KANT'S 'APPROPRIATION' OF
LAMPE'S GOD
by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
keywords added.
1. The Problem of Transcendental Theology
It
would be difficult to find a philosopher who has suffered more injustices at
the hands of his commentators (friends and foes alike!) than Immanuel
Kant. This is particularly true
when it comes to the many anecdotes which commentators are, for some reason,
quite fond of reciting about Kant.
The problem is that such tales are often used surreptitiously to twist
Kant's own explicit claims about what he was attempting to accomplish, so that
when his writings are read with these stories in mind, misunderstanding is
almost inevitable. As an example,
we need only think of the tale of the old ladies of Konigsberg who became so
familiar with Kant's rigid schedule that they used to set their clocks by his
daily comings and goings. This may
or may not be true; but the point is that the recounting of this anecdote, if
not taken with a pinch of salt, is likely to encourage a prejudice whereby the
reader of Kant assumes at the beginning that Kant's writings are filled with
the unreasonably rigid and formalistic ravings of someone out of touch with the
unpredictable passions which punctuate the ordinary person's life. In other words, such stories are in
danger of creating an image of Kant which may have little or no justification
in the text! Other examples could
also be cited, such as the story of how Kant used to lead the procession of
university professors up to the cathedral each Sunday, only to desert it at the
door, or Russell's quip that Kant's response to being 'awakened' by Hume was
merely to invent a transcendental 'soporific' to help him fall asleep again.[1]
My
intention in this paper is to demonstrate the falsity of a myth which has
arisen out of one such anecdote.
The myth is that Kant's Critical philosophy simply carries on the
Enlightenment project by rejecting the common religious man's belief in God in
favour of the typical agnostic deism of his century. The anecdote I am thinking of suggests that, whereas in the
first Critique Kant threw God out the
'front door' (of the house of philosophy), in the second Critique he let God in again, through the back door [see RK vii]. Along these lines Heinrich
Heine suggested in 1882 that Kant's reason for committing such a dishonorable
act of trickery must have been that he felt sorry for his poor servant, Lampe,
who had faithfully served him for all those years, and whose faith in God had
been jeopardized by the first Critique.
Kant, unable to bear his servant's suffering at the thought that his master had
killed God, revived God 'half
ironically' in the second Critique
in the form of the moral proof for God's existence [RPG 119]. 'Old Lampe
must have a God', Kant is supposed to have thought, lest he be unable to
continue performing his daily chores.
(Heine's conjectures reach their height when he suggests that Kant may
have developed his moral proof 'not merely for the sake of old Lampe, but
through fear of the police' [276-7]!)
Before demonstrating how mistaken such caricatures are, before
explaining why Kant's God is not
simply an after-thought, as it were, appropriating
the God of Lampe or any other 'common man', I will briefly explain the problem which was, supposedly,
disturbing Lampe in the first place.
Kant's
transcendental philosophy begins with an attempt to solve the theoretical
problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. In solving this epistemological problem Kant demonstrates how transcendental
knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the synthetic a priori conditions for the
possibility of experience) is possible only when its application is confined to
the realm of empirical knowledge (i.e., to experience). He argues that space, time, and the
twelve categories form the transcendental boundary line between what we can and
cannot know. But this 'solution'
itself calls attention to an even more significant problem: what is the status of that which lies outside the boundary of possible
empirical knowledge? Kant reveals
as early as CPR xxix-xxxi[2] that this metaphysical problem--viz., how to verify the fundamental human
ideas of 'God, freedom, and immortality', upon which he believes all religion
and morality depend--constitutes the deepest and most urgent form of the
'transcendental problem'. It
should therefore come as no surprise when he devotes the entire Transcendental
Dialectic, the largest section of the first Critique,
to the task of solving this ubiquitous perplexity of human reason.
According
to Kant our ideas of God, freedom, and immortality inevitably arise in the
human mind as a result of our attempts to unify and systematize our empirical
knowledge. In other words, reason
naturally seeks for something beyond the limits of empirical knowledge which
can supply unity and coherence to the diversity of facts which fall within that
boundary. The problem is that the
transcendental conditions which enable us to gain knowledge in the empirical
world are unable to perform their function with respect to such ideas, because
the ideas abstract from all sensible content, whereas the transcendental
conditions (space, time and the categories) all require such content.
As
is well known, Kant devoted considerable effort in the Transcendental Dialectic
to the task of pointing out the implications of this transcendental problem for
rational psychology (with its proofs of the immortality of the soul), rational
cosmology (with its proofs of transcendental freedom), and rational theology
(with its proofs of the existence of God). Interpreters often assume Kant sought to demonstrate the
total uselessness of all such
'speculative' disciplines, especially when it comes to theology, where he
offers his radical criticisms of the three traditional proofs for the existence
of God. Since Kant's division and
negative assessment of these proofs has become common knowledge among
philosophers of religion, I will give here only a brief review of his arguments.
Kant
divides all theoretical proofs for God's existence into three basic types: the ontological
type tries to prove the existence of God from the mere concept of a necessary being; the cosmological type argues from the nature of the world in general to
the necessity of God's existence; and the physicotheological
(or 'teleological') type argues from the nature of specific things in the world (such as designs or purposes) to the need for a God as their creator. Ontological arguments fail, according
to Kant, because they mistakenly assume that 'existence' is a real predicate
which adds something to the nature of
a concept; but in fact, the concept
of, say, 'a hundred dollars' is the same, whether or not I now have a hundred
dollars in my pocket. In other
words, we must go outside our
concepts and appeal to intuitions
(i.e., sensible experiences) in order to establish the existence of anything. Cosmological arguments fail because they assume that laws
applying to objects within the world, such as the law of causality, must also
apply to the world as a whole. But
we cannot be sure that something must
have caused the world to exist, since the world as a whole can never be
presented to us as a sensible intuition.
Physicotheological arguments are the best of the three types, in Kant's
opinion; but the most they can ever prove is that there is a designing power
greater than man. They can never
prove the existence of a necessary being who actually created the material of our world. In general, all three types of proof fail for the same
reason: they all attempt to gain
knowledge of the existence of an object which is necessarily beyond the transcendental limitations of
our knowledge, because it can never be experienced by us in terms of intuitions
which conform to our concepts.
This
is the 'front door' out of which Kant is supposed to have banished God from the
realm of the reasonable. Yet Kant
himself thought this very criticism of the traditional proofs served a beneficial function in relation to theology
and religion. For he explicitly
states that the failure of the traditional proofs does not close the books on
the issue of God's existence, but poses one of the most important problems for Critical philosophy to
resolve. Although some theologians
fear that the demise of traditional rational theology at Kant's hands would
have a detrimental effect on the ordinary religious believer, Kant's rejection
of such a 'sophisticated' conjecture is clear and to the point:
In
religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone .... [So] it is not necessary for this
belief [i.e., in God] to be susceptible of logical proof.... [For] sophistication is the error of
refusing to accept any religion not based on a theology which can be
apprehended by our reason....
Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous thing; our reasoning
powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove everything. A speculative basis is a very weak
foundation for religion... [LE 86-7; cf. CJ 480-1]
The
problem, then is to discover the proper
foundation which can be put in the place of speculation.
What
is not so well known is that Kant saw his philosophical System not only as
posing this problem, but as offering at least four distinct ways of solving
it. So, even though Kant begins
his theology on an essentially negative theological note, believing he has
been able 'to discover the fallacy in any attempt [to prove God's existence
theoretically], and so to nullify its claims' [CPR 667], nevertheless he devotes considerable effort to the task
of showing how an honest recognition of the limitations of human reason leaves
ample room for drawing affirmative theological conclusions concerning God's
existence and nature. In what
follows I will examine these affirmations in turn, with a view towards
ascertaining Kant's true attitude towards theology. This will enable us to assess the common claim that these
affirmations are, in fact, merely an appropriation of something foreign into an
essentially negative theological position.
2. God as a Regulative Idea
Kant
believed it is important for us to form some
judgment on the question of God's existence despite the transcendental
limitations imposed on human knowledge.
He explains that there is 'a real need associated with reason itself
[which] makes judging necessary even if ignorance with respect to the details
required for judging limits us' [WOT
136-7]: because we cannot know God
as an object of empirical knowledge, we must first 'test the concept [of
God]...to see if it is free of contradictions' and then examine the 'relation'
between our idea of God and the
objects we do experience.[3] Kant's criticism of the traditional
proofs is actually designed to fulfil the first of these tasks, by demonstrating
that belief in God cannot be logically contradictory, since God's existence,
regarded as a constitutive part of
the world, can never be proved or
disproved, on the grounds that an intuition of God is, in principle,
impossible. The second task is
fulfilled in a lengthy Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic [CPR 671-732], where Kant offers an
alternative explanation of the epistemological status of the idea of God--an
explanation which is often not treated very seriously by commentators.
Kant's
first theological affirmation provides an explanation for a commonly
experienced paradox, which Kant expresses in CPR 643 by asking:
'Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing things is
in itself necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the existence
of such a being as from an abyss?'
Dialectical illusion results only if we try to subdue one of these
natural tendencies. Those who try
to prove God's existence theoretically are repressing the latter, while those
who categorically deny God's existence are repressing the former. But if the truth which lies behind both
tendencies is grasped, both errors can be avoided. The situation which gives rise to this paradox is that 'I
can never complete the regress to the
conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in
a position to begin [such a regress]
with such a being' [CPR 643-4].
The
two sides of this paradox can be made compatible by recognizing the 'merely
heuristic and regulative' character
of the principles underlying each side:
The one
[principle] prescribes that we are to philosophise
about nature as if there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to
existence--solely, however, for the purpose of bringing systematic unity into
our knowledge, by always pursuing such an idea, as an imagined ultimate
ground. The other warns us not to
regard any determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate
ground... [CPR 644-5e.a.]
Whereas
all theoretical arguments about the existence of God are bound to fail in their
attempt to establish knowledge of God
as an ideal object, these two
principles suggest that the concept of God can have a valid use as long as it is regarded, less
ambitiously, as an idea of
reason. Rather than discussing the
general character of this regulative employment of the ideas [see FKK 452-5 and KE 190-6], I will proceed directly to a discussion of its
implications for our theoretical understanding of the concept of God.
A
theoretical discussion of God's existence and attributes, Kant argues, cannot
be based 'upon the knowledge of such
a being but upon its idea only' [CPR
729e.a.]. From the standpoint of theoretical reason our idea of God
is
postulated only problematically (since we cannot reach it through any of the
concepts of the understanding) in order that we may view all connection of the
things of the world of sense as if they
had their ground in [it]... In
thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure systematic unity... [709]
In such
usage God is 'an idea which reason is constrained to form as the regulative
principle of its investigation of nature' [725]. As such, it is used as a principle for viewing empirical
objects from a hypothetical, not an
empirical, perspective. (The
latter would be a 'constitutive' use of the idea in reference to the
world.)
Kant
explains the proper use of an idea as follows:
I think
to myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely unknown to me,
to the greatest possible systematic unity of the universe, solely for the
purpose of using [this idea] as a schema of the regulative principle of the
greatest possible empirical employment of my reason. [707]
The main
purpose of Kant's treatment of the idea of God in CPR is to establish the right
to use this theoretical concept from other, nontheoretical standpoints [see
above, note 3]. His criticism of
the traditional proofs does this by demonstrating that, although the concept
cannot be instantiated in experience, it is at least not self-contradictory. The function of this concept as a regulative idea can therefore be put
forward as a reasonable hypothesis (i.e., as plausible, though not provable),
even from the standpoint of theoretical reason.[4]
Far from being an afterthought, this theory is at the core of Kant's
theological concern.[5]
By establishing peace in our system of theoretical knowledge, the
regulative use of the idea of God directs our attention forward to the other
Critical standpoints in anticipation of a more complete justification for
belief in God.
This
affirmation of the benefits of the regulative employment of our idea of God is
frequently rejected prematurely by Kant's critics. One of the most common criticisms is that science
(especially since Darwin) simply has no use for postulating 'the idea of
God...as a heuristic device in the empirical study of nature' [KRT 145]. But this is based on a complete misunderstanding of the
perspective from which Kant is speaking:
he never intends the ideas to be used as regulative principles from an empirical perspective, such as that
adopted by the natural scientist; for he insists that 'just because it is a
mere idea, [the idea of God] is altogether incapable...of enlarging our
knowledge in regard to what exists' [CPR
630-1]. Hence it cannot serve as the constitutive 'ground
of the systematic order of the world'.[6]
Instead,
the ideas are to function regulatively only in the context of reason's special hypothetical perspective. To think otherwise is to ignore the
fact that metaphysics 'does not need the ideas for the purposes of natural
science, but in order to pass beyond nature' [395n]. In other words, these regulative principles concern how 'to philosophise about nature' [CPR 644, q.a.], not how to investigate nature scientifically. Indeed, Kant harshly condemns the
latter approach:
To have
recourse to God...in explaining the [physical] arrangements of nature and their
changes is...a complete confession that one has come to the end of his
philosophy, since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he
otherwise has no concept in order to conceive the possibility of something he
sees before his very eyes.[7]
Just as
the regulative use of an idea assumes it not to have 'creative power', but to
'have practical power..., and form
the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions' [CPR 597], so
also such regulative usage implies nothing about how we are to go about
gathering empirical knowledge, but
only about how we are to structure our beliefs
about the source of the ultimate unity of that knowledge: much as a (e.g., religious) vision of
the 'not yet' can act as a powerful force pulling us forward towards the
realization of a hope, the idea motivates us to search for systematic unity in
our philosophical explanations.[8]
Another
frequent complaint against Kant's plea that we be satisfied with regarding God
as a regulative idea is made by those theologians who are (as Kant says with
respect to the moral philosophers of his day) 'dedicated to the omnipotence of
theoretical reason' [Kt6:377]. He
continues:
...the
discomfort they feel at not being able to explain
what lies entirely beyond the sphere of physiological explanation [e.g., the
idea of God] provokes them to a general call
to arms, as it were, to withstand that Idea, no matter how exalting this
very prerogative of man--his capacity for such an Idea--may be.
