Prof. Stephen Palmquist, D.Phil. (Oxon)

Department of Religion and Philosophy

Hong Kong Baptist University

Synchronicity andIntellectual Intuition in Kant, Swedenborg, and Jung, by Paul Bishop.Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000. xvi + 465pp. $129.95 (cloth). ISBN0-7734-7593-1.

“TheKant-Jung Book” (or KJB) is a project I have had in mind for some twodecades, ever since I began reading Jung as a hobby to complement my scholarlyresearch on Kant. In his autobiography, Jung openly confesses the significantinfluence Kant had on his intellectual development. For example, he expresseshis frustration at how busy he was during his “clinical semesters”by recalling: “I was able to study Kant only on Sundays” (Memories,Dreams, Reflections,p.122)! As Paul Bishop notes, tantalizing references to Kant and/or variousKantian concepts “pepper Jung’s psychological writings”(p.297). Not being or claiming to be a philosopher, Jung leaves thesereferences undeveloped, claiming no more than to be developing depth psychologywithin essentially Kantian parameters.

Theprojected goal of KJB is to explore how far Jung’s analytical psychologyand Kant’s critical philosophy can function as complementary intellectualsystems, like yin and yang manifestations of one Tao: entirely different(indeed, opposing)forces that nevertheless work together toward the same unified goal, originallyexpressed by the inscription over the entrance to the temple at Delphi as knowthyself.Whereas Kant developed a transcendental philosophy grounded in a logicallystructured set of 12 a priori categories of consciousness that give form to themanifold aggregate of human knowledge, Jung developed an empirical psychologygrounded in a haphazard collection of “archetypes” (categories ofthe unconscious)whose flowering produces a fixed set of psychological types that exhibits a logicalpattern virtually identical to that of Kant’s categories: Jung’sfour functions (sensation, intuition, thought, and feeling) correspond directlyto Kant’s four main categories (quantity, quality, relation, andmodality), while Jung’s three ways of experiencing each function(introvert, extravert, and their combination in the integrated personality)correspond directly to Kant’s three manifestations of each category(e.g., the three moments of quantity: unity, plurality, and totality). Likewise,Kant’s doctrine of the unknowability of the thing in itself resonatesdeeply with Jung’s doctrine of the Self as the mysterious totality of thehuman psyche, knowable only in the differentiated form of archetypal images andideas. These examples merely touch the tip of the iceberg of connections thatexist between Kant’s philosophy and Jung’s psychology, asexpressions of two sides of one and the same worldview – a worldview Ihave elsewhere dubbed “Critical Mysticism” (see Kant’sCritical Religion[Ashgate, 2000], Part Four).

When I firstlearned of Paul Bishop’s book on Kant and Jung, focusing on themes asobviously “mystical” as Jung’s “synchronicity”,Kant’s “intellectual intuition”, and Swedenborg (the Swedishmystic who fascinated both Kant and Jung), I thought this could be one of thoserare opportunities when, rather than fanning the flames of urgency, readinganother author’s book satisfies one’s scholarly “calling” tocontribute to that particular area. “Perhaps this is it;” I mused;“maybe I won’t have to write KJB after all!” Inthis hope, however, I could hardly have been more mistaken.

Paul Bishopmakes his bias clear at the outset: he starts the Acknowledgements byexplaining how this book extends his doctoral research on Jung, which placedJung firmly within “the specific context” of “GermanRomanticism” (p.xiii). That Bishop will treat “Romanticism”and “Romantic” as dirty words had already been hinted in theForeword, where the “Germanist”, Raymond Furness, says (p. xi) this“book is, basically, a history of an error [i.e., Jung’s error, in RomanticizingKant], and … a salutary (and daunting) reminder of how frequently reasonmay be transformed into unreason.” Accordingly, Bishop pays no attentioneven to the possibility that there may be meaningful connections between Kant andJung, that the two scholars may have been constructing two sides of the sameintellectual Way. From the point of view of Kant-scholarship, the book’smost interesting discussions center around the popular nineteenth centuryspiritualist scholar, Carl du Prel (1839-1899), who portrayed Kant as a closetmystic, heavily influenced by Swedenborg. Bishop’s thesis is that Jungwas duped by du Prel, and by his allegedly “Romantic” tendencies,to misinterpret Kant.

