Prof. Stephen Palmquist,
D.Phil. (Oxon)
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
Book Review
Immanuel Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xii + 307
pages.
With this publication in one volume of the two parts of Kant's Die Metaphysik der Sitten, a small but significant milestone in
English-speaking Kant-studies has been reached. Its significance can be
appreciated by noting the history of the various English translations of this
book—an issue the current translator, Mary Gregor,
does not address. This is not, in fact, the first time the entire work has been
translated into English. In 1799, just two years after
the original German version had been published, a Scotsman
named John Richardson, while studying under L.H. Jakob
and J.S. Beck (two of Kant's prominent young disciples), anonymously
translated and published both parts in English. However, his efforts went
almost entirely unrecognized, with the translation quickly passing into
virtual oblivion. All subsequent translations have, until now, included only
the general Introduction and one of the two parts: the "Doctrine of
Right" was translated by William Hastie in 1887,
by John Ladd in 1965, and by H.B. Nisbet (extracts)
in 1970; and the "Doctrine of Virtue" was translated by John W. Semple (incomplete) in 1836, by James W. Ellington in 1964,
and by Gregor herself in 1964. While these
translations (especially the more recent ones) all have their merits, the very
fact of their separateness, together with the unavailability of Richardson's
outdated translation, has meant readers of Kant in English have not had access
to a unified translation. Published as part of the
"Texts in German Philosophy" series, Gregor's
new translation includes a significantly revised version of her previous
translation of the Doctrine of Virtue, together with a new translation of the
Doctrine of Right and a new "Translator's Introduction". As
such, it is destined to be the standard English
edition of The Metaphysics of Morals for many years to come.
One reason the English translations of the two parts of Kant's book have been
published separately for over 150 years is that Kant himself initially
published them in two installments (in January and August of 1797). This was
possible because they deal with topics that are apparently quite distinct:
politics and morality (i.e., rights and virtues). Nevertheless, Kant's general
Introduction (pp.40-54) makes it clear that the two parts belong together like
two sides of the same coin: each gives an account of how the facultyofdesire(orrationalchoice)canapplythemorallawinsuchawayastosecurepersonal
freedom: first, freedom from the desire of others to impose their inclinations
on us externally; and second, freedom from our own desire to allow our
inclinations to control us internally.
A metaphysics of morals, in contrast to the critique of morality
or the groundwork for such a metaphysics, serves the purpose of displaying
in systematic form the body of moral knowledge that can be derived "from
concepts alone" (p.44). Interestingly, Kant uses this phrase as a synonym
for "a priori", even though it would seem more properly to indicate
the analyticity of the knowledge under consideration. Furthermore, Kant
emphasizes that the task of "applying" the (synthetic a priori)
principles established in the second Critique to (for example)
anthropology must be kept at the forefront: "we shall often have to take
as our object the particular nature of man, which is known only by
experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal
moral principles" (p.44). He apparently thinks such inferring gives
metaphysics a synthetic status. Yet it could be argued that it actually indicates
the a posteriori character of the analytic knowledge-claims under
consideration. Although neither Kant nor Gregor
explores this possibility, they do both recognize that such a project retains
its interest, because it is not something that can be accomplished once and for
all, but must be constantly revised as new areas of application arise (see
e.g., pp.28,38).
Following the general Introduction is an Introduction to the Doctrine of Right,
which starts off with Kant defining the scope of such a Doctrine as including
"the sum of those laws for which an external lawgiving is possible"
(p.55). After observing that "the question ‘what is Right?' might
well embarrass the jurist", he attempts to alleviate this situation
with a "universal principle": an action can be called "right
if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal
law..." (pp.55-56). By applying the law of noncontradiction to this principle, Kant reasons that
coercion is justified whenever it is employed "as a hindering of a
hindrance to freedom" (p.57). He therefore concludes: "Right and
authorization to use coercion ... mean one and the same thing" (p.58).