That is
to say, they reject the notion of God as an idea not because it is incoherent,
but because it does not provide what they are looking for, viz. certain
knowledge of God's existence and nature.
Because Kant says, for example, that 'this Idea proceeds entirely from
our own reason and we ourselves make it'
[442], they disregard his many other claims to believe in a real, living God,
as in traditional theism.[9]
Such a premature rejection of his position fails to recognize that, as
in virtually every other aspect of his System, Kant often gives different
answers to the same question when different perspectives are assumed. Hence, viewing 'God' from the
theoretical standpoint as a man-made idea does not prevent us from adopting
some other standpoint in order to affirm that a real, transcendent God actually
exists.
3. Physicotheology as an Empirical
Confirmation of the God-Hypothesis
Kant's
theory concerning the regulative idea of God is actually the least important of
his various ways of affirming the rationality of theology; for 'the conception
of a Deity...can never be evolved merely according to principles of reason's
theoretical standpoint' [CJ
400]. So in addition to such transcendental theology, he develops his
own type of natural theology in the
second and third Critiques. Examining his moral and
physicotheological arguments for God's existence will help to reveal the
systematic character of his general concept of God and to demonstrate the
richness and depth of this 'guiding-thread' [cf. CJ 389] of his System.
Kant
affirms the physicotheological proof in the third Critique, yet this does not nullify the limitations he places on it
in CPR; for the standpoint from which
it is discussed in CJ is judicial
rather than theoretical. The same theoretical concept (God) is still under
consideration; from the outset, however, Kant is now aiming to establish not
theoretical knowledge, but only an
empirical justification of a practical belief. Even in CPR Kant explicitly allows for such a usage: he argues that we are 'undoubtedly'
permitted, if not required, 'to assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the
world', as long as we realize that such an assumption does not in any way 'extend
our knowledge beyond the field of experience' [725-6]. Elsewhere, he develops this idea a bit
further:
Physicotheology...can
enlighten and give intuitive appeal to our concepts of God. But it cannot have any determinate concept of God. For only reason can represent
completeness and totality. In
physicotheology I see God's power.
But can I say determinately, this is omnipotence
or the highest degree of power? [LPT 32-3]
The
implicit answer, of course, is 'no'. For although it has a constructive role
to play, physicotheology on its own is 'unable to...serve as the foundation of
a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of religion' [CPR 656]. Instead, Kant intends it to point the way outward from
experience to moral activity, where theology has a more secure foundation.
Kant
argues in CJ 389 that empirical
reflection on 'the clearly manifest nexus of things according to final causes'
requires us to conceive of 'a world-cause acting according to ends, that is, an
intelligent cause--however rash and undemonstrable a principle this might be for the determinant judgment.' He bases this conclusion on the
specific phenomenon of finality (or
'purposiveness') in our experience of the world:
...the
nature of our faculty of reason is such that without an Author and Governor of
the world, who is also a moral Lawgiver, we are wholly unable to render
intelligible to ourselves the possibility of a finality, related to the moral
law, and its Object, such as exists in this final end. [455]
In particular
Kant emphasizes that 'the end for which nature itself exists' is man, and that 'it is upon the definite
idea of this end that the definite conception of such a supreme intelligent
World-Cause, and, consequently, the possibility of a theology, depend'
[437]. Viewed from the judicial
standpoint of CJ rather than the
theoretical standpoint of CPR, this
argument is, as Wood points out in KMR
174, directed not so much to the theoretical philosopher as to the ordinary
man: 'the ordinary man
"sees" nature as the work of God, and discerns in it--what no amount
of empirical evidence could have demonstrated--the signs of a divine and
morally purposive creation' [176].
Yet even from the standpoint of CJ
physicotheology on its own is quite limited, for experience 'can never lift us
above nature to the end of its real existence or thus raise us to a definite
conception of such a higher Intelligence' [CJ
438; see also LPT 38]. Thus 'physical teleology urges us to go
in quest of a theology. But it can
never produce one' [CJ 440]; for
'physico-theology...is of no use to theology except as a preparation or
propaedeutic and is only sufficient for this purpose when supplemented by a
further principle on which it can rely' [442].
Rather
than depending on the speculative proofs of transcendental theology, however,
Kant's physicotheology depends on the proof provided by moral theology from the
practical standpoint: 'underlying
our procedure [in physicotheology] is an idea of a Supreme Being, which rests
on an entirely different standpoint [than the judicial], namely the practical'
[CJ 438]. Kant sums up the preparatory function of physicotheology
when, in giving an example of 'a moral catechism' [DV 479], the final comment of the pupil is [481]:
For we
see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a wisdom so widespread and
profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the ineffably great art of
a creator of the world. And from
this we have cause, when we turn to the moral order...to expect there a rule no
less wise.
4. The Moral Argument as the Basis for Kant's
Theism
Kant's
moral argument for the existence of God is the only aspect of his solution to
the problem of transcendental theology which has been duly recognized by his
commentators. In its simplest
form, his argument is fairly straightforward. After arguing that the highest good consists of the
distribution of happiness to each person in proportion to his or her virtue,
Kant points out that, given the nature of human virtue (viz., that it often
requires us to deny our own happiness in order to obey the voice of duty), man
on his own is unlikely to bring into being this ideal end of morality. Yet if the end or purpose of morality
proves to be unattainable, moral action itself will be irrational. Hence, anyone who wishes to regard
moral action as rational is constrained to postulate something which would make
it possible to understand how the highest good could become a reality. As is well known, Kant argues that the
immortality of the soul and the existence of God are the two postulates which
alone can save morality from the abyss of meaninglessness.