Unfortunately,Bishop never defends his anti-Romantic bias with anything like a reasonedargument. Rather, he merely assumes anyone who exhibits goals similar to thoseof nineteenth-century Romantics is not worthy of serious consideration. And hisKant-scholarship is no more impressive: he merely assumes that Kant, thephilosopher who marked the transition-point between theEnlightenment and German Romanticism, had affinities only with the formermovement. Bishop’s underlying argument seems to run like this: (1)Romanticism and all motifs typically associated with it are obviouslyirrational and untenable; (2) Jung’s works exhibit numerous motifstypically associated with Romanticism; therefore (3) Jung’s works areobviously irrational and untenable. A corollary to this argument, it seems, isthat Kant, being a pre-Romantic philosopher, was eminently rational, and therefore shouldnot be associated with the likes of Jung. In this context, the main theme ofBishop’s book is to show that Jung’s “concept ofsynchronicity only makes sense in terms of” Kant’s theory ofintellectual intuition, even though Jung himself never employed Kant’sterm (p.2).Correspondingly, the main theme of this review is to argue that Bishop isthoroughly mistaken.

Bishop’sgreatest strength is probably also the greatest danger of his approach: heexhibits erudite scholarship on virtually every page. For example, the text providesboth German and English for most of its numerous, often lengthy, quotations– a tedious practice that adds significantly to the book’s length.Having done an impressive breadth of research, the author refers to a widespectrum of books on numerous relevant topics. To begin, the Introductionprovides a brief overview of the references Jung makes to Kant and of all“eight articles” and “five books” (p.6) that addressthe Kant-Jung relationship. Yet the reader is left with no idea of whatJung’s interest in Kant was all about – except that it hadsomething to do with Swedenborg. The Introduction also makes an initial attemptto argue that “synchronicity” meant for Jung what“intellectual intuition” meant for Kant, and that Jung’sacceptance of a concept Kant so resolutely rejected proves that Jung was not aKantian, but a “post-Kantian” – i.e., a“Romantic” (p.20), with all the nastiness Bishop believes thatentails. Here, as elsewhere, Bishop reveals he is not a Kant scholar.

Chapter1 examines Jung’s theory of synchronicity more closely. After discussingpossible connections Jung saw between synchronicity and modern physics, Bishopcites “four definitions” (pp.33-34) Jung gives the term in hisbook, Synchronicity. What escapes Bishop’s notice is that these fourcorrespond to Kant’s four categories: as regards quantity, synchronicity appearsas “meaningful parallels” between a “psychic state” and“external events”; its quality appears as “the simultaneousoccurrence of two different psychic states”; its relation is a person’sawareness of a connection between “[a]n unconscious image” and“[a]n objective situation”; and its modality (its definition proper) is a uniquecombination of possibility, actuality, and necessity that Jung calls“meaningful coincidence” (p.34). Bishop dutifully quotesJung’s claim that synchronicity must be understood from a strictly“hypothetical” perspective (p.34), yet shows no awareness of whatthis meansin a Kantian context: it is a heuristic fiction used to regulate our inquiries, ratherthan a concrete (categorial) claim to have discovered something that constitutes human knowledge.Intellectual intuition, for Kant, is always and only the latter. SoBishop’s attempt to identify Jungian synchronicity with this Kantiannotion only highlights his limited understanding of Kant. Instead of beinggrounded in Kant’s philosophy, Bishop’s section entitled“Philosophical Implications of Synchronicity” (pp.36-51) describeshow a wide variety of other scholars used the relevant terms, ranging fromAvicenna and Albertus Magnus to Geulincx, Leibniz, and Schopenhauer. Jung, bycontrast, hadstudied Kant – even if (for a time) “only on Sundays” –so he had good reason for steering clear of any attempt to connect synchronicitywith intellectual intuition. In short, Bishop’s argument here is grosslyunfair to both Kant and Jung.