In the main body of the Doctrine of Right, Kant divides his inquiry into
sections on Private Right and Public Right. The former treats of the topics of
possession, acquisition, and legal acquisition, while the latter examines the
notions of state, national, and cosmopolitan rights. Throughout his discussion
it becomes clear to the attentive reader that Kant is dealing with a concept of
rights that is markedly different from the one in common usage today, which
tends to encouraged divisiveness and conflict. The distance between the common
conception and Kant's ideal becomes especially poignant when he says in the
Conclusion (pp.160-161) "that establishing universal and lasting peace
constitutes ... the entire final end of the doctrine of Right ...": "There
is to be no war, neither between you and me in the state of nature nor war
between us as states ...; for war is not the way in which everyone should seek
his rights."
Understanding how Kant could have seriously believed that a Doctrine of Right
would lead to such a situation—one in which people willingly give up
their external rights, as opposed to the tendency of many in this century to
glorify the practise of selfishly defending their own
individual rights—requires a recognition of the fact that the Doctrine of
Right points necessarily beyond itself, to the deeper considerations of the
Doctrine of Virtue. In the Preface and Introduction to the latter half of The
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant restates many of the basic
ideasalreadyestablishedinthefirsthalf,buttakesthemastepfurtherbyexaminingtherelationship
between rights and virtue. He now explains that "virtue" is "the
capacity and considered resolvetowithstandastrongbutunjustopponent...withrespecttowhatopposesthemoral disposition within us"
(p.186). The "opponent" here is, of course, our own inclination to
pursue happiness by fulfilling personal pleasures. What distinguishes virtue
from rights is that only virtue can lead us to adopt a moral end (i.e.,
to make a free rational choice, in conformity with duty): the coercion made
possible through the Right may constrain me "to perform actions
that are directed as a means to an end, but I can never be constrained by
others to have an end; only I myself can make something my
end" (p.186). Rights, therefore, relate to a "narrow" form of
obligation focussing on particular actions, whereas
virtue relates to "wide obligation" because the moral law "can
prescribe only the maxim of actions, not the actions themselves" (p.194).
The lengthy Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue (18 sections in all) defines
the scope for the remainder of the book. Unlike considerations of rights,
wherein one may freely choose whatever end one wishes, so long as the principle
of Right is not transgressed, considerations of virtue focus only on those
ends that are also duties (pp.187-190). The two types of ends that fit
this qualification are "one's own perfection and the happiness
of others" (p.190). On this basis, the Doctrine of Virtue (like its
predecessor) discusses first private, then public duties. Kant also makes a
number of subordinate distinctions, such as "perfect" versus
"imperfect" duties; but examining these is beyond the scope of a
general review such as this.
Let us instead turn now to Gregor's introductory
comments. In a "Translator's Note on the Text" (pp.ix-xii),
she offers some valuable insights concerning Kant's use of the term Recht. After explaining the difference between its
adjectival use (recht, as in "it is right
to obey the law") and its use as a substantive (Recht,
as in "everyone has the Right to self-determination"), she explains
that the former notion of "a right", as "an authorization to use
coercion", is contained within the wider concept of what is
"Right" as such (pp.x-xi). Keeping this firmly in mind while reading the Doctrine of Right
should help readers avoid the pitfall of reading some of the contemporary
connotations of the term "rights" into Kant's usage.
The "Translator's Introduction" that follows begins with a helpful
sketch of the architectonic relationships between Kant's three works on
morality (pp.1-4), highlighting the difference between Sittlichkeit
(i.e., "morality", the topic of the Groundwork and the second Critique)
and Sitten (i.e., "morals", in the
sense of "manners" or "customs" [cf. p.44]). Next Gregor explains the important distinction between Wille and Willkür
(pp.4-7): the former refers to the will as active in "the subject imposing
obligation ... regarded as having pure practical reason", while the latter
denotes the will as active in "the subject put under obligation ...
regarded as having a capacity for free choice" (p.4). The latter can be
further distinguished from "wishing" by the fact that the Willkür is "accompanied by consciousness of its
ability to produce the object" (p.5), whereas a mere wish is not.