Although
Kant's basic argument is familiar enough, its intended force is often
misunderstood, especially by those who fail to take into consideration the
different perspectives in Kant's System.
In the first place, Kant's moral argument is not actually part of his
theory of religion (a point often misunderstood by those who write on the
latter subject). Instead, the
postulate of God is intended to perform its function exclusively within the
final stage of Kant's practical (moral)
system, where it suggests that rational moral agents are, in fact, acting as if God exists whenever they
act morally, whether or not they claim to believe in God. In other words, God's existence, though
not theoretically provable, is nevertheless a necessary assumption for any moral agent who wishes to conceive of
the highest good as being realizable (and therefore, of moral action as being
ultimately rational).
What
then are the specific implications of Kant's moral argument for the
theologian's attempt to prove the existence of God? Kant's argument, as summarized in CJ 446, is that every moral agent
needs a
moral Intelligence; because he exists for an end, and this end demands a Being
that has formed both him and the world [i.e., both freedom and nature] with
that end in view.... Hence...there
is in our moral habits of thought a foundation for...form[ing] a representation
depicting a pure moral need for the real existence of a Being, whereby our
morality gains in strength or even obtains --at least on the side of our
representation--an extension of area, that is to say, is given a new object for
its exercise.
The
resulting concept of 'a moral Legislator' has no theoretical value; yet, Kant
continues,
the
source of this disposition is unmistakable. It is the original bent of our nature, as a subjective
principle, that will not let us be satisfied, in our review of the world, with
the finality which it derives through natural causes, but leads us to introduce
into it an underlying supreme Cause governing nature according to moral laws.
After
presenting his moral argument for the existence of God in the second Critique [CPrR], Kant asks: 'Is
our knowledge really widened in such a way by pure practical reason, and is
that which was transcendent for speculative reason immanent in practical
reason? Certainly, but only from a
practical standpoint' [133].
Earlier, he warns against assuming that the conclusions of his practical
system merely 'serve to fill out gaps in the critical system of speculative
reason' [7]. Kant does on a few
occasions make careless remarks, such as that 'a faith in God built on this
[moral] foundation is as certain as a mathematical demonstration' [LPT 40]. (He should at least have added that there is a crucial
perspectival difference between the type
of certainty we have in each case.)
But such remarks should not be given priority over his many other, more
carefully worded, comments regarding the perspectival structure of his
System. For example, he says 'no
one will be able to boast that he knows
that there is a God [i.e., from a theoretical standpoint]... No, my conviction
is not logical but moral
certainty...' [CPR 857]. Thus Wood insists 'it would be a great
mistake to see in the God of Kant's moral faith no more than an abstract,
metaphysical idea. For Kant moral
faith in God is, in it[s] most profound and personal signification, the moral
man's trust in God.'[10]
Kant's
moral argument, therefore, is not to be regarded as 'an incontrovertible
proof', as the traditional theoretical proofs attempt to be [CPR 665]. As Kant says in CJ
450-1:
This
moral argument is not intended to supply an objectively
valid proof of the existence of God.
It is not meant to demonstrate to the sceptic that there is a God, but
that he must adopt the assumption of
this proposition as a maxim of his practical reason, if he wishes to think in a
manner consistent with morality.
As a
practical 'presupposition' of our moral activity, it 'cannot be brought to a
higher degree of certainty than the acknowledgement that it is the most
reasonable opinion for us men' [CPrR
142]. Accordingly, Kant describes
it as a 'doctrinal belief' [CPR 853],
which means it is, 'from an objective perspective, an expression of modesty,
and yet at the same time, from a subjective perspective, an expression of the
firmness of our confidence' [855].
For one who accepts this practical postulate and decides to believe in
God must resolve within himself 'not
[to] give up this belief' [CPrR
143]. This resolution is the 'back door' through which Kant supposedly
appropriated his faithful servant's belief in God.
Yet
Kant himself claimed that theology can 'better fulfil [its] final objective
purpose' [CJ 479] if it accepts the
conclusions established by moral theology, and supported by physicotheology,
especially the conclusion that theology should be 'founded on the moral
principle, namely that of freedom, and adapted, therefore, to reason's
practical standpoint'. The
limitation of basing theology on practical rather than theoretical reason is
that its conclusions are now 'of immanent use only' [CPR 847]:
[Moral
theology] enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by showing us
how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends [i.e., to the practical
standpoint], and by warning us against the fanaticism, and indeed the impiety,
of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct
of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme
Being [i.e., from the theoretical standpoint]. For we should then be making a transcendental employment of
moral theology; and that, like a transcendent use of pure speculation, must
pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason. [847]
Once its
purely immanent use is understood, the myth that views Kant's moral postulates
as merely 'a side gesture, [pointing] beyond the limits which he himself had
drawn', is immediately seen to be invalid [see CPK 470]. For a fair
assessment of his theological position reveals that, if indeed he has opened
the back door to let God into the
house, this is only because he recognizes that the house itself belongs to God: only the occupants of a house are usually allowed to use the back door!
As
Donald MacKinnon points out [DMK 133],
throughout Kant's treatment of God and religion, he often 'tries to do justice
to what at a first reading he seems to dismiss out of hand.' If we keep in mind Kant's reliance on the
principle of perspective, the sincerity and reasonableness of such attempts
should be clear enough. Thus,
rather than taking such anecdotes too seriously, we can suggest a more
appropriate version of Heine's story:
perhaps Kant invented the moral argument in order to protect his faithful servant (and all
others who humbly recognize, with Kant, the universal limits of 'common human
understanding' [see e.g., CPR xxxii])
from the misuse he knew many
philosophers would make of his negative criticisms of theoretical arguments for
God in CPR. In other words, the moral proof explains not to Lampe (who
had no need of a formal proof), but to Kant's fellow philosophers--some of whom
may well have joined Kant for lunch, and offered snide remarks attacking the
servant's simple faith--why Lampe and all other human beings have nothing to
fear from the limitations of theoretical reason.
Regarded
in this way, the anecdote actually highlights a crucial point in interpreting
Kant's theology: the moral proof
of God's existence is in no sense intended to satisfy the requirements of the
theoretical standpoint; rather it directs our attention away from the theoretical, away from scientific knowledge, and
towards the practical standpoint, which serves as the only context in which the
concept of God can be rationally justified.[11] Kant states this as plainly as we could
expect in LPT 39:
Thus all
speculation depends...on the transcendental concept [of an absolutely necessary
being]. But if we posit that it is
not correct, would we then have to give up the knowledge of God? Not at all. For then we would only lack the scientific knowledge that
God exists. But a great field
would still remain to us, and this would be the belief or faith that God
exists. This faith we will derive
a priori from moral principles. Hence if...we raise doubts about these
speculative proofs...we will not thereby undermine faith in God. Rather, we will clear the road for
practical proofs. We are merely
throwing out the false presumptions of human reason when it tries from itself
to demonstrate the existence of God with apodictic certainty. But from moral principles we will
assume a faith in God as the principle of every religion.