WhereJung mentions Kant in Synchronicity, he agrees with Kant’s theorythat the a priori conditions of knowledge, space and time, are products ofthe mind(p.42). From this, Jung infers that the unconscious mind is capable of puttingasidethese conscious forms and viewing the world differently, in a manner that isnot subject to normal categorial restrictions, such as causality. Bishop thinksJung is perverting Kant at this point; but he forgets that Kant wasconstructing a philosophy of conscious knowledge, whereas Jung wasexplicitly constructing a psychology of unconscious ideas. Much of Bishop’sscholarly footwork in this initial chapter is of immense value to the perceptivereader; disappointingly, Bishop himself seems unaware of that value, believinginstead he has proved Jung’s theory to be anti-Kantian (p.49). His maincomplaint is that Jung tends to refer to synchronicity as a way of obtaining“absolute knowledge”; yet he fails to recognize that Jung wasreferring here only to a hypothetical apprehension of something that always remains amystery to the conscious mind, and therefore has no relation whatsoeverto Kantian intellectual intuition (which entails knowing or even creating the absolute as anempirical object,merely by thinking it). That the products of our unconscious are not incompatiblewith the Critical restriction of conscious knowledge to space and time is shownnowhere more profoundly than in Kant’s own Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, where he assessesSwedenborg’s mystical visions from a philosophical perspective. (SeeChapter II of Kant’s Critical Religion for a thorough argumentalong these lines.) Here, if anywhere, Kant showed he was capable of the samealleged “conceptual recklessness” Bishop attributes to Jung (p.54).

Insteadof moving directly to an examination of Kant’s approach to Swedenborg,Bishop devotes the next three chapters to three stages in Jung’sdevelopment: his early interest in philosophy; the use of Kant in his earlywritings; and the use of Kant in his writings after 1921. The upshot of Chapter2 is that (p.77) “Jung’s attitude towards Kant was a highlypersonal one.” Although there are no great surprises in this chapter,Bishop’s survey benefits greatly, here and throughout the book, by thefact that he had access to Jung’s personal library and carefullyinspected all the (relevant) books Jung possessed. In this regard, Appendix A(“Editions of Kant in C.G. Jung’s Library”) provides avaluable resource for anyone interested in the Jung-Kant relationship, andBishop’s endnotes make ample (often instructive) references toJung’s marginal markings and comments. Again, Bishop has done hishomework on this point, and done it well.

By contrast,one wishes Bishop’s reading of contemporary Kant-scholarship had extendedbeyond the few works included in his otherwise massive Bibliography; he baseshis entire view of Kant’s philosophy of science, for example, solely onRobert Butts’ 1986 book. As a result, Bishop chides Jung for being“highly unKantian” (p.81) merely because Jung observed what manyKant scholars recognize Kant himself observed, that “there might be eventswhich overstepped the limited categories of space, time and causality” (Memories,Dreams, Reflections,p.120). For Kant (as Jung and many Kant scholars have recognized), such“overstepping” is possible, but cannot produce knowledge for us human beings,simply because we do not have access to intellectual intuition. Contrary to theimpression Bishop wants his readers to take from his book, Jung nevercontradicted this basic tenet of Kantian philosophy, but understood and agreedwith it far more accurately than Bishop does. Most of Bishop’s othercriticisms of Jung’s views on Kant in Chapter 2 are similarly half-baked,as when he claims Jung went through a period of viewing Kant“negatively”, when the negativity Bishop describes was focusedprimarily on Ritschl’s interpretation of Kant (pp.92-93).

Thelongest, and possibly most interesting, section of Bishop’s book comes atthe end of Chapter 2: “Excursus: Freud’s Interest in theOccult” (pp.102-129). Here Bishop provides an excellent contextualizationfor anyone who wishes to understand Jung’s interest in the occult, for hedemonstrates that Freud was fascinated by many of the same issues Jung was, yethe was unable to integrate them as consistently into his psychoanalytic theory.As Bishop puts it (p.106): “Read against Freud’s remarks about hisintellectual development, Jung’s seems far less eccentric than it usuallydoes.” Bishop’s conclusion, however, is typically biased (p.127):Freud’s approach to the occult was superior to Jung’s because atleast “Freud was keen to reject any method that involved [that devilishscourge of the Romantic era!] intuition.”