The remainder of Gregor's Introduction is devoted to
"an overview of Kant's procedure in deriving the
two systems of human duties" (p.8). Among the numerous fine points of
interpretive scholarship brought out in the process of accomplishing this
task, Gregor analyzes the role of
"possession" in Kant's notion of what it means to have a right
(pp.11-13). As an example of how an "[a]nalysis
of the concept of Right ... yields the concept of a [particular] right" (p.11),
she explains how the use of "coercion" can be authorized. In the
course of her discussion, Gregor hints at an insight
which is of utmost importance for a proper understanding of Kant's view of
rights (cf. pp.15-16): that particular rights are to
legal theory what inclinations are to a theory of personal morals. Like
the affirmation of an inclination, the act of claiming to possess a particular
right is not bad in itself, but is morally justifiable
only when it conforms to a higher end (namely, the Right as such). The
relevance of this Kantian insight to the current political climate in most
democratic countries could have been brought out by highlighting the dangers inherent
in the common tendency to reverse this order of priority and treat individual
claims to possess rights as themselves defining what is Right.
Gregor concludes the Introduction with a lengthy
consideration of some exceedingly complex problems relating to the Doctrine of
Virtue, to which she proposes some rather unclear solutions (pp.17-28). For
instance, in attempting to discern what it is that Kant regards as the
"material basis for determining choice", she concludes that it
"is just the thought that the action or the end prescribed is a duty"
(p.23); yet Kant's answer seems rather to be that the material basis is simply
whatever maxim a person chooses to adopt. Gregor
then examines Kant's defense of the paradoxical notion that, in order to be
permitted to do what makes me happy, I must do what may not make me
happy (namely, will the happiness of others). But instead of
bringing out the subtle connection between such a conclusion and the Golden
Rule Kant valued so highly, Gregor merely labels
Kant's argument as "cryptic" (p.24). One of the most
interesting points in this part of her discussion comes when she develops a few
hints of Kant's into the suggestion that justice and respect can be regarded as
duties that bridge the gap between the external duties of Right and the
internal duties of Virtue, respectively. The Introduction concludes by
commenting on Kant's often-misunderstood view that, when two duties appear to
conflict, it is actually the "grounds of obligation" that conflict,
not the duties themselves: in these situations, free choice is therefore
required in order to determine which duty to favor, and in such cases,
"inclinations may be consulted" (p.28). Unfortunately, although the
Introduction makes a number of good points such as the latter, it does so in a
style that is often no more transparent than the original text itself. As such,
it is not very suitable for students or other readers with little or no prior
knowledge of Kant's philosophy. Such readers would do well to read the first
ten pages of this Introduction, and then turn directly to Kant's text, returning
to the remainder of the Introduction only afterwards, when the subtler points
raised therein can be appreciated more fully.
Gregor provides a moderate supply of notes to Kant's
text (pp.281-293), mostly of a grammatical or linguistic nature. Some of these
are adapted from the notes Paul Natorp appended to
the German version of the text that appears in volume VI of the standard,
Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works. The book also includes a
comprehensive Index and a Bibliography which, while not exhaustive, does serve
as a helpful pointer to the relevant secondary literature. All in all, this is
a work of mature scholarship, for both the author (Kant) and the translator (Gregor), undertaken in both cases near the end of a long
career of devoted service to the profession. As such, it is certain to provide
a rich source of stimulating reading, with respect both to the philosophical
content of the original and to the linguistic form of the translation, for
anyone interested in obtaining a systematic understanding of what is right and
good.
Stephen Palmquist, Hong Kong
This etext is based on a prepublication draft of the published
version of this essay.
Send comments to: StevePq@hkbu.edu.hk
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