In CJ 482 he deliberates with equal
clarity, explaining that the moral proof 'satisfies the moral side of our
nature', yet without making a transcendent use of the categories in a futile
attempt to know 'the intrinsic, and for us inscrutable, nature of God'.[12]
When
we read Kant giving one or another of his various accounts of God's nature,[13] we must always keep in mind that he is
not contradicting his own theoretical principles by suggesting that we can know
God's attributes after all, but only urging that, despite our inherent
ignorance of God's essence, necessitated by the perspectival nature of human
rationality, it is legitimate for practical
purposes to make assumptions about God, as long as we recognize the dependence
of such descriptions on our own perspectives, and so use the resulting
'knowledge' only as an aid in coping with our earthly existence (especially
with respect to our moral activity).
One of the main purposes of CPR
is to prepare the way for such a theology by replacing the positive noumenon with the negative
noumenon--i.e., by replacing the rationalist belief in a speculative realm
which transcends the phenomenal world
with the Critical belief in a practical realm which is revealed in and through moral experience.
Any attempt to grasp God must
therefore be given up and replaced by a willingness
to be grasped by God.
Kant
suggests in CJ 444 that 'all
transcendental attributes [of God], ...attributes that are presupposed in
relation to such a final end, will have to be regarded as belonging to the
Original Being. --In this way moral teleology supplements the
deficiency of physical teleology, and
for the first time establishes a [moral] theology.'[14]
Thus the moral theology towards which the physical teleology of CJ directs our attention provides the
only adequate philosophical basis for a belief in the existence of God, and so
for a regulative use of the idea of God in theoretical contexts [see CPR 664], by supplying not knowledge but 'a conviction of the existence
of a supreme being--a conviction which bases itself on moral laws' [660n]. With this foundation, our concept of
God 'meets the joint requirements alike of insight into nature and moral
wisdom--and no objection of the least substance can be brought against the
possibility of such an idea' [CJ
462]. With the existence of God thus vindicated as a legitimate
object of belief, we can now conclude by stepping back and briefly assessing
the character of Kant's own attitude towards belief in God.
Even
those who are not fooled by the 'myth of appropriation' typically characterize
Kant's theology as primarily negative.
Thus, Cupitt says Kant has 'a non-cognitive philosophy of religion which
leaves the believer to be sustained in a harsh world by nothing but pure moral
faith'.[15]
But in fact, Kant's theological and religious views are not so 'bleak
and austere' as is often assumed.
On the contrary, such an assumption, like most misinterpretations of
Kant, rests on a failure to understand how the principle of perspective
operates in his System. It is true
that his practical postulates as such are not much help in facing the harsh
realities of human existence, but they are not primarily intended to fulfil
such an empirical role; for Kant offers us a good deal more in the way of
equipping us with tools to cope with reality. The most significant of these, which concern Kant's view of
God as participating in human
morality and as relating on a personal
basis with his creatures, are beyond the scope of our present inquiry.[16]
Nevertheless,
the foregoing account of Kant's solution to the problem of transcendental
theology has, I hope, made abundantly clear that Kant's theology is not that of
a 'deist', as is so often assumed, but is the rational framework for a 'theism'
which has rarely been adequately appreciated by his interpreters. This failure is due in part to the fact
that theologians and philosophers of religion often group Kant on the side of
those who argue 'that God is utterly unknowable', and that therefore 'theology
is a useless effort'.[17]
The latter conclusion does seem to follow naturally from the deistic
assumption that God is utterly unknowable, an assumption Kant apparently adopts
in his denial of our ability to intuit God. But this interpretation reflects a rather limited
acquaintance with Kant's writings.
For, even in the Preface to Religion
within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant says with no apparent irony that the
philosopher and the theologian should see themselves not as rivals, out to
destroy each other, but as co-workers, mutual friends and companions [see RLRA 7-10].
Kant
defines theology as 'the system of our knowledge of the highest being'; it
'does not refer to the sum total of all possible knowledge of God, but only to
what human reason meets with in God' [LPT
23; cf. CPR 659]. The 'knowledge of everything in God',
which Kant calls 'theologia archetypa',
is unattainable for man, while 'that part of God which lies in human nature',
the knowledge of which he calls 'theologia
ectypa', is attainable.[18]
Within the latter he distinguishes between deism and theism: 'Those who accept only a transcendental
theology [i.e., knowledge of God based on the theoretical standpoint] are
called deists; those who also admit a
natural theology [i.e., knowledge of God based on the practical or judicial
standpoints] are called theists' [CPR 659; see also 660-1; LPT 28-9]. Kant therefore believes the distinction between the theist
and the deist concerns not only one's theoretical standpoint, but also one's
particular (moral and empirical) experiences of the God whom such theories are
intended to describe. Deists,
then, are those who, after reflecting logically and/or transcendentally on the
concept of God, come up with a positive answer to the question of His
existence. Theists are open to
these two perspectives, but regard them as only secondary to the more basic use
of empirical and/or hypothetical perspectives in developing a theoretical
affirmation of God. Only from the
latter two perspectives can God be regarded not just as 'an original being or
supreme cause' (as in deism), but also as 'a supreme being who through
understanding and freedom is the Author of all things'. Thus, Kant asserts 'that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God' [CPR 660-1].