Chapters3 and 4 are the shortest, most straightforward, and least objectionable of thebook’s six main chapters. The former begins with a helpful summary of howJung employed Kant’s distinction between analysis and synthesis in hisearly work on word-association, leading eventually to the split with Freud,which Jung himself expressed in terms of a need to complement Freudian analysis with psychic synthesis (p.145). (Unhappily,Jung abandoned his initial idea of calling his new approach“psychosynthesis”, and replaced it with the less distinctive name,“analytic psychology”.) The next section argues that Jung’swork on symbols, as a path beyond faith to knowledge, betrays“Jung’s divergence from Kant” (p.147), since the Preface toKant’s first Critique denied knowledge in order to make room for faith. But hereBishop allows a semantic similarity to becloud the deep and intentional difference instandpoint Jung adopted in his effort to complement Kant’sphilosophy. Kant’s goal was to deny objective knowledge of God (etc.) in orderto make room for rational (practical) faith, grounded in our moralnature. Jung’s goal was to deny blind faith in God in order to make roomfor psychological knowledge, grounded in the realities of our religiousexperience. These goals are not in conflict, as Bishop claims.

The thirdand fourth sections of Chapter 3 examine Jung’s Psychological Types. In the former, Bishopdraws some clear correlations between Jung’s view of“phantasy” and Kant’s theory of “imagination”.Here is one of the few places where Bishop suggests a potential area of genuinecompatibility,though he does so in a manner that furthers his main agenda (namely, to portrayJung negatively), by emphasizing Jung’s failure to relate phantasy toKant’s third Critique. (Interestingly, Bishop himself had earliercommitted the same error by referring to Kant’s “two Critiques” [p.87], callingthem, along with Prolegomena, “the key texts of the criticalphilosophy” [p.82]. And later, Bishop complains about Jung’s“apparent ignorance of the third Critique” [p.173], eventhough Appendix A clearly states [p.412] that Jung’s own copy of thatbook did containmarginal markings!) The chapter ends with a section assessing (negatively, ofcourse) Jung’s attempt to relate his theory of “archetypes”to Kant’s distinction between “idea” and “image”;once again, the apparent conflicts Bishop finds are due more to his ownsuperficial understanding of Kant than to any real incompatibility.

Chapter4 begins by assessing Jung’s portrayal of the archetypes as“categories of the imagination” (p.176) in his later writings. HereBishop continues his effort to persuade the reader that Jung’s real intention is to claim knowledge of the sort Kantregarded as impossible, due to human beings’ lack of intellectualintuition. He offers the legitimate criticisms that Jung seems to use“category” in an imprecise way, and that some attention to thethird Critiquewould have been helpful [pp.187,192]. However, he fails to provide anythingmore than a “hint” that Jung’s terminology sometimes“closely resembles that of intellectual intuition” (p.178); indeed,Bishop seems unaware of the obvious Kantian implications of numerous texts hehimself quotes,where Jung warns (for example) that the archetype “is in itselfirrepresentable” (quoted on p.179) or that “[t]he archetype as suchis a hypothetical and irrepresentable model” (quoted on p.180), so thatall we can know(scientifically) about it must be based on the ideas and images we observe (e.g., in our dreams).This is vintage Kant; yet Bishop misconstrues it as an implicit acceptance ofintellectual intuition. Moreover, Bishop claims that because “Kant sawhis task as complete” (p.184), he would never have approved of Jung’sattempt to complement it. Yet Kant’s bold claim refers only to his establishment ofa transcendental foundation for all further scientific and metaphysicalinquiry; he fully recognized that the task of building on that foundation anenduring system of metaphysical principles and/or scientific knowledge was atask that would have to be fulfilled by future generations. And Kant was keenlyaware of his own generation’s limited accomplishments in areas such aspsychology.

Chapter4 ends with a section entitled “Why did Jung think he was aKantian?” Bishop states at the outset that his aim here is to explainJung’s “confused use of Kant”. He cites several examples ofsuch usage from Jung’s later writings and claims Jung believedKant’s philosophy gave him “license” to make “claimsabout a transcendent realm” [p.189]. This section, unfortunately, ismostly made up of quotations and is virtually devoid of any real argument. The conclusion, thatJung’s “philosophical imprecision” enabled this“self-styled empiricist” to “entangl[e] himself in preciselythose transcendent notions of mysticism that Kant himself unequivocallycondemned” (p.192) really just restates Bishop’s presupposition. IfKant’s philosophical system was meant as a foundation for a newway of interpretingmystical experiences such as those of Swedenborg, then the single pillar thatholds up the whole edifice of Bishop’s argument collapses in a heap.

