing more
than" the expression of such wishes (p.97, Perovich's
emphasis). These words, as is so often the habit of Kant's commentators, have
been added by Perovich and attached to quotations
in order to make Kant look like a reductionist. But
no such language will be found in Kant's own writings, for he was no reductionist.[11] Instead, the alert reader
will always find a cautious form of expression which is based, more than
anything else, on a Critical recognition of ignorance as to the ultimate
nature of such experiences as prayer. What Kant does deny is that the mere
repetition of words can have any value, practical or otherwise. By contrast,
he affirms that real prayer can
and does have value, and that this value goes far deeper than the mere
repetition of words. Thus, whereas Kant does indeed believe that verbal prayer
is optional, he would by no means agree that true prayer "falls
away as a result of proper moral development" (p.97).
Perovich will never be able to find a text in which
Kant explicitly denies that the believer is allowed to regard verbal prayer
as a form of communication with God, because any such dogmatic denial would be
repugnant to Kant's lifelong Critical disposition. Likewise, he will be unable
to find a text in which Kant states that God is not to be regarded as a
Trinity, because Kant believed, as shown in the passage quoted by Perovich himself (p.98), that there are good practical
reasons for viewing God in this way.[12] That such denials, and
innumerable others like them, can be found in the writings of Kant's commentators
is unquestionable. Perovich, for example, seems to
think that because Kant believes God's Triune nature is "theoretically
unfathomable", the theoretical standpoint is entirely useless to the
theologian or religious believer. But if we put aside the reductionistic
tradition of interpreting Kant's religious views, and approach the text afresh
(with a full recognition of the perspectival
character of Kant's Critical way of thinking), the belief that Kant's hidden
agenda is to do away with all theoretical theology will fall like scales from
our mind's eye. Kant has nothing of the sort in mind. Rather, his intention is
to provide the practical ground for a proper way of thinking about
God from a theoretical standpoint, by (1) denying that we can know
about God from the theoretical standpoint, and (2) affirming that
this standpoint, when directed towards the supersensible, can nevertheless be
used to obtain hypotheses for rational belief, the value of which can then be
confirmed or denied by practical reason. This interplay of denial and
affirmation is the source of the "openness" and "balance"
which Perovich proclaims "are quite simply not
there" in Kant's position (p.98).[13]
This means it is quite wrong to say that Kant believes "that numerous
Christian doctrines are intelligible from the practical standpoint and from
none other" (p.103, note 9), even though Perovich believes Kant is "transparent" in his
support of such a position. What is the case is that Kant consistently and
openly argues that, when comparing the theoretical and practical standpoints
for their relative importance, we must always put the practical before
the theoretical, as its ground, rather than vice versa. Hence, although it is
incorrect to say that for Kant "[t]he moral perspective [= standpoint]
provides the only legitimate context for interpreting" Christian doctrines
(p.98), it would be correct to say this standpoint must be the rational ground
for any such interpretation. The difference between true religion and false
religion is not that one is practical and the other theoretical, but that one
allows the practical to govern the theoretical, while the other requires
the theoretical to govern the practical. Thus, in discussing the role of
theoretical, "statutory laws" in religion, Kant does not
categorically deny their validity, but requires that the "priority"
be given to practical, moral laws:
So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order
in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very
distinction; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and
hence a moral service.[14]
This
emphasis on the proper order in our combination of the practical and
theoretical standpoints means that, for Kant, there is always a space left open
for theoretical beliefs—beliefs which can never be fully justified by
practical reason, but are acceptable because of their ability to strengthen our
reliance on the latter (see above, note 13).
Kant's"Criticaltheology",therefore,operatesinpreciselythewaysuggestedbyPerovich's
"revision" of Kant's position: "The Kantian need not abandon his
commitment to practical foundations of religion, but he must supplement them if
he would also be a Christian" (p.101). I believe Kant himself supported
exactly the same position in his own explanation of a healthy form of religious
belief.[15] By using our religious
experience and our practical reason as the two "known" points on the
map of religion, we can, as it were, "triangulate" in order to find
appropriate ways of thinking about the God who forever remains beyond the
grasp of our theoretical knowledge. If my interpretation is correct, then Perovich and Kant are in agreement that
"triangulating" God is the best advice to offer to a
philosophically-minded Christian. This requires us to see religion not merely
as a set of theoretical dogmas to think about, nor merely as a set of
practical rules to act upon, but as a set of experiences which
show us the way to be. This does not mean that religious thoughts and
actions are rendered superfluous: on the contrary, they are only in this way
seen in their proper perspective. For only after we have rooted
ourselves in such experiences (i.e., those which many philosophers, unlike
Kant, have not been afraid to call "mystical" (see above, note 10))
can we then interpret these through the doctrine of the primacy of
practical reason, and in so doing, use them to triangulate our way to an
adequate theoretical (though hypothetical) understanding of the God within us.
Footnotes
to: "Triangulating God"
[1]Anthony
N. Perovich, "Kant A Christian? A Reply
to Palmquist", Faith and Philosophy 9.1
(January 1992), pp.95-104. Subsequent references to this article will
appear in the text as bracketed page numbers.
[2]Stephen Palmquist, "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?", Faith and Philosophy 6.1 (January 1989),
pp.65-75.
[3]Kant distinguishes between
metaphysics ("the inventory of all our possessions through pure
reason, systematically arranged") and Critique (reason's own
self-examination of its sources and limits) as early as the preface to the
first edition of the first Critique. See Immanuel Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p.Axx-xxi. Page numbers refer to the original German
versions, with "A" indicating material
unique to the first edition. Page numbers for other references to Kant's
writings always refer to the Berlin Academy edition of Kant's works, and are
followed by the English pagination in brackets.