Kant
demonstrates in numerous ways that he is, given the above definitions, a thoroughly
theistic philosopher. Not the
least of the reasons for regarding Kant as a theist is that, as we have seen,
he replaces the deist's reliance on the theoretical standpoint with a theology
firmly rooted in the practical standpoint. Thus he confesses [CPR
856]: 'I inevitably believe in the
existence of God..., and I am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since
my moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown, and I cannot
disdain them without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.' Ironically, the very criticisms of the
traditional theoretical arguments for God's existence with which Kant begins
his critical theology, though they were designed to pave the way for a
practical theism, are (as we have noted) often the basis upon which Kant is
misinterpreted as being himself a deist![19]
Kant
is indeed acutely aware of the problems posed to theological knowledge by human
ignorance: 'Both in theology and
in religion, but particularly in theology, we are handicapped by ignorance' [LE 85]. Sometimes even when we think we have knowledge, he tells us,
we actually have 'no concept at all' of God [LPT 24]. But as Wood
points out, this does not make him a deist [KMR
155,164], for he means by this that 'our concept of God is an idea of reason' [KRT 79], rather than a concept which
rises out of abstraction from appearances. Thus, 'the "minimum" theology it is necessary to
have is a belief that God is at least possible'
[KMR 31]. For Kant holds that 'we cannot intuit God, but can only
believe in him' [LE 99]; yet 'in
order to believe in God it is not necessary to know for certain that God
exists' [81]. He believes the ideas of 'God, freedom, and the immortality of
the soul are the problems to whose solution, as their ultimate goal, all the
laborious preparations of metaphysics are directed' [CJ 473]; and his System is intended to solve these problems once
and for all by developing a theistic philosophy which rejects the false
foundations offered by theoretical reason. Hence, in a choice between atheism, deism, anthropomorphism
and theism, Kant would undoubtedly favour theism.[20]
Because
Kant's theology guards against what might be called 'gnostic' errors (such as
anthropomorphism), into which dogmatic theologians and philosophers of religion
repeatedly fall, he is branded an agnostic. And because his theology likewise takes
seriously the objections advanced by the atheist, he is branded a deist. Yet a perspectival interpretation
reveals that his response to the problem of transcendental theology was that of
neither a deist nor an agnostic, but a theist in a quite profound sense of the
word. Ironically, those who label
Kant as a deist or an agnostic are often those who would call themselves
theists because of their affirmative response to the traditional arguments of
speculative theology. Yet for Kant
this is not good enough: no one
can claim to be a theist on the strength merely of logical ingenuity, for
theism depends on a belief in a God who manifests Himself as 'a living God' in our immediate experience,
whereas the ontological and cosmological arguments portray God 'wholly separate
from any experience' [LPT 30]. If anyone is a deist, then, it is not
Kant, who believes in a God who purposely hides his true nature from us, but
gives us enough evidence to make a reasoned step of faith, after which we are
able to understand God's nature with sufficient clarity in terms of our finite
human perspectives; rather it is those who put all their trust in the powers of
theoretical reason and toil endlessly and in vain to attain knowledge which is
not to be had by us men. The
religious implications of Kant's theism are not always entirely consistent with
orthodox Christianity; yet they are not as inconsistent as is often assumed.
For, although it is couched in the difficult terminology of a highly complex
philosophical System, Kant's theism is not significantly different (in its
general intent, at least) from the theism expressed by the writer of 2 Cor. 4:7
when he proclaims that 'the transcendent power [h uperbolh
thV dunamewV] belongs to God and not to us'.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CKC: Lewis
White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (London: The University of Chicago Press,
1960).
KMP: Peter
Byrne, 'Kant's Moral Proof of the Existence of God', in Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1979), pp.333-43.
CPK: Edward
Caird, The Critical Philosophy of
Immanuel Kant,2 2
vols. (Glasgow: James Maclehouse and Sons, 1909).
EPR: James
Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of
Religion (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
KNT: Don
Cupitt, 'Kant and the Negative Theology', in B. Hebblethwaite, and S.
Sutherland (eds.), The Philosophical
Frontiers of Christian Theology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
p.55-67.
KHR: Michel
Despland, Kant on History and Religion
(London and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973).
IK:
Lucien
Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, tr. Robert
Black (London: NLB, 1971).
HCRS:Theodore M. Greene, 'The Historical
Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion', in RLRA
ix-lxxviii.
RPG: Heinrich
Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany,
tr. J. Snodgrass (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).
GWB: Grace
M. Jantzen, God's World God's Body
(London: Darton, Longmann and Todd, 1984).
CPR: Immanuel
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
(1781,1787), tr. N. Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1929).
PFM: -----,
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
(1783), tr. L.W. Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950).
WOT:
-----, What is Orientation in Thinking?
(1786), tr. L.W. Beck in CPrR
293-305.
CPrR: -----,
Critique of Practical Reason (1788),
tr. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956).
CJ: -----,
Critique of Judgement (1790), tr.
J.C. Meredith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952).
DV: -----,
The Doctrine of Virtue, tr. M.J.
Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964).
RLRA:-----, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), tr. T.M. Greene
and H.H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960).
GTLA:-----, Of a Gentle Ton Lately Assumed in Philosophy (1796), in Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political,
Religious and Various Philosophical Subjects, anonymous translator J.
Richardson (London: William Richardson, 1798-9), vol.2, pp.159-87.
PM: -----,
Progress in Metaphysics (1791; ed.
F.T. Rink, 1804), tr. Ted B. Humphrey (New York: Abaris Books, 1983).
LE: -----,
Lectures on Ethics (ed. P. Menzer,
1924), tr. L. Infield (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1979), English pagination.
LPT: -----,
Lectures on Philosophical Theology
(ed. K. Beyer, 1937), tr. A.W. Wood and G.M. Clark (London: Cornell University
Press, 1978), English pagination.
KPC: -----,
Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, tr. and ed.
Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).
AKF: J.C.
Luik, 'The Ambiguity of Kantian Faith', Scottish
Journal of Theology 36 (1983), p.339-46.
DMK: Donald
MacKinnon, 'Kant's Philosophy of Religion', Philosophy
L (1975), pp.131-44.
PC: Greville
Norburn, 'Kant's Philosophy of Religion:
A Preface to Christology?' in Scottish
Journal of Theology 26 (1973), pp.431-48.
NPG: Robert
A. Oakes, 'Noumena, Phenomena, and God' in International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1973), pp.30-8.
FKK: Stephen
Palmquist, 'Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental
Reflection' in The Heythrop Journal
XXV (October 1984), pp.442-55.
RUKT:-----, 'The Radical Unknowability of
Kant's "Thing in Itself", Cogito
III.2 (June 1985), pp.101-115.
SPO: -----,
'Six Perspectives on the Object in Kant's Theory of Knowledge' in Dialectica 40.2 (l986), pp.121-51.
KE: -----,
'Knowledge and Experience -- An Examination of the Four Reflective
"Perspectives" in Kant's Critical Philosophy' in Kant-Studien 78 (1987), pp.170-200.
KCM: -----,
'Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (2) Critical Mysticism', Philosophy & Theology 4.1 (Fall 1989), pp.67-94.
DKR: -----,
'Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?', Kant-Studien,
forthcoming.
RK: Gabriele
Rabel (ed.), Kant (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1963).
HWP: Bertrand
Russell, History of Western Philosophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd, 1946).
DKT: Herman-J.
de Vleeschauwer, The Development of
Kantian Thought, tr. A.R.C. Duncan
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1962).
KPR: Clement
C.J. Webb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926).
KNF: Don
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution:
Kant on the Nature of Faith' in Scottish
Journal of Theology 33 (1980), p.515-32.