Assuch, the “make or break” argument of this book comes in Chapter 5,where Bishop examines Kant’s view of Swedenborg, and of all thingsmystical. The chapter begins by detailing the eighteenth-century’srejection of “enthusiasm” as “an epistemologicaldisease” (p.201), then outlines Kant’s own position on the subject.What Bishop neglects here is that, especially in the highly negativecontext of the Enlightenment, Kant’s view of enthusiasm was not asentirely dismissive as it is often portrayed to be, because the enthusiast andthe philosopher share a common personality type, and that this accounts (at least in part) forthe tendency philosophers have to let their minds run wild in the realm ofspeculation. (An excellent elaboration of this point is given in GregoryJohnson’s contribution to Kant’s Philosophy of ReligionReconsidered—Again [Indiana University Press, forthcoming].) In other words,Kant’s concern about enthusiasm was so great not because it was somethingfar awayfrom the truth, but because it was so close to the truth, yetmisrepresents it. This is precisely the reason Kant became interested inSwedenborg, to whom Bishop devotes the remainder of Chapter 5.

Afterfour relatively short but helpful sections introducing Swedenborg, overviewinghis reception in Germany, recounting the famous stories of Swedenborg’spowers that fascinated both Kant and Jung, and sketching the context inKant’s life of his interest in Swedenborg, the core section of thischapter provides a detailed summary of Kant’s 1766 book, Dreams of aSpirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics. (Kant wrote this afterbeing one of only four persons who purchased all eight volumes ofSwedenborg’s Arcana coelestia (p.220) – another of the seeminglyendless string of trivial yet fascinating tidbits Bishop has dredged from hiscareful research.) The four introductory sections present a curious mix ofstatements depicting Kant’s philosophy as a “campaign againstmysticism” (p.224) and confessions that Kant nevertheless“persist[ed] in deploying a quasi-mystical vocabulary” (p.225) thatled avowed mystics to align themselves with Kant even within his own lifetime.Toward the end of his life, as Bishop fully admits, Kant’s writingscontained at one and the same time, more and more “biblical and theologicalmetaphors [that] ran the risk of bringing him closer to those who professedmysticism” and harsher andharsher warnings against the dangers ofmysticism (p.227-228). How could this be? The clue [see Chapter II of Kant’sCritical Religion] is that Kantcontinued interpreting mysticism through the lens of his early assessment of Swedenborg,which itself oddly exhibits this same twofold emphasis.

Kant’sDreamsuses the problem of how to assess the validity of alleged experiences ofspirits (or of a hidden, spiritual world) as an analogy to guide philosophersin understanding the more general problem of how to assess the validity of allmetaphysical claims. Kant employs athoroughly Critical methodology by first adopting one perspective (defendingthe mystic’s claims by explaining how such experiences are possible), then adopting the opposite perspective (showing howknowledge of any such experiencesis quite impossible), and finallyadopting a “middle way” – one that focuses on the“practical” and emphasizes the need to honor the limits of humanknowledge. The perceptive reader of Dreams who is already familiar with Kant’s mature philosophy can seemany “seeds” of the latter in the former. Bishop’s 20-pagesummary of the book does fairly well in this regard. However, he falls prey tothe tendency many interpreters have had, to view the book primarily as a pieceof sarcastic skepticism, rather than as a serious attempt to prepare for agenuinely Critical solution to theproblem of mysticism. Bishop rightly concludes that for Kant,“Swedenborg’s work is the product of the wrong kind of intuition”– namely, “fanatical intuition” (p.244); what he fails tonote that (in keeping with the analogy in its title), just as Dreams prepares the way for Critical philosophy by making adistinction between right and wrong kinds of metaphysics (i.e., based on whether it restson a critique of the limits of human reason), so also there must be rightand wrong forms of mysticism. SinceKant believed his philosophy was the foundation for all future developments ofa correct metaphysics, he mustalso have regarded his philosophy as the foundation for all correctinterpretations of mystical experience. Bishop totally misses this crucial nuance of Kant’s earlyproject. Instead, he ends this section with an all-too-typical put-down ofJung: after claiming Jung “entirely overlooked” the three mainaspects of Dreams (how itforeshadowed Critical philosophy, united mechanistic and teleologicalexplanations, and employed a nuanced style), Bishop surmises that “Jungwas unable to follow [Kant], perhaps because he did not fully understand, thepath of the critical philosophy” (pp.250-251). Yet Jung did understand a fourth and crucial aspect of Dreams that Bishop misses: it forges a new path forexamining the nature of mystical experience, a Critical Mysticism that avoids the pitfalls ofSwedenborg’s fanatical enthusiasm.