[4]For a more detailed
explanation of these levels, see my forthcoming book, Kant's System of Perspectives (Washington D.C.:
University Press of America, 1992), especially Chapter II.
[5]These articles, which
unfortunately have not appeared in their logical order, are as follows:
"Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (1) The Critical Dreams", Philosophy
& Theology 3.4 (Summer 1989), pp.355-383 (published with several
hundred gross editorial and typesetting errors, which render it virtually
unintelligible in its uncorrected form); "Kant's Critique of Mysticism:
(2) Critical Mysticism", Philosophy & Theology 4.1 (Fall 1989),
pp.67-94; "Four Perspectives on Moral Judgment: The Rational
Principles of Jesus and Kant", The Heythrop
Journal 32.2 (April 1991), pp.216-232; "Kant's Theistic Solution to
the Problem of Transcendental Theology", Rodica Croitoru (ed.), Kant and the Transcendental Problem
(Bucharest: University of Bucharest Faculty of Philosophy, 1991),
pp.148-178; "Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's God", Harvard
Theological Review 85.1 (January 1992), in press; "Does Kant
Reduce Religion to Morality?", Kant-Studien
83.2 (1992), in press. I plan to begin working in the near future on a sequel
to my book on Kant's Critical philosophy (see above, note 4), entitled Kant's
Critical Religion, about half of which will consist of revised versions of
the above articles. Originally, I had planned to include this material as Part
Four (Chapters X-XII) of Kant's System of Perspectives (as stated in
notes 26, 32 and 38 of my previous Faith and Philosophy article (see
above, note 2)), but I have now decided to publish these as two separate
monographs.
[6]See e.g., Immanuel Kant, Critique
of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956), pp.119-121 (124-126).
[7]See Kant's System of
Perspectives (op.cit.), pp.???.
[8]See Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. T.M. Greene and
H.H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p.153 (142).
[9]Immanuel Kant, Critique
of Judgment, tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), pp.188-192 (28-32).
[10]In the pair of articles on
Kant's "Critical mysticism" cited above (see above, note 5) I have
demonstrated at length Kant's keen interest in mysticism, as well as explaining
why most of Kant's remarks about mysticism were negative. The fact that Perovich's own "modifications" of Kant's position
refer explicitly to mysticism (pp.101-102) is therefore noteworthy. Provided
that mystical experience is clearly distinguished from "intellectual
intuition", and provided no claim is made to have thereby reached
"empirical knowledge" of ultimate reality, I would heartily
affirm Perovich's conviction "that nothing
essential to Kantianism is sacrificed or rendered inconsequent by the recognition
of mysticism as a legitimate cognitive mode" (p.102).
[11]I argue this point in
detail in my article, "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?" (op.cit.).
[12]The text Perovich does quote, from Critique of Pure Reason (op.cit.), p.B270, does indeed contain some
very strong words concerning the illegitimacy of claiming to have a
supersensible experience of ghosts, clairvoyance or ESP. Yet Kant is here
denying only that such experiences can ever obtain the status of empirical knowledge,
not that they have no part in "human experience" in general, as Perovich assumes (p.98). Moreover, Kant says nothing about
whether or not Critical philosophy might provide some other way of thinking
about such experiences. In other words, he is denying only that there will
ever be a science of such experiences.
Incidentally, Perovich himself refers to Kant's
distinction between thinking and knowing, using it to suggest that we can never
know anything about the supersensible (p.101). If "knowledge" means
only theoretical knowledge, then of course, this represents an accurate
interpretation of Kant's position. But we must not forget that Kant not only
believed in practical knowledge, but regarded it more highly than its
theoretical counterpart (something which some Christian philosophers and
theologians unfortunately seem reluctant to do). Perovich
underestimates just how much of Christian doctrine can be justified from
the practical standpoint.
[13]Perovich claims that "nothing
beyond what our commitment to morality necessitates" is justified by the
practical standpoint (p.99). In his Religion, however, Kant's actual
position is that we are not required to think or act in any way other
than that which our practical standpoint necessitates, but that we are justified
in extending religion beyond morality as long as the non-moral (hence,
non-necessary) elements serve to encourage the development of our moral
standpoint. (I defend this point in detail in "Does Kant Reduce Religion To Morality?" (op.cit.),
where I argue that morality is a necessary, but not a sufficient element
in Kant's conception of true religion.) Hence, Perovich's
charge that I "pretend...that other perspectives...are legitimate but
underemphasized" (p.100) is unfair; what I claim is that other
standpoints are legitimized by the practical, and perhaps even complete
the practical in some important ways, even though they can never be legitimate
when used independently of their practical ground.
[14]Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone (op.cit.),
pp.178-179 (166-167).
[15]The main difference
between Perovich and myself, once the above
clarifications of my position have been made, seems therefore to be a
difference of opinion over just which reading of Kant it is that
"conflicts with Kant's texts on every page" (pp.98-99). And the only
way to settle such a difference is to go into the details of the text itself.
Although neither Perovich nor I went into sufficient
detail in our Faith and Philosophy articles to demonstrate the
validity of our opinions on this issue, I hope my subsequent efforts in this
direction (see above, note 5), have provided at least a partial demonstration
of my position—a position which I believe is fully consistent with all
four of the "desiderata" which Perovich
thinks must "be satisfied by any admissible supplement" to the
position he believes Kant holds (p.101).
This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published
version of this essay.
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