KMR: Allen
W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion
(London: Cornell University Press, 1970).
KRT: -----,
Kant's Rational Theology (London:
Cornell University Press, 1978).
FOOTNOTES
[1]. HWP 731. Hereafter, references will
normally be included in the main text, using the abbreviations specified in the
Bibliography.
Earlier
versions of this paper were read at the conference on "Kant and the
Transcendental Problem", sponsored by the Romanian Kant Society and held
in Bucharest in September, 1991, and at a seminar sponsored by the philosophy
department of Hong Kong University in December, 1991. My thanks to all those who offered comments and criticisms in
response to those presentations.
[2]. All references to CPR cite the page numbers of the second
(1787) German edition. References
to Kant's other writings (except where otherwise noted in the Bibliography)
will cite the pagination of the Akademie
edition of Kant's works. For
translations which do not give the German pagination in the margins, the Akademie page number(s) will be followed
by the English pagination in brackets.
[3]. Kant continues by
explaining that 'the right of a need of reason enters as the right of a
subjective ground to presuppose or assume something which it may not pretend to
know on objective grounds' [WOT
137]. From the former, theoretical
standpoint, this 'need of reason' to 'assume the existence of God' is
'conditional': the assumption only
'needs' to be made 'when we wish to judge concerning the first cause of all
contingent things, particularly in the organization of ends actually present in
the world' [139]. But from the
latter, practical standpoint, 'the need is unconditional; here we are compelled
to presuppose the existence of God not just if we wish to judge but because we must
judge' [139].
[4]. 'Hypotheses',
Kant urges in CPR 805, are
'permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose of defending a
right, not in order to establish it.'
They can be invaluable tools, when used 'in self-defence', in order to
nullify 'the sophistical arguments by which our opponent professes to
invalidate this assertion [of God's existence]' [804-5]. Yet they cannot be used dogmatically,
since the sceptic can also produce opposing hypotheses. Since theoretical reason 'does
not...favour either of the two parties', hypotheses can be used 'only in
polemical fashion.' So a proper
view of hypotheses limits dogmatists by refusing them knowledge, while yet
limiting sceptics by upholding the right to believe. These warring parties, Kant explains, both 'lie in
ourselves'; and the task of criticism is to remove 'the root of these
disturbances' in order to 'establish a permanent peace' [805-6]. Once we recognize that hypotheses,
'although they are but leaden weapons', are required
'for our complete equipment' in fulfilling this purpose, we will see that there
is 'nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for; namely, that we may gain
for ourselves a possession which can never again be contested.'
[5]. As Despland
points out in KHR 146: 'The unique strength of criticism is
that "rational" is not restricted in meaning to cognitive. The Ideas of reason can be thought
rationally without being objectified into possible objects of knowledge.'
[6]. CPR 709; cf. 724-5. This function is fulfilled on the
material side by the thing in itself and on the formal side by reason's
architectonic forms [see e.g., 723-4].
[7]. CPrR 138; see also LPT
25-6. This seems at first to apply
equally to Kant's own assumption of the thing in itself, which he does believe
to be philosophically sound.
However, he is speaking here from an empirical perspective, in the
context of which the thing in itself, as positive noumenon, is indeed
superfluous [see section 3 of SPO]; Kant's use of the thing in itself does
not fall under this criticism because it assumes the transcendental
perspective. Hence, when we read
Kant warning us that 'a presumptuous readiness to appeal to supernatural
explanations is a pillow for a lazy understanding' [On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World
(Kant's Inaugural Dissertation), p.418, as translated in KPR 45], we must be careful not to interpret this too harshly, as
does Webb when he says this claim means that 'the assumption of the
supernatural is excluded on "critical" principles' [KPR 45]. For as we have seen, Kant actually encourages such an assumption in the appropriate circumstances, as
long as it is put forward without a presumptuous
attitude (i.e., as long as it is regarded as a theoretical hypothesis rather than a dogmatic
knowledge-claim). If Kant's advice
to us in such passages is that supernatural explanations are always inappropriate, then why does he
himself make use of the God hypothesis throughout his writings? Rather, his message is that we must be
careful to use them wisely--i.e., in such a way that they do not prevent us
from relentlessly seeking natural explanations wherever possible.
[8]. Kant describes a
'hypothesis' in CPrR 126 as 'a ground
of explanation'. As such, a
proper understanding of his theory of the regulative use of the idea of God
from the hypothetical perspective reveals it to be remarkably similar to modern
attempts to defend God's existence as the best 'explanatory hypothesis' [see
e.g. PC 441]. There are differences, of course, such
as that the modern versions, while they perhaps benefit from their freedom from
Kant's rather difficult and old-fashioned terminology, often suffer
unnecessarily by mixing different perspectives uncritically (e.g., by assuming
that rigorous logical argumentation is the primary, if not the only, tool
available to defend or refute such hypotheses). But the two approaches are alike to the extent that they
both attempt a theoretical defence of God's existence not on the basis that the God-hypothesis enables us to provide a
better scientific explanation of the
available data, but rather on the basis that the available data point beyond
themselves to something which can best be explained philosophically in terms of the God-hypothesis. Thus in both cases the theoretical
argument, when properly constructed, assumes a hypothetical, rather than an empirical,
perspective.
[9]. The issue of Kant's
theism will be discussed in more detail at the end of this paper.
[10]. KMR 161.
Unfortunately, many interpreters make the very mistake in interpreting
the underlying connotations of Kant's moral argument that Wood is warning
against here. Webb, for example,
claims that Kant's moral argument 'certainly is in no way calculated to express
the religious man's conviction of the reality of the object of his worship' [KPR 66]. If 'the religious man's conviction' here refers to
traditional, uncritical ways of believing in God, then of course Webb is
correct, since the argument is directed to 'the moral man'. But the
words 'in no way' are misleading, since (as I argue in DKR) Kant does intend his
argument not only to be compatible
with a religious standpoint, but also to provide a rational foundation for the
fuller conception of the God of religion, as expounded in his own book, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason
[i.e., RLRA].
[11]. As Webb puts it in KPR 68, 'Kant...definitely denies that
the knowledge of God, the Object of religion, falls primarily or properly
within the spheres of Physics [cf. the judicial system] or Metaphysics [cf. the
theoretical system]. It is
only...to be reached by starting...from the consciousness of duty or moral
obligation [cf. the practical system].'
Along these lines, Kant distinguishes between the moral argument as 'an
argument kat’ anqrwpon valid for all men as rational [i.e., moral] beings in
general', and 'the theoretical-dogmatic argument kat’ alhqeian' [PM 306].