Chapter5 closes with a lengthy and very informative, four-part summary of Kant’sLectures on Psychology, as published in 1889 by the mystic, Carl du Prel. ThatKant’s main purpose in Dreams was to provide the foundation for a CriticalMysticism, and that this aim is fully consistent with his mature Criticalphilosophy, is demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in these Lectures, for here Kant dropsthe stylistic (and self-protective, given the bias of Enlightenment thinkersagainst mysticism) sarcasm of Dreams and explicitly honors Swedenborg as one whopresents the philosopher with experiences that call for explanation in aphilosophically responsible way (unlike Swedenborg’s own, fanaticalexplanations). Being an honest scholar, Bishop does not hide Kant’spositive portrayal of Swedenborg; on the contrary, he openly explains howKant’s theory of “symbolic knowledge” attempted to accountfor such experiences (pp.257-259). He rightly stresses that for Kant suchknowledge is epistemologically “inferior” to ordinary knowledge,since it is a type of conception, not intuition (p.260); but he doesnot draw from this the obvious conclusion, that for Kant a measured(“Critical”) form of mysticism is acceptable, without requiring intellectualintuition.

Havingbacktracked from his initial emphasis on Jung all the way to Kant andSwedenborg, Bishop devotes Chapter 6 to an examination of developments between Kant and Jung, withspecial emphasis given to the origins of scientific psychology (especially itsrelation to Neo-Kantianism in Germany) and the parallel development of interestin experimenting with the occult, both mystically and scientifically. Here, asthroughout this book whenever encyclopedic knowledge of a broad spectrum oftheories is required, Bishop is at his best, providing the reader withindispensable contextualization for understanding Jung’s intellectualdevelopment. Unfortunately, as elsewhere, this service to the reader is compromisedby Bishop’s uncharitable assumptions that anything mystical must be“diseased and unhealthy” (p.320), that anything“Romantic” is for that very reason untenable, and that Kant (unlikeJung) was never really interested in spiritual experience. That Jung himselfexplicitly rejected the label “Romantic” as a way of accounting forhis interest in the spiritual realm (p.331) carries no weight for Bishop;instead, failing to make any distinction between “spiritism” and“mysticism” (see e.g., p.332), and overlooking Jung’s carefuluse of Kantian hypothetical (“as if”) language when describingspiritual experiences (e.g., p.341), Bishop never considers the possibilitythat Jung might have been constructing the psychological side of the same CriticalMysticismthat Kant had already developed philosophically.

Thatthe “conclusions” of Jungian psychology “go well beyondKant” (p.350) is only to be expected if, as Jung repeatedly claimed, hewas attempting to complement Kant’s worldview by applying it to theempirical field of depth psychology. The reason “Jung’s world isfull of mysteries” is not that it stands in “contrast withKant’s universe” (p.351) – at least, not in Bishop’ssense of being incompatible with it – but that the two perspectivesexamine the same reality from two sides, each having the other’s seed atits core.

Bishop’sConclusion begins by recapitulating his conviction that Jung took over from duPrel an untenable interpretation of Kant as a mystic, then sketches howJung’s analytical psychology relates to each of six major developments inphilosophy of science since Kant’s day. The final section traces theinfluence of Jung’s notion of synchronicity in recent (post-Jungian)literature, treating the reader to a veritable feast of some of the mostprofound and interesting books published over the past 35 years. Because Bishopadopts his usual posture of making fun of Jung throughout thissection, he must repeatedly confess the “surprising” (e.g., p.393)fact that most of these modern classics have regarded Jung’s ideas as supportingtheirown insights! Again, such overviews of the literature are where thisbook’s true value rests. The reader looks in vain for the proverbial“forest” that unites in one idea this myriad of interesting trees.Such a grand overview is necessary if one is to appreciate how it makes sense that Jung and Kantcould be such happy bedfellows; yet one will not find such“Romance” in Bishop’s work. For better or worse, this is not the long-awaited Kant-JungBook.

Stephen R. Palmquist

AssociateProfessor, Dept. of Religion and Philosophy,

HongKong Baptist University,

Kowloon,Hong Kong

Stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk

This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this essay.

Send comments to: StevePq@hkbu.edu.hk

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