[12]. Peter Byrne argues
against Kant's moral proof in KMP
337: 'If knowledge of God is
impossible then one cannot have grounds for believing or thinking that God
exists.' He reaches this
conclusion, however, only by presupposing an epistemology quite foreign to
Kant, whereby knowledge is identified with justified belief [336; cf. section 3
of RUKT]. For Kant, unknowability
by no means implies unthinkability. And he distinguishes between knowledge
and belief by explaining that the evidence for a judgment one believes is true must be 'subjectively
sufficient', but 'objectively insufficient', whereas the evidence for a
judgment one knows is true must be
'sufficient both subjectively and objectively' [CPR 850]. For Kant,
the relevant 'subjective' grounds are, of course, moral.
Oakes
argues against the common assumption that anyone who believes knowledge of God
is possible must reject Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of noumena [NPG 31]. He argues that Kant was wrong to construe 'all religious
epistemology as necessarily a quest for noumenal
knowing' [32], because our knowledge of God is, in fact, phenomenal [33]: 'any
sensible experience of God...must be construed as providing knowledge which is
partial or perspectival, i.e., knowledge solely from the vantage point of a
finite knower.' Kant would, of
course, agree that all knowledge is perspectival, but would argue that our
'sensible experience' is never a direct experience of God, in the way that our
empirical knowledge is a direct experience (i.e., intuition and conception) of
empirical objects. Rather, the
religious person regards some
experiences as coming from God by means of the God-hypothesis, which can never yield actual knowledge of a phenomenon
called 'God'. Nevertheless, Kant's
treatment of the experience of God is
not far removed from that of Oakes, except that Kant never regards such
experiences as capable of producing knowledge
[see KCM 67-94].
[13]. Kant offers the
theologian various tools to cope with the realities of human ignorance, in the
form of analogical models for God's nature which represent a balanced and
realistic view of some basic theological issues. These models, though rarely appreciated by his commentators,
constitute an important aspect of Kant's systematic understanding of our
theoretical conception of God's nature, though there will be no opportunity to
discuss them in this paper.
[14]. 'Moral teleology' is
the title Kant gives his moral proof in CJ
to show its structural parallel to teleology proper (i.e., physical
teleology). Each is teleological
insofar as it concerns the purpose or final end which must be posited in order
to explain a certain type of experience (viz. of either a moral or a physical
end). Beck's criticism of the
moral proof on this account [CKC 275]
is therefore correct, but irrelevant, since this type of teleology is clearly
distinguishable from that discussed elsewhere in CJ.
[15]. KNT 64. Likewise,
Goldmann [IK 201] says Kant believes
in: 'A transcendent superhuman God
who has only practical and moral reality but who lacks independent moral existence...--a
more unreal God could scarcely be imagined.' Such a comment is grossly unfair, however, since Kant never
dogmatically proclaims that God has
no such independent existence, but only warns that if He does, we could never
grasp it as an item of our empirical knowledge.
[16]. I have discussed this
issue in detail in KCM.
[17]. GWB 1; cf. 42-3. For
instance, Goldmann says 'Kant rejected all positive religion' [IK 194]. Or, as J.C. Luik puts it in AKF 345, 'there is quite literally no Kantian theology, no
religious knowledge for Kant.'
Luik makes this assertion in the process of rejecting Wiebe's claim that
for Kant '"knowledge" of God can be had', though only if it is
'inferred' from 'moral data' [KNF 531]. Although Luik's position would be
correct as a description of Kant's theoretical
standpoint, it ignores the fact that for Kant the practical and judicial
standpoints are at least as important; for they can each produce (at least in a
symbolic sense) a kind of knowledge of their own. Thus, when Kant claims that 'all our knowledge of God is
merely symbolic', he contrasts his
own position with 'Deism', since the latter 'furnishes no knowledge [of God]
whatsoever' [CJ 353].
[18]. LPT 23. In his 1796
essay, GTLA 391(164-5), Kant makes a
similar distinction, between Plato's view of 'archetypes (ideas)' as intuitions
which originate in 'the Divine understanding' but can be 'named directly' by
man, and his own belief that 'our intuition of these divine ideas...is
distributed to us but indirectly, as the copies (ectypa)...'
[19]. Zweig infers from a
1759 letter to Kant that Kant equates 'deism' with 'sanity' [KPC 35n]. Yet Hamann's letter actually portrays Kant as an arbitrator between Hamann the Christian
and Berens the deist. Zweig's
assumption that Kant was on Berens' side is not justified from the content of
the letter, which seems instead to portray Kant in his usual, 'critical'
position as a middle man.
Although
Heine caricaturizes CPR as 'the sword
that slew deism in Germany' [RPG 268],
he believes CPrR was intended to
revive it. Likewise, Greene
regards RLRA as 'a deistic classic' [HCRS lxxvii; see also p.lxvi]. And Webb implies that Kant was a deist
for most of his life when he says that in his Opus Postumum, Kant 'was prepared to repudiate ...the deism which
had been so predominant in his youth--the deism which taught a merely
transcendent God' [KPR 200-1]. Ironically, Vleeschauwer sees in this
same work 'a public confession of deism' [DKT
177]!
There
is, however, a growing rank of scholars who reject such interpretations. Despland, for example, argues that in his
philosophy of religion 'Kant...moved beyond the classical deist position' [KHR 198; see also pp.199-201,228,262;
and PC 431; KNF 515]. For as
Collins puts it [EPR 117]: 'Kant regards religious deism and the
varieties of nature-based theism as incomplete, preliminary forms of religious
life.' Indeed, as I have
demonstrated elsewhere [see DKR and KCM], Kant moves beyond these to form a moral theism--one which is thoroughly
compatible with his Critical principles.
Indeed, Kant's theistic outlook is acknowledged so consistently
throughout his writings that I would call into question even the assumption
that Kant ever seriously defended a
deistic position as such.
Kant's
rejection of deism is, admittedly, usually expressed in very cautious
terms--and understandably so, given the dominance of deism in the philosophical
climate of his day. Nevertheless,
some texts reveal his dissatisfaction with deism so clearly that all debate on
this question ought to be a thing of the past. In a 1789 letter to Jacobi, for instance, Kant approves of
his friend's refutation of 'the syncretism of Spinozism and the deism of
Herder's God' [KPC 158]. And in PFM 356-7, Kant says that if theism and anthropomorphism are both
abandoned, then 'nothing [would] remain but deism, of which nothing can come,
which is of no value and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or
morals.'
[20]. It should be noted, however, that Kant
reveals his dissatisfaction with the theoretical implications philosophers
often impute to theism, by warning in CJ
395 that even theism 'is absolutely incapable of authorizing us to make any
objective assertion.'
This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published version of this essay